Roundtable Discussion; The Future of Mineral Sands. Watch the video here.
They just didn't suddendly file for arbitration a day, week or month after no oil was sold.
Here's what they RNSd.
8/7/21 - Last sale of oil 68,000 bls.
26/1/22 - Announced that they will have 114,000 bls net to Zenith by 31/3/22 for sale with a lifting scheduled for April 2022.
22/4/22 RNSd that 62,000 bls had been lifted and that 52,000 bls were due to be lifted in June (Total 114,000 bls). So far so good.
But whrere i first notice problems is when you get to the results to the RNS of 30/11 2022 and in that, their sales only amounted to 79,223 bls by the end of Sep 2022 - so still 3 months after June last year this is short surely of the 114,000 expected sales by 34,777 bls.
In those accounts page 34-35 announced in Nov 2022 -Sid El Kilani licence was due to expire end Dec 2022. There was at 30 Sept 2022 127,759 bls of oil unsold.
Imo this was a material issue with no mention of a problem being stated into the shortfall of oil sales by 30th Sept 2002 ie 8 whole months ago.
Since then there has been no announced liftings at all which would be a material event. Imo it looks like there has been little or no revenue/cash flow since before September 2022.
No mention that i can see of Tunisian problems come the placing 5 months later for £2.3m to further Benin, Yemen etc as well as additional funding for Tunisia development - yet they there was no mention of Tunisian government problems over unsold oil.
There's nothing there that can fund Benin given they announced a new strategy on 26th May followed by their intended investment of $2m in the USA where they will pay a bonus when 75 bopd is reached (which looks to be in shares). They hint at problems by saying beureacrativc delays and other detrimental impediments elsewhere.
They leave it a further week to 7/6/23 by saying they have taken arbitration against Tunisia over the obstruction of the sale of oil - so that is fact that they have sold no oil since before Sept 2022 - ie no revenue or income and running on air from the reduced electricity generated payments - they havent reported these sice the reduced Jan/feb numbers which were already substantially off their high.
They say theyre producing 20-25 bopd in Tunisia but this pointless for revenue if they can't sell the oil.They mention that there is 8,000 bls there in stock - well what about an update on the previous unsold oil or has Tunisia stepped in and sold it ?? Exactly how long has production been shut down and from what date did it reduce to 20-25 bopd day. One must surely ask where the buk of the production occurred what happened to the new concession awaiting parliamentary approval ?
Does anyone know what the cash situation was like up to the fundraise and monthly burn rate .
Curiously the documents for 2022/23 aren't available on Sedar for some reason - last document showing now as Jul 2021 - States Ceased Reporting.
On the 28/2/23 they announced the £2.3m funding
"The proceeds of the Financings will be used to provide additional funding for the following:
· Negotiation and planned finalisation of a Production Sharing Contract for Block 1, Sèmè oilfield in Benin
· Technical and managerial appointments in view of planned operations in Yemen
· Additional funding for the development of Zenith's Tunisian oil and Italian natural gas production portfolio
· Business development activities in Africa and the Middle East
· General working capital."
Now 3 months on and production is 20-25 bopd with 8,000 produced bls in stock. How long has it been running at this daily low ? How many days does the 8,000 bls relate to which would give an indication of daily production since last lift. ?
For now they can't sell anything unless the dispute is resolved. So no spare cash coming in to divert elsewhere imo.
Electricity production prices have dropped significantly month on month from their high. They gave Jan & Feb figures resulting in combined revenue of 313k Euros less fixed costs of 70k euros. I see nothing announced for March, April or May whereas last year they were announcing it monthly almost in H2.
Could be wrong but i don't see Benin coming to fruition given their strategy for going into the USA. They say they agreed to invest approximately $2m (£1.6m) in the US so to me it looks like the cash they raised for Africa. Benin was going to be a few K bopd so why waste going into the US if it was anyway close to completion eating up that kind of cash. The tone changed on 2/6/23 RNS talking about "bureaucratic delays and other detrimental impediments elsewhere"
What price are oil grades for Oklahoma, Calfornia and Texas ? (see oilprice.com) .
