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Don't forget the "ex-dividend" effect - most shares fall (generally by the dividend amount) immediately following the payment date.
Depending on dealing costs, etc, and by how much it actually falls, you might be better to take the divi and then buy on the drop but it could go either way.
This year, because of the additional Special Dividend to be paid a month later, and taking into account the "mood music" that could emerge from the AGM, it's not at all clear just how the SP will behave.

As part of the restructuring of their 3-year $500M loan facility (signed Jan-2017 with payments starting Jan-2020), the KRG were allowed to reduce their monthly payments to Glencore last year to only $3M for the 2nd half of the year, but then increasing to $30M per month from Dec-20 until Dec-21.
Despite strengthening oil prices, the continuing disagreements with Baghdad has severely squeezed the KRG finances and this is part of that ongoing story.

The Special Dividend I see as an attempt to head off criticism by leading investors before the AGM - criticism that has been growing for the last 2 years.
The 2 x Divis is actually quite a finely-judged gamble by the CEO and he might, just might, have staved off a full scale revolt by major shareholders.

Armasmaximilian,

do as putup says, have a good close look at the PSC and everything should become clear.
At $65 Brent and 55Mbopd you might be looking at $12.60/bbl as the return on your invested capital, plus another $3.40/bbl as your "profit".

Interesting articles that caught my eye this morning:

1. FT reporting on the increasingly authoritarian actions of the Kurdistan government - arresting and beating journalists etc. So much so that the German consulate in Erbil, among others, strongly complained.
https://www.ft.com/content/cd943209-b26b-45b2-a34a-e0d432b2e3f1

2. NYT reporting that Lockheed Martin are withdrawing their maintenance crews responsible for servicing the remaining Iraq F16 fighter jets. That fleet is now expected to be completely grounded - which will have implications for any action contemplated against resurgent DAESH.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/10/world/middleeast/iraq-f-16s-lockheed-martin.html

Bless you, but I'm afraid you're going to have to repeat your Basic Arithmetic year - yet again!

300 if you're lucky...

Reading Shamaran’s Q1 filing today, I noticed the following remarks – qualifications which I have not yet seen elsewhere:

“Since first oil occurred in July 2017, Atrush oil production has been consistently delivered to the KRG at the Atrush Block boundary and transported by pipeline for the KRG’s onward sale in the international market from Ceyhan, Turkey.
ShaMaran is not aware of the official allocation to the KRG of export pipeline capacity to Ceyhan but management expects no change in 2021 on the KRG’s ability of export pipeline capacity in Turkey.
However, due to possible unforeseen political developments in Iraq, Turkey and/or Kurdistan arrangements currently in place to export oil produced from the Atrush Block may not continue to be in effect.”

The single (operational) pipeline from Faysh-Khabur to Ceyhan has, I believe, a capacity of around 600,000 – 700,000bopd, so Shamaran’s concerns might indeed be worth taking on board – especially if the supposed agreement with the MOO does get off the ground and another 250,000+bopd gets put into the pipe (thus severely restricting how much the KRG can take from their operators).
Worth watching.

You don't have to agree with it, but you should take it into account.
From Hydrocarbon Processing, today :

Global oil demand to peak in 2026
The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EV) around the world will probably cause global oil demand to peak two years earlier than previously expected, Norway's biggest independent energy consultancy Rystad said.

World demand is now seen peaking at 101.6 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) in 2026, down from a forecast made in November of a peak in 2028 at 102.2 million bpd, Rystad Energy said.

"The adoption of electrification in transport and other oil-dependent sectors is accelerating and is set to chip away at oil sooner and faster than in our previous forecast," Rystad wrote.

Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, Rystad had anticipated that peak oil demand would be reached in 2030 at 106 million bpd.

Aside from the staggering takeover of EVs, assumptions across all our scenarios see oil demand being either phased out, substituted, or recycled across a range of sectors, it said. (Reporting by Terje Solsvik, editing by Nerijus Adomaitis)

I read that someone claims Wood Mackenzie have put a valuation of $8Bn on GKP.
I also read, on WoodMack's own website, that their AET-2 scenario paints a rather bleak picture of near- and medium term crude consumption / demand / price. Note that this is a scenario - but is based on the developed world's stated aims as per the Paris Agreement.
You don't have to believe it, but you certainly should take it into consideration.

"...As demand plummets under AET-2, the outlook for oil prices gets weaker and weaker. As mentioned, oil demand begins to decrease in 2023 and, soon after, the decline accelerates to year-on-year falls of 2 million b/d.
Consequently, oil prices begin to slip later this decade.
By 2030, under AET-2, we would expect Brent to average US$37 to US$42/bbl, down from US$60 to US$70/bbl currently. As low-cost producers, OPEC would end up with a 50% share of the market by 2050. But even though that is an increase in share, under AET-2, the rate of oil demand displacement is such that OPEC cannot prevent prices from falling over the forecast period. With demand declining 2 million b/d a year, OPEC cannot cut production enough to support prices over time because each year sees another large demand drop.

After 2030, the industry can rely largely on production from assets already on line. In 2040, our modelled oil price is in the range of US$28 to US$32/bbl. After 2040, as the demand decline accelerates, Brent slides to US$10 to US$18/bbl in 2050."

Look at both sides of the coin.
woodmac.com/horizons/reversal-of-fortune-oil-and-gas-prices-in-a-2-degree-world/

The “net book value” of Marathon’s O&G Assets (for the Atrush activities) is not available to us, but in order to estimate what they might have been we could look at what SNM have stated, and for the year-ended 31st Dec-2019 their O&G Assets (Tangible only, excludes Intangibles) were stated as $207,695,000.
(It’s worth noting that this number was subject to a severe impairment in 2020, due to the decline in world oil prices, and was reduced to $145,875,000 for the 2020 FYR - but I’ll stay with the old value of $207.7M for the rest of this evaluation.)

Assuming all contractor parties shared equally in the financing of the O&G Assets (in proportion to their %WI), we might conclude that if SNM’s final WI share in 2019 (27.6%) equated to $207.7M, then Marathon’s WI share (15%) or net book value just prior to the sale might have been roughly $112.9M (I am not aware of what their write-down standards are).
(If 27.6% = $207.7M, then 100% = $752.5M, and 15% would equate to ca. $112.9M)

This, however, is completely at odds with the value of Marathon PP&E acquired, stated in the transfer details, and said to be only $11,549,000.

Puzzling…

So, in the final analysis, and if the above rough calculations are correct, either Marathon’s share of the Capex used to create the O&G Assets does not appear to have been recognized,
Or
something else is going on.

Were the barrels-still-in-the-ground given away for nothing, and if so, why?

There are no answers, only more questions.

At least DNO did offer a price somewhat closer to GKP's Net Book Value of the Shaikan producing assets...

You have to ask yourself…

The price paid for Marathon’s 15% stake by Shamaran (subsequently split 50:50 with the main holder TAQA), as operator of the Atrush block directly to the N of Shaikan, is interesting as it appears to be the only recent and well-documented transfer of O&G asset transfer.
Some pertinent aspects:
A. The Atrush crude is higher quality (lighter, less S) and more valuable,
B. The pipeline down to the new Kurdish export was kicked-off by & for the Atrush field and later tapped into / shared by the Shaikan field.
C. Atrush bopd output is presently slightly more than Shaikan.
D. Gross Atrush block 2P/C reserves are said to be 109.9MMstb

For those with time to spare, and a wish to understand more about valuations, a read of Shamaran’s 2019-Annual Report (P11) might be rewarding; this report covers the 2018 agreement with Marathon.
Therein you can read that SNM paid $17.4M plus $1M (PSC capacity building bonus payment to KRG), so a total of $18.4M.

