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To some degree, PAF's immediate prospects seem to rest on two key ZAR Gold price metrics. The first is what the Elikhulu project, and obviously the debt associated with it, was based on and that is ZAR16,319 per oz. And the second is the price needed so that it stays within its loan covenants at the year-end and that is ZAR525,000 per kilo. At the moment the ZAR Gold price lies around ZAR17,862 per oz or ZAR574,000 per kilo. For the time being, it appears on track. Of course, events could change rapidly. But it looks as though it's through the riskiest part of its restructuring.

Simply thinking aloud. Taking a look back five years and the annual report for the year ended 2013 shows that administrative costs totalled some £2.7 million. For the year ended 2017, that figure climbed to £3.4 million. And then for the period ending 30th June 2018, it was £2.2 million. With such low levels of production, is there any reason why the figure seems to be so stubbornly high?

Overall, I think you are right. The real interest here is in Tantalum. There is much Lithium across the world – it could not be described as a rare commodity. That said, what attracts me most about this project is that the Tantalum can be and has been extracted and sold. It's not a pie-in-the-sky resource stock. The real issue is how much is this worth? What's the monetisable value of its resources?

As project managers, I have my doubts about Clarke, Harrison and Wardle. But whatever their failings, they are not stupid. Based on its key asset, I think it's worth a lot more than its current market capitalisation.

Nevertheless, this is a very risky proposition and, in my view, should be viewed as such by investors. The completed JORC report may simply demonstrate that this is not commercially viable. On balance, I don't think that will be the case.

Put crudely, there appears to be a stigma attached to Russian stocks. But looked at objectively and over a long period, Highland Gold doesn't seem to present governance issues. The management and the Russian authorities have had ample time to rip off investors. Cynical though it may seem, doing so would probably not be in their long-term interests. Demonstrating that the company can deliver for shareholders makes a lot more sense. Whether that changes in the future who can tell?

As for dividends, the company is mature and is doing what I would like it to do as a mature resource company. It's distributing excess profits to the owners of the enterprise. For me, that's a smart move. It shows confidence in the future – it's a cash movement. A very important signal. Frankly, I feel quite relaxed about investing in an established, dividend-paying Russian miner. And a look at its share register shows that I am in good company. When a listed resource business develops beyond a certain point and pays little or no dividends, it raises my suspicions about its underlying full-cycle costs. This does not appear to be one of those companies.

In my view, it also has a substantial upside on its doorstep. It doesn't need to make a "Transformational" acquisition. Or to go into new jurisdictions that may present a variety of problems.

The one potential downside I do see is whether there are changes at a political level in Russia. But, in my opinion, the company's dividend policy mitigates the risk.

As I mentioned before, the appointment of Panmure Gordon as joint broker shows something in terms of President's intentions. The former seems to be expanding its natural resources department at a time when President is clearly growing.

Whether or not the company will be successful in Paraguay is anyone's guess. My understanding is that it's looking at spending around US$12 million on a well. Frankly, I would rather the money be spent on Puesto Flores. But the company appears quite committed to drilling in Paraguay.

The implications for PAF may be unclear but this short article from Bloomberg could be worth a look.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-09/south-african-gold-industry-enters-final-phase-of-slow-death

After going through an awful lot of hoops to develop an onshore Trinidad portfolio, it just strikes me as being a little odd that the company is setting about on international expansion. Again, returning to its recent interim results, it points out that it's in “Active discussions” in respect to merger and acquisition activity in other countries in the Caribbean and South America. Surely, it makes more sense to concentrate on making its core assets operate at their optimum before moving on to other jurisdictions?

At this stage of its development, I would not invest in CERP. Having said that, it may be worth considering at some point. For now, it seems to lack a clear direction. For example, in its latest interim report, it outlines its most recent deals and the substantial development opportunities they present in Trinidad. But it then goes on to suggest that expansion in South America and the Caribbean would de-risk the business. Why a small company with clearly limited resources would seek international expansion, seems to me to be questionable. Fully exploiting its current assets and demonstrating their profitability would, in my view, make more sense. And it could then become an interesting proposition.

Genuine surprise. That is my initial reaction to the lack of response by the market to the company's recent drilling results. Firstly, they came in way ahead of guidance. And secondly, they both have located secondary targets that can be exploited at a later date. The backdrop is a local Argentine oil price that provides good margins.

At the same time, the oil sector seems to be out of favour, or should I say fashion. So I am not altogether that surprised. In my view, the anomaly of the share price will only be solved when the company's efforts show through to the bottom line - and that's when it reports its final results.

With the vast majority of the company's 2P reserves located in Goudron, it appears very dependent on the success of its waterflood programme aimed at wells in that particular field. Thus far, and it's no longer early days - it carried out tests from early 2018 and launched the programme fully in June 2018 - it does not seem to be working. It has already poured more than 80,000 barrels of water into well GY667 with what looks like little effect. Earlier in the year, it targeted one of its best prospects, well GY-670, but again with nothing to show for it.

Just how will the company define the limits of the waterflood campaign? Will it continue indefinitely? Is it limited by time? Is it limited in terms of the volume of water?

But the real question I have is what does it do if the Goudron waterflood campaign simply does not work?

Appointing a joint broker may not ordinarily be worth commenting on. However, as this link demonstrates Panmure Gordon appears to be beefing up its energy team. It does seem to illustrate President's ambitions.

https://www.panmure.com/panmure-gordon-hires-head-of-natural-resources/

Not wishing to pour water onto anyone's parade but the relevant parts of the attached report may be worth reading. It covers, amongst other things, the efficacy of past water injection programmes in Trinidad. A glaring point is that only a relatively small fraction of the water injected resulted in the production of oil. If we include the production of gas, the recovery rate rises substantially. But it's still nowhere near 100%. And these programmes were conducted by the likes of Texaco using huge amounts of water. Sure, technology has moved on but the key variable appears to be the volume of water and CERP's efforts seem to be pivoted on quite small amounts. Therefore, I would suggest, that the results are likely to be just as minimal.

http://www.energy.gov.tt/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Annual_Administrative_Report_1981.pdf

Whether the ill wind of falling oil prices works favourably for Trinity is anyone's guess. However, the company is debt-free, profitable and a low-cost oil producer. Not only could Petrotrin's reorganisation create opportunities for Trinity but it might be worth remembering that some of Trinity's rivals have staked a good deal on the success of waterflood programmes. My understanding is that such campaigns have been tried on a larger scale in Trinidad but failed as the reservoirs tend to be compartmentalised rather than interconnected. Maybe this time it will be different. However, if this technique does not work then Trinity could be in a strong position to pick up what remains of these companies. Basically, the low oil price environment could be conducive to it consolidating its position.

Today's RNS seems to point to the Royal Sheba project being relatively low cost as it will lend itself to open pit mining with some 0.37 million oz of Gold near-surface. Like many, I was labouring under the assumption that the company would need another fundraise to exploit this project fully. Now I am not so sure. And the figures it's using it describes as “Conservative”. Something worth noting as the company does not have a reputation for rashness.

Interestingly, it appears fairly confident about the prospect of near-surface deposits for its New Consort licence. And there seem to be more exploration opportunities within its wider acreage.

Broadly speaking, it seems on-track in developing its low-cost Gold production model. But I still think the market needs the reassurance of its next financial statements.

It may seem like a minor point but today's RNS highlights a useful revenue stream for the company in terms of utilising the pipeline capacity that this deal offers. Basically, it immediately benefits from selling some of that capacity to CGC, who are producing gas from a neighbouring concession. But, as it points out, there are other gas suppliers who could be potential users.

As with its acquisitions in late 2017, it's moving rapidly to monetise its assets with the company looking to add production by the year-end and unlock its gas resources in Estancia Vieja in Q1 2019. And, as an earlier poster mentioned, it's not being done with the issuing of shares and dilution.

Whether this proves to be a correct analysis, only time will tell. But I suspect that the oil business is becoming rather like the tobacco business. Long-term, and that's very long-term, it's in decline but in the meantime, the established low-cost players can afford to pay high dividends to shareholders. SOCO's model of paying out a substantial proportion of its free cash flow to investors, in my view, has a logic to it. Some small-scale oil producers can be built up and sold on but many cannot because their assets are fragmented and they are of dubious quality.

Basically, SOCO seems to have a model that works well bearing in mind the research that shows the importance of dividends with respect to investors' total long-term returns. That said, the one big potential downside is the price of oil. To some degree, it's a bet on the price of oil. But it has set itself up to be a full cycle low-cost producer. In my opinion, many other oil companies and with them their oil production will go to the wall before SOCO in the event of a collapse in oil prices.

At risk of repetition, the ZAR Gold price is ahead of what the company anticipated and planned for in April 2017 when it finalised the loan agreement for its Elikhulu project. It's even beyond the parameters required for it to meet its loan covenant requirements at the year-end. Basically, the numbers appear to be holding up. But I suspect that the market really wants to see the first set of figures for the new look Pan African. That's to say, excluding the high-cost underground production from Evander and including low-cost overground production from Elikhulu. And, of course, at some point the reinstatement of regular dividends. For now, I think it's probably a question of patience.

With an absence of news, it's virtually impossible to predict the direction of the company. However, looked at very crudely, it could quite easily become a key certified supplier in the Tantalum industry. And, of course, it has substantial and very accessible Lithium deposits. It has been in production and has the necessary infrastructure in place to ramp up production. Yet its market cap is little more than the price of a small house in Chelsea. I would suggest that the upside potential far outweighs the downside risk at this point in time. But this is definitely a risky investment.

As many already know, the management team behind KZG are the same as that behind Amerisur. The latter has just announced a US$93.5 million farm-out deal with a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum. And, as I write, the stock price is up over 20% on its opening.

Considering the JORC test results so far released, I would suggest that simply based upon its net asset value, this project still looks very attractive. Incidentally, John Wardle (Tracarta) has an academic background in mining rather than oil. I suspect that he has a clearer idea of what lies beneath KZG's acreage rather than Amerisur's which is probably why he owns so much of KZG's stock and so little of Amerisur's.

This highly successful start to its drilling campaign will not only lift production volume but will also increase reserves in its highly lucrative Puesto Flores concession – US$40 per barrel netbacks. Most of its 2P reserves, some 18.6 MMBO (Out of a total of 27 MMBO) are in its Puesto Guardian acreage which, at the moment, is less commercially attractive. Basically, it changes the profile of the company in terms of both production and reserves as it becomes a higher margin operation. And, of course, the campaign is not yet over.