One thing i'm wary of is that they'll pay a first incentive if 75 bopd is reached so the question is where exactly on the actual bopd starting block are they. What's the rate per well etc ? There's scores of divestment opportunities in the trade mags and agency vendors and plenty of these bunging out a half - 1 bopd per day. For $1.6m i can't see that being able to buy much in the way of reserves or production even using $5-$10/b or a flowing bl metric.
Basically back to square 1 as of 2007/8.
Trustilie, i was wondering what your thoughts are now re your post 11/5/23 17:41 re acquisitions you mentioned (due to size) particularly as in the A/report they mention outside of South Sudan delivering one SIGNIFICANT M&A opportunity.
They reviewed 22 new business opportunities in 9 different countries (so where else outside South Sudan, Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger have they contemplated?
We know they were mentioned in AI re Exxons Zafiro (Eq Guinea) as well as Chevron i think, Seme field (Benin), Eni Assets (Tunisia) and loosely on Petronas (Egypt) brings the total to 9 countries though Egypt may have crept into 2023. Worth remembering that Petronas had been keen to offload it's assets to the same buyer (until Chad issue arose) so could there be 20k bopd on the cards in Egypt ? That accounts for roughly the 9 countries but not all of the 22 opportunities.
2023 KPIs -
Completion of the acquisition of the South Sudan Assets.
Deliver at least one significant M&A opportunity.
Also a paragraph by the COO Antoine Richard on COTCo and Bini a Warak in Cameroon - where he mentions "We are actively working on further hydrocarbon AND renewable energy asset opportunities in country.
Niger elaborated on-
110k bopd pipeline taking into account CNPCs planned production expected to leave 30k bopd spare for other operators.
30km pipeline to be laid between SAVEs EPF and the export pipeline. Big change from laying a 90km one all the way back to the refinery. The exported oil means on time payment compared to selling it to the government refinery.
Main export pipeline to reach 300k bopd in 4 phases with 8 pumping stations added.
" Looking forward to the rest of 2023 - Key projects we are focused on completing include:
(1) the closing of our proposed acquisition of PETRONAS' assets in South Sudan in Q3;
(2) at least one further hydrocarbon asset deal; "
From the above i believe there is at least 3 (including S.Sudan) to come. It's the level of reserves and production that we don'y know yet, but given peoples concerns over S.Sudan (Sudan issues at moment) the risk can be reduced in repaying the associated non recourse debt by 1-2 sizeable further deals.
If S.Sudan completes, i don't see any future suspension as the next acquired assets would have to be absolutely bigger than what we would have combined post S.Sudan.
It's no coincidence that Chad is trying it's hardest to get SAVE removed from COTCo.
Chad is now very exposed if it loses the ICC arbitration case and any award against them. It would mean that SAVE could seize Chads share of revenues/FCF or possibly shares from COTCo should Chad not pay up over Exxon Chad oil fields and TOTCo seizure.
Saves valuation for it's 41.06% share of COTCo in the CPR was valued at $277.5m with upside to $358m on the higher throughput figures being met down the road.
Although they sold 10% (still in process) for $44.9m to SNH Cameroon this shows the value that is attributed to Chads 33.77%
Either on a pro-rata basis what SAVE sold their 10% for.
Chads COTCo stake = $151.6m or on the CPR valuation = $228m.
SAVE's 41.06% Revenue from COTCo was about $80m and $30m FCF.
This would mean Chads revenue for 33.77% is about $66m and FCF of $25m yr on present throughput.
This mornings revelation shows that Chad are prepared to even act against the business agreements it made to CEMAC over COTCo. At the very least it shows how Chad act and shoot themselves in the foot ahead of the ICC case.
Pt 2
Chad's buyout of Petronas was made official in late May. The cost of the operation was not made public. Savannah Energy was also in the running, but the right of first refusal allowed the Société des Hydrocarbures du Tchad (SHT) to take possession.