What is really interesting, is the breakdown of Identifiable Assets and Liabilities so acquired for that $18.4M, and these were listed as follows:

USD Thousands
Purchase price paid for 7.5% (total cash paid less net acquisition related costs) $18,431
Identifiable assets and liabilities acquired at fair value*:
Property, plant and equipment ($11,549)
Atrush Exploration costs receivable ($12,550)
Accounts receivable on Atrush oil sales ($7,378)
Atrush Development Cost loan ($1,764)
Atrush Feeder Pipeline loan ($1,087)
Provision for decommissioning and site restoration** $4,003
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities $2,393
Bargain purchase gain $9,500
Acquisition related costs – net ($8,750)
Net gain on Atrush acquisition $750
* IFRS 3 requires to fair value all assets and liabilities acquired. This included the fair market value of the property, plant and equipment acquired, , which the Company has approximated with reference to the $18.4 million price paid in the acquisition and other market indicators of the value of the property. All other fair values correspond to payment terms fixed by contract or, due to the short-term nature, are readily convertible to or settled with cash and cash equivalents.

As you can see, the assets acquired do not include any reference whatsoever to “barrels-still-in-the-ground” and nowhere in the document can be found any other such “intangibles”.

Why would that be?

It's the same Broadford Bay...

As I recall, for some reason or another I was unable to incorporate the space.
I use no other avatars on these public boards.

A straight like-for-like comparison with other deals done is impossible.
The crude quality is not the same - SH crude is significantly heavier and contains more Sulfur.
Even leaving aside other factors, these 2 factors alone reduce the price that buyers will pay.
Atrush crude discount to Brent is currently $15.77/bbl.
Shaikan crude discount to Brent is currently $21.10/bbl.

Do not be fooled by people reporting that Shamaran has paid $30/bbl for Marathons unwanted portion of the Atrush PSC.

The facts are:
Shamaran has currently reported 2P/C "Reserves" of 109.9MMstb, plus 3P/C of 158.4MMstb.
Following the Marathon purchase, Shamaran's interest in the Atrush PSC increased from 20.1% and is now 27.6%.

The 15% Marathon PSC interest was acquired, and then split 50/50 between Shamaran and TAQA, i.e. each then increased their PSC holding by 7.5%.

Shamaran reported in their 2020 FYR:
"On May 30, 2019 ShaMaran completed its acquisition of an additional 7.5% participating interest in the Atrush block. Under
two separate sale and purchase agreements, done in contemplation of one another, (“SPA”s) ShaMaran’s wholly owned
subsidiary, General Exploration Partners, Inc. (“GEP”), acquired directly Marathon Oil KDV B.V.’s (“MOKDV”) full 15%
participating interest in the Atrush Block and immediately thereafter sold a 7.5% Atrush participating interest to TAQA
Atrush B.V. (“TAQA” and Operator of the Atrush Block), bringing the Company’s total interest in Atrush up to 27.6%. The
total consideration paid to complete the acquisition was $27.2 million, comprised of $17.4 million paid to Marathon, $1
million of PSC capacity building bonuses accounts payable paid to the KRG on direct behalf of MOKDV and in conjunction
with the payment to MODKV, and $8.8 million of net acquisition related costs. The $8.8 million of net acquisition related
costs were comprised of $9.5 million of PSC capacity building bonuses paid to the KRG and $750 thousand of payments
received from TAQA and were not considered part of the purchase price of the acquisition in line with IFRS 3 and have been
expensed as incurred within the Statement of Comprehensive Income in 2019. The fair value of the net identifiable assets
and liabilities acquired exceeded the $18.4 million purchase price paid resulting in a bargain purchase gain of $9.5 million in the year 2019."

Work it out for yourselves - you will not reach anywhere near $30/bbl.

Be very careful who you believe here.

theoryman,
your point is taken - the detail will out eventually and we shall all be the wiser.

In my posting, I omitted the "plus 50% of all border taxes" issue.
Again, and depending on who's lies you believe, these misappropriated revenue streams are said to benefit the KRG by approx. $8Bn pa. If added to the SOMO crude oil invoices, this skews the benefit side of the deal even more in Baghdad's favour and puts pressure not only on the extended clan members who share in that bounty, but on those oil companies like GKP who depend on the KRG coffers being well-filled.
I fully expect border tax corruption to continue unabated and, as Baghdad's people are well-informed, this will severely stress the agreement.
The export meters at Faysh Khabour have not yet been mentioned, but any policing of the export volumes will have to be done there - and on a permanent basis. Same will apply to truck exports via the various border crossings, both legal and illegal.

