RE: Next chapter14 Aug 2018 08:54
Squif - no doubt we'd all like SP as a performance metric for determining bonuses for management, but there's not that many British companies using this a metric, unlike many of the US based companies. I haven't had a chance to review what our peers like PMO/TLW do, but I'd suspect they don't either.
Here's some notes from the 2017 AR that shows ENQ decreasing overall bonus percentages, with more weighting going towards PSPs. The 2017 bonus metrics were Production (30%), Cash Opex and Capex (30%), Net Debt (20%), Magnus Integration (20%). The 2018 bonus metrics were Production (25%), Cash Opex and Capex (30%), Net Debt (15%), Operations (30%). We'd have no doubt liked to see some of the operations % go to SP performance - can we push for this in 2019? Shareholders could try….
JS does have 5 million shares option at this time, both unvested/vested not exercised, and that's the equivalent of circa 6 times his current salary. There's some skin in the game, but could be better..
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In 2017, we implemented the first phase of the two-year rebalancing of the overall executive remuneration package from short-term bonuses to longer-term Performance Share Plan (‘PSP’) awards. The main updates were as follows:
• Annual bonus award percentage was reduced from 100% to 85% of salary (at target) and from 225% to 175% of salary (maximum);
• Implementation of an additional debt metric into the annual bonus performance conditions;
• PSP maximum awards increased from 200% to 250% of salary at normal award level and from 300% to 350% of salary at exceptional award level;
• PSP awards to include a debt metric if and when required;
• Policy of bonus deferral into shares revised so that the entire annual bonus award above 100% of salary is deferred intoEnQuest shares for two years delivering a cap on the actual bonus paid out in cash;
• Executive Directors required to build up and hold at least 200% of salary in shares; and
• Malus or clawback provisions initiated on 2017 cash andshare elements of the annual bonus plan and on PSP awards.
In 2018, the second phase will see us implement a further reduction in the annual bonus percentage award to 75% of salary (at target) and 125% of salary (maximum).
As a Committee, we believe that the policy, strongly endorsed by shareholders, is aligned with the Company’s strategy and market best practice. We are also clear that variable remuneration should be based on strong, long-term business performance that delivers value to shareholders. We believe we have set threshold, target and stretch levels of performance accordingly.
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