Member Info for BroadfordBay

GKP made a Declaration of Commercial Discovery on 1st August 2012.

The Development Period is defined in the PSC as 20 years; without an extension, the contract therefore ends on 1st August 2032.

There is also an “…automatic right to a 5-year extension”. Not defined, however, is whether or not this “right” has to be officially requested and, if requested, when such request must be made.

Finally, there is another possible extension, of another 5 years, which can be requested at the end of the 20+5 year period. If so requested, and granted, the contract would then end 1st August 2042. Such request to be made at least six (6) months before end of the development period.

After August 2032, management’s decision on whether to accept the first 5-year extension (Aug-32), or request the 2nd and final 5-year extensions will depend on the business environment and -outlook at that time.

Starsalign

the missing "believability" goes to the very heart of the matter.

Baghdad doesn't believe what the KRG/MNR says about payments to, from or via TR, or barrels produced and sold.

Nor do they believe the PSCs that were put out on the public domain (MNR website) some years ago contain all pertinent details - the request to the contractor's trade association for ALL contractual details to be put on the table was refused point blank.

Starsalign,

short and pity - NO

Ever since Todd and JG departed, getting any hard "technical" news out of the company has been like waiting for the Lotto numbers...(I include such tariff details in the "technical area). Todd & JG had their faults but they sure knew how to flood the market with nice, juicy numbers - some of which we now know of course were rather too juicy.

We don't know exactly how much is deducted for use of the Khurmala-Faysh-Khabur pipeline and the local blending station (Atrush plus Shaikan)

We don't know exactly how much exported Shaikan crude is discounted to the reference crude - and we don't know which crude was used as a reference

We don't know what the Shaikan composite grade actually is, nor do we know the composite Sulphur content.

We don't know the grade of the exported Kurdish blend - the API and the %S.

We don't know how much the exported Kurdish Blend was achieving in the market

We don't know exactly how much BOTAS was actually charging as Transit fee for the "Kurdish Blend" - It's very difficult to imagine that the old fee of $1.18/bbl was still current.

So many pesky details...

Invstrat,

it was always to be expected that BOTAS (pipeline operator) insist on a higher $/bbl tariff; for no other reason than to try to recoup their losses due to the very high incidence of pipeline attacks over the years - mostly inside Turkey.

Not only was the original contract (plus revisions) overly cheap at the time (starting at $1.18/bbl for volume up to 22MTA), the only indexing feature it included was the annual tonnage to be transported (starting at 22MTA running up to 70.9MTA) - there was absolutely no $/bbl indexing to reflect any increasing (or decreasing) oil price.

As I have mentioned before, I expect both of these to change - higher $/bbl tariff ($5/bbl or thereabouts) plus indexing to a reference crude price - which might well not be Brent but the new Kurdish Blend (Kirkuk analogue) to be established by SOMO.

The Summer 1985 crude price was in the low- to mid twenties.

I think your contribution is total Cr*p too...

Invstrat,

you posed the question: "...why didn’t our BoD execute these clauses in the light of the delayed and missing payments ??"

A possible answer could be that, if the BOD were perfectly aware of the large holdings held by certain unnamed persons / groups, it could be extremely disadvantageous (mildly put!) for the company directors in the event that court proceedings, for whatever reasons, were ever to be opened. Withholding such important information from the market authorities is no laughing matter.

It's called leverage, extreme leverage.

Turkey was firmly against the KRI declaring independence the last time this was on the table - nothing has changed there.

Turkey values harmonious relations with the state of Iraq more than it does any "special deals" from the KRI.

The US is fed up with the Barzani crowd filling their pockets and buying US influence.

For the US, having a large military support point / airfield close to Iran is a bonus, but it's not the be all and end all.

The problem, in a nutshell, is that APIKUR are unwilling to compromise - citing "sanctity of contracts", which of course is rubbish. Contracts can easily be re-jigged - when circumstances warrant.

Those changed circumstances are now.

Putup, I don't disagree with much of what you say - but I do disagree with your 1st para.

I believe the US would aim for a fast, almost surgical, strike to destroy the nuclear production capabilities -and are seriously planning to use the MOP for that.

The question is, how (or how quickly) would that destruction lead to a regime collapse?

