Member Info for jimb2

🗳️ Let’s unpack Cadence Minerals’ upcoming **Annual General Meeting (AGM)** and how nominee holdings like Lynchwood’s 11.84% stake could influence corporate control.

### 📅 AGM Details

- **Date & Time:** 06 August 2025 at 11:00 a.m.

- **Location:** Hill Dickinson LLP, Broadgate Tower, London EC2A 2EW

- **Proxy Deadline:** 01 August 2025 at 11:00 a.m.

### 📜 Key Resolutions on the Table

| Resolution | Type | Description |

|------------|--------------|-------------|

| 1 | Ordinary | Receive and consider financial statements for year ended 31 Dec 2024 |

| 2 | Ordinary | Re-appoint Adrian Fairbourn as Director |

| 3 | Ordinary | Re-appoint PKF Littlejohn LLP as auditors |

| 4 | Ordinary | Authorise Directors to allot shares up to £1,000,000 nominal value |

| 5 | Special | Disapply pre-emption rights for equity issuance up to £1,000,000 |

### 🧠 Why Nominee Holdings Matter

Nominee accounts like Lynchwood’s are **legal custodial structures** where shares are held on behalf of beneficial owners. While the nominee is listed on the share register, **voting rights and influence** depend on:

- Whether the nominee votes independently or per client instructions

- If the beneficial owners consolidate their votes

- Whether the nominee is acting for a single institutional investor or multiple individuals

In Cadence’s case, Lynchwood’s 11.84% stake could:

- **Swing key resolutions**, especially Resolution 5 (which requires 75% approval)

- **Signal strategic interest** in future equity issuance or corporate direction

- **Influence board composition**, particularly if aligned with other large holders

### 🔍 Transparency & Control

Under UK law, companies must identify **Persons with Significant Control (PSC)**—typically those with >25% voting rights or influence. While Lynchwood doesn’t cross that threshold alone, its position as the **largest registered shareholder** means its voting behavior could be pivotal.

I'm intrigued!! - again trust AI at your own discretion - I asked if the loan as below was made:-

Yes, the loan to CSN Mineração S.A. in Brazil, with BNP Paribas as a key participant, was indeed made.

Multiple sources confirm this, detailing two significant financing arrangements:

USD 350 million loan for Iron Ore Plant Upgrading Project: This loan was co-financed by BNP Paribas (Tokyo Branch), Citibank, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale, and was underwritten by Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). This transaction was announced in May 2021.

US1.4billionexportpre−paymentfinancingfacility(includingaUS375 million commercial bank tranche): This larger facility, which included a pool of banks led by BNP Paribas (as Agent, Bookrunner, and Policyholder), Crédit Agricole, Natixis, and Société Générale, was advised by White & Case and also had insurance from SACE (an Italian export credit agency). This financing was confirmed in June 2022 (with further details in April 2023). This loan was intended to support CSN Mineração's investment plan for 2021-2025, including the construction of a new pellet feed plant and industrial expansion projects.

Further search:

While BNP Paribas has a policy on the mining industry and is committed to financing the energy transition, finding direct evidence of them investing specifically in "green iron ore" projects in Brazil is nuanced.

Here's what the search results indicate:

* **Financing for CSN Mineração (Brazil):** BNP Paribas was a mandated lead arranger in a **$375 million loan to CSN Mineração**, a major Brazilian iron ore exporter, in 2022. This loan was for their investment plan to increase production capacity, including the construction of a new pellet feed plant and industrial expansion projects. While the article mentions "energy self-sufficiency" through investments in power plants, it **does not explicitly state that the iron ore production itself is "green" or low-carbon** in this context. It focuses on increasing recovery of scrap material and general production capacity.

* **Brazil Iron's "Green Pellet Feed" Project:** There is a separate mention of **Brazil Iron Mineração Ltda** planning a **$5 billion iron ore project in Bahia, Brazil**, which aims to be the "first integrated producer of green pellet feed, pellets and HBI, with net-zero carbon emissions." This project is described as revolutionizing the iron and steel industry. However, **BNP Paribas is not explicitly mentioned as an investor or financier in this specific "Brazil Iron" project.**

* **BNP Paribas' Broader Policies:**

* Their "Mining industry" policy states that "Many ores are also key to the energy transition, for example in playing a predominant role in electric vehicles or wind and solar power." This suggests a general interest in minerals that support green technologies.