Thinly veiled threats
In his 2 June letter, the head of the SNH also requests that Chad cede 20% of its 53% stake in COTCO - a demand that he claims has the backing of President Paul Biya, with whom he has been close for a good 60 years. As such, Cameroon, where 80% of the infrastructure is located, envisages the distribution of a 35.17% stake for itself, and a 33.77% stake for Chad, in order to restore balance.
Moudiki makes no attempt to hide his irritation in the letter's conclusion: "While awaiting the outcome of our discussions on restoring balance, make sure that you allow COTCO to continue operating in a serene manner, so as to prevent a potential shareholder crisis from seriously affecting the running of this company which has strategic value for both of our countries."
Moudiki, who was disappointed by unrealised promises of a transfer of COTCO shares from Chad to Cameroon, particularly after the SHT's buyout of Chevron's 25% stake in 2014, continues to support Savannah Energy's position, come hell or high water. The latter company transferred a 10% stake in COTCO to the SNH in April for $44.9m.'
Pt 1 6/6/23
' ExxonMobil-Savannah: SNH boss Moudiki ups the ante in letter to Chadian oil minister
The head of Cameroon's Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures sent a scathing letter to Chad's oil minister. Since ExxonMobil's withdrawal from southern Chad, the battle between Savannah Energy and N'Djamena has rekindled a recurring conflict between Cameroon and the Chadian junta.
Chadian and Cameroonian authorities are far from seeing eye to eye on the Savannah Energy issue. Unlike Cameroon, Chad is at loggerheads with the British junior oil company. These differences in opinion were underscored on 2 June by Adolphe Moudiki, managing director of Cameroon's Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH), in a confidential document sent to Chad's oil minister, Djerassem Le Bemadjiel.
Moudiki begins the two-page letter by attacking the Chad presidency's statement, released that same day, about the general meeting held on 24 May in Paris that assembled shareholders of COTCO - the joint venture that runs the pipeline exporting Chadian crude oil in Cameroon - during which directors representing Savannah Energy were reportedly dismissed. Savannah bought ExxonMobil's shares in the Doba fields and the export pipeline via COTCO and TOTCO (in Chad) in December 2022. The Chad state, which was against the transfer, nationalised those assets on 23 March. Only COTCO's stake, which previously belonged to ExxonMobil, were unaffected by the operation.
Yaoundé ghosted in Paris?
In his letter, Moudiki asks the Chadian minister to send him, in his capacity as a COTCO shareholder, "the written resolutions, as well as the summons letter to this general meeting, and finally the board of directors' resolution approving the agenda". According to the SNH boss, his company did not take part in a general meeting in Paris on the date cited, nor did it receive a summons letter. The SNH's managing director goes on to say that "in these conditions, were such a general meeting to have taken place, resolutions arising from it would be void, because they would be in breach of COTCO's statutory rules on the summoning and holding of general meetings".
Moudiki also points out that Chad had committed to "maintaining COTCO shareholders' representation on the board, limiting the number of Chadian directors to four, handing over a part of COTCO's shares to the SNH, and not including resolutions on ordinary general meetings' agendas that concern, inter alia, the appointment of COTCO managers, other than Chadian directors". N'Djamena originally made those concessions to get the green light from the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)'s competition authorities, in order to acquire Petronas's 20% stake in the Doba-Kribi pipeline and the oil fields in southern Chad.
China tightens grip on Niger's oil with Sinopec
5-6-23
China's state-run oil major Sinopec has set it sights on the northern African country, where it is poised to become the second largest Chinese firm operating there behind China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), an old hand in Niger.
Niger could shortly welcome a second Chinese oil major after its oil minister Mahamane Sani Mahamadou, known as Abba, and Xue Weisong, the new deputy executive director of China's state-owned Sinopec, signed a memorandum of understanding in Niamey on 26 May. Already present in the country is China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), where Xue Weisong once worked, which has been operating in Niger since 2008.
In Niamey, Xue Weisong was accompanied by his firm's financial director and the technical director of Sinopec's "new business" branch. While he was there, the Chinese executive did not give any details of the agreement or the precise purpose of his visit.