The problems have not been solved, only the major cracks have been papered over.

Depending on which version you believe, Kurdish crude blend sells for between $7 - $10/bbl less than what SOMO believes should be the case.
At $8.5/bbl difference, that implies that ca $64M per month, or $768M pa, more will be paid to Baghdad than what the Kurds will receive for their 250,000 barrels.
That has potential implications for the current payment agreement with the Kurdish producers, and until these are clarified there will remain a question mark against this whole thing.

As long as Brent remains around the current level such payments can be relatively easily stomached; should Brent slide back below the $55 level then it has the potential to unravel very quickly.

The apple has a worm:

"...The quantities delivered are based on the amounts realized from the sale of 250 thousand barrels of crude oil per day AT THE PRICE OF SOMO."

If this goes through, and it has the powerful backing of Erdogan, then we will almost certainly see the restart of terrorist attacks against the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline running through the Diyarbakir province of S. Turkey - with all that implies for producers.

The open and transparent ownership of foreign-registered companies, coupled with the issue of Beneficial Ownership, has long been of interest to GKP shareholders (not only!), and some of us have been lobbying MPs and others to tighten the rules for such companies that also make use of London Listings for their offshoots.

Last year for example, the issue of Beneficial Ownership Registers was debated in the Parliament.

Bermuda is a Sovereign Overseas Territory, and as such, the UK Parliament has unlimited powers to have all sorts of Bermuda (financial) laws altered – should it see fit. It also already has a Central Register (not a public register) which contains the relevant shareholder information but, until recently, there has been no great pressure to have things changed.
(A lot of that pressure came from the EU!).

The debates on the Sanctions and Money Laundering Bill 2017-19 included an Amendment 69G, which would have forced Bermuda to make their listings public. Needless to say, the amendment faced great opposition and appeared doomed. Facing defeat on other points, however, the government agreed to include the new clause (Clause #6) compelling the OTs to establish public registers (they did not agree to do this for the Crown Dependencies, see Clause #14).

To the best of my knowledge, the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 bill was passed with a deadline (for the OTs to comply) of “End-2020”.
Minister of State Alan Duncan stated in the House that, in the event of an OT not complying, a Draft Order in Council would then be raised, requiring the government of the day to prepare Draft Legislation (by 31st Dec-2020) requiring the government of the OT to introduce such public register by Dec-2023.

This implied delay went down badly, and the act was again debated in the HoL last Summer, but the Draft Order In Council was published 14th Dec-2020.
As far as I know, the new deadline of Dec-2023 still stands.

The Bermudians are no at all happy…

...and no sooner said than done, DNO popped up on my ticker!

Oslo, 9 March 2021 – DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today reported receipt of USD 42.4 million net to the Company from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), of which USD 31.9 million represents DNO’s entitlement share of January 2021 crude oil deliveries to the export market from the Tawke license in Kurdistan.

Of the balance, USD 4.3 million is an override payment equivalent to three percent of gross January 2021 Tawke license revenues under the August 2017 receivables settlement agreement and USD 6.2 million is a payment towards the Company’s arrears of USD 259.0 million relating to withheld payment of Tawke license 2019 and 2020 entitlement and override invoices.

ShaMaran announced yesterday, DNO yet to do so:

VANCOUVER, BC, March 9, 2021 /CNW/ - ShaMaran Petroleum Corp. (“ShaMaran” or the “Company”) (TSXV: SNM) (Nasdaq First North Growth Market Sweden: SNM) is pleased to confirm payment of $21.7 million ($7.3 million net to the Company) has been received from the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) for Atrush oil sales invoice entitlements for the month of January 2021. In addition, the Company has also been paid $1.04 million as the first monthly implementation of the KRG’s proposed repayment mechanism for receivables.