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News 🔜 so time to sit back - buckle up - enjoy the ride of your life ……..

Oh dear ghin 🤦‍♂️🫡

You’ve really outdone yourself this time and posting a link you clearly didn’t even understand and calling other people “ignorant.”

Peak clown season.

Your own source literally says:

“EIA to be submitted by 31 Dec 2025…”

Which is… exactly what everyone already knows.

No one said it was submitted now, that’s just you arguing with the voices in your head again. The point (which you somehow still haven’t grasped) is that the DFS has been basically finished for years, and the EIA submission timeline is a scheduled conditional milestone, not some magical revelation you just uncovered.

You’ve managed to “correct” something no one said, misread your own link, and then act smug about it.

Impressive, in the same way watching someone trip over a flat surface is impressive.

If you’re going to try a gotcha, at least learn to read the RNS first.

“New handle?”

I’ve been here since before 2018, long before the revolving-door pessimists who pop up every cycle pretending they’re the guardians of truth. You’re starting to sound like that idiot Earache from back along — same recycled lines, same selective amnesia, same boredom dressed up as insight.

EIA:

Your claim is simply wrong. The EIA was submitted, reviewed and publicly consulted on. The approval is pending — which is exactly what JTF requires. Saying it “hasn’t been submitted” is misinformation, pure and simple.

DFS “done since 2019”:

Utter nonsense. The project has been redesigned from the ground up: new decline, new backfill, new tailings, new flowsheet, new ESG requirements, new mining sequence. No one is dusting off a 2019 document. Pretending otherwise is either lazy or deliberate.

Cash:

Developers spend cash while finishing DFS — shocking, I know. EMH still has no debt, a €49m grant, and the largest hard-rock lithium resource in the EU. Calling this a “crisis” is just drama for effect.

Capex:

Your $2bn hand-grenade is forum fantasy. The DFS gives the number — not anonymous guesswork.

If you want to “call out FOMO”, fine. But at least use facts from this decade. Repeating outdated talking points as if nothing has moved since 2019 doesn’t make you a realist — it just makes you another noise merchant.

I’ve seen all this before. Every cycle. Every personality. Every Earache clone.

If you want a proper discussion, bring data. Otherwise, it’s just the same tired script.

MT Detailed Design = Massive Leverage in Any Sale or JV

With today’s RNS confirming completion of the MT Detailed Design, Eurasia has just ticked the single biggest technical box left in the development process.

Buyers pay premiums for assets that are:

✔ Fully permitted

✔ Feasibility Study completed

✔ Reserves & Resources approved

✔ Detailed Design completed

✔ EPCF financing already secured

✔ Construction-ready

MT now meets every one of these criteria.

In M&A terms, MT has moved from “permitted resource” to “ready-to-build mine” backed by world-class engineering houses (Gipronickel, Mekhanobr, CKE, Wardell Armstrong).

This dramatically strengthens EUA’s negotiating position for any sale, JV, or carve-out.

⭐ Timing Is Impossible to Ignore

This milestone lands:

   •   immediately after new broker valuations (28p target, $880m asset value)

   •   as global geopolitics shift toward ceasefire talks

   •   while EUA is building liquidity through the Kazakhstan AIX

   •   with a shareholder webinar due before year-end

   •   AND with state approval of the Technical Project now imminent

The sequence of events is extremely telling.

When an asset is ready, financed, permitted, and technically validated, all that remains is the transactional window.

🚀 Bottom Line

MT is now a construction-ready, finance-backed, fully designed, independently verified mine — just waiting for state sign-off.

This is a decisive derisking event and a major value trigger.

It strengthens the sale case, the JV case, and the “liquidity event” the company keeps referencing.

For a company valued at ~£90m with world-class PGM/Ni/Cu assets, the asymmetry has just increased again.

Poor ghin or should I say Earache 🤡

You keep pretending you’re the lone voice of reason, but all you’re doing is rehashing old negatives and hoping nobody notices how much the project has moved on.

When someone appears when good news hits, that’s not “caution” — that’s panic.

EIA submitted (2021), updates tied to €360m funding, DFS near-complete, EU strategic backing…

None of that fits your favourite script, so you ignore it.

And the “filter me lol” routine?

That’s classic deflection when you know you’ve been caught out:

Talk big, contribute nothing, and run when challenged.

Predictable. And boring.

Ahhh poor ghin 🤦‍♂️ Every time you post, it’s like watching someone try to sound clever while proving they haven’t read a single document.

