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Topps results are bad, but management gave an optimistic outlook. Here are my brief thoughts: Topps Tiles is one of Britain leading tile company. Today�s annual result isn�t pretty because sales fell to �211m, a decrease of �3m from last year. This is despite the number of stores rising to 372 from 352. Topps saw operating profit fell to �17.9m from �21m, but it is converting profit into operating cash profit of �22m (although this is down from �30m). The one piece of good news from today�s result is the smaller than expected decline in dividends of 3% to 3.4 pence per share, yielding around 5%. The outlook was surprising because investors were expecting more of the same, but management was upbeat by reporting 3.2% Like-for-Like increase in the first 8 weeks of the new financial year, up from a decrease of 0.3% in the previous period. For more Topps analysis, which includes: A long-term chart of Topps operating margin. Productivity analysis, Dividends assessment and Market valuation, then click: http://bit.ly/2BkrhEl

I'm not.

I think Luke Johnson is a little cautious about the economic climate. In order to see double-digit sales growth, it needs to open more stores every year. And that could put pressure on profit margin if some stores turn out to be unprofitable.

Brief Update Trakm8 reported an increase in revenue to �14.7m, as operating profit shot up to �806k from �362k, as well as Basic EPS rising to 2.97 pence from 0.88 pence. Looking at Trakm8 divisions, their solutions division saw sales grew to �12.48m (2016: �9.69m), whereas Product Sales amounted to �2.27m (2016: �3.49m), a reduction of 35% on last year. Also, they managed to increase recurring revenue by 17% to �5.48m. They have undrawn credit facility of �3.7m at HSBC, as of 30 September 2017. Management Outlook Management remains optimistic about the second-half by stating they have visibility to support our second half expectations because of substantial new contracts in place. The Board remains confident that the market expectations will be met for the full year. Financials in Detail Although net assets rose to �21.37m from �20.23m, this can be attributed to rising intangible assets of �18.1m from �17.1m. But, the greater than expected net cash profit was attributed by the following: 1). Income tax awarded for R&D tax credit of �1.64m; 2). A cash inflow of �200k from movement in working capital, compared to �1.2m cash outflow last year. Net debt improved to �2.32m from �4.4m, helped by a �2m placing and supported by higher than expected net cash profit. There are two things that concern me, these are: 1). No mentioned dividends and 2). Capitalised development costs rising to �1.76m from �1.45m because there is no explanation what constitute these costs. But the company did capitalise �300k of engineering, sales and marketing expenditure. Overall the results were Okay. To read more on Trakm8, it includes analysis of: 1). Trends in development costs; 2). Quality of shareholders� equity; 3). Share price pattern; 4). And the list of contract wins and extensions. Then, click http://bit.ly/2jpuueJ

Patisserie results looked alright as sales grew by 9.7% to �114.2m. Operating profit rose to �20m, as basic EPS is 16.36 pence. The company operates in 199 stores and for next year it will open a further 20 stores. They are supplying 18 Sainsbury�s counters. The average payback period is 23 months. Financials in detail Today�s EPS of 16 pence means Patisserie is on 20 times earnings. The company has a superb balance sheet with equity of �92m (30% of market value), �20m in cash and total liabilities of ONLY �6.6m. Profits are republicated in the cash flow statement, as net cash profit amounts to �20.4m vs. net profit of �16.3m. Meanwhile, it paid out �3.2m in dividend, up from �2.7m. The ONLY concern is the sales growth coming in below 10%, down from 13% last year. For more on Patisserie, which includes: 1). Mission Objective; 2). Quality of earnings; 3). Profits converting to cash; 4). ROCE and Capex to depreciation pattern; 5). Long-term share price projection. Then click http://bit.ly/2hVO3e4

Contract wins are good. But we should focus on the profitability of these contracts. Anyone who follows Carillion or Interserve knows they have a big order book, but it didn't stop their share price cratering.

