Member Info for MudPump

Good stuff WM! Sounds like a plausible route to a deal with something for everyone.

"For whatever reason Parsortix did not take off" ....the "whatever" is kinda important for the investment thesis here: is it due to limited performance, or tough competition, or blocking by actors that benefit from excess biopsy......or is it still just a bit early, waiting on the Domino results, more NHS trials etc?

WM, here are my thoughts from 5 Jan, if of any interest....

RE: Chad5 Jan 2026 18:14

Carigli Chad net assets were valued at USD240m in 2021 (having been written down to reflect lower oil prices). Savannah offered USD266m. In Petronas accounts they were 'held for sale'. SHT pre-empted, as was their right, implying they paid the same as the Savannah offer. Perenco were apparently involved in financing the purchase. The sale was completed with a ceremony in Kuala Lumpar, and Petronas accounts stated 'no material effect' upon disposal, implying price received was similar to carrying value.

This sets a precedent and a price on the Exxon/Savannah assets, and Savannah state that Chad admit that compensation is owed.

Meanwhile the oil minister has changed since the nationalisation. Ndolenodji Alixe Naimbaye has no history of supporting nationalisation, and is currently trying to attract investment, for example SEMICA 2026 in January, EGYPES in March.

The World Bank is involved in financing several energy projects in Chad, eg Scatec $100m, PAAET $295m. The US is the largest shareholder in the World Bank, and we now know how Trump feels about nationalisation without compensation.

Doba output has stagnated since nationalisation, due to a 'lack of investment'.

Nationalisation without compensation has rarely succeeded, Gaddafi and Maduro both tried it...

In all, it looks probable that Savannah will win significant compensation in arbitration. And this does not appear to be priced in at 8p/share.

WM, worth bearing in mind that the float, excluding the over 3% holders who are presumably in contact with AK directly, is under 20%, so no particular reason for retail facing IR to be a priority.

Rather a dull RNS. Presumably the market mover would be the results of the Domino study with Midlantic - anyone know where we stand on that?

The main assumptions would be that the company means what it says when they indicate more share buyback are possible (I see no reason to doubt it). And that the main holders noted by Zengas are not going to start selling at this sort of price. In which case the float is under 20%, and some of that will be holders with no intention to sell under 10. I wouldn't expect the buyback program to function much above this level due to optics - they issued stock at 7p. But if they're writing a put at 6.8p, an entry around 7p can be reframed as a cheap call option on management getting receivables down, some sort of arbitration settlement and stock price that better reflects sum-of-the-parts.

You might add that since the company executed a buy back at 6.8p and indicated that it is happy to continue at that level and has the funds to do so, SAVE at 7p is as close to a one way bet as you're ever likely to find in the stock market.

My understanding was that if you have 29.9 and a board seat, then a buyback moving you over 30% triggers an offer on the basis that you have control over whether or not to buyback. But stand corrected if that is not the case.

Very positive move by the company imo, I hope they continue if the share price remains down here. The knowledge that this was possible would explain why Nipco have no board seat - if they did they would now be obligated to make a cash offer.

Fair points Avi8r, but worth remembering the windfall taxes that have made the North Sea a less predictable investment proposal in the past than some other supposedly frontier places.

Or to put it another way, it's not obvious to me why Nipco want exposure to a hydroelectric plant in Uganda. Or a Green Fund would want exposure to oil in Niger. The Chad play was worth a go, with the potential to link in Niger. But the geopolitical situation has changed. And I can't believe AND enjoyed hanging around in Juba for months for nothing. Looks to me as if the value here would be best realised quickly via a break up, and AND go back to running a hedge fund.

SP, There's not a huge exposure to the oil price at SAVE, more gas under contract where the central issue is whether they get paid or not. With Doba nationalised and Niger oil in the ground for the foreseeable future, subject to the whims of the Niger junta and CNPC, the best one can hope for is that Chad make a payout to avoid their Vision 2030 plan to attract investors look absurd. CNPC seem to be in trouble in Niger for not using enough local labour so perhaps there is an angle there for SAVE to exploit. But the bigger issue is 'what is the point of SAVE as a company ?' Is it renewables? There are focused funds for that, tied in with development agencies - I don't see Savannah's edge. Is it the 'generational' opportunities as the majors pull out of onshore? The locals seem to have the edge there, pretty dire results to date from AK. Feels like an unwieldy conglomerate that has lost its sense or purpose as well as its auditors - if the vision was as an ethically secure way for funds to invest in African energy the audit problems certainly will not help. I assume NIPCO see their investment as securing their source of gas, having already built a retail operation - which does make sense. It would probably make even more sense for them to consolidate their control over Accugas and the other Nigerian assets, and dump the rest of the scattershot portfolio.

