Member Info for extrader

Tie-up with GLEN would dilute= address Chinalco shareholding issue, so maybe lessen pressure to swap out of Simandou ....and deal would presumably (?) need US sign-off, inter alia, which might complicate any move to acquire an asset the US decided was 'strategic'.

Let's see what Mr Market says.

GLA

"The parties' current expectation is that any merger transaction would be effected through the acquisition of Glencore by Rio Tinto by way of a Court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement..."

"It said that under the code, Rio Tinto was required, by not later than 5pm on 5 February, to either announce a firm intention to make an offer for Glencore or walk away."

May be an unwelcome distraction...?

GLA

Https://www.reuters.com/business/glencore-rio-tinto-resume-talks-mining-mega-deal-ft-reports-2026-01-08/

"Glencore notes recent media speculation and confirms that it is in preliminary discussions with Rio Tinto... about a possible combination of some or all of their businesses, which could include an all-share merger between Rio Tinto and Glencore," a statement said.

"The parties' current expectation is that any merger transaction would be effected through the acquisition of Glencore by Rio Tinto by way of a Court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement..."

"It said that under the code, Rio Tinto was required, by not later than 5pm on 5 February, to either announce a firm intention to make an offer for Glencore or walk away."

May be an unwelcome distraction...?

GLA

The post on advfn is now complete. Their limits on length aren't as tight as lse's, but still finite...

Two post-related news items that MAY have a bearing on our 'process':

(1) Sundance/Congo : no news, so far...but 'imminent': the decisions (in the form of arbitral AWARDS) are not expected before 28 November 2025 for the Congo case and 31 December 2025 for the Cameroon case......

Any time now. Could put C-B in a tricky position.

(2) Energy Transition Minerals (ETM) / Greenland:

It would seem from their website that there's some foot-dragging/procedural issues on the Greenland/Denmark side, meanwhile ETM itself is being quite proactive:

hxxps://investorhub.etransmin.com/announcements/7319622

28 December, very timely!

ETM APPOINTS US ADVISORS TO ASSESS OPTIMAL PATH TO ACCESS US CAPITAL MARKETS

Highlights:

 Energy Transition Minerals has appointed US-based advisors to commence the process of SEEKING A LISTING on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange.

 Cohen & Company Capital Markets (“Cohen”) has been appointed as exclusive US financial advisor, providing listing strategy, M&A advice, and capital markets engagement.

 Cohen is a leading SPAC Underwriter, having led 28 SPAC IPOs priced in 2025, and advised on 24 announced or completed De-SPAC transactions in 2025.

 Cohen brings proven expertise, having advised on several transformative SPAC transactions,including:

 US$903M combination with USA Rare Earth (Nasdaq: USAR)

 US$838M combination with Critical Metals Corp (Nasdaq: CRML)

 US$400M combination with Mkango (Announced)

 US$589M combination with Tactical Resources (Announced)

 Multiple PIPE financings totaling over US$100M.

 A Nasdaq listing, if achieved, would provide ETM with access to deep US capital markets, enhanced liquidity and STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT WITH WESTERN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN PRIORITIES.

 ETM has strengthened its international Advisory Board with the appointment of Jeppe Kofod (former DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER) and Friis Arne Petersen (former DANISH AMBASSADOR to the US ) and plans to add A US-BASED ADVISOR TO ACCELERATE NORTH AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT.

[ Ed.: what's the betting there'll be a Trumpian connection?]

 Legal proceedings relating to the Kvanefjeld Rare Earths Project have advanced, with the case now proceeding to the merits before the High Court of Greenland.

Constructive stakeholder engagement on the Kvanefjeld dispute also continues in parallel.

The Company will evaluate a range of potential pathways to achieving a US listing, including dual listing or a SPAC BUSINESS COMBINATION TRANSACTION BY WAY OF A MERGER WITH AN EXISTING US-LISTED COMPANY.

ETM will work closely with its advisors to assess these options with a focus on long-term shareholder value creation...."

Your move, Denmark...

I'm sure a lot of ZIOC potential strategics will be following both BUR-funded cases closely.

GLA

The BUR trifecta post is now complete

As to ETM's case agst Greenland, it would seem from their website that there's some foot-dragging/procedural issues on the Greenland/Denmark side, meanwhile they're being quite proactive:

hxxps://investorhub.etransmin.com/announcements/7319622

ETM APPOINTS US ADVISORS TO ASSESS OPTIMAL PATH TO ACCESS US CAPITAL MARKETS

Highlights:

 Energy Transition Minerals has appointed US-based advisors to commence the process of seeking a listing on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange.

 Cohen & Company Capital Markets (“Cohen”) has been appointed as exclusive US financial advisor, providing listing strategy, M&A advice, and capital markets engagement.

 Cohen is a leading SPAC Underwriter, having led 28 SPAC IPOs priced in 2025, and advised on 24 announced or completed De-SPAC transactions in 2025.

 Cohen brings proven expertise, having advised on several transformative SPAC transactions,including:

 US$903M combination with USA Rare Earth (Nasdaq: USAR)

 US$838M combination with Critical Metals Corp (Nasdaq: CRML)

 US$400M combination with Mkango (Announced)

 US$589M combination with Tactical Resources (Announced)

 Multiple PIPE financings totaling over US$100M.

 A Nasdaq listing, if achieved, would provide ETM with access to deep US capital markets, enhanced liquidity and STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT WITH WESTERN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN PRIORITIES.

 ETM has strengthened its international Advisory Board with the appointment of Jeppe Kofod (former DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER) and Friis Arne Petersen (former DANISH AMBASSADOR ) and plans to add A US-BASED ADVISOR TO ACCELERATE NORTH AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT.

[ Ed.: what's the betting there'll be a Trumpian connection?]

 Legal proceedings relating to the Kvanefjeld Rare Earths Project have advanced, with the case now proceeding to the merits before the High Court of Greenland.

Constructive stakeholder engagement on the Kvanefjeld dispute also continues in parallel.

The Company will evaluate a range of potential pathways to achieving a US listing, including dual listing or a SPAC BUSINESS COMBINATION TRANSACTION BY WAY OF A MERGER WITH AN EXISTING US-LISTED.

ETM will work closely with its advisors to assess these options with a focus on long-term shareholder value creation...."

Your move, Denmark...

GLA

PS..

ZIOC's latest tweet

Zanaga Iron Ore Company

@Zanaga_Iron_Ore

·

7h

Check out the new project section of the Zanaga website to learn more about the Zanaga Iron Ore Project, its quality and scale, and its wider development strategy ..."

This doesn't seem like the behaviour of a Company about to leg its PI's over...

(Famous last words) ;-

GLA

Hi G_G_G,

Re Shard,

From the published info, my understanding is that Shard had under 5m headroom left under Tranche 2...and ZIOC should have told us of net £ proceeds under Tr1 AND Tr2 (which AFAIAA it hasn't) , before notifying us (which also AFAIAA it hasn't) that it wanted to exercise its option for another 12m under Tr3.

Even under the best (worst?) scenario therefore, Shard would only have been able to source subscriptions for about 17m new shares.

That wouldn't account for much of the activity we've been seeing.

OTOH, that 'one-time' availability of 17m pales into insignificance beside the potential for trading around 'unaccounted for' shares in the hands of the new investor consortium :

they took 416.9m in the placements and Everblue another 11m or so when its holding became disclosable.

So 428m, of which 330m is currently disclosed amongst 'significant shareholders'.

Nearly 100m that could be used for 'spoofing', 'layering' and assorted other ways of manipulating shares - either (1) for the longer term (but that would trigger eventual disclosure requirement a la Minchin) or (2) more likely, it would seem, to keep the s/p in a trading range.

You'd expect (or at least I would) the s/p to have reacted more positively to the newsflow....and yet it hasn't (so far). One has to wonder why.

Which leads to a 'bad case scenario: that -seeing the size of the prize- the new investor consortium decide to keep more of the pie for themselves, by squeezing out any remaining 'uncommitted/unconnected' parties..... which would be us 'umble PI's:

After you add to the above 430m, Elphick/Guava's 80m, ZIOC management (AT, MK, Florent Lager, etc) 20m say = 530m and then add another poss. 50-60m from exGarbut's now non-disclosable holdings (Garbut's stake was larger than Guava's at the outset), you're at 580-590m out of a current 830m, or maybe 70-71% of a potential 'concert party.

That's awfully close to the 75% at which (IIRC) ZIOC could delist.

Recall also that most Guava/Garbut -related shares are a 'free ride' and that the new investors only paid around 4.1p for their shares.

A dilutive , low price placing with a strategic to fund FEED would (a) draw in the strategic; (b) clear the financing of the next stage (FEED); and (c) provide the (when it suited) means to delist.

I don't think the consortium would do that...but you did ask.

And it's always good to plan according to capabilities, not (necessarily) intentions.

All the above AIUI.

HTH

.."I take it they confirmed the Shard facility is finished then."

ZIOC should have - I've asked them, the broker Panmure..and the Company Secretary - latter two also re missing TR-1s for Greymont and Regatta.

Re Shard, of the 3 x 12 m Tranches, the first was activated on 1st July 2024 ..

"entered into a new equity subscription agreement with SMC ("2024 ESA") in accordance with the terms outlined earlier today, and authorised the issue of the first tranche of shares in accordance with the 2024 ESA (the "2024 First Tranche").

An application for the admission to trading on AIM of the 24 million Ordinary Shares to be issued pursuant to Existing ESA Tranche 3 and 2024 ESA First Tranche has been made and these Ordinary Shares are expected to be admitted to trading on AIM on 4 July 2024..."

These were used to satisfy the subscriptions of 14,380,953 + GLEN 4,503,339 + Elphick 300,223 total 19,184, 515 leaving 4,815,485 available for subscription IF/WHEN the Tranche 2 was activated.

Not clear if it was (we should have been told the proceeds of Tr 1 AND Tr 2)...and Tr 3 for 12 million is RNSable, IF activated.

So it doesn't look like Shard has/had much availability of stock...

An aside: don't some platforms tell you which broker executed a trade?

Cheers!

Burford (BUR) is a litigation financier bank-rolling cases in the above 3 countries - amongst others.

I've started a post (over on advfn / BUR/extrader , given length) that discusses the above. There's some interesting (IMO) and maybe useful read-across and overlap/relevance.

The Congo/Cameroon connection is re Sundance Resources (M'balam Nabeba).

Only part-posted so far.

GLA

I've started a post (over on advfn / BUR/extrader , given length) that discusses the above. There's some interesting (IMO) and maybe useful read-across and overlap/relevance.

Only part-posted so far.

GLA

Hi G_G_G,

Pace your comparison SOLG/ZIOC, today's Mining Journal leads with a photo of Cascabel, accompanying an article that starts:

.."Ecuador miners need their own power

Faced with an energy crisis, Ecuador's president Daniel Noboa has issued a decree that mining projects need to include the development of their own power sources, rather than taking from the national grid.

Executive Decree 273 introduced several reforms to the General Mining Law, changing mining investment conditions in Ecuador. These reforms require project developments to include plans for providing 100% of the power they will require, regardless of the operation's size..."

GL and ATB

Some good stuff re the AFC role in Lobito Corridor and a reminder of its stake in ARISE IIP

https://www.africafc.org/news-and-insights/news/africa-finance-corporation-acts-as-co-financial-adviser-for-angolas-lobito-atlantic-railway-concession?utm_source=semafor

and

https://www.africafc.org/our-impact/afc-investee-companies/arise_iip

with three operational zones - Nkok SEZ in Gabon, Glo-Djigbe Industrial Zone (GDIZ) in Benin and Plateforme Industrielle d’Adétikopé (PIA) in Lome.

The special economic zones (SEZs) are focused on value capture and retention in core commodities including cashew, cassava, maize, plantains, rubber and timber.

-The Nkok Special Economic Zone in Gabon – Africa’s first certified carbon neutral industrial zone– transformed the country into the world’s largest exporter of wood veneers, creating over 30,000 jobs and increasing foreign-currency earnings.

- In Togo, the Plateforme Industrielle d'Adétikopé (PIA) has attracted over US$77 million in foreign direct investment, generated US$155 million in revenues to date and created 3,200 jobs, empowering local communities and fostering economic resilience.

- Benin ‘s Glo-Djigbe Industrial Zone (GDIZ) set up in 2022, has attracted over US$1 billion in foreign direct investment, generating US$1.9 billion in revenues for the economy.

Something for Big and Little Den to envy.....and hope to emulate, perhaps.

GLA

Https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/shell-buys-stakes-angolan-offshore-blocks-chevron-2026-01-06/

..""New exploration, such as in Angola, is important to sustaining production into the 2030s," said Shell, which wants to grow its gas production 1% through 2030 and to keep its oil output steady..."

ATB

Useful graphic highlighting changes in costings and outcomes...

https://x.com/Zanaga_Iron_Ore

Zanaga Iron Ore Company

@Zanaga_Iron_Ore

4h

The economic potential of the Zanaga Project has been strengthened by the completion of Zanaga Iron’s project value enhancement initiative, ensuring that its development pathway is optimised for value creation, and reinforcing its status as a world-class iron ore asset.

Read the economic highlights from these workstreams below ⤵️

Zanaga Iron Ore Company

@Zanaga_Iron_Ore

10h

Zanaga Iron is pleased to announce the completion of its project value enhancement initiative, confirming significant value enhancement and strategic benefits across multiple areas of the Zanaga Project.

Detailed design and costing assessments were completed with industry experts across the following workstreams.

1) Product quality enhancements - DRI test work

2) Pellet plant feasibility study

3) Single 30Mtpa capacity pipeline feasibility study

4) Thickened and dry tailings facility study

The completion of these workstreams has not only improved the economic potential of the Zanaga Project but has also established a robust engineering and design foundation..."

GLA

Thanks for your added thoughts, G_G_G.

I like (quelle surprise) your somewhat contrarian arguments for ZIOC.

The NPV's are certain to go up, AFAICS, and of course are based on 30mtpa modelling: don't know about SOLG specifically but there's a saying that 'big mines get bigger', which should certainly be factored into ZIOC - (i) only partially explored, along length and strike; and (ii) management have spoken/written about potential for 40mtpa and even 60mtpa in the past.

I'm sure ZIOC management (and the new investor consortium informally) will be selling the 'sizzle' as well as the sausage.

ATB

Continued...

Where SOLG is riskier:

Social licence: Ecuador has strong, organized, and internationally networked anti‑mining movements; they’ve already stopped or suspended projects.

ESG optics: Cascabel is already a poster child for “don’t do this” in some NGO circles, with explicit calls for investors to walk away.

Long‑tail liability: tailings dams, pipelines, and water impacts create decades of contingent risk that can blow up balance sheets and reputations.

Bottom line, in investor language

Zanaga (ZIOC):

Risk type: “Can we fund and build this in RoC, and will the state behave?”

If you solve funding and get a credible strategic partner, the social/ESG risk is comparatively manageable, and the product (DR‑grade) is strongly aligned with decarbonisation narratives.

Cascabel (SOLG):

Risk type: “Even if we fund and build this, will we be allowed to operate for 30 years without being socially or legally strangled?”

The asset is Tier‑1, but ESG and social‑licence risk are structurally high, with credible expert criticism and mobilised opposition already on record..."

No real surprises there...the cynic in me says that the lower perceived pushback on ESG matters in C-B may be a reflection of it not having had much success in attracting 'squeezable' publicity-sensitive Western mining companies so far...;-<

...OTOH the point that the Govt/Big Den may suppress ESG opposition in their desire to land a big fish (or other more self-serving reasons) is a valid one.

Thanks to hxulcolrdoh for the prompt!

GLA and ATB

SOLG – Cascabel: mining‑sector risk profile

1. Jurisdiction & politics

Ecuador is pushing mining as a growth engine, but the sector is politically contested, with strong Indigenous movements and environmental NGOs.

Regulatory reforms (ARCOM) aim at modernisation and control of illegal mining, but new fees and shifting rules create uncertainty for juniors.

Elections and political swings (left/green vs pro‑mining) mean policy continuity is fragile.

2. Project & technical profile

Cascabel is a Tier‑1 copper‑gold project with a 28‑year mine life and large annual copper and gold output.

Development plan: hybrid open‑pit (Tandayama‑America) then underground block caving at Alpala, with accelerated first production around 2028.

Block caving + huge tailings volumes + long pipelines to port = complex, high‑consequence engineering.

3. Environmental & social licence risk

Independent expert work (Emerman) and NGOs (Rainforest Action Group, Friends of the Earth) argue Cascabel will generate hundreds of millions of tonnes of tailings, with under‑estimated costs and insufficient analysis of dam‑failure consequences.

Tailings options include very large dams or 57 km pipelines to coastal plains sites; both involve high failure consequences and contested siting.

A 200 km mineral pipeline to Esmeraldas is flagged as a major risk to rivers, mangroves, and coastal ecosystems, with high spill risk and land‑rights conflicts along the route.

Expert recommendation in one report: SolGold should abandon the project and investors should decline to fund it—that’s extreme language for a Tier‑1 asset and signals serious ESG headwinds.

4. Wider Ecuador mining‑sector social risk

Loma Larga and other projects show how local water concerns + Indigenous mobilization can suspend or derail projects even after licences are granted.

Conaie and allied groups have a track record of paralyzing the country and forcing policy shifts; mining is now a central axis of that conflict.

For Cascabel, that means: even if the engineering is solved, social licence is structurally fragile over the full mine life.

Net feel:

Cascabel’s mining‑sector risk is social, environmental, and legal: tailings, pipelines, water, Indigenous rights, and NGO campaigns. The project is technically impressive but sits in a high‑conflict social landscape with credible expert critiques and organized opposition..

Continued...

Sovereign & governance: RoC is a weaker state with higher corruption and institutional fragility than Ecuador.

Financing: African greenfield iron ore with big corridor capex is harder to fund; investors demand steep risk premia.

Execution: building and operating a 30 Mtpa corridor in RoC is non‑trivial, even with Arise and CEC on board.

Where SOLG is riskier:

Social licence: Ecuador has strong, organized, and internationally networked anti‑mining movements; they’ve already stopped o

“Which project is more execution‑fragile, ZIOC’s Zanaga or SOLG’s Cascabel?”

High‑level comparison: ZIOC (Zanaga, RoC) vs SOLG (Cascabel, Ecuador)

Dimension ZIOC – Zanaga (RoC) SOLG – Cascabel (Ecuador)

Jurisdictional baseline:

-High corruption, weak institutions, but mining not yet socially “radioactive”

-Mid corruption, but mining is politically and socially contested, especially in Andean/forest regions.

Project commodity & product

-DR‑grade, high‑grade iron ore concentrate, DRI pellet feed, 30 Mtpa staged

-Large copper‑gold porphyry, block cave + open pit, long‑life Tier‑1 style asset

Core technical/logistics risk

-300 km+ mine–port corridor via buried slurry pipeline to Pointe‑Indienne SEZ; port partner (Arise) now in place

-Deep‑underground block caving, huge tailings volumes, 150–200 km concentrate/tailings pipelines to coast

Infrastructure dependency

-New pipeline + port, but port now “de‑bottlenecked” via Arise MoU; power via CEC MoU

-Multiple hydro projects likely needed; no existing power at site; long linear infrastructure through sensitive areas

Social / environmental licence

-Remote, low‑density area; ESG scrutiny but limited global NGO focus so far

-Intense NGO scrutiny; expert reports recommending project be abandoned; high perceived tailings/pipeline risk

Country‑level mining politics

-Congo‑Brazzaville: governance risk, but regime likes big showcase projects; fewer organized anti‑mining movements

-Ecuador: strong Indigenous/anti‑mining movements; protests already stopping/suspending projects (Loma Larga, others)

Primary risk “mode”

-Sovereign/governance, funding, and delivery risk

-Social licence, environmental, legal, and political‑cycle risk

Key mining‑sector risks for Zanaga

Funding & partner risk: Capex is large (Stage 1 ≈ $1.94b, Stage 2 ≈ $1.87b). Project needs a deep‑pocketed strategic (Gulf, Asia, or major) willing to take RoC sovereign risk.

Sovereign / governance risk: risk of fiscal changes, slow bureaucracy, and political interference; but the regime’s incentive is to get a flagship mine built, not to kill it.

Execution risk on corridor: pipeline, land access, and environmental permitting for a 300 km+ corridor still need to be delivered in practice, even with Arise and CEC MoUs.

ESG/tailings: base case includes a large wet TSF, but ZIOC is exploring thickened or filtered tailings to reduce water and long‑term liability—that’s a positive signal, but still to be engineered and permitted.

Net feel:

Zanaga’s mining‑sector risk is macro‑political and executional: can you fund, build, and operate a mega‑corridor in a high‑risk African state? But social licence and NGO pressure are relatively low compared with Cascabel.

Continued ....Cascabel

Thanks for the SOLG/ZIOC comparison.

I asked copilot for a 'reality check' (I know, I know) on various metrics, this is the reply (spoiler alert : no real surprises, IMO). I think copilot is more sensitised to ESG issues.

(1) Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International)

Scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).

Country CPI Score CPI Rank Source

Ecuador 32 / 100 121 / 180

Congo‑Brazzaville 20 / 100 163 / 180

Interpretation

Ecuador: Corruption is a significant issue, but the country sits in the middle‑lower tier globally.

Congo‑Brazzaville: Corruption is severe, placing it among the most corrupt countries worldwide.

2. 🏢 Ease of Doing Business (World Bank – Doing Business 2020)

Scores range from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).

Country DB Score DB Rank Source

Ecuador Not directly shown in snippet, but Ecuador is mid‑range in Latin America (historically around the 120s). —

Congo‑Brazzaville 39.5 / 100 180 / 190

Interpretation

Ecuador:

Not top‑tier, but far more functional than Congo‑Brazzaville.

Regulatory environment is burdensome and unpredictable, but still workable for foreign investors.

Congo‑Brazzaville:

Ranked 180 out of 190—one of the hardest places on earth to operate a business.

Challenges include corruption, weak judiciary, poor infrastructure, and bureaucratic barriers.

Overall Reality Check

Corruption

Ecuador: Bad

Congo‑Brazzaville: Much worse

Ease of Doing Business

Ecuador: Difficult but manageable

Congo‑Brazzaville: Extremely difficult, bottom‑tier globally

For another perspective, project-specific, see below.

Continued....

"...Argentina: The Senate approved the first budget of the Milei administration, marking a shift from rule by decree toward legislative negotiation and helping anchor his austerity agenda in law.

The budget passed with a wide margin after lawmakers added funding for universities and disability payments, concessions President Javier Milei accepted, while still implying real spending cuts across most ministries.

Approval was a key IMF condition for continued support and comes alongside efforts to rebuild FX reserves, including a USD 10–17bn reserve accumulation plan for next year and a USD 20bn US-backed currency swap.

Congress also passed a fiscal amnesty aimed at drawing undeclared cash back into the banking system, addressing chronic financial disintermediation.

Despite a strong midterm showing, Milei remains short of a congressional majority, leaving him reliant on opposition support as he pushes more contentious reforms, notably labour market changes.

Proposed labour reforms would cap severance pay, limit strikes in essential services, and promote alternative compensation schemes, which the government argues are critical for investment but have triggered union protests.

With Congress reconvening in February for extraordinary sessions, labour reform now represents the key near-term test of Milei’s ability to translate shock-therapy economics into durable legislation ahead of the 2027 election cycle..."

GLA