Member Info for KeithOz

Rd, some thoughts (not advice):
* Since you are hoping to move to a Buddhist country, remember the Buddha said "Question everything you are told, including by me"
* Do not take anything on this or other bulletin board as sound advice. Read the company presentations, announcements and analyst opinions and come to your own conclusions.
* Do you really believe it is likely that you can multiply £3500 twentyfold in a short time frame?
* If that is all you have, might it be safer to keep some in reserve in case HE1 does not work out?
* I do not use a UK broker, but know that 'commission-free' brokers are invariably more expensive in the long run.
* HE1 is both high risk and high reward. Some might consider that Isaan Province has an even greater risk profile for your money. Have you taken advice on what would happen if your humble family decided that once they have a nice house, they did not want you around any longer?
* You are understandably upset with the way you were treated by 'arab' officialdom. Others have suggested that maybe it was not 'arabs' that were at fault in the face of a global pandemic, since people were stranded in many countries, including Australians in the UK, and British people in Australia. Do you have the right temperament to cope with Thai officialdom? You are aware that the country is under martial law?
* Your choice of investment and choice of future lifestyle can only be yours, but have you considered what you do if the decision you have made for either does not turn out as you hope? Do you have a Plan B?

I sincerely wish you all the best with your future, but you will have to live with the choices you make.

Annoyingly, the links (although different) both open up the same 29/11 view. If you open the 29/11 view again in a second tab, click on the calendar at upper left, and bring up the 14th November view on the second tab, you can easily see the changes just by switching tabs.

I agree that work has started a few days ago exactly at the location shown in the presentation slide, together with some work adjacent to the main road - rather odd, since the RNS told us that work was complete. I find the Sentinel satellite gives a clearer picture - here's 29th November:

https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/sentinel-playground/?source=S2&lat=34.32119831819033&lng=-3.367854595053359&zoom=16&preset=CUSTOM&layers=B01,B02,B03&maxcc=20&gain=1.0&gamma=1.0&time=2022-05-01%7C2022-11-29&atmFilter=&showDates=false&evalscript=cmV0dXJuIFtCMDEqMi41LEIwMioyLjUsQjAzKjIuNV0%3D

compared to 14th November:

https://apps.sentinel-hub.com/sentinel-playground/?source=S2&lat=34.32106717809852&lng=-3.367455480256467&zoom=16&preset=CUSTOM&layers=B01,B02,B03&maxcc=41.285000000000004&gain=1.0&gamma=1.0&time=2022-05-01%7C2022-11-14&atmFilter=&showDates=false&evalscript=cmV0dXJuIFtCMDEqMi41LEIwMioyLjUsQjAzKjIuNV0%3D

Just suppose, that you had two companies (any companies) that were in potential competition for either development finance necessary to get their product to market, or to tie up major customers in advance, to ensure that their product would sell once available.

The management of both companies would of course be talking directly with finance providers and potential major customers, and putting across the positive aspects of their respective operations. But if they were in an environment where they had to be circumspect in presenting the negative features of the opposition, how might they do so in a subtle manner?

That is where PR rears its ugly head. Here's an example. Monsanto Corporation launched a very good sweetener product, aspartame. It had received the most intensive ever safety investigations of any new food ingredient, but suddenly articles began appearing suggesting that there were all sorts of health problems, even a suggestion that it was the cause of Gulf War Syndrome in US troops. Despite some of the outlandish suggestions, these were intelligently written and apparently had a scientific basis for many of the negative assertions. After some investigation work, it became apparent that the authors of these articles were not scientists and medical specialists as they claimed to be, but were generated by a London-based PR agency who were paid by a large rival organisation.

Sometimes it is necessary to step back and give some thought as to why some apparently knowledgeable people may be making claims, positive or negative, about companies on these bulletin boards, particularly if it is not very easy to refute those suggestions. They might have a personal position (long or short) to profit from, they may work for an organisation that does, or they may even work for the company itself or the direct competitor.

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Solai is in turn owned by the Anglo-Indian Kansagra family, brothers Bhupendra and Ramesh Kansagra), who have extensive African oil holdings and ship-owning interests, worth an estimated £320M.

is held by Purebond Ltd, who are in turn owned by Solai Holdings, who are an investment company:

https://www.solai.co.uk/industries/

£42? I'm not commenting - I got a whole shedload of trouble for saying it wouldn't go below 10p again.

I'll try to address several points made across a number of yesterday's threads.

1. Capex for production. The original CPR, Section 9 gave full details and costings -$50M for a modular concentrator/liquefier including associated infrastructure. This would produce enough liquid helium to fill one ISO tanker a day (1MM scf/day @ 99.99% purity), with production linked from several wells. Remember we are talking about primary helium, with only nitrogen to worry about. The idea is that the operation would become self-funding as more productive wells were drilled, they would be linked up to additional $50M modules as needed. The huge costs for Renergen are due to the need to separate low concentration helium from natural gas, and to get rid of all the other contaminants.

