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Put bluntly, my understanding is that Petrotrin's problems create more opportunities than challenges for Trinity. As for selling its oil, again from what I can understand, Petrotrin's woes are not a major problem for Trinity. My main concern is the trading range of oil and, obviously, the SPT implications. But just to recap. Its low-cost production, debt-free model with substantial offshore east coast upside is the same as it was a month ago when the stock price was 30% higher.

Quite amazing really. Looking very briefly at the UKOG segment of the Bulletin Board and there are, as I write, some 569 postings and the stock price is down more than 9%. While this is the second posting, thus far today, for SOCO and the share price is down around 0.9%. The former has never made a bean and neither has it ever paid a penny to shareholders while the latter has distributed some US$476 million to shareholders between 2006 and 2017. As for exploration upside. Where would you put your bets on? SOCO's acquisition target, Merlon Petroleum, has a 59% success rate with wells that it has drilled based upon 3D seismic.

To paraphrase Warren Buffett, investors are the only people to run out of a store when a sale is on.

With some 70% of Merlon's 1570 square kilometres of acreage covered by 3D seismic and a success rate of over 50% for new wells drilled by the company, I would expect SOCO to really push to develop this concession. Especially bearing in mind just how constrained it has been offshore Vietnam due to its partner's decision not to fund drilling. Whether that will equate to a doubling of the share price within a year, I wouldn't like to guess. But I do think that the company is moving into a different phase and its profile is changing quite substantially. It's less risky as it will have low-cost operations in two jurisdictions and, at the same time, Egypt presents it with a huge upside.

Of course, as you mentioned, the oil price is the joker in the pack but pivotal to the company's model is a focus on low-cost production. The Merlon acquisition simply reinforces that focus – In 2017, Merlon's operating expenditure was just US$6 per barrel.

That's a good point. Rightly or wrongly I laboured under the assumption that the company was putting its own personnel into these newly acquired concessions. But something I noticed from a recent RNS was that President appears to have already begun work on reactivating the shut-in wells. It certainly indicates that the company has a strong relationship with the local Government – the deal has not been completed and yet it feels confident enough to start spending its time and money. That said, the local energy company, EDHIPSA, has a 10% interest in the project and so it obviously makes sense to let President crack on as soon as possible. I may be wrong but I would expect these concessions to start producing, albeit modestly, in H1 2019.

Having recently attended a Trinity presentation, I left completely assured that the company is making all efforts to lobby for change to the SPT regime. The current SPT structure clearly does not encourage investment and has a perverse impact on profitability. However, the T&T authorities released a budget in October for 2019 and there was no change. Unless or until it's changed, I would suggest that it puts a question mark over the company. It throws a joker into the pack. No matter how well the company is managed, it will take a big hit if the price of oil is in the “Wrong” range.

Paying out 30% to 50% of its free cash flow, after capex, in dividends strikes me as a standout feature in the mining sector, an industry that devours large amounts of capital and with it shareholder value. Should it not find the right acquisition target then its stated intention is to pay down its debt. In the meantime, it will continue to pay a generous dividend. But can it continue? Bearing in mind that its production is in the lower C1 cost quartile, I would argue that it probably will for the foreseeable future. With its assets spread across two jurisdictions and three metals, I would suggest that it now has a degree of stability that it did not previously possess. Most importantly, it appears to have aligned its interests with those of the owners (Shareholders).

Paying out high but sustainable dividends presents investors with a model that is fairly straightforward and understandable. If earnings collapse then so to will dividends and presumably the share price. It's not an investment without risk. At the same time the company, in my view, is conservatively and well managed. Will it become a “Multi-bagger” over, say, the next two years? I doubt it. But the Merlon acquisition does allow its scope for expansion and that is not quite possible with its current portfolio. And that growth in production and reserves gives, at least, the prospect of a re-rating.

Trying to predict where the share price is heading in the short-term, in my opinion, is not worth attempting. There are simply too many variables and it often comes down to second-guessing the reaction of other people. So moving on to the company, the focus has clearly been on its oil assets and quite rightly so. But it does seem to have substantial gas resources at Estancia Vieja. The impression that I was left with from attending its reception for private investors in August 2017, was that the real problem was finding a way to get the gas to market and the figure of US$25 million was mentioned in terms of building a pipeline. If it can get that gas out via the pipelines that come with the acquisition of Puesto Prado and Las Bases, then it will effectively save some US$15 million. It will also save it a great deal of time: The pipelines are already in place.

The bottom line is that the commercial production and sale of gas will open up a whole new dimension to the company. Not only impacting the bottom line in terms of profits but also boosting reserves.

A key aspect of the company's business model and something that, as an investor, I appreciate is the short-cycle nature of what the company is doing. The first of its three well drilling campaign has been successful. The next two could be useless. That's quite possible. But following the RNSs produced from late 2017 and the acquisition of Puesto Flores/Estancia Vieja gives an outline of a company moving at speed. Whether this works or not, who can tell? But it's not a lifestyle company. The Board does not spend several years “Learning” and “Understanding” its acreage (It's not in the marriage guidance business). It gets on with it. Unsurprising given that Peter Levine, CEO, owns around 30% of the stock. Many resource companies appear staffed by people not keen to get on with it. It's more profitable for them to stretch the project out as long as possible and syphon money out of the enterprise by all kinds of means. In many cases, the whole Board has a derisory stake in the business. And that stake is often simply the proceeds of low-hurdle share option deals. With President, there appears to be a closer alignment of interests between management and shareholders.

It might be worth noting that the company's netbacks on oil produced from its main area of operation are now some US$40 per barrel. With increasing production and a relatively stable fixed cost base, it appears to be gaining traction.