EIA? Submitted years ago.

Current timeline? Just the EU funding-aligned update.

You talk like EMH is still stuck in 2019 — meanwhile the project has €360m Czech backing, EU critical-minerals priority, and is in final permitting.

The only “humble pie” here is the slice you’re forcing yourself to eat because you sold early and can’t accept reality has moved on without you.

Great history lesson , well worth listening to.

IFKA — great spot. Miliband mentioning Green Hydrogen unprompted tells you exactly where the narrative is heading. The battery-only lobby on LinkedIn have had his ear for too long, but reality is catching up fast.

And the biggest myth they push — “hydrogen infrastructure doesn’t exist” — collapses instantly when you look at what’s actually happening.

Neptune V is already being deployed next to refuelling stations, with the Guttroff RNS (8 Nov 2024) being just one example. They received €5m from Bavaria to produce green hydrogen on-site, and Neptune V was selected specifically to feed a new H₂ station.

But it’s not just Guttroff — this is now the model:

• Neptune V at refuelling stations

• Neptune V at depots & logistics hubs

• Neptune V on industrial sites

• Neptune V in grid-balancing projects

• Neptune V in distributed production (Hydropulse)

When you can make 99% purity hydrogen on-site, every old battery-lobby talking point collapses:

• “Hydrogen logistics are too difficult” → Gone

• “Infrastructure isn’t ready” → Neptune V is the infrastructure

• “Hydrogen can’t scale” → Germany just selected ITM for 710 MW of national infrastructure

And the BEV limitations are now unavoidable:

👉 One battery HGV uses as much electricity as ~1,000 homes.

The grid can’t cope today, never mind in a BEV-only future.

That’s why the political tone is changing.

Hydrogen isn’t replacing batteries for cars — but batteries absolutely cannot replace hydrogen for heavy transport, industry, or grid stability.

Meanwhile, ITM Power is one of the only companies actually delivering this shift:

• 500+ MW deployed or contracted

• Neptune V rolling out across multiple real-world use cases

• National-scale projects in Germany, APAC & the UK

• Zero debt + ~£205m cash

• Trades at pennies per MW while indebted peers trade at £5–£70/MW

That’s the valuation disconnect the market will eventually be forced to confront.

Hydrogen isn’t “coming”.

It’s already here — and Neptune V is proving the model.

To keep everything factual:

• The only published valuation is the January 2022 PFS

• PFS post-tax NPV ≈ £1.5bn

• EMH owns 49% → £735m

• Shares in issue ≈ 217m

→ PFS implied value = ~339p per share

Now add only confirmed funding:

• Czech Government Grant: €360m → EMH share ≈ £155m

• EU JTF Allocation: €36m → EMH share ≈ £17m

→ Total grant uplift = ~£172m

PFS value (£735m) + confirmed grants (£172m) = ~£907m

→ ~418p per share “today value” after the RNS.

Where does the DFS take this?

The DFS will include:

• lower capex (due to €360m grant)

• updated lithium price deck

• improved plant-location economics

• CRMA-accelerated permitting assumptions

• updated recoveries/opex

Those factors all increase NPV relative to the PFS.

A realistic DFS case is:

NPV £900m–£1.1bn (EMH share) + £172m grants = ~£1.05bn–£1.27bn → 485p–610p per share fair value.

So: ~418p based on PFS + grants, and 485p–610p after DFS.

Current price ≈ 21p.

This is what a major de-risking event looks like.

1. Valuation uplift per share (simple, factual)

£155m / 217m shares = ~71p PER SHARE

in value uplift from this grant alone.

Meaning:

Even before DFS, EIA, offtakes, or lithium-price assumptions, the grant itself supports ~71p per share of EMH’s market value.

And EMH closed around 21p.

That means:

The grant alone is worth more than 3× the current share price.

This is an argument Skelly cannot touch.

It’s fairly obvious what’s going on:

when someone sells out and the next day the company lands one of the largest critical-raw-materials grants in EU history, the instinct is to downplay it.

But the facts don’t care who’s holding:

Grant awarded.

JTF allocated.

Strategic status confirmed.

€360m non-dilutive funding.

69% reaction from the market.

That’s not “hype”.

That’s what major project de-risking looks like.

VikR, I really appreciate your post — it mirrors exactly where I’ve ended up.

Like you, I let myself get taken in by the repeated messaging around “year of delivery”, “multiple deals”, and everything supposedly being “imminent.” After being here before with IMM, I should have known better. I genuinely wanted to believe this time would be different… but a leopard really doesn’t seem to change its spots.

I still think p140 has real scientific merit and could ultimately help a huge patient population, but the problem isn’t the molecule — it’s the timelines, the communication, and the constant drift. What was meant to be hard-timed delivery has now become an open-ended “sometime in 2026,” with zero clarity on size, structure, or even certainty of any deal at all.

So I’ve done the same as you: reduced my position, taken a lot of risk off the table, and will reassess from the sidelines rather than get caught in another locked-in, distressed hold. It’s a hard-earned lesson, but an important one.

I genuinely wish holders the best, and I still hope IMM eventually lands something transformational — I’m just no longer willing to bet on the timelines or promises.

PP come on 🤦‍♂️, You’re valuing Eco like it’s one Albanian pilot line selling raw panels, which is why your numbers collapse. That’s not the business anymore.

1️⃣ Eco isn’t a panel seller

The €1.8m interims included panels, slabs, stairs, structures, installation + partner-funded work.

You can’t value the whole company off a €42.50/sqm panel assumption. That’s just wrong.

2️⃣ Your JV maths is fantasy

Eco doesn’t earn “40% of 40%”.

In a JV it shares manufacturing margin + project margin and in several countries owns the lines.

Your entire argument is built on the wrong model.

3️⃣ You’re using ONE pilot line to value a GLOBAL rollout

Eco now has factories in:

• Chile

• Senegal

• Sudan (partner-funded)

• Albania

• Kosovo

• Canada (planned)

Minimum 2 lines per country, 6 homes/day per line.

Your model = “42,000 sqm Albania forever.”

Reality = industrial scale across 5 countries now, 8+ next.

4️⃣ PE multiples don’t apply mid-rollout

You don’t value a scaling manufacturer off half-year pilot revenue.

You value it off contracts, capacity, throughput and rollout.

5️⃣ The 2024 risk section is outdated

Since then: Chile €420m, Senegal JV, Sudan 2 lines, Canada entry, TÜV/EN/ISO suite, global line deployment.

Still calling it “just a story stock” is ignoring reality.

Bottom line:

Your maths isn’t “tough,” it’s based on the wrong company.

Eco today is multi-country, multi-line, multi-revenue, partner-funded and scaling.

If you model THAT — not the Albanian pilot — a £100m+ valuation isn’t far-fetched at all.

@cryptochump101 , here’s the basis, using only public numbers, industry-standard multiples, and the actual 2022 offer:

1️⃣ MT PGMs (4Moz+)

PGM projects are valued at $40–$100/oz in-ground.

Even at the low end:

4m × $40 = $160m.

Mid-range = $320m.

2️⃣ NKT Nickel Sulphide

Tier-1 deposit near Norilsk.

Nickel sulphides typically value at $300m–$600m depending on tonnage and cost base.

3️⃣ West Kytlim (producing)

Low-cost, long-life PGM producer.

Typical valuation range: $50m–$150m.

4️⃣ Permitting + exploration

Fully permitted assets carry large premiums.

Conservatively: $100m–$200m.

5️⃣ Conservative sum-of-parts:

$610m – $1.27bn

6️⃣ Real 2022 buyer offer:

UBS-run sale reached final docs at $1.2bn before war froze it.

That wasn’t theory — it was a live transaction.

7️⃣ Convert to per-share:

$1.2bn ≈ £960m

£960m ÷ 2.95bn shares = ~32.5p

Independent 2025 valuation ($880m) = ~24p

Historic analyst valuation ($5.6bn) = £1.50+

So 40p is simply the middle of:

• the $880m valuation,

• the $1.2bn offer,

• the $1.6bn peak market cap,

• and standard industry metrics.

That’s the maths — no hype, just the published numbers.

Continued:

Sub-6p reflects political uncertainty, not asset weakness — with 5×–30× upside if the window reopens.

Thanks Brighty1 this basically backs up what I have been saying 🙏

For anyone who hasn’t read the full piece, here is a clean, factual breakdown of all the key points — no hype, no noise, just what the article itself confirms.

⭐ 1. EUA Controls Multiple Strategic, World-Class Assets

The article confirms EUA owns several highly valuable mining assets, including:

• Monchetundra (MT) – multi-million ounce PGM resource, fully permitted.

• NKT – tier-1 nickel sulphide deposit near Norilsk Nickel.

• West Kytlim – producing low-cost PGM mine.

• Additional Arctic exploration projects.

These are exactly the metals the world is short of: PGMs, nickel, copper, cobalt.

⭐ 2. EUA Was Hours Away From a $1.2 BILLION Sale (Confirmed)

The article states:

• UBS ran the formal sale.

• A buyer reached final documentation.

• Signing was planned for 24 Feb 2022.

• War started the same day → deal collapsed instantly.

The sale didn’t fail — it was frozen by geopolitics.

⭐ 3. Independent Valuations Are 10×–30× Higher Than Today

The article cites:

• Peak market cap: $1.6bn

• Analyst valuation: $5.6bn

• Buyer offer: $1.2bn

• 2025 valuation: $880m, target 28p

Current market cap: £89m

Share price: ~3p

The disconnect is extraordinary.

⭐ 4. Price Collapse Was About Access, Not Fundamentals

The article makes this clear:

• War froze cross-border deals.

• Some brokers imposed “sell-only” restrictions.

• Russian tax issues temporarily froze cash.

• EUA itself is not sanctioned — just caught in blanket policies.

The assets and permits remain intact.

⭐ 5. Positive Momentum Building Again

• Successful £3.15m raise at 4.37p in 2025.

• New AIX listing in Kazakhstan.

• Block deals being arranged.

• Multiple new broker reports since April 2025.

• US interest quietly returning (Goldman reinstated Russia desk).

• Upcoming investor webinar.

This is not the behaviour of a dead company.

⭐ 6. Risk vs Reward (as per article)

Bear case:

• War lasts longer; sanctions delay sale.

Bull case:

• Assets sell (management’s stated goal).

• Interest exists.

• Metals are in global shortage.

• Major rerate if geopolitics normalise.

Upside potential: 5× (fire sale) to 30× (normalisation).

⭐ 7. Core Reality the Article Highlights

EUA is not a “story stock.”

It is a strategic metals asset holder whose sale was paused — not abandoned.

Assets, permits, value — all unchanged.

Only geopolitical access is frozen.

When that changes, reratings happen very quickly.

🔥 Conclusion

The independent article confirms everything long-term holders already knew:

• The assets are real.

• The value is real.

• The 2022 deal was real.

• The upside remains enormous.

• The discount is purely geopolitical.

Sub-6p reflects political uncertainty, not asset weakness — w

Furion - You’ve actually hit the key point without quite spelling it out — so let me say the quiet part clearly:

**The “elephant in the room” is the war.

It’s the ONLY reason the sale froze.

And it’s the ONLY major risk left.**

Everything else — resource size, permits, strategic metals, development status — is intact and unchanged.

And yes, it’s hard to ignore that the timing of the recent research note lines up very neatly with:

• ceasefire discussions being reported internationally,

• increased diplomatic activity,

• and the first signs of geopolitical cooling in two years.

It doesn’t prove anything on its own.

But the alignment is hard to dismiss.

⸻

Risk vs Reward is exactly why we’re at sub-6p.

The market discounts geopolitical uncertainty heavily because it’s binary.

But that’s also why the upside is enormous:

Risk:

Ceasefire takes longer than hoped.

Reward:

Ceasefire arrives → transaction window reopens → assets reprice to their fundamentals.

And the fundamentals are still:

• 4Moz+ PGM resource

• Significant nickel / copper / cobalt

• Full permits granted

• Manageable liabilities

• Multiple monetisation routes

• Strategic metals in global shortage

Nothing here has weakened.

If anything, global demand for these metals is stronger now.

⸻

⭐ This is why sub-6p gives the classic asymmetrical setup:

• Downside already priced in.

• Upside 5x–10x+ on a stabilisation event.

• A research note dropping right now, not six months ago, is… notable.

• Volumes spike every time headlines shift toward peace — the market is watching this closely.

⸻

📌 Bottom Line:

EUA hasn’t failed. It’s been frozen.

And when the only real blocker is geopolitical rather than fundamental,

a ceasefire becomes the trigger for a rapid and violent rerate.

This is just the reality of the risk vs reward setup and the asset base that remains fully intact.

“Nobody wants to mine its assets any time soon.”

Not supported by anything.

EUA holds exactly the metals in global shortage:

• 4Moz+ PGMs

• Nickel, copper, cobalt

These are strategic metals — the idea “nobody wants them” doesn’t fit reality.

“That won’t change for a decade.”

Pure guesswork.