Africa Intelligence understands that Sinopec wants to take over three areas in the region of Agadem which were handed back to the Nigerien authorities by CNPC. These areas, known as R5, R6 and R7, contain proven reserves. Sinopec is also considering acquiring the Dibella licence which was formerly owned by Labana Petroleum and Advantica Gas & Energy, owned by Nigerian billionaire Alhaji Dahiru Mangal (AI, 17/04/23).
A Sinopec deal in Niger would strengthen China's grip on Nigerian oil. Since its establishment there, CNPC has developed the Agadem area - which has yielded more than a billion barrels - by building the Zinder refinery which processes 20,000 bpd. A new pipeline to Benin currently under construction and scheduled to come on stream at the end of 2023, could enable the export of 100,000 bpd.
Other than CNPC, two other oil majors are present in Niger. Savannah Energy operates in the Agadem area (permits R1, R2, R3 and R4), which should be ready for production in 2024. Algeria's Sonatrach operates the Kafra licence, where the first drillings in 2018 yielded positive results with an estimated 150 million barrels.
You could roughly refer to the price Savannah sells its Uquo gas to Accugas which processes it and sells it on.
This latest deal is stranded gas and without the Accugas network they would have no other way of selling it. Probably being bought at a similar price as Uquo gas. Could therefore be worth $6+ boe to Accugas.
Accugas could be getting $2.50 mcf + transport fee of perhaps 50c so perhaps worth some $8-10 per boe to Save ?
If it was simply a transport or tolling of 3rd party gas we wouldn’t be engaged in buying it, therefore I think those margins may be significant at little cost to us.
Forecast net debt is $26.7m in 7 months and $41m end next year but that needs to be kept in context and it is pretty small relative to reserves/production. Payback still forecast at under 3 years. (2 yrs already up almost on INA). I actually see net debt increasing with further acquistions.
"Our current forecasts are based on the current inferior terms re the new fiscal terms" -FinnCap.
Relative to the reason for that net debt is In 18 months time production from 3/05 is hoped to be up by over 30% and possibly 50% potentially the following year. There's likely to be an increase in reserves. In turn this should materially lower opex which helps in a lower oil price environment. They could sit still, do sweet FA as to spend and have none of the above net debt in a shorter timescale but unable to book further production or reserves as a result so if someone is prepared to harp on about net debt in isolation they are missing the point.
In 3/05A they've started production testing on Gazela that wasn't happening when the adm doc came out - so work is progressing pretty fast. There's decent reserves to book here across this block especially with 300 mmbls OIP when you look at the R/F on the adjacent fields in 3/05.
When people also wake up to the potential of the Kwanza basin and with a small pre salt small oil discovery in block 23 with a 40% stake. The Cameia and Golfinho fields on block 20 & 21 are estimated to come on at 70,000 bopd.
From Energy Capital & Power 22/3/23
' Kwanza Basin
Holding close geological similarities to hydrocarbon-rich areas like Brazil’s Santos and Campos Basins, pre-salt areas in southern Africa represent frontier acreage with lower exploration risk and higher potential for production. In Angola, the exploration of pre-salt basins became increasingly active following early discoveries in Blocks 20, 21 and 23 in the Kwanza Basin. The evaluation of these discoveries produced a comprehensive geological model for pre-salt prospecting, which has since expanded to include Block 0 offshore Cabinda. Unlike frontier markets, pre-salt discoveries in Angola can be developed at a lower cost by utilizing existing infrastructure, an important factor at a time when companies are prioritizing shorter development cycles. As part of its efforts to focus on subsea tie-backs, infill drilling and other near-hub projects, French major TotalEnergies is exploring the development of a new pre-salt production hub in newly acquired Blocks 21/09 and 20/11 in the Kwanza Basin. The company’s Cameia-Golfinho project– which is expected to reach FID in June – will be the first deepwater project in the pre-salt Kwanza Basin and is estimated to hold 420 million barrels of oil equivalent. '
https://energycapitalpower.com/exploring-angola-upstream-potential-oil-gas/
Tinubu's first act has been to abolish the Nigerian fuel subsidy.
26 minutes ago 29/5/23
'The new president of Africa's largest democracy, Nigeria, has used his inaugural address to make a major policy announcement to ease pressure on government finances.