Investors could be concern about Babcock increasing in net debt level, rising from �1,173m to �1,291m on an annual basis. Other than that results look decent!!!

Bonmarche interim results look interesting. Here are a few things for investors to digest: 1). Basic EPS of 6.8 pence more than doubles last year. But the business is weighted towards the second-half. For example, last year Basic EPS was 9.2 pence and its made up of 3.1 pence (H1) and 6.1 pence (H2). H2 contributes 64% of EPS. So, if you apply the same ratio, then this year EPS could be as high as 20 pence! Although I like to take a prudent estimate of 14 pence to 17 pence. 2). The majority of Bonmarche trade receivables is made up if prepayments. When you look at their 2017�s annual report, trade receivables were �1.8m while prepayments were �13.3m (made up of prepaying business rates of �9.4m). A high level of prepayments is a sign it is not struggling to pay rates and rent. 3). Their cash balance is growing. With a market cap. of �49m and a growing EPS makes their share price on a multiple of 8 times earnings, according to brokers� forecast before interim results. My forecast for Bonmarche EPS is 16 pence or 6.3 times PER. That is too low for a retailer with a growing EPS! Expect a re-rating. In the next 6 months, you should expect the share price to grow by 50% to �1.35 and if the recovery continues than �2 per share in 18 months isn�t out of the question. For more Bonmarche analysis, click http://bit.ly/2mJC4Wq

Here is my interpretation of Record results: Asset under management increasing to $61.2bn is another record high, as Record (no pun intended) continues their recovery for the fifth year in a row. However, 85% of this fund is allocated to �Passive Hedging�, a product that earns Record the lowest amounts, in terms of basis points. That is 3 basis points or 0.03% of allocation fund size., down from 4 basis points. This compares to their dynamic hedging (14 basis points), Multi-product (18 basis points) and Currency for Return (17 basis points). All these other products earn 4 times more than passive hedging. But, their fund sizes compared to passive is 20 times smaller! Which is why passive hedging has contributed 53% of the management fee. For further interpretation and a historical perspective of Record, click http://bit.ly/2zaK1tz

The problem I see with SRT involved three factors: 1). Lumpy sales and delay in orders; - this caused profits to be inconsistent. 2). The volatility between inventory levels and sales. 3). After fulfilling their orders, SRT has to wait for an extremely long time to receive cash payments (now it is over 250 days). Add in the loan conditions of 9.5% coupon interest and the 12.5% in gross fee (SRT received �1.75m in net proceeds, check cash flow statement), it looks like SRT is serving LGB Corporate Finance very well. Think about it, a �2m senior loan note generates �250k in fees and 9.5% in coupon interest giving LGB a total of �450k in interest in the first year, or 22% return. Hope their new business produces profits. For full analysis and illustration click here: http://bit.ly/2hzyXP2

For those who are lacking in McCarthy & Stone knowledge, here is how you should interpret their annual results: - 1). 2017�s results were alright with sales rising by 4% thanks to home price rising by 3%. PBT was down by 1%, as profitability fell to 16% from 20%. 2). Cash balance fell to �40.7m from �119m is mainly from paying a �28.5m dividend and repaying loans of �45m. There is no new issue of equity. 3). Although net cash profit was a negative �3.8m, this was due to a smaller increase in cash inflow from payables. And management has said H2 2017 saw a recovery in sales volume from H1 2017. Their forecast outlook makes for some interesting reading. Apparently, McCarthy & Stone acquired 3,164 plots and estimate the cost of build totals �472m, this equates to �149k per unit, down from last year �179k per unit. That would increase the homebuilder margins! And management seems to confirm this with the aim of achieving ROCE of 25% over the medium-term. So, with a 25% ROCE in say the next two to three years, then we have to assume the following: Currently, Capital Employed is around �755.5m, assuming it rises to �790m-�830m. Then, a 25% operating margin is applied giving operating profit of between �197.5m and �207.5m. Next, we deduct 20% and 2% net interest costs, then net profit range from �161.9m and �170m. Therefore, we are looking at a 2 to 3-year forward PE of between 4.98 times and 5.22 times by 2020. For full analysis of McCarthy & Stone with share price forecast, brief comparison with other homebuilders and the issue of land bank, click here http://bit.ly/2AGpyJg Remember to always do your research.