By the way, just how far the market has taken on board President's gas interests is, in my view, debatable. The impression I have is that the company has played down its Estancia Vieja gas assets because of its inability to monetise those assets. Sure enough, it has put in place the necessary infrastructure to make itself energy self-sufficient in Puesto Flores and Estancia Vieja. But its recent acquisition of Las Bases and Puesto Prado now give the company the pipelines to get its gas to market. And even though this acquisition is due to complete in December, the company is already working on reactivating the concessions' shut-in wells. It seems to be applying the same urgency as it did in 2017 when it acquired Puesto Flores and Estancia Vieja. Very much a fire, ready, aim approach. In today's short-cycle oil industry, I think that this has much to commend it.

Considering the ZAR price of Gold, the company seems to be in a reasonably good position. It estimated that it could meet its year-end debt covenants based on a Gold price of ZAR525,000 per kilo and with a lower level of production. The price today is around ZAR556,000 per kilo and the company appears on track to meet its guidance production figures.

And not forgetting the Elikhulu project. This is now in production and was based on a Gold price of ZAR16,319 per oz, the price today is around ZAR17,309 per oz. At the lower Gold price level, it was calculated that the project would produce a post-tax internal rate of return of 34.3%. Incidentally, originally, the Elikhulu project had a life of mine of 13 years. But that appears to be based upon it only recycling material from its own dumps. There was no estimation for sourcing material externally which it's now in the process of organising.

Of course, it's a resource stock and it's in South Africa. Therefore, it's not without risk. But broadly speaking, the company seems on course to turn itself around.

An earlier poster mentioned that he/she was holding 2.5 million Amerisur ordinary shares. Putting that into perspective, the holder owns more of the equity than most of the Directors. There are eight Directors and apart from Clarke, Harrison and Wardle, they individually own less of the company than the amount earlier mentioned. This gives me the impression that the poster has more faith in the enterprise than the Board.

By the way, as of April 2018, Dana Coffield, the former CEO of Gran Tiera, saw fit to only hold 600,000 Amerisur shares. It's not exactly a resounding vote of confidence from someone who really understands the environment in which the company operates.

Time allowing, I intend to go to the forthcoming AGM due to be held in London. Are there any specific issues that anyone would like to be raised?

For a company that shows every sign of maintaining its dividend, it does seem to be undervalued on that metric alone. Especially considering that it's a low-cost, full-cycle operator. The Merlon acquisition is cash accretive and its development opportunities, according to SOCO, are low-cost and low-risk.

Of course, oil could really nosedive and, maybe, that is what the market is pricing in. But, by its own estimation, it will still remain profitable even with an oil price in the early US$30s per barrel.

As an investor rather than a trader, I may take a longer-term perspective. But I suspect that most traders thrive on an ample supply of news. In recent years, that has not been forthcoming from SOCO. Its cash pile has grown while it sought out an attractive proposition. The acquisition of Merlon should provide the company with many development opportunities and that will equate to more news. Basically, it will give traders more to work on – whether they are going long or even shorting the company. And, of course, its capitalisation will be larger so it will probably be a more liquid stock with tighter spreads.

Execution of its plans is a lesson that Amerisur's management could learn from PPC. Just how successful President's recent Puesto Flores drilling campaign will be who knows? But we do know that it has drilled one well and the results of that drilling are about to be announced and it has spudded another well. Basically, it delivers on its promises within the timeframes that are set. What has really damaged Amerisur's stock price is the chronic lack of delivery and that has fed into stagnant production and declining reserves.

As for Rex Harbour, he appears to have read the situation correctly and decided to sell his holding. The only way that could be achieved was in a piecemeal fashion over a long period and that's exactly what he has done.

That's a good point about the company possibly breaking its debt covenant. From an RNS issued on 19th September 2018 detailing its final results, the Board reported that it was confident of complying with its financial covenants. It stated that its assumptions were based on a Gold price of ZAR525,000 per kilo and what it described as “Reduced production volumes”. Thus far, the Gold price is ahead of that figure and its production numbers are in line with guidance. So it seems to be on course. But we really do need to see the next set of financial figures. Its actions must impact the bottom line. Basically, it needs to get the cash in and the debt down.

There is an explanation of the funding for the Elikhulu project in an RNS dated 12th April 2017. This states that the financing, some ZAR one billion over seven years, is subject to a grace period of two years. That seems to indicate that no capital or interest will be paid until April 2019. It might also be worth mentioning that the ZAR Gold price is now well ahead of what the project was originally based on. So, cash flow does not seem to be a major issue at the moment.

Yes, the stock has performed poorly over the last six months with the price falling some 20% from early May 2018 to around 80p as of today. However, I get the impression that there is a broader malaise amongst small cap oil stocks. If we take a look at the S&P Smallcap 600 Energy Index from 7th May 2018 to 5th November 2018, basically a six month period, it has fallen by just over 18%. Incidentally, the price of Brent has dropped just 3.6% over the same period. Whether it's the ingrained herd instinct of many fund managers, or what lies over the horizon in terms of renewables, I am unsure. It may have something to do with the business model followed by many small-cap producers with a reluctance to distribute their profits. The company could have found itself caught up with wider investing trends.

Taking a closer look at SOCO, the proposed merger with Kuwait Energy fell through in March 2018. So I suspect the market was concerned about its possible direction.

Wise words indeed. Whether it's Amerisur or Apple, getting involved with leveraged products such as CFDs can be a complete disaster – possibly life-altering. In my opinion, unless you are a market professional, they are probably best avoided.

Difficult to prove but the manipulation of stock prices in the very short-term is widespread. And it's fairly easy for market manipulators to force the execution of stop-loss orders if it suits their aims. Basically, short-term trading, especially in illiquid stocks can be very risky. Even more so, if you are leveraged-up.