With "AND" Knott appearing somewhat out of his depth, maybe it's time to contemplate a value enhancing break up of the conglomerate?

1. Obvious value to Nipco of the up/mid stream Nigeria assets - instead of not getting paid for the gas it could be fed into their downstream assets, and sold for a handsome price.

2. Sale of the Niger assets to Chinese interests, they control the Benin pipeline and might be in a position to open up a second route through Chad/Cameroon

3. Sale of arbitration claims to a fund that knows the business - Elliot, Aurelius, Burford, Parabellum

4. Sale of renewable portfolio to a focused fund - AREF, ARCH, Evolution II

Surely that would bring in significantly more than the current market cap?

Https://www.opinionnigeria.com/power-sector-debt-jumps-62-5-to-n6-5trn-raising-concerns-over-fgs-n1-23trn-bond/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CAt%20the%20end%20of%20the,are%20about%2038%20per%20cent.%E2%80%9D

Always 'elsewhere'. For a company with an acquisition mandate in an area with 'generational opportunities' there seems to be disappointingly little newsflow from SAVE. Anyone have a theory on what Nipco sees as worth buying into here other than as a cheap roll of the dice on a receivables settlement or Chad payout ?

Major expansion of lending facility and clearance for equity stakeholding signed Dec 18th...

https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-secures-expanded-authorities-fy26-ndaa-signed-law

Does anyone have any colour on why Maniry, Balakhivske and Sarytogan are all EU designated strategic graphite projects, but Orom-Cross is not?

As of 1 January importers of iron and steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers, hydrogen, and electricity into the EU begin accumulating financial liabilities associated with the carbon footprint of the products, which will need to be settled in 2027. No wonder Indorama are excited about the jv with Block. Likely to see interest and the share price climb as we move through 2026.

FF, the market doesn't have to absorb the performance shares, they have a one year hold restriction. They do cause some dilution, but anybody who wants to maintain their percentage holding will have to buy a few, not sell.

As far as the discount to NPV goes, you might assume it's due to the fact that the Uganda credit spread is about 1200bp over treasuries ie we should be looking at NPV15-20. But funding is likely to come from DFC, and they lent $150m at T20Y+400 to Balama....so NPV10 looks about right. Conclusion, the discount is more due to inertia and illiquidity (from a funds perspective), therefore not justified and the share price will almost certainly rise significantly over the next few months, barring any shock news.

Carigli Chad net assets were valued at USD240m in 2021 (having been written down to reflect lower oil prices). Savannah offered USD266m. In Petronas accounts they were 'held for sale'. SHT pre-empted, as was their right, implying they paid the same as the Savannah offer. Perenco were apparently involved in financing the purchase. The sale was completed with a ceremony in Kuala Lumpar, and Petronas accounts stated 'no material effect' upon disposal, implying price received was similar to carrying value.

This sets a precedent and a price on the Exxon/Savannah assets, and Savannah state that Chad admit that compensation is owed.

Meanwhile the oil minister has changed since the nationalisation. Ndolenodji Alixe Naimbaye has no history of supporting nationalisation, and is currently trying to attract investment, for example SEMICA 2026 in January, EGYPES in March.

The World Bank is involved in financing several energy projects in Chad, eg Scatec $100m, PAAET $295m. The US is the largest shareholder in the World Bank, and we now know how Trump feels about nationalisation without compensation.

Doba output has stagnated since nationalisation, due to a 'lack of investment'.

Nationalisation without compensation has rarely succeeded, Gaddafi and Maduro both tried it...

In all, it looks probable that Savannah will win significant compensation in arbitration. And this does not appear to be priced in at 8p/share.