2. Valuation. It is pretty pointless to do a valuation until after we know exactly what is within Tai. Things have changed substantially since the original CPR and the subsequent H & P note. Among the factors that will need to be revisited for a new valuation post-Tai are:
* Helium concentration - the CPR gives 4.4%, Tai may be more than twice that, hence instantly doubling the current P50/2U 138 BCF.
* Reservoir risking - success at Tai will de-risk the other prospects - reservoir, trap, seal & charge assumptions, all of which will positively impact the calculation
* Reservoir size - all the extra geophysics done since 2019 (CPR date) should have better defined the reservoir dimensions, especially with regard to northern extensions of the major Tai & Itumbula formations, which were previously unknown.
* Additional prospects - work has been done this year at Eyasi & Balangida - this may be enough for a preliminary prospective resource, which was not included in the 2019 CPR.
* Helium price achievable may now be twice that originally envisaged.

Let's see what happens next Quarter, but the reason I am here in force is that I believe there is a sound rationale for the current prospective 2019 CPR P50/2U resource of 138 BCF to be double or treble post Tai success, for early production (2024), and due to increased helium prices, for that increased resource to be worth double per MCF than as assumed in the CPR.

I refer to Cube's tweets yesterday:

"Possible vertical and horizontal mergers occurring simultaneously in the not-too-distant future to form a mega platform for Moroccan energy, both national and international? " and

"Morocco is also a potash powerhouse. There is industry readacross!"

I agree with both statements. I posted this on 15th March 2022 :

"Morocco is often thought of as being a desert country, but much of it is highly fertile, with a mild Mediterranean climate. A third of the population is employed in agriculture - Guercif is famous for its olives. For agriculture to be successful, fertiliser is needed. Here Morocco is blessed with the world's largest deposit of phosphates. But to turn phosphates into fertiliser, gas is required - a lot of gas. Hence the problem Morocco faces in the need to import gas at ever higher prices."

"As well as potentially having a large supply of indigenous gas, there is a hidden factor helping us. King Mohammed VI has very large personal investments in the agricultural and fertiliser sectors. Success in these investments isn't just financial - it ensures large scale employment and social stability. The new Coalition government elected at the end of last year has put increasing employment and social programmes at the top of the 2022 budget. Hardly surprising that the country is making energy security a priority."

Cube may be correct in his view that a Moroccan integrated energy company may be in the making, but imho although the state may have a big stake, it is more likely to be commercially managed along the lines of the big Moroccan electricity, fertiliser and agricultural enterprises. There are clearly huge synergies here:

*Gas & oil - export through the currently unused Trans-Maghreb pipeline, domestic energy generation & fertiliser production. Currently by far Morocco's largest IMPORT - $8Bn in 2020, must be a lot more currently.
*Fertiliser - export & domestic agricultural use. Morocco's largest export sector - 15.6% of the economy, or $5.7Bn.
*Agriculture - exports are 8.9% of the economy, or $3.3BN

Before we get too excited, PRD has to prove up what is underneath Guercif.

Hi Bob, wishing Alfie & the rest of your family all the best, and hope you are all able to celebrate the holiday season together. - Keith

Just looked at the post on the other board. Interesting that whomever Hermana3 is, that they twice use the phrase 'the wee man' when referring to PG. I have only seen that used before by the one and only NigelHaemoglobin, who has a longstanding habit of incorrectly undermining PG's track record. Draw your own conclusions.

Having re-re-read Thursday's RNS, I can't help wondering if the target audience was potential corporate purchaser whales, rather than us little minnows.

I didn't get up at 4 in the morning to watch this, have just reviewed now. It would be nice if the slide set is available in better resolution, I found some of the detail difficult to see. Anyway, overall, I thought this extremely positive, and very pleased to have bought more in bulk earlier this week after the de-risking RNS. My key takeaways:

* The subsurface data presented by Lorna is a vast improvement over what was available to the team at the first drill of Tai. It would seem that many of the engineering problems last year were due not just to the small drill, but to drilling into the fault itself. Next year they will have a huge improvement in both borehole targeting and the actual drilling and logging processes.

* The hole will be completed ready for DST and flow testing, which will occur after full evaluation of the downhole testing. Later testing will almost certainly be rigless, meaning it can be done with less forward planning and less expenditure. The next drill is therefore initially an exploration well, and if successful will also become an appraisal well.

* The economics are extraordinary. Capex of $50M is almost nothing to get first gas production by 2024. The margin is outstanding - opex of $20-25 per MCF is a tiny fraction of sales price of perhaps $400 per MCF. David talked of production of 350,000 MCF per year, which is one truckload a day. 350,000 x $375 = $131M (£108M) profit per year, just from the first prospect. That is bonkers for a company with a market cap of just £50M.