How should you interpret Zoo Digital results? Here�s goes: Zoo Digital saw revenue grew by 62% to $12.7m. I immediately thought they were going to beat profit expectation. Then management said their new dubbing division contributed most of their sales but it earned them a lower gross margin (63%from 75%). They promise to improve this since it is a new division. Next, a look at their financials see operating profit rose by $100k to $413k (not that impressive), but net profit fell to $85k from $677k due to higher borrowing costs and forex expenses. The big surprise came from trade receivables doubling from $3.4m to $7.1m meaning sales growth was helped by receivables. And this is reflected in Zoo Digital�s cash flow as the $3.34m increase in receivables caused them to report a NEGATIVE net cash from operation of $1.85m. Also, despite raising a net share issue capital of $3m, their cash balance at year-end saw a net increase of $115k to $722k. Unless Zoo Digital converts their �excessive� receivables into cash, it will need to raise cash! For more analysis on Zoo Digital (which includes the effects of PLC costs on their profitability, divisional analysis and share price forecast) click http://bit.ly/2iRMH42

Results are Okay and Halfords saw steady growth in LFL sales and revenue. But below the surface underlying PBT is down 10% to �36.8m from �40.8m. When we make a comparison from five years ago, then H1 2012 is �54.7m, a decrease of 30%. Management has already mentioned the weak pound is the main culprit for the drop of earnings. Another look back to the past (before the pound was weak) see operating margin has averaged 8% from 2013 to 2017. Before that margins were hovering around 12%. It should tell you that Halfords is facing stiffer competition. Historically, Halfords has seen their share price collapsed to �1.60 during 2012 before making new highs. The question is will we likely see new highs or the next leg lower towards the �2 mark. For the full analysis on Halfords click here: http://bit.ly/2zJFEFs

Despite management, stating profit is in-line with market expectation. Basic EPS of 23.4p is close to their 2011�s earnings trough of 20p. Those who use underlying EPS of 35.3p excludes amortisation and acquisition costs which are real costs. Overall, Gattaca divisions show some serious declines in Net Fee Income, with their biggest division (UK Engineering) falling by 6%. The acquisition of Resourcing Solutions Limited has saved Gattaca of an overall decline in NFI. You can blame management for their poor choice in acquiring Network International in 2015 for �58m, despite struggling to make a profit. We now know it didn�t help to boost profit at all. An interesting observation is to compare the UK unemployment rate to Gattaca EPS. Normally, Gattaca sees EPS rise when the UK unemployment was falling, this happened during 2011-15. This is normal because businesses are hiring more people to fill positions. Given that the UK unemployment is at 40-year lows and Gattaca has already fallen to the five-year low, does this mean Gattaca EPS will decline further if unemployment starts to rise? For full analysis on Gattaca, click here http://bit.ly/2zKockd If you enjoy this post, please subscribe to the blog.

Tracsis is a great business and has rewarded Long-term shareholders with a ten-bagger in under ten years. The company manages to produce a decent level of profits and reward shareholders with a dividend, even though it yielded is less than 0.3%. The dividend well covered. The two major acquisitions made last year will continue to integrate into the main business. Despite, Tracsis numerous good traits, we need to look at some negative ones. These include: 1). Falling operating margins, as market valuation has pushed PER to 35 times earnings. Normally, Tracsis�s PER range around 12-16 times during 2011 to 2013, before the shares got �re-rated.� 2). Although it sees costs per employee falling, Tracsis wage �component� is becoming an important factor as it accounts for 55% of revenue in 2016 from 30% in 2012. Apart from the above, I feel shareholders and investors need to account for up to �9m in deferred payments if targets are met in 2018, a potential cash outflow and would halt the growth in their cash balance. At �156m, I see Tracsis�s shares trading sideways for the next 12 months until fundamentals catch up with valuation. For full analysis and charts click http://bit.ly/2hSPlXK If you enjoyed this post, there are other company coverage here http://walbrockresearch.com/home/

