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Stop posting such tosh.

I can see a similarity in the chart with last year. Low SP of around 1.5p in December and then a steady climb upwards for the next few months.

Stop posting such tosh.

The CEO has already signed thousands of restaurants for another company through telesales so why start bleating on about self-signing. Of course it can be done on the phone. I hope he just gets on and does it.

Restaurants have already been added today with photos and restaurant descriptions.

Discoeats restaurants are all back on their platform today - 107 now.

No, but the total is 215.

Select a restaurant. Book Now. Select a date. Can book any day up to Friday 10th Jan.

I see they have added extra booking days now - looks like up to 7 days plus today. Every little helps.

4 in Manchester plus the others already mentioned.

I have bought a few back in here but nowhere near the amount I've held in the past. See how it goes.

I can see Big Dish becoming a virtual discount card operator with everything the same except Dish won't have any membership fee money (or any customers) and the restaurants will pay the booking fee instead of the members. Unfortunately without members there won't be much in the way of booking fees.

Overall Big Dish will just do a lot less business and take a lot less revenue than the card companies.

Contrary to what some posters have claimed I do not agree the the yield management concept is proven. In fact the figures say the opposite.

As I have previously posted, the revenue figures in the IPO Prospectus show that both Big Dish Asia and Table Pouncer achieved revenue of about £250,000 in their start-up years which subsequently fell to around £160,000 by years 2/3. Then when they converted both to yield management the revenue fell to around £10,000 in Asia and £20,000/£30,000 at Pouncer. That is a chronic drop in revenue due to the fact that there wasn't any income from card membership.

It looks as if the discount card companies are winning this hands down and there just isn't a future for yield management in the restaurant sector.

Has anyone looked at the App recently. Obviously not as every single restaurant has suddenly gone "No Seats Available".

Not sure what is going on. Thoughts anyone.

Align did a previous Research Report just after the IPO. All of the Eatigo figures are repeated from the first one. Link below:

https://www.investegate.co.uk/bigdish-plc--dish-/rns/publication-of-research-report/201808150700048546X/

Re Discoeats I have no idea.

Some of their restaurants are in the City and only open from Mon to Fri but they don't take them off the platform every weekend.

Also some are clearly not open today and they are still there but you cannot book a table.

Also with the big range of discounts and the option for customers to book a table with just a 10% discount or even with no discount why take any restaurants off the App. Very strange.

From the customers viewpoint they will save more money paying the booking fee - especially if it is only 50p - and then getting 30% or 50% off the drinks bill. Alcohol, especially wine, is still notoriously expensive in restaurants and that extra saving is huge in terms of the overall bill.

Let's face it yield management in the restaurant industry is not working at all.

What is there for the restaurants to sign with the Big Dish platform as against Tastecard, Table Now or Gourmet Society, where a lot are already signed anyway.

The discounts with both are the same - both 25% or 30% and 50%.

Why should the restaurants pay the booking fee to Big Dish when the other options get the customers to pay the booking fee.

You could say that the customer doesn't have to pay a fee but against that firstly there are hardly any customers and secondly Gourmet Society are offering a 2 month trial for £1 and also with the discount cards the discount also applies to the drinks menu.

To be honest looking at the Principle Risks and Uncertainties it looks to me as if the directors know that this company is as good as finished.

With Big Dish Asia now closed for business and the tech team in Manilla only staying around for Big Dish UK there is nothing to stop them just closing the whole thing down.

They have struggled since IPO to sign restaurants, with only 205 to show for 17 months work, and even if they do manage to sign up any decent restaurant numbers they are still not generating any revenue. Basically no-one is aware of or using the App anyway.

It might not be all lost for shareholders as they could keep the listing open and find some new directors and become a shell company in search of an RTO.

That would just leave the problem of what to do about the 150 million or so shares currently in the hands of the directors.

I'm surprised there is no mention that they have since closed Big Dish Asia completely - probably due to the complete lack of revenue of this model.

The £11,000 revenue was from between 100 and 150 restaurants for the 6 month period. Yield Management for restaurants just does not generate revenue - and the management seem to have realised this by the long list of Principle Risks and Uncertainties they have included in the results.

Principal Risks and Uncertainties

The principal business risks that have been identified are as below.

The Company is operating in a competitive market and faces competition from other companies who do or may in the future offer a similar service on similar terms. Competitors may have much greater marketing budgets than the Company. If the Company is unable to attract sufficient restaurants and potential customers in the UK at the rate expected, the Company may be unable to successfully compete in the market which would have a material adverse impact on its future prospects.

Restaurants may not continue to accept the value proposition of online reservation companies like BigDish which could lead to the number of restaurants signing up and continuing to use BigDish to decline which could affect the Company's prospects.

The success of the Company is dependent on the technical capabilities of its restaurant booking app and appeal to users. If technical issues arise or the technology is not as appealing as competitors' technology, this may have a significant impact on the Company's ability to attract and retain restaurants and entice customers to use BigDish. The costs associated with remaining competitive may be disproportionate to the revenues generated by the Company resulting in an adverse impact on the Company's financial position.

And even using the Tastecard valuation of $100M for 6000 restaurants that is roughly £77M for 6000 restaurants which give Big Dish with their 205 restaurants a valuation of £2.62M or 0.75p per share which makes the current share price and valuation of 1.20p far too high.

The Align Research Top 5 Conviction Picks For 2020 article on Big Dish was little more than a rehash of the info in the last couple of RNS's and some extremely inaccurate figures for Eatigo which were rehashed from the IPO prospectus and have no relevance to anything.

Take this opening paragraph:
"Investors in restaurant yield management platform BigDish (DISH) had a rollercoaster year, with the shares starting 2019 at around 1.7p before soaring to over 9p in June. Fast forward six months and we are now down to just 1.2p per share, for a market cap of just £4.2 million, a valuation which looks unfair in our view set against net cash of slightly in excess of £1m."

In actual fact, with little or no revenue and Big Dish Asia since closed the remaining cash in the bank is about all they have got - and that works out at a share price of about 0.28p - 4 times less than the current share price.

It also doesn't take into account that the share price rose on the back of the plans for the nationwide roll-out which in reality turned into a total disaster.

The next few paragraphs repeat the recent RNS's but anyone who's followed this share for a while knows that the ideas and plans in the RNS's don't always work out to plan. In fact they never do.

Finally it is nonsense to dig out this valuation of Eatigo who do not even operate in the UK. At the time of the IPO AB was talking about the value of Tastecard - $100 Million for 6000 restaurants - so to use this stupid Align valuation is like saying that Tastecard were really worth $600 Million which is nonsense.

In fact, someone once posted an article on here to say that Tastecard with 6000 restaurants were initially sold for £34.5 Million to a company that already had a similar number of restaurants on its platform and then the larger company was sold on for $100 Million. This means that Tastecard's real value was more like $50 Million - for 6000 restaurants.

Plus anyone who read my posts of a few weeks ago should know that as yet the yield management concept seems to bring in considerably less revenue than the card discount concept - roughly ten times less revenue to be exact.

Things may change here if the new CEO actually does sign up hundreds and thousands of restaurants in the next few months but I'd rather wait to see this happen than buy shares on the strength of this extremely poor Research report.

Discoeat meanwhile have gone from 110 restaurants to 41. Not sure what is going on there.

"advise on the acquisition of restaurant groups" etc. That is saying 2 totally different things.