Member Info for The.Crowman

IG work well and have no fees. I had my voting email on the day the AGM was announced - I voted them all No aside of the accountants.

He has been 'bought'. Nothing more or less. This will be his swansong chair and he insists the pay for his cooperation is very good indeed.

Time is nearly up on the VAT refund, another porky from the master of porkies? Whale - was it four years ago they were about to land and yet never did and now frankly hardly matters.

Sleight of hand... I have stronger words but this BB would pull the thread.

Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vqZDliuuvcw

Settle in but for holders do not expect a happy ending.

Mukiwa - 1400 posts? Hardly. I rarely post about anything anymore so you are confusing my recent posts on AML as though that is all I have an interest in.

I watch this thread because the whole AML facinates me - the car business, british management, Palmer, the whole IPO con job and not least the refusal on here to see the wood for the trees. Everyone hates CG26 and that pack mentality is another draw, he is a one ball juggling act I accept but reading the protest to his predictions is always interesting in terms of investor psychology. Last but not least as petrol head I want to see Aston prosper and turn things around without simply being a name plate for a chinese company.

Thats my interest and it sure aint 1400 posts - maybe 50 tops.

You do realise they will need to raise more cash though? It is inevitable. That was the main thrust of the Telegraph piece - just how long will Stroll / Yewtree keep stumping up to keep the lights on?

Basically asking how long will Stroll keep writing the cheques before Geely decide to add it to their full ownership portfolio.

When the Saudis made a pitch for Wood Group everyone belived it would result in at least 80p a share (some hoped for £2 and thought it was justified) when the then sp was around 50p.

They offered 35p and ended up paying even less - 30p.

I fear the sp here is talking the same language and the MM / MA colab will not end well for shareholders. The form book is clear - Ingenuity.

I would as of today take anything north of 50p and not look back.

The level of stupid demonstrated by posters is quite remarkable. Gamblers at Betfred know more about the horses they back than many a punter on the LSE.

I believe they are a consortium of potato farmers based in the Midlands. Hence the name.

I think Hallmark along with those before him have brought their ideas and strategy to AML and have found out it will not work or Stroll will not let it happen.

They need to bring DBX to Ga&ydon and slash capex if they have any hope of surviving.

Their current grandiose facade will not survive on sub 5000 cars and will never pay down the debt. Stroll must rue the day he got involved.

Https://ssoreport.com/aml-q1-2026

Calls it straight again. The bank of Dad - Stroll snr will be needed again before q3 - Is this simply history long repeating going back to David Brown/Gauntlett or a smarter play? Me I think Stroll wishes he had never laid eyes on AML even in a car park.

Almost pointless BB - run as if one MM was the moderator.

It sucks.

28p agaim I reckon.

Layer in buys as a hedge. Is 5% daily a falling knife? Me its an opportunity.

You do not seem to understand Fitch's line of business.

Look it up - Google.

Rating action and leverage concerns

As reported by Fitch Ratings, the agency has revised THG PLC's Outlook to Negative from Stable and affirmed its Long-Term Issuer Default Rating at 'B+'. Fitch also downgraded THG Operations Holdings Limited's EUR445 million term loan B senior secured rating to 'BB-' from 'BB', with a Recovery Rating of 'RR3'.

The agency says the outlook change reflects delayed deleveraging in 2025 and its expectation that leverage remains stretched in 2026. Fitch estimates EBITDA leverage falls to 6.2x in 2026 from 9x in 2025, before moving toward 5.0x in 2027, but warns that a lack of continuous quarter-on-quarter EBITDA growth in 2026 could trigger a downgrade in the next six to nine months.

Fitch links the weaker recovery outlook mainly to THG's nutrition business, where it expects only partial pass-through of elevated cost inflation. EBITDA margin in the segment is projected to recover gradually to 6.4% in 2026 and 7.6% in 2027, still well below the company’s medium-term target of 12%.

