Member Info for Scot126

06:06

Hi Ratboy1971 - I don't know a single soul who regards PANR's equity as a proxy for the POO. And that's an entirely logical view because the market is currently pricing the CoS of PANR ever producing a barrel of oil (within a full field development scenario) at less than 4%.

As often happens, there's been a wave of new social media posters across multiple platforms who are clearly short term traders. Proof comes from their clear lack of fundamental knowledge of PANR's investment case and careless language. It goes without saying that these folks are as entitled to trade PANR shares as anyone else - their money is as green as mine.

However, when they come up with non-back tested claims that the global POO has an effect on PANR's SP then I'd suggest you reach for the salt cellar.

PANR is a veritable poster child of an example of an equity which reacts primarily/solely to stock-specific news. For example, *if* Megrez confirms 609mmbo within ***conventional*** reservoirs then the POO could be down 10% on that same day and the SP will 2x, 3x, 4x bag from current levels.

I can see why traders are attracted to PANR as we near spud of Megrez-1, of course I can. However, when they post on forums like this they often possess no concept of the upside risk to the fundamentals on a success case because their short term trading strategy is disinterested in such considerations. And that's fine, I get it, perfectly understandable.

Where it's not sensible to follow the traders' world view is when they limit or seek to reframe the narrative around the investment case. Posting that the POO falling 4% when a) the market is implying

15.06

Correction. "....almost 2 years"

HTTps://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-appeals-court-likely-reject-challenge-alaska-lng-exports-2024-10-21/

10/10/24 @ 15:08

Hiya Brom - I'm sure you meant to type "contingent resources" rather than "contingent reserves"? Because one is the correct term and one isn't.

How'd you get on enquiring about the stock exchange Burgundy Xploration is hoping to list on? Odd that you only appear to answer questions which would tend to cast a positive light on 88E, isn't it? Then again, I reckon a large proportion of this forum is realising your modus operandi by now.

I note you published publicly your criticism of 88E's management remuneration policy over the last few years. Yet not a peep about Dave Wall and Erik Opstad *literally* funnelling multi-millions out of the company when 88E purchased XCD Energy at a ridiculous premium and then proceeded to waste $50m of shareholders' funds drilling Merlin-1 and Merlin-2.

So Brom had zero problem with Dave Wall and Erik Opstad ripping multi-millions of dollars out of the the company and yet has a major issue with Ashley Gilbert's salary? It's a rum old world.

By the way, Brom, you haven't informed the forum whether Erik Opstad and ELKO are still retained by 88E? Is there an investigation by the Australian regulators into the circular invoicing from ELKO/immediate payment by 88E/immediate private placing to ELKO of 2021 and 2022? If not, why not?

Thanks in advance, Brom. I know you'll do the right thing.

Anyone got info on Burgundy Xplorations's proposed IPO? I've had a sniff around the usual sources and can't find any "Intention to Float" notifications anywhere. Does anyone know if Burgundy is hoping to list in the US/UK/Oz/Canada? Any info gratefully received.

Brom - you repeatedly informed this forum that 88E management always get back to you very quickly when you have a query. I'm sure the forum would be grateful if you would use your good offices to point us in the right direction in order that we can all investigate the potential IPO and assess the risk of Burgundy listing successfully (or not) and raising the capital to farm further into Project Phoenix.

Without further colour on Burgundy's IPO intentions and finances, and looking at 88E's sub-scale 2C Phoenix estimates combined with the dribble of oil collected during the flow tests at Hickory-1 in H1'24, I reckon 88E is going to have a very tough time progressing Project Phoenix another inch further.

It's crystal clear the 88E BoD doesn't think it's feasible to raise capital from its shareholders or the wider market to fund any future activity in Alaska. They've given up all the leases in Alaska except for Phoenix and Leonis. If 88E is unable to find a farm in partner then all Alaska activity is going to grind to a halt. And we all know the small cap resources market just loooooooves operational inactivity!

I think it's time for me to refresh my model which compares the value of a PANR barrel in the ground with an 88E barrel in the ground. More to follow.

8/10/24 @ 08:06 & 08:13

BuyHoldinvest & Freaktrader - please refer to my post of 7/10/24 @ 19:09 where I explain clearly what has occurred over the last couple of weeks with Mangrove and their paperwork.

08:34

Hi Chinaplate - have a listen to the most recent webinar where Jay Cheatham gives some colour on the timetable in advance of spudding. There's also a very useful section where management describe how operations at Megrez-1 could be iterative in nature.

1) Drill, LWD, SWCs, send rig back to Deadhorse

2) Send SWCs to labs in Lower 48

3) Design/fine tune flow test depending on analysis from the labs

4) Secure appropriately-sized equipