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No debt, cash-rich and accruing cash on a daily basis, a strong asset base with scope for development and exploration. And a Board that has not delivered for shareholders. In my opinion, the company is looking very vulnerable to a takeover. Difficult to prove, but bearing in mind just how late it is with its drilling programme plus oil nudging US$84 per barrel, it's quite possible that it has something like one-third of its current market capitalisation in cash. Based upon its cash pile and the prospective sale price of its CPO-5 acreage, I would suggest that the company makes an attractive acquisition that would not be difficult to finance based upon the cash generating ability of its assets.

There also appears to be widespread unease amongst private shareholders. How much institutional support the Board has after so many false dawns and broken promises is difficult to gauge. But I suspect that patience is running out. An opportunistic bid at say 30p per share could be acceptable to most investors.

By the way, on a more upbeat note, I welcome the addition to the Board of someone with practical experience and a fluent Spanish speaker. Just hope she is going to spend time on the ground in Colombia.

Not wishing to put a dampener on anyone's party but a little perspective may help. As many posters have pointed out, Rex Harbour has had some serious issues with the BOD. So let's date this spat to 2014. And let's assume that he has been selling his shareholding over this period and this has kept the stock price artificially low.

According to the company's interim report for the period ended 30th June 2014, the company had US$56.3 million in cash and no debt. According to the interim results, H1 2014 production was 6561 BOPD. Making a very crude comparison, the recent interims for H1 2018 showed production at 5959 BOPD. While cash was US$49.3 million and no debt. Production is down by about 9% and cash is down some 12%. However, the company now has a raft of opportunities to increase production and reserves. Its OBA pipeline has slashed transport costs. The Chiritza re-pumping station will change the transport dynamics even further.

The point I am making is that the company has come a long way since Rex Harbour and others fell out with the Board. However, in the intervening period, it has not come that far. It's put in place the framework for growth. However, it appears to be having problems executing its plans. Rex Harbour or not, the stock price has not gone anywhere because of the company's inability to monetise its assets. The stock price at the 30th June 2014 was roughly 45p. The market makers appear to have understood that the company, for whatever reason, would not be able to turn its assets into cash. The real saving grace has been the price of oil.

According to Value The Markets, Goldman Sachs had a target price of 82p for the stock in June 2013. Investco had a target price of 75p in January 2014. Basically, institutions have placed a good deal of faith in this management team and it has not delivered. Maybe we may need to accept a merger or takeover as the best way forward. In my opinion, the company has some excellent assets but will they be fully exploited by the current managers?

The company's communications skills are, in my view, poor but it's worth bearing in mind that there are several upcoming Lithium related IPOs. This includes FMC's Livent, Tianqi Lithium and Ganfeng Lithium. The former will be listed in New York while the latter two are due to be listed in Hong Kong. This may give some indication of the value attached to KZG's Lithium assets.

By the way, as a recent article in the FT, August 29th 2018, pointed out, the key to Lithium production success lies in an ability to meet the exacting physical and chemical requirements of users. Carmakers, for example, cannot afford to have a recall. When one considers just how demanding KZG's Tantalum customer has been, I would suggest the company is in a far better situation to exploit its readily accessible deposits than most Lithium projects. It has delivered, albeit on a modest scale, with Tantalum but it has delivered.

When one considers just how successful the OBA pipeline has been for Amerisur in terms of reducing transport costs, I cannot help but think that analysts may have significantly undervalued its worth. With a pumping capacity of some 28,000 BOPD and, of course, the building of the Chiritza re-pumping station in Ecuador, it has considerable capacity. And John Wardle has made no secret of the possibility of expanding the OBA. The point I am making is that this could at some stage be a major profit centre in itself but, unlike the company's oil reserves, it goes largely unnoticed.

My understanding is that Giles Clarke, Alex Snow and Stephen Foss are the Board members responsible for shareholder relations. Does anyone know whether they have a clear campaign to convey this positive news to the market? Are they reaching out to institutions and to private investors?

As a shareholder, I am supportive. And I think the deal will go through. But I would like to see more details. The earlier merger discussions the company had with Kuwait Energy proved fruitless. This, in my view, is a much better fit. The company will be buying into Egypt and retaining management control. The Kuwait Energy deal would have involved assets in several different countries, including Iraq. There appeared no obvious synergies.

This acquisition strikes me as more binary. It's entering a country moving towards or back to energy independence. Sure, there are problems with getting paid in full and on time. But it's in the interests of the Egyptians to create an environment attractive to foreign investors – punctual payment is key to that.

Put simply, it's onshore low-risk and low-cost. SOCO cites research by Wood Mackenzie claiming that over the last 10 years the cost of the average well in the Western Desert was US$3.8 million with many at less than US$1 million. With that scale of costs, I would suggest the upside could be substantial. And SOCO appears committed to its model of distributing excess cash to shareholders.

Should the Merlon acquisition go ahead, it will, in my opinion, open up many avenues for SOCO to exploit. To start with, Merlon has some 1570 square kilometres of acreage and around 70% of this is covered by 3D seismic. It appears to be relatively cheap to drill. Certainly compared to drilling offshore Vietnam. And it claims that the exploration success rate on the concession exceeds 50%.

Although the Merlon deal is largely cash-based, it might be worth bearing in mind that Yorktown Energy Partners will hold around 12% of SOCO's stock if the deal completes. Yorktown is one of the world's most established private equity businesses operating in the oil and gas space. It seems prepared to bet big that SOCO can optimise this resource.

However, getting paid in full and on time has proved problematic for international oil companies operating in Egypt in recent years. My understanding is that after the upheavals of 2011, the country experienced a US dollar shortage. Simply paying oil companies became a major problem. But the high water mark appears to have passed and it looks as though the country is heading into what might be regarded as normality. The Government has expressed its intention of paying all its outstanding debts to international oil companies by the end of 2019. A brief look at the Credit Default Swap markets shows that insuring Egyptian debt is still expensive but over the last two years the cost has fallen substantially and the trajectory appears downward. And, of course, huge amounts of direct foreign investment are pouring into the energy sector. The backdrop is an IMF loan secured in 2016 that is compelling the Egyptians to carry out reforms.

In my view, this is a good deal for SOCO. Not “Transformational” but very manageable.

For those of a curious mind, it may be worth taking a look at what SOCO International has recently announced in terms of an acquisition in Egypt. Its acquisition consists of producing as well as exploratory oil assets. Although a very different company in terms of maturity, it's a serious player in the offshore Vietnam oil sector. And it's a company that pays a healthy dividend with a policy of distributing surplus cash to shareholders.

It may help to put the company's cash position into some perspective. True, according to the results its total debt increased to some ZAR1.636 billion and its cash fell to ZAR12.6 million as of 30th June 2018. However, as it pointed out this was the result of building Elikhulu, the losses emanating from Evander and retrenchment costs. The increased debt was a result of transitioning its business model.

By the way, it's my understanding that the debt associated with the Elikhulu project will not start to become repayable until April 2019. It has a grace period attached to it. In addition, it also had substantial firepower in terms of ZAR485 million of unused debt facilities as at the year-end date.

Basically, at this point in time, it appears to be a reasonably liquid company. And, of course, its output is extremely liquid. With increasing low-cost Gold production, I would argue, we will see a rising cash balance and a shrinking debt pile in the short-term.

According to an RNS dated 12th April 2017, the company has a two-year grace period on the debt repayments associated with the Elikhulu project. However, it does not make it clear whether this includes interest or whether it's simply in reference to capital. However, it does state that there is a grace period. Therefore, presumably, it will not be making full repayments on the loan until April 2019. By which time, Elikhulu should be in full operation. And that includes incorporating the Evander Tailings Retreatment Plant into the new operation.

As for writing off £106 million in terms of the closure of Evander. It seems to indicate that it has absolutely no value, which is clearly not the case. Incidentally, today's RNS goes on to say that it's reviewing the merits of mining the 8 Shaft pillar at Evander.

The overall impression, in my opinion, is that the company wants to get as much bad news out of the way as possible as it moves into what is, in many respects, a different type of business model. Basically, low-cost with much of its revenue from overground operations.

Should this deal go ahead, and it seems likely that it will, President stands to open up its Estancia Vieja gas field for a very modest cost of US$9.9 million. My understanding is that the real issue with Estancia Vieja is not whether it has substantial gas assets but it's how to store and transport that gas to market. Using it internally to make its Puesto Flores field energy sufficient is really smart as it will avoid any royalties. However, that obviously has its limitations in terms of using its full production potential. This deal will give it access to much-needed gas pipelines.

The company is still testing its Estancia Vieja gas wells but the results should be known fairly soon. In which case we will have a better understanding of the upside. It might be noted that the deal also includes former Chevron assets. They may require work but it does, in my view, point to quality.

Whether the company's policy has changed or not, I don't know but tucked away in an RNS dated April 12th 2017, is a reference to the dividend. Essentially, the RNS refers to the company's financing arrangements for its Elikhulu project. It states that “the projects [Sic] funding is not expected to impact on PAR’s ability to pay dividends during the construction period.” I interpret that as meaning that the company will probably pay a dividend. In my view, it's more a question of what level of dividend.

Yes. A well-managed company. And it has been a very strong dividend payer in the past. I am unsure how it will address the dividend issue this year due to the strains on its cash flow of bringing the Elikhulu project on stream. However, it does have a repayment holiday on the debt attached to Elikhulu. It will start repayments in April 2019. So a dividend could be on the cards. In the meantime, it appears to be transitioning into a low-cost producer with much of its production above ground.

By the way, I noticed that Numis has recently forecast that Pan African's cash costs will fall to US$657 per oz in 2019 (2018: US$1045).

Taking a slightly sideways view, it might be worth examining the latest RNS from Savannah Resources. This is a £71 million market cap company with no revenue but is purely an exploration play. Its latest research indicates that the bulk of its Lithium deposits at its flagship Mina Do Barroso project range from 1.14% to 1.5%. Of course, making comparisons is very difficult – size, jurisdiction, etc. But it may put Kazera's resources and its value into some perspective when the drilling results are produced as it works towards a JORC compliant report.

Over the last few weeks, the company has, in my opinion, demonstrated that it has turned a corner. For starters, the commissioning of the Elikhulu project will be completed by the end of this month. In addition, the Evander Tailings Retreatment Plant will be folded into Elikhulu in the New Year. Reducing AISC even further - the combined entity will produce around 70,000 oz of Gold pa. The Royal Sheba project is looking far more attractive than the company originally envisaged with Gold resources estimated to be some 0.9 million oz (The previous estimate was 0.36 million oz). Very importantly some 0.35 million oz of this is near surface and lends itself to open cast ie low-cost mining (A DFS is due to be published in February 2019). Having faced an adverse exchange rate environment for an extended period, it's now benefiting from a falling Rand and a subsequently higher Rand price of Gold. And to cap it all, Pan African has reached an affordable three-year wage settlement. Basically, the management appears to have successfully steered the company into becoming a low-cost Gold producer.

Considering how fast and how far it has moved with the Chevron acquired assets, I feel comfortable with the company reinvesting its profits. At this stage, I think that dividends are not necessary. That said, we are looking at the spudding of one well this month followed later in the year by two more. The campaign has a base target of around 600 BOPD. It's not difficult to see an uplift in cash generation. In that type of scenario, a dividend would certainly underpin the value of the stock and would be affordable. It may even raise the bar for many other AIM-listed resource companies. Too many of them seem to be promoting the idea that another company will buy them out at some point. In the meantime, senior managers, with little paid-for equity, use all types of devices to extract money from the company on an ongoing basis.

By the way, with a holding of around 30%, Peter Levine's interests, in my view, are much more aligned with private investors than those of most AIM CEOs.