* They are actively involved in financing **green steel initiatives** globally. For example, BNP Paribas is a lead lender in the **H2 Green Steel** project in Sweden, which aims to produce green steel using hydrogen, significantly decarbonizing the industry. While this isn't directly "green iron ore" in Brazil, it shows their commitment to the decarbonization of the steel value chain, which relies on iron ore.

* BNP Paribas also provides "Inclusive & Sustainability-Linked Financing" to microfinance players in Brazil, linking financial conditions to environmental and social objectives, demonstrating a broader commitment to sustainability in the region, but not specifically in large-scale mining.

* They have a strong stance against financing thermal and metallurgical coal mining projects.

**Conclusion:**

While BNP Paribas has financed iron ore operations in Brazil (like CSN Mineração) and is a significant financier of green steel projects elsewhere (like H2 Green Steel), there is **no direct, explicit confirmation that BNP Paribas is currently investing specifically in "green iron ore" extraction projects in Brazil.** Their policies indicate a move towards more sustainable mining practices and a focus on minerals for the energy transition, but direct invest

@tomcat-14, yes that seems to be the case: AI search results

While the directors manage the company, the "Person with Significant Control" (PSC) is the individual or entity that ultimately owns or controls more than 25% of the shares or voting rights, or has significant influence over the company.

According to Companies House filings, BNP Paribas S.A. was notified as a person with significant control on April 8, 2020, holding 75% or more of the shares and voting rights. Prior to this, BNP Paribas Securities Services was listed as a PSC. This indicates that Lynchwood Nominees Limited is ultimately controlled by BNP Paribas.

So, the associated people are primarily the current and past directors, but the ultimate control lies with BNP Paribas S.A.

July 24, 2025 -

The Claimants file observations on the request to address the objections to jurisdiction as a preliminary question.

AI:

This statement indicates several key things about the legal case:

A Challenge to the Court's Authority: There's an existing "objection to jurisdiction." This means one of the parties (most likely the defendant, but potentially the court itself) has argued that the court does not have the legal power or authority to hear this particular case. This could be due to issues with:

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The type of case isn't within that court's purview.

Personal Jurisdiction: The court doesn't have authority over the specific people or entities involved.

Geographical Jurisdiction/Venue: The case belongs in a different location or country.

A Request for Early Resolution: The phrase "request to address the objections to jurisdiction as a preliminary question" means that the party raising the objection (or the court) wants this fundamental issue to be decided before the case proceeds to the main arguments and evidence (the "merits" of the case). If the court agrees it lacks jurisdiction, the case could be dismissed without further proceedings.

The Claimants' Response: "The Claimants file observations" means that the party who initiated the lawsuit is formally submitting their written arguments and explanations in response to this request. Their observations would aim to convince the court that it does have jurisdiction and that the case should proceed.

In summary, this indicates:

The case is at a procedural, pre-trial stage.

There's a fundamental dispute about whether the court can even hear the case.

The Claimants are actively defending the court's jurisdiction over their case.

The outcome of this "preliminary question" is critical; if the objection is upheld, the case could be dismissed.

AI search, local gov in Pedra Branca

both **Marcelo Pantoja dos Santos** and **Gheysa Priscila da Silva Duarte** have professional and political ties to mining in Pedra Branca do Amapari.

- 🏗️ **Marcelo Pantoja** worked for **MPBA – Mineração Pedra Branca do Amapari** starting in 2004, where he held roles in administration and human resources. His career in public service has consistently emphasized partnerships with the private sector, including mining, as part of his development strategy.

- 🦷 **Gheysa Duarte**, while primarily known for her work in public health, is part of the same political coalition and supports the municipality’s development model, which includes mining as a key economic driver. There’s no direct record of her working in mining, but her alignment with Pantoja suggests shared priorities.

Pedra Branca do Amapari is home to significant mineral activity, especially iron ore, and local leadership has historically supported responsible mining as a source of jobs and infrastructure investment.