* HE1 is evaluating other opportunities worldwide. Makes sense - Tanzania Helium can be transported without much evaporative loss to the Asian markets, but it is a long way from Tanzania to the main market of USA. Projects in both Africa & the Americas would be complementary.

* What we didn't hear - how the subsurface work done 2021-2022, including new areas, may have impacted the Prospective Resources, which were last estimated in August 2019. I guess we will have to wait until after Tai-3 for an updated CPR which should give a Contingent Resource for Tai, and an enlarged and partially derisked Prospective Resource for the rest of Rukwa. Maybe a first resource for Balangida & Eyasi also. I have mentioned here before my belief that a P50 / 2U resource upgrade from the 2019 estimate of 138 BCF to 300-500 BCF in 2023, is readily achievable.

Here you go:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQxeDVCxuq0

@HC - We need to upgrade that to baths in a swimming pool.

The Zak Mir 50p prediction for the end of November was made on 9th November - prior to the duster announcement. Just goes to show what a load of pants results from using charts without understanding the fundamentals.

I sense there is a little (a lot of?) confusion about the numbers after MOU- seeming to refer to different drills and/or prospects. Back in the September 2021 presentation
https://wp-predatoroilandgas-2020.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/media/2021/09/29105657/Webinar-Presentation-website-Version-28092021-Corrections-15.40pm.pdf
on p.12, there are several separate prospects mentioned, including MOU-2, -3, -7 & -8, plus MOU-NE. It must be noted that these are Prospect names, not drill names. MOU-1 had already been drilled, and MOU-4 & -5 were planned, and for these three, both drills and prospects apparently had the same name. These three were all going into the same geological structure, so another change was made - that prospect has now only one name - the MOU-Fan.

Then a couple of months ago, we had another round of name changes. MOU-4 drill was renamed MOU-2 (into the MOU-Fan), and MOU-NE prospect was renamed MOU-3, into which drill MOU-3 was being prepared.

Then we had yesterday's RNS. It appears that some big players have had a word in Paul's ear, and suggested that there is a pressing need for as much gas as the MOU-Fan can produce. Previously it was only the intention to produce the maximum that the CNG market could take - ramping up to a maximum of 50 MMcfd. Now these big boys want to make use of the Trans-Mahgreb pipeline and send it off to Europe, hence the talk of 150 - 250 MMcfd. Clearly, one borehole isn't going to be able to produce that much gas, so another one (probably several) is needed. The result is a change of nomenclature again - the oil prospect MOU-NE (or MOU-3 as it recently became) has been put on hold, and resources allocated to the third gas hole into the MOU-Fan - and it is that which has been re-named MOU-3.

So, MOU-1 is unchanged, MOU-2 which is going ahead next month used to be called MOU-4, and MOU-3 going ahead next year used to be called MOU-5.

If you go back to the presentation linked above, to p.9, you will see a cross-section of the MOU-Fan, showing the positions of MOU-4 & -5, now renamed MOU-2 & -3 respectively. This shows the rationale behind the two drills. MOU-2 (shown as 4) goes into the highest part of the reservoir, so has the greatest chance of finding gas (of course gas rises to the top of a reservoir). MOU-3 (shown as 5) goes into the deepest part of the reservoir, so has the potential to find the largest column of gas, and therefore the greatest area of reservoir, and the greatest volume of gas, but is more risky than MOU-2. You will see the two drill sites are separated by a vertical fault, so to get the most gas from MOU-Fan, both compartments of the structure would need to be drilled.

Having re-read this, I'm not sure if it will leave you more or less confused!

@HH. My own stupid fault. I've always made a point of sticking to factual stuff, and not making share price predictions. Just goes to show how unreliable much of this BB really is - as Buddha said "question everything you are told, including by me"

I agree with all the comments today - this is interesting information, but the good bit appears to be missing. What I would like to read is something along the lines of "CSMAT over the Kronos deposit showed a clear signature at the juncture of the Ngwako Pan & D'kar formations. PRD are currently drilling PL082/2018 where the same CSAMT signature has already been identified at a depth of xxx m, and expect to reveal the same mineralisation as has been identified by Sandfire at Kronos". I await the results of the DD with great interest, as the guys at SPAngel always say.

With regard to the 4000m penetration, this is of academic interest. Unlike the magmatic intrusive deposits, there is no mineralised feeder zone for stratigraphic-bound copper deposits. The mineralised fluids migrate up through the shears, faults and other structures until they meet a redox boundary, as occurs between the Ngwako Pan & D'Kar formations. The change in chemistry causes the deposition of the minerals from solution at that point, not below and not above.

Hi HH, it's really hot here today, still 30° after sunset. Will you please let me know when I can take off this stifling clown outfit? Thanks - Keith :-)