Bola Tinubu said the decades-long subsidy on petroleum products was being scrapped.
"Fuel subsidy is gone," he told a packed crowd in the capital, Abuja.'
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65737846
Says can no longer be justified. Devoured $7.5b last year. Money to be spent on public infrastructure. Something the IMF and World bank have been calling on for years but no predecessor got to grips with.
As a previous 2 time govenor of Lagos and transforming it, he hopes to apply the same plan across the country.
It will take something like this to radically increase the power supply to 30GW from the present 7.7 GW.
SAVEs Julian Horn managing director of renewables at the Cameroon Hydo-electric site
https://twitter.com/Savannah_Energy/status/1659571709974904832?cxt=HHwWgIC8xa3r_YcuAAAA
Also spent over 6 years as development director at Lekela Power. "led Lekela's investment in the 158.7 MW Taiba NDiaye wind farm in Senegal, which reached financial close in July 2018. This will be the largest wind farm in West Africa."
https://uk.linkedin.com/in/julian-horn-a6584713
SAVEs Niger windfarm will be much bigger than the one in Senegal.
It will be interesting to see the future value expected to be created from SAVEs renewables division with 1GW to be announced by this year end.
In March this year, Lekela Power with an installed 1 GW where SAVEs Julian Horn was development director was sold to Infinity Power for $1.5b.
https://waya.media/infinity-power-acquires-100-of-lekela-power/
In turn - the buyer Infinity Power (part of MASDAR Company) has 3GW in operation and under development with 2GW expected to be operational by 2025. https://weareiph.com/
Worth noting that Lekela was all wind power.
Lekela had a total of 1034 MW installed in Africa and operational with up to 225 MW in development in Ghana. https://lekela.com/
FinnCap estimated the wind cost development at $0.7m per MW so 1GW coming in at around $700m with 75% of that financed ($525m) on their analysis.
On the above and with cash being diverted from oil/gas, the renewables division could be as big/bigger than the hyrocarbon element itself.
Panoro were only a minor producer in 2020 before buying the assets for up to $140m including contingency payments in early 21. Panoro https://www.panoroenergy.com
3/5/23 Trading statement https://www.panoroenergy.com//wp-content/themes/hello-elementor/cision/releasesingledetail.html?releaseIdentifier=8B5CA8DE5DA30EF0
£241m m/cap $27m net debt. 6320 bopd Q1 2023. (Current 8,500 bopd)35 mmbo 2P.
3 analysts with an average 68% target higher than current valuation which is £400m m/cap if achieved.
If AET get a 2nd deal by year end /Q1-2 next year and have parity on production to Panoro's exit expectation for year end, i can see AET being easily worth Panoro's current valuation if no dilution on the 220.5m shares in issue.
If oil stays $70/b+ it could grow quite rapidly on a 12-18 month time frame even on a modest acquisition.
So overall heartened to see word of further acquisitions on the cards here yesterday.
With the current acquisitions practically paid for, there should be decent leverage for paying down the next assets quite quickly above $70/b.
Panoros quarterly dividend is $3m ($12m/yr $70/b oil)
Also " Panoro intends to pay out a USD 20 million core dividend in 2023 on a quarterly basis in cash weighted towards H2 and subject to average oil price realisation remaining above USD 80 per barrel"
If AET were to introduce a similar sized $12m dividend in the next year - 18 months it would be a yield of over 20% at these levels or 4.3% if the share price equalled 100p and a m/cap of £220m which would still be lower than Panoro"
Is Exxons share of production around 12k bopd on Oml 138.
They could offer a similar deal to what was done in Chad perhaps re financing.
Omni - don’t they have or have had significant oil production of around 20k bopd plus some other fields. Also 1.6 Tcf of undeveloped gas close to Port Harcourt area ? Maybe an all share deal ???
If true I think it would derisk repaying for South Sudan if production was interrupted for any length of time ? Same complex as Save on Victoria island and they did get involved with Lekoil so could be feasible. Couldn’t see them giving up on S.S after recent talk on closing it and being suddenly piling into these two possible deals as if on the rebound.