I'm not expecting much resistance in Pedra Branca if the search is accurate,

🗳️ Marcelo Pantoja dos Santos and Gheysa Priscila da Silva Duarte were elected on October 6, 2024, during Brazil’s municipal elections. Marcelo won with 70.6% of the valid votes, securing a strong mandate from the people of Pedra Branca do Amapari. Their official term began on January 1, 2025, following a formal swearing-in:

If you trust AI!

Marcelo Pantoja’s administration has taken a **markedly more collaborative approach** to mining operations in Pedra Branca do Amapari compared to his predecessor, Beth Pelaes.

### 🔄 Shift in Tone and Strategy

- **Beth Pelaes’s administration** was known for its confrontational stance toward **Dev Mining**, including equipment seizures and refusal to recognize state-issued environmental licenses.

- **Marcelo Pantoja**, by contrast, has emphasized **partnerships with private companies**, including mining firms, as part of his broader development model. His background in **MPBA – Mineração Pedra Branca do Amapari** likely informs this pro-industry orientation.

### 🛣️ Infrastructure and Road Use

- While Beth’s team objected to Dev Mining’s use of local roads, Marcelo’s administration has **not publicly opposed** such usage. Instead, it has focused on **infrastructure investment** to support industrial activity and improve road conditions for both residents and businesses.

- Marcelo’s platform includes **on-time salary payments, public works delivery, and policy development**, all of which benefit from mining revenue and logistical support.

### 🤝 Political Continuity with Pragmatism

- Though Marcelo was vice-mayor under Beth Pelaes, his leadership reflects a **pragmatic evolution** rather than strict continuity. He’s retained the coalition’s core values but **softened the stance** on contentious issues like mining road access.

Thanks @tomcat-14,

Back in 2013, when roughly a third of the railroad was complete, the projection was up to three years to finish the full stretch. Have we now returned to the full estimated length of around 190 km? Another point to consider: will those taking on the project commit the same level of investment to maintain a similar timeline?

If TCDIR were still involved—particularly with Chinese backing—I’d feel more confident about the railroad moving forward. As for the decision to start the Azteca mine, it doesn’t strike me as a strategic development. It feels more like a last-ditch effort. Well otherwise I would have to say that perhaps that could have been started a couple of years back?

Yes I do recall @Ivybush, you did contribute often on here back then, for me the railroad with the interest from the Chinese to develop agriculture in the region was a real positive with the added benefits to the region. As expressed by the bod at state level all the dialogue was supportive of the mine, railroad, and port but I have doubts this is the same throughout the municipalities and the railroad now appear of greater importance to the region with BRICS.

The 3,000 families to relocate was also something of concern but that apparently is something in the planning, how long that will take if the go ahead is received and then the time to revitalise the track and infrastructure... best case now for me is the Azteca ore finances us up to a buyout.

TCDIR - are they out of the equation? since they haven't been mentioned recently as far as I can tell.

TCIDR is positioned as a key partner providing both the technical expertise for the project's design and construction, and leveraging its connections to secure the significant funding required to bring the Amapá Iron Ore Project back into full operation.

You have to wonder if their interest remains but not as financer??

China is Brazil's Largest Agricultural Trading Partner: China has been Brazil's largest agricultural trading partner since 2013, surpassing the EU and the US. In 2024, China accounted for one-third of Brazil's total agricultural export value, and in 2023, Brazilian agricultural exports to China hit a record US$60.24 billion.

Soybeans Lead the Way: Soybeans are the flagship product, with Brazil being China's primary supplier. In June 2025, China's soybean imports hit a record 12.26 million metric tons, with nearly 80% sourced from Brazil. Brazil's share of China's soybean imports increased from 7% in 2005 to 30% in 2024, and it's projected to maintain a significant share in 2025

Well, whatever the outcome I don't believe the partnership will have any management with the railroad other than being customers if they are still around for the Amapa mine to come online.

It still looks many years off for the railroad to link to the port and plan D (I'm calling it) to use the Azteca plant makes me believe this is so, that's 194Km to ship the processed ore by road to the port on poor condition roads....seems plan D should have been plan A.

I'm not sure the doubt around the railroad being revitalised has been covered..but a slight tick up is welcome..

US offtake, very unlikely the Orange felon:

Trump interfering in Brazil with threatens import taxes of 50% on Wednesday for its treatment of its former president, Jair Bolsonaro, showing that personal grudges rather than simple economics are a driving force in the U.S. leader’s use of tariffs.

Blimey,

ARM - my first AIM investment, around 2004 - 2005, £500 but after six months got a little impatient - nice £50k missed out on - hopefully ITM will make up for it?

Yes, China need all that coal fired power stations to keep the solar, EV and renewables manufacturing at full capacity such is the global demand:

They have a better approach than the idiot in the US:

https://youtu.be/CexZqxu-waQ?si=HoziUqn5s1Fcft8U&t=147

Yes, it appears the confidence is centered around projects possibly expediting planning/construction as others have alluded to by taking advantage of the extended period:

The current deadline for U.S.-funded hydrogen projects to begin construction and still qualify for the 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit is December 31, 2027.

This extension was recently passed by the U.S. Senate, pushing the original cutoff from January 1, 2026, to the end of 2027. It gives developers two extra years to start construction and still claim up to $3 per kilogram of clean hydrogen produced—a major boost for green hydrogen initiatives

As long as there's no executive order or Trump decides to put tariffs on sun and wind if it originates from outside the US - LOL

I'm not sure the Sonora lithium will find its way to the US for a good while, Trump will cancel all EV subsidies as his revenge for Biden and Musk continues along with his bribery by big oil:

https://youtube.com/shorts/nx3Ttj3pPSg?si=xzzx316y1skX6vSN

I wonder how Seinbaum sees the funding opportunities from the US for lithium?

I'm all for the US contracts coming through 100%, you might have seen Elon Musk is threatening all republicans who vote in favour of the Bill that he will make sure they lose in the primaries - odd really as he was a Trump enabler.

Senator Whitehouse - very interesting pitch:

https://youtu.be/d94S2O0VdLw?si=uFwj_wb-PGSZIGg-&t=564

I'm just conscious of how much big oil money has bought/bribed/influenced Trump's direction on energy

Yes, it looks like Trump is hitting resistance, he is overall anti renewable:

~In a significant move for the clean energy sector, the U.S. Senate has extended the eligibility for the 45V clean hydrogen production tax credit through to the end of 2027, meaning projects that begin construction by December 31, 2027 can still qualify for up to $3 per kilogram of clean hydrogen produced.

This extension—part of the revised “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” under the Trump administration—offers a two-year reprieve from the original 2025 deadline and is seen as a stabilizing gesture for developers facing uncertainty. It aligns U.S. policy more closely with European timelines and could revive stalled projects that were racing against the clock

Thom Tillis is anti Bill, he knows his energy sector very well.,there have been some big power purchases for some of the renewable projects including hydrogen that would have depended on the current planned project and with gas peakers taking five years to construct these demands would not have been met, I doubt Trump would have done so otherwise:

https://youtu.be/KVTrY3k-410?si=M9XXlWVJGMOgaBDT&t=605

AI search:

🛑 Hubs Facing Defunding

The Trump administration is reportedly targeting four hydrogen hubs for funding cuts—all located in Democratic-leaning states and focused on green hydrogen from renewables or nuclear:

• ARCHES (California)

• Mid-Atlantic Hub (Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey)

• Pacific Northwest Hub (Oregon, Washington, Montana)

• Midwest Hub (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan)

These hubs were central to Biden’s clean hydrogen strategy and had already begun development with public-private backing.

✅ Hubs Likely to Keep Funding

Three hubs are expected to retain support, all in Republican-leaning states and primarily producing blue hydrogen (from natural gas with carbon capture):

• Heartland Hub (Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota)

• Appalachia Hub (Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania)

• HyVelocity Hub (Texas and Louisiana)

This shift favors fossil-fuel-based hydrogen and aligns with Trump’s broader energy agenda.

I don't believe hydrogen will be moving forward under Trump, he trying to defund all renewables.

Intermittent energy!

Today is a good day for renewable energy, 45% wind 37% solar - as I type - storage is the way forward, I've seen wind as low as 6% and obviously solar will be that low on a daily basis.

https://gridwatch.co.uk/

28 GW demand.

No mention of the original TCIDR mou funding 70% equity 30% debt, I'm not seeing anything to say the full production from the mine will happen with the big question on when will the railroad to the mine be up and running and who will fund it.

Still, it's not as bad as I was expecting more of a placed in an induced coma rather than time of death.