RE: Ankara19 Mar 2024 15:47
My take is that the oil pipeline is not a primary concern for ICG or Turkey. Turkey places greater priority on PKK/threats to the Iraq-Turkey trade route, which is of greater strategic value. Opportunistically, Turkey also sees Iraq as a fertile place for Turkish companies to do business, especially in the context of the Iraq-Turkey trade route. As I see it, ICG (wants) Turkey to stop violations of sovereignty/incursions into its territory and (needs) water. The Kurdistan-Ceyhan pipeline is probably a secondary or tertiary matter for these two stakeholders. Again, just my perception: Turkey is not worried about the pipeline because its restarting/utilisation (on the Turkish side) is inevitable simply, and until then, they are accruing non-usage fees which can be offset against any arbitration fine payable to ICG. On the other hand, ICG has more of a financial imperative to get oil flowing again, but (IMO) the strategic value of denigrating KRG autonomy and utlising this time to capitalise on the political fracturing which results from the economic losses is to politically valuable - more so than any revenues which can be gained from the Turkey-Ceyhan pipeline in the near term. In this context, the Zoom article may have simply been a "shots fired" discourse suggesting that ICG can and will consider circumventing Kurdistan entirely (or by extension, setting the tone for a future scenario where all Kurdish oil must go through ICG-controlled refineries to be considered legitimate - I don't know).
For the political elites in Kurdistan, I think the situation is quite acute. KDP is apparently boycotting the upcoming elections, meaning they might lose any claim they had (rightly or not) to a democratic mandate to rule/govern; PKK are now public enemy number 1; PUK (if I remember rightly) appealed to the Iraq Supreme Court (indicating some acquiescence; in contrast, all Barzarni-KDP media have been reiterating how 'unconstitutional' Iraq Supreme Court rulings have been)... so I really don't know how the politics in Kurdistan will play out or what will happen after the elections.
In the context of GKP, I think this situation has been a long time coming and I am hopeful/expectant of a resolution in my lifetime (lol). The KRG referendum didn't get the international backing necessary to bring it to fruition, so from that point economic and political autonomy of the region has been slowly eroded. For GKP, the main benefit I see is that its contracts (in whatever form they take) will be legal, and with the Iraqi Central Government, ultimately with a pipeline to world markets and a more stable business environment (in the context of the Iraq-Turkey trade corridor, and with internal Iraq-Kurdish jurisprudence being resolved) - in my opinion, a best case scenario. Question then is about the contents/terms of the contracts.