Save did say they would borrow up to $2.5b in their adm docs. Thanks for sharing Trustilie.
Todays ShoreCap note 11-5-23
Net Debt forecast
End 2022 = $441.3m.
In 7 months (End 2023) = $257.9m.
The pending S.Sudan acquisition has to be added. Could it be as low as $600m by then allowing for what was previously said re effective start date and possible contingencies if any included in the headline "up to" $1.25b figure. Perhaps overall net debt as low as $850m in 6 months and not the approx $1.2b i was running with.
Regardless of the S.Sudan deal and using the existing forecast $257.9m - if the remaining 30% of the COTCo pipeline was sold as what was achieved for the other 10% - pro-rata would give $135m so the Accugas net debt would in real terms be down to just $123m this year end.
People wondering where all the cash will come from for the renewables. No wonder that some significant oil/gas acquisitions are required because the renewables should be a very major business in its own right.
At $70/b oil there should be $400-450m FCF/yr imo from S.Sudan, Cameroon & Accugas.
Accugas was to be in a net cash position in around 2 years so looking at the timeline for bringing these renewable projects on stream gives an idea of the cash needed and also at what point the renewables become self financing.
Niger 250 MW wind farm. Project sanction this year. First power 2025.
Back in July last year F/Cap gave $0.7m MW development cost so overall $175m cost expected. 25% own cash needed would be about $44m. Expected to give EBITDA of $30m/Yr.
Niger 2 Solar projects combining to offer up to 200 MW. Project sanction next year 2024. First power 2025-26. F/Cap had $0.5m dev costs for the solar in Chad so i would assume the same here for Niger. (Chad had battery storage that would cost an extra $1.5m MW but none stated here for Niger this am). 200 MW costing $100m would require $25m of our own cash.
No concrete EBITDA figures for Niger Solar but perhaps yields $20m/yr.
That could mean the 3 Niger projects of 450 MW giving about $50m/yr EBITDA in 3 years with our internal cash of around $70m needed.
Pro-rata you could see potentially that if they had 2.5 GW Solar/Wind up and running and in development it would require about $390m of our own cash with possible EBITDA of around $280m/yr. Likely 25-40 year PPAs. They intend to have around a total of 1 GW+ of renewables in motion in the next 6 months alone.
The African Renewables market was stated by AK as around 310 GW by the end of the decade and a once in a generational opportunity.
Rather than give excess dividends to shareholders i can see the value in building out a renewables business given the market opportunity which would be worth multiples to an actual major dividend.
Cameroon 75 MW Hydro. Project sanction next year 2024 . First power 2027-28. No info yet what the cost/returns might be.
Article yesterday on bank lending for oil/gas assets in Africa and one prominent bank still lending regardless but in tandem expects to lend over $14b in the next 2-3 years alone for African Renewables projects so imo i don't see a problem on FinnCaps expectation of 75% financing.
Seperately FT article today on $5.2b of outstanding debt as of 2022 to China from Sudan but that doesn't include $billions in prepayments to Sudan for oil to be shipped.
Sudans state oil Co SudaPet) owes about $2.5b to CNPC. Chinese state backed entities loaned Sudan $15.5b to 2020 alone with $5.5b new loans pending.
"Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at John Hopkins University, pointed to Chinas hectic 'shuttle diplomacy' that helped keep the oil flowing following the split between South Sudan and Sudan in 2011. Sudan is where Chinese diplomats first got involved in shuttle diplomacy, and at the time got grudging praise from their American counterparts" she said and "wouldn't be surprised if they returned to help sort out these problems".
Saves 3 acquisitions
Exxon Chad for the sum of US$360 million (with a further oil-price contingent payment of up to US$50 million), subject to other adjustments ie $410m.
Petronas Chad for the sum of US$266 million, subject to working capital and customary adjustments
Petronas South Sudan for a *total* cash consideration of *up to* US$1.25 billion, subject to certain completion adjustments.
As for South Sudan - information has been light. The price is stated as 'up to' and 'total consideration.
'
There remains a possibility that perhaps as much as 20% of that headline price could be inclusive of contingencies - ie for certain production levels being met as well as the oil price for x years.
Taking that into consideration along with whatever effective start date is used, there could be a very substantial discount to apply when you look at the make up of other deals and SAVEs use of the term 'up to'.
Panoro Feb 2021
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon oil producing assets (up to $180m)
for an initial aggregate cash consideration of up to US$ 140 million and aggregate contingent consideration of up to US$ 40 million, based on an effective date of 1 July 2020.
The EG Contingent Consideration is up to US$ 16 million in aggregate payable only in years where the average annual net production of the acquired interests is in excess of 5,500 bopd. Once this initial net production threshold has been reached, in that year, and for the four consecutive subsequent annual periods, annual contingent consideration of US$ 5.5 million will be payable to Tullow provided that the production threshold is met in such annual period and the average daily Dated Brent oil prices in respect of the annual period is in excess of US$ 60/bbl, subject to the aforementioned cap of US$ 16 million.
The consideration for the Dussafu Acquisition consists of an initial cash consideration of US$ 46 million (to be adjusted at completion for working capital and other customary adjustments) and a contingent consideration of up to US$ 24 million (the “Dussafu Contingent Consideration”).
----------------------------------------------------------
Afentra April 2022
Sonagol transaction $80.5m upfront with a $50m contingency (Contingency is $5m annually for 10 years subject to above $65/b oil price and being over 15k bopd gross production).
INA transaction $12m cash upfront plus $21m contingency (Contingency is $10m licence extension, plus $2m/yr x 3 yrs on 30% of the revenue upside if oil price above $65/b. Further $5m if any new discovery subject to it being developed.
We seem to forget that the top partners in South Sudan are South Sudans state NilePet, Chinas CNPC, Indias ONGC Videsh. I still beleive Chinas Sinopec and Tri-Ocean Energy may still be there also.
All these other participants need to see alternative export routes rather than just depending solely on Sudan while we worry about Save/Petronas. The others have to drive alternative options and not solely all our own worry if this deal goes ahead or not. Imo there are alot more strategies and angles weighing on the deal than we can be aware of.
So although some time away it's good to see that Chinas CNPC subsiduary will construct the EACOP project. Imo these are details that will affect the strategy of Save/Petronas deal financing terms and who might our backer be (Refer again to the Vitol report last year and the high potential rewards for an oil marketer).
We are a partner of Sinopec in S.Creek. We work closely with CNPC in Niger re pipeline access and we have used their subsiduary for drilling all 5 wells so far. This comes on top of S.Sudan having bought land for oil export facilities in Djibouti. Save also sending a renewables development analyst to the Ethiopian investment conference last week.
EACOP (Oil Pipeline)
20/1/23 "The pipeline would also tap South Sudan's Oil, which according to the report, is of higher quality due to its low Sulphur, and also cheaper to extract. This would help South Sudan to reduce its decades of reliance on the Republic of Sudan(Sudan) for its oil exports. The UKCOP's initial prospects would enable Juba to ship an estimated 130,000 barrels of oil per day before including the Ugandan and Kenyan crude export volumes. "
https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/geopolitical-intrigues-decimated-planned-uganda-kenya-pipeline-eacop-report
8/5/23
"China is likely to take over financing of the 1,443km East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) project following withdrawal by several top lenders amid pressure from environmental activists. This shift in financing follows a string of EACOP deals signed with several Chinese firms including an agreement between the project’s lead investor, oil and gas major TotalEnergies, and pipeline contractor and China National Petroleum Corporation subsidiary, China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering (CPP), to carry out the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) works for the project.
Set to become the longest heated oil pipeline in the world, China’s financing is poised to offer new life to the mega project, which is expected to transport 216,000 barrels of oil per day from the Tilenga and Kingfisher oilfields in the Lake Albert Basin of Uganda to Tanzania’s Tanga Port.
TotalEnergies and Ugandan Government officials maintain that the project remains on track, with the project expected to undertake land acquisition planning; contract awards; and detailed EPC works between 2022 and 2025, with first oil production and export due for 2025."
https://energycapitalpower.