Words from Bowleven new management team is encouraging, but I feel shareholders are extremely frustrated with the share price poor performance. Previous management has made things difficult. And having looked at this business I can see potential value. As always action speaks louder than words, and shareholders need to know when gas production will start. Below is my summary: Their main offshore assets look promising with up to 2 Trillion Cubic Feet of gas. Bowleven has a 20% stake and has approx. claims of 69m barrels. At under �100m in market capitalisation, Bowleven has the potential to monetise 20% of their assets with minimal operating costs. That is the attractive feature of Bowleven. Until we get a definite update from Bowleven about their deadline to gas production and information on the daily gas flow, then it is all speculation. The downside to Bowleven has run its course, in my opinion. The potential for future revenue at low operating costs is immensely attractive. So, at this level of valuation, there is a good potential to see market value at least doubling. But, remember the risks involved (see above) and always do your homework. See full analysis http://bit.ly/2hlcKUv

This business looks to be dying at first glance. But, recent acquisitions could bring life at the end of the tunnel. Management expects Image Everything to report in excess of �5.53m (2016: �4.81m) with profit before tax of �0.59m (2016: �0.43m). Right now, we have time to assess Grafenia because turnaround takes time. Also, Grafenia needs to deal with borrowings of over �3m, along with a possibility of raising further equity due to lack of cash in the bank. Grafenia�s current valuation is speculative, but the future could look prosperous if they successfully integrate Image Everything. Please see the full analysis here: http://bit.ly/2zo5UnZ

Earthport has survived longer than any actor who played James Bond. And, despite operating loss amounting to �80m, the company still manages to successfully raise funds without seeing share price going below 1 penny. I can�t understand why big investors are backing this business. Despite the consistency of their losses! For those who can understand the bigger picture behind Earthport, please leave a comment below. For full analysis and charts of Earthport, click http://bit.ly/2A3z2Pe

Apart from the current level of production, Egdon Resources is still some years away from bringing the rest of their oil and shale gas portfolio into production. Also, they require a series to fundraising to implement these projects. With low oil price being persistent, there are high-risks for things to go wrong, given that it�s in the UK. And at �20m, Egdon is fairly valued. For full analysis of Egdon Resources and other companies� analysis, click http://bit.ly/2A3z2Pe

At over �5.2bn, the market has pushed Just Eat to new heights causing PER to rise to 75 times. Brokers have forecast by 2019 will cause PER to fall to 24 times (based on EPS rising to 29 pence). With the successful implementation of grabbing the necessary market share to make a dent in their individual market, Just Eat will focus on generating profits and sustainable company growth. The problems with investing in Just Eat is I feel the shares are at least one year ahead of their time which will cause it to trade sideways. But, most importantly at �5.2bn, the potential to increase in market size will be limited. Here are a couple of things investors need to pay attention to when Just Eat gets larger: 1). With a PER of 75 and growing, it is no longer the size of their profits that matters, but the rate of growth. For example, if Just Eat made �300m in net profit but the growth rate fell to 5% Just Eat shares will fall. However, if it grew by 25%, the shares are likely to rise because the rate of profit growth is more important. 2). The decrease in commission fees per order will harm operating margins. A potential 30% drop in fees per order could wipe their profit margin even if they make more sales. Finally, I like Just Eat business model and the simple concept of delivering food. Done on a big scale, their operations become more efficient. If you are thinking about buying Just Eat and holding the shares for more than ten years, then it is a worthy investment. Right now, the shares are fairly valued given their high growth potential. For full analysis and charts of Just Eat, click http://bit.ly/2A3z2Pe