RE: IS there any Light here16 Jan 2022 18:11
Part 2
So if decommissioning was to be only actually costing somewhere between £1.4 to £3.5M, what was the purpose of the other £10M+ in cash received by SEL on transfer from Gazprom?
Additionally SEL was handed £61M in losses (having made a huge loss in 2016) to be set against tax liabilities.
Ariund this time there was another Aim listed company in financial difficulties Anglo African Oil & Gas, AAOG, which on 3 July 2019 announced it had organised a fundraising of around £8.5M with EHGOSF. Riverfort made an alternative proposal of an immdeiate £2.5M in immediate cash and upto £5M in deferred shares to be issed at a later date.
This funding was completed on 17 July 2019 with Riverfort, who was also ANGS financier. The funding of up to £8.5M was supposedly to arranged to redrill a highly prospective drill site in Congo, but in reality most of the money was used to pay off pre existing debts.
Hidden in the small print was that the Chairman of AAOG had control of all the shares which were to be issued to Riverfort, even when those shares had not actually been issued or paid for, giving the said Chairman effective control of AAOG.
During the autumn of 2019 AAOG issued several RNS's about contracts to finance and drill Congo, the shares falling from 5p to 2.5p, due to the constant monthly issuance to Riverfort under the financing deal to finance ongoing operations, and payment of debts at AAOG.
On 2 December 2019 ANGS announces that the transfer of ownership of SGF to ANGS/FESL had been approved by UK authorities.
On 11 December 2019 AAOG announces it had run out of cash, had no realistic means of raising further funds, and was curtailing all operations. The shares, predicably, fall to 0.5p.
On 23 December 2019 AAOG announced it had an offer to buy its existing Congo business, and on 27 December 2019 announces an AGM for the sale of Congo to Zenith Energy for £1M. On 6th January 2020 Brian Moritz an AAOG director of 20 years standing, resigns.
On 13 January 2020, following the rejection of alternative offers, the AAOG Chairman uses the unissued Riverfort shares to force through the sale to ZEN.
On 20th January 2020 FESL buys up the remaining shares yet to be issued to Riverfort for 0.5p (a 43% premium to the market price!) for £420,000 using part of the £14M Gazprom bequeathed to SEL.
Issues to note here, I believe, are the timing of the AAOG “we're broke” announcement, just 9 days after the UK approval of the transfer of SGF to ANGS/SEL, the predicatable effect it had on the share price (collapse), the use of the Riverfort shares to force through the proposal to turn AAOG into an “investing company”, which then set the clock ticking on delisting, and following the share price collapse FESL was then able to buy up a cheap 25% or so of AAOG, giving them effective
cont/