The last noted position for USS Nimitz was 80km off Medan (Sumatra) in the Malacca Straits and her speed at that point, before loss of transponder signal, was 19knts (ca 35km/h). Her top speed is said to be 30knts (55km/h).

Distance from Medan to Oman Station is approx. 5,200km. Stopping at Diego Garcia for whatever reason would add about 1,600km to that route.

Assuming no stopover at DG, her arrival at Oman Station could therefore be about 6 days from now – possibly shorter, but her battle group (incl. sub) will determine that average speed.

All in all, it looks as though she could be on station by Sunday / Monday and that ties in with what the President said today.

Thomas Newdick at TWZ seems to be up-to-date on all of this:

www.twz.com/air/u-s-air-force-fighters-deploy-to-reinforce-middle-east

Confirmation via Amichai Stein at the Jerusalem Post that all the necessary assets are being put in position:

www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-857965

Reports coming in that the USS Nimitz carrier strike group (currently South China Sea) has been ordered to the Gulf - transit time is about 2 weeks assuming no port calls on route. USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group is currently in Red Sea. USS Carl Vinson strike group is also in the Arabian Sea area.

Spirit B2 bombers already in Diego Garcia.

A lot of assets being positioned "just in case"...

Well, it might just be getting things in place just in case...

Avi Scharf at Haaretz is reporting that 28 refuelling tanker aircraft took off three hours ago from Eastern USA, heading Eastwards across the Atlantic.

Complicating any possible optimism re price spike etc. tomorrow, must also be the statement attributed today to Kataib Hezbollah (Iran-aligned militant group) that it would resume attacks against US troops in the ME if the US becomes directly involved in the conflict. Its leader Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi is reported as saying "If America intervenes in the war, we will act directly against its interests and bases spread across the region without hesitation".

Volatility might well be the order of the day...week...month

Rogthegamer,

How on Earth can you justify such a statement? : "Iran can’t inflict serious damage in Kurdistan and “local “ sales will continue."?

It's less than a hop-skip-and-a-jump for Iranian missiles and there are certainly enough US assets, incl. oilfield infrastructure, to target.

Admittedly it might be seen as cutting off their noses to spite their face, but in such an overheated conflict scenario, and especially if deep bombing of the nuclear facilities takes place, it should not be ruled out.

...by drones from entering Gulf of Oman - acc. to Tehran Times.

Draw Media have published what they say are details of KRG Revenues for this period but I'm unable to find verifiable sources.

https://drawmedia.net/en/page_detail?smart-id=16952

The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has been closed to Iraq exports since the last week of March-2023 and accurate data for subsequent oil exports and -payments is difficult to come by.

The following is based upon the audited KRG accounts, the latest being for Q1-2023.

KRG total Gross sales value (Export and Local, incl. both Crude Oil and Condensate) was $2,199,684,396 for Q1-2023.

Stated sales price achieved in this quarter was $58.638/bbl

Brent Spot in this Quarter averaged $81.17/bbl.

Deductions from that sales revenue:

Payment to Buyer Account of $70,598,747, leaving a total still owed by the KRG to the buyers of $3,277,415,066.

Interest paid and other charges $68,327,463.

Payment to oil producers of $749,700,219 (incl. $87,803,094 for settlement of unpaid amounts from prior years).

Payment to Turkish Energy Company (TEC) of $139,397,296

Payment to Kurdistan Pipeline Company (KPC) of $129,303,354

Payment to other companies of $95,869,175 (power plant maintenance, refinery processing, electricity supplies to Kurdistan, fuel purchased for Ministry of Electricity, legal & professional fees)

Total Net remaining for KRG after these deductions was $946,497,142.

To my knowledge, there are no details available showing how the Buyer's Account, TEC and KPC payments / accounts are treated during the No-Export periods.

ValueS,

the last KRG audited accounts were for Q1-2023 (pipeline was closed last week of March-23)

They showed $2.177Bn oil revenues (after removal of water content).

Accounts for Q4-22 showed Gross Oil & Condensate sold revenues of $2.429Bn

Q3-22 revenues were $3.117Bn, Q2-22 revenues were $3.789Bn, Q1-22 revenues were $3.063Bn.

The mentioned Annual Revenue figure of ca $13Bn has probably been extrapolated from these numbers, but they appear to have neglected to take into account the drop in Brent price in recent years (May-22 was $113, May-23 was, $75, May-24 was $81, May-25 was $64/bbl).