Nutrition recovery and cash flow outlook

Segment profitability in nutrition fell to 4.7% in 2025 from 6% in 2024 as whey cost pressure and limited price increases weighed on margins. Fitch expects some normalisation in U.S. whey prices, but says THG is likely to implement only moderate price rises in 2026 because of muted consumer sentiment and intense competition.

The affirmation of the rating also reflects improving revenue momentum across beauty and nutrition, which began in the second half of 2025 and continues in the first quarter of 2026, when revenue rises 4.6%. Fitch expects mid-single-digit revenue growth in 2026, supported by demand for protein products, new product launches, expansion in offline channels and licensing, while beauty sales growth of about 3% is expected to come from a stronger focus on higher-margin products and prestige brands.

Fitch says THG's liquidity remains comfortable and refinancing risks are manageable, helped by lower interest costs after the 2025 amend-and-extend deal and lower capital expenditure following the Ingenuity demerger. It forecasts free cash flow margins of 1% to 3% from 2026, compared with negative 3.9% in 2025, but adds that failure to deliver consistently positive free cash flow from 2026 would further weaken liquidity and no longer fit a 'B+' rating.

Our earlier coverage of KBRA’s rating action on Cantor Fitzgerald outlined the agency’s affirmation of the firm’s issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings at BBB with a Stable outlook. The update emphasized that the credit profile was viewed as unchanged, supported by Cantor’s diversified operating structure across capital markets, investment banking, and asset management, with no near-term shift signaled in the rating view.

Https://ssoreport.com/who-lives-who-dies

Aston Martin today is not too different. The brand has survived seven previous bankruptcies; there is no reason it can’t successfully navigate another.

Survival Chances: High

Aston Martin: hugely valuable brand, equally badly managed

Since early 2020, Aston Martin Lagonda has been under Lawrence Stroll and his Yew Tree Consortium. AML has relaunched its core product range, invested heavily in Formula 1, and churned out an endless series of specials. It has also chewed through multiple CEOs and leadership teams, making the Trump White House look like a bastion of stability. The “world’s most desirable, ultra-luxury British performance brand” Stroll announced in 2020 simply hasn’t materialized. Wholesale numbers fell 9% in 2024 and a further 10% in 2025. The only thing AML has consistently grown is its debt pile.

On paper, the strategy — product relaunch, constant stream of specials, F1 investment — isn’t far from Ferrari’s playbook. Why then does one have a market cap of $60 billion and the other less than £500 million? Execution. Ferrari has run a textbook scarcity-demand model for years. AML throws any pretense of demand management out the window every Q4 by loading dealers, then spends the following year unwinding the mess that creates. The specials programme has compounded the damage: the Valour’s secondary-market collapse, the protracted Valhalla delays, and evaporating residual values on recent limited editions. Combined, these actions have broken the implicit promise that makes ultra-luxury cars worth buying. Ferrari’s waitlists exist because a significant number of customers believe they are investing in assets that will likely hold value, with high potential for appreciation. AML has undermined that belief among exactly the collectors it most needs to cultivate and rebuilding it will require years of supply discipline that the company has never demonstrated. The cars themselves, after the latest product relaunch, are better than they have been in a generation, even if the basic design language has gotten further bastardized with every new iteration. The underlying product is not the problem. The management of it is. On this my friend and I violently agreed and it’s the reason why we believe Aston Martin is far from deserving Last Rites.

At the end of the day, it is Aston Martin’s hugely resilient strength as a global brand that makes it a highly likely candidate for long-term survival. Getting healthy, though, will not be easy. Another trip through bankruptcy is looking more likely by the day, but if that gives AML the ability to shed its crippling debt, eliminate the majority of its excess manufacturing capacity, cut the expensive leases on Q by Aston Martin showrooms in New York and Tokyo, and terminate the F1 sponsorship and marketing fees, then it is probably worth the pain. A restructured AML built around 5,000 retail sales and a three-car portfolio of Vanquish, Vantage, and DBX, with specials dramatically curtailed to create real demand, could be a viable business. Ferrari was a struggling, cash-burning company 30 years ago whose one indisputable asset was a great global brand. Aston Martin tod