Member Info for RodneyT

Nick Mather stands out as the most consistently positive for small shareholders, with tangible returns and capital outcomes.

Bob Sangha has had one strong instance (PolyMet), but other deals have favoured insiders. At PolyMet, Maxit/BS was appointed strictly as an independent expert and had no investment in the business or connection with insiders

Dan Vujcic remains unproven; current dynamics are concerning for small shareholders

Paul Smith appears negative—value erosion has characterised his major deals.

The above sumarises my current research. As I said, I would be delighted to learn of better past outcomes for small shareholders.

Agree with your last point, Add.

Concerning the Glencore/Xstrata deal, Glencore executed a ‘creeping control’ strategy (starting with 34% and forcing a merger that ended with control).

At the time, many viewed it as a power play by Ivan Glasenberg, with small Xstrata holders caught in a deal that favoured Glencore insiders.

The deal is now seen as a case study in dominance-by-merger and the risks of weak minority protections. Concerning the former, I would like to see the Solgold Board take immediate steps to reassure the market of its independence from JCC and the PRC to the maximum extent is allowed to do so. There must be no 'creeping control' here.

Add, like you, I am a LTSH. I have checked the career histories of PS and DV. As yet, I cannot find one company where either have been involved with deals and small shareholders have done well as a consequence. There may well be one, but I have not found it. If I could find one, I would be happy. It is not about dogma, it is about objectivity, facts and a decent outcome for LTSHs. I think we agree on the latter?

For illustration only. My personal view is that a figure of 25p is more likely although that is only an opinion. 25p would bring DV about $4 million without risking a penny of his own capital and with no opportunity cost. Were a fairer value takeover negotiated that gets price closer to NAV, his reward with no cost or capital at risk would go to the heavens. The example this sets to LTSHs is utterly unsavoury, indefensible and wrong.

It Enables a Cheap Takeover

A low price makes any bid appear generous — even if it dramatically undervalues the company.

For example:

Current price: 7.0p

Potential offer: 10.5p

Superficial premium: 50%

But real NAV may be 100p

Result: Long-term shareholders are short-changed.

It Amplifies Insider Gains

Management awarded themselves millions of options at 7p.

A sale at 12p yields them enormous profits — but only because the base price is so low.

Shareholders bear the cost of this windfall.

It Discourages Competitive Bidding

BHP, Newmont, or others may be deterred if it looks like the board is “in a deal” already.

A higher price creates pressure for better terms or counter-offers.

It Reduces Shareholder Leverage

You cannot negotiate effectively when the board points to “market price” as an anchor.

A higher price empowers us to demand fair value.

Suppressing the share price before big news benefits insiders and aligned bidders — not shareholders like us.

A higher share price would make it much harder for SolGold to be sold cheaply and would improve our leverage in any transaction.

The 0.6% short (around 5 days of volume) is substantial for a thinly traded £213m market-cap stock.

Since the increase in April, SolGold has traded in a tight 7.0–7.1p band, with occasional dips.

Volume figures (2–4 m shares/day) are low enough that a well-timed short could consistently absorb any wave of buying.

The combination of a large short and modest liquidity is a recipe for price suppression, as seen in the sideways-to-slightly-down action in May.

2 options are:

1. Submit a Section 793 Companies Act request to SolGold asking which institutions have lent out stock.

2 .Ask the FCA to investigate under Rule 5 and Rule 8 of the UK Takeover Code if possible market abuse or undisclosed concert parties are suspected.

For either DV or PS, please tell me about any company in the past that either have been involved with raising finance as an executive where small shareholders have done well. I have found many examples of executives and large shareholders doing very well.

£1 million nominal, 'sell a tier 1' for half it's NAV and walk away with £8 million. Hasn't cost you a penny. How about buying some shares with your own money DV? Nasty.

Thank you Add. My opinion is that DV's first move was to feather his own nest. Nasty. Things can only look up from here so we shall see.

Let's see how actions pan out rather than words. So far, the actions taken by management over the last 8 weeks or so has made it much more likely that they will make a lot of money for themselves. Let's see what actions they take in due course to enable a fair outcome for all small shareholders. I have done deep research on the individuals concerned. Let's hope they have decided on a new course.

Talking with management directly has to be a general chon wag only . A number of fund managers have a policy not to meet management for this reason and also to reduce conviction bias and increase objectivity.

From the company's financial statements and LTIP documentation:

" Unless otherwise documented with the company, when a participant ceases employment prior to the vesting of their share options, the share options are forfeited after 90 days unless cessation of employment is dud to termination for cause, whereupon they are forfeited immediately."

and

" in the event that the company undergoes a change of control by way of sale of greater than 50% of the voting shares in thr company or 50% of the assets of the company or any resolution to wind up, dissolve or liquidate the company or there is a change greater than 50% of the company's directors as a result of a reorganisation, all awards vest early.'

Summary: the position for leaving option holders is codified but this can be overridden by an agreement with the company. Immediate vesting is available on change of control. All looks pretty good for option holders.

Fort, as a shareholder, I would dearly like to challenge the tenor of your note. Unfortunately, I can't. I hope that changes based on clear evidence that management has changed its ways and displays clarity, candour and fiduciary duty. Through actions not words.

Neither am I Red!

Eloro, seems likely that the JCC sale could indeed have been arranged because the Company perceived a forthcoming liquidity crunch. If so, why has the Company just awarded its CFO, who is a qualified accountant, more options? Even more so at such a low exercise price?

Objective is the word you are looking for Red, objective. I've highlighted issues with this report today. That they're not great for folk like us is a shame but this doesn't change what I have highlighted.

As asset can be sold for £X. If there are 3bn shares now, you will be paid pro rata. If there are 3.03bn shares, you will be paid pro rata. In case 2, you have been diluted. You pay. The asset has been sold for £X and you've get less of it due to the sudden introduction of new shares that belong to someone else.

The Solgold Board are required to adhere to the law at all times just as all company Boards are. At the least, we can insist on that. Other than this, we can monitor tone, words and actions. Investing means risk to capital for folk like us. We have no free lunches aka share options with an exercise price many multiples below the 12 month SP forecast of the company's own broker. As investors, clarity and candour from the Board. The report today projects away on key topics. I have given examples. One hopes this will change in future.

Different subject E. We are reliant on candour from management. Good or bad news. Clarity and accuracy are key. Our voting rights were diluted as a result of the JCC sale. Management projecting away from this fact and not referring to it is not a 'conspiracy theory'. They have to take responsibility for their own actions just as we all have to. Same applies to the point about value for shareholders emphasis and bucket load of free options reality. And, again, emphasis on timescale and reality of immediate vesting. Time and time again, emphasis, projection and reality that has to be searched for. As minority shareholders, we require candour and clarity from this Board. We are currently not receiving this. I've given the examples.