As I mentioned earlier, Rob Shepherd gave the very strong impression that treasury management was at the forefront of their minds. It might be worth remembering that Peter Levine through his experience at Imperial Energy in Russia has gone through currency crises, albeit in a different part of the world. So this mindset is understandable.

By the way, in the Core Finance TV interview, Levine stated that the company is now throwing off some US$2.3-US$2.5 million per month in free cash flow. Or to put it another way, it's now trading at a price to free cash flow (P/FCF) ratio of less than 5. Giving that some perspective, Great Eastern Energy has a market cap of £95 million (Very roughly the same today as President) and trades at a P/FCF ratio of around 5.69. And the latter is an energy company with over 100% net gearing. Premier Oil is trading at a P/FCF ratio of more than 10 and has over 340% net gearing. Obviously many other factors need to be considered. However, I don't think the market has caught up with President's accelerating cash generation coupled with a strong balance sheet. Maybe this is unsurprising given the transformational impact of the Chevron deal in late 2017.

Agreed. The devil is in the detail. But to the best of my knowledge, this is correct. The US Dollar /Argentine Peso exchange rate fluctuations are not that great over a working day. Should the company choose to convert the Pesos it has received into US Dollars immediately, it can do so at a small cost. But the broader point I am making is that, from what I can understand, the depreciation of the Peso has had little or no impact on the company's ability to generate cash (US Dollars).

As for its Peso holdings, I simply do not know. But the impression I got from Rob Shepherd was that they have really focused on treasury management. They seem to be clued up on the potential problems.

details. However, I did get the impression that there were potential targets who were wrong-footed by the large increase in Argentine interest rates and the currency's depreciation against the US Dollar. The Directors were possibly too diplomatic to suggest that every cloud has a silver lining!

Well organised and well attended. The President Energy reception was certainly a worthwhile event with ample opportunity to quiz both Rob Shepherd and Peter Levine.

The main point that I took from my discussions with both Directors was that the current Argentine crisis is having little or no impact on its operations. The impact appears to be largely affecting investor sentiment. It has not amended or postponed forthcoming projects, including its upcoming Puesto Flores drilling campaign. Basically, the crisis appears to have had no influence on its plans because it does not impact its cash flow.

Very importantly, the depreciation of the Argentine Peso has almost no impact on President's cash generation. To put it in a nutshell, the company receives the Peso equivalent of the US Dollar price on the day of payment, not on the day of invoice. The currency fluctuation in the intervening period is irrelevant. Sure, if it was in a period of hyper-inflation with prices doubling in hours, it would be an issue. But it's not. It simply requires good treasury management and that is what they have put in place.

Just to add to some of the points already made. My understanding is that there are limitations on what they can do with Estancia Vieja in terms of gas production. However, they are looking at becoming energy self-sufficient in both Estancia Vieja and Puesto Flores by early next year and also selling electricity into the grid. The cost is estimated to be “In the low millions (US$)”.

Peter Levine is clearly sick to death of the saga surrounding the Chinese pumps. So I think we can put that to bed. The likelihood of getting compensation, in my view, is remote. The new replacement pumps cost US$1.5 million, which has been paid for, and they are in place. The upshot is that Puesto Guardian production has stabilised. My only concern with this concession is that the workovers appear not to have gone to plan. This leaves the company with no cheap options. If it wants to develop the field, it must undertake relatively risky drilling. And this it will do. That said, its licence stretches out to 2050 and all its mandatory work has been completed.

Paraguay is still on the cards with a well expected to be drilled next year at a cost of some US$12 million, to be funded through its own cash flow. When I asked what was holding back a potential participation partner, the response that I received indicated that it was not related to the geology or even to the financial structure of the deal. But it was the lack of oil services infrastructure in Paraguay. President has spent a great deal of money on Paraguay and, I would suggest, is now in a better position for a successful drill. But it clearly needs luck on its side. Given the size of its acreage and its position in Paraguay, should the drill be successful, I would argue that the upside could be huge.

As has been mentioned, acquisitions are still on the radar but they were not forthcoming about any