Mining deals reopen as soon as:

• access improves

• risk reduces

• permits + resources align

A ceasefire alters that landscape immediately, not in 10 years.

“EUA can’t wait that long and buyers know it.”

Not true.

EUA already has:

• a fully permitted project,

• a large, defined resource,

• and a manageable balance sheet relative to asset size.

This is not a distressed position.

“Dishonest BOD milking the teet.”

Zero evidence.

No false RNS, no hidden liabilities, no fake resources.

Permits and resource data are public and verified.

“Victim if you invested higher.”

Only if you ignore the fundamentals:

• 4Moz+ PGMs

• Ni/Cu/Co upside

• Full permits granted

• Strategic metals in global demand

• Multiple monetisation routes

Nothing here has disappeared.

A ceasefire simply reopens what was paused.

Bottom line:

Once you strip out the emotion, the facts still point to a valuable, strategic, fully permitted asset base.

Just public, verifiable numbers.

Oh Dear 🤦‍♂️

You’ve raised a lot of noise, but none of it addresses EUA’s actual fundamentals.

So let’s go point by point — briefly:

1️⃣ “Paid notes aren’t conservative”

Some aren’t — agreed.

But the whole point is that 28p is conservative compared to typical AIM puff targets.

If this were hype, the target wouldn’t be 28p — it would be 70p–100p like the historic ACF note.

You’ve just disproved your own argument.

2️⃣ “Look at ADME / his old track record”

Different company.

Different sector.

Different asset type.

Different economics.

Dragging in unrelated AIM history isn’t a valuation argument — it’s a distraction.

3️⃣ “In-the-ground figures don’t matter”

They’re literally the foundation of every mining valuation on earth.

No resource = no DFS = no model = no value.

EUA already has multi-million ounce published resources and full permits — that’s why valuation is possible now.

4️⃣ “Wait for DFS before discussing numbers”

MT is fully permitted already — that’s the biggest early-stage derisking event in mining.

Permitted projects can be valued without waiting for a DFS.

This is standard industry practice.

Now the actual numbers you still haven’t addressed:

   •   4Moz+ PGM resource at Monchetundra

   •   Additional nickel / copper / cobalt at Nyud + Western areas

   •   Zero debt

   •   $2bn+ in-ground metal value on conservative pricing

   •   Multiple monetisation routes

   •   Permits already granted — huge derisk

These are facts, not hype — public, verifiable, transparent.

📌 Bottom Line

The 28p target is the risk-loaded base case.

The asset-backed valuation is clearly higher — 40p–50p+ depending on the model.

I’m not giving advice — just quoting the actual numbers you keep avoiding.

If you want to debate EUA, debate the assets.

Everything else — ADME, ACF, AIM history — is just noise.

Spikeyj 😂😂🙈

You’re not actually responding to my point — you’re dodging it with two logical fallacies:

1️⃣ Strawman Fallacy

You’re attacking a claim I never made:

“ALL paid-for analyst notes are conservative.”

I never said that.

I said THIS one is conservative — and the numbers make that obvious.

If this were the typical AIM puff-piece you’re referring to, the target wouldn’t be 28p… it would be 80p–100p with blue-sky assumptions.

The fact it’s only 28p proves it’s been heavily risk-loaded.

2️⃣ Red Herring / False Generalisation

Bringing up ADME or other AIM companies doesn’t change anything about EUA’s metrics.

Different sector, different assets, different economics.

It’s just misdirection to avoid discussing the actual valuation here.

Now back to the facts — because that’s all I’m looking at:

   •   4Moz+ PGM at Monchetundra

   •   Significant nickel / copper / cobalt across Nyud and Western areas

   •   Fully permitted project (a huge derisking factor)

   •   Zero debt

   •   $2bn+ in-ground metal value even using conservative pricing

   •   Multiple monetisation routes not included in the 28p figure

   •   Improving geopolitical backdrop that directly impacts asset accessibility and value

These are known numbers.

They are public, verifiable, and objective.

I’m not giving advice —

I’m simply looking at the facts and published resource metrics, nothing more.

📌 Bottom line:

You can dislike the analyst.

You can distrust AIM notes.

No problem.

But dismissing EUA’s valuation by waving around unrelated AIM history is logically flawed and avoids the real issue:

👉 Even the “conservative” 28p target sits below the hard-asset-backed valuation of 40p–50p+.

If you want to debate EUA, debate the numbers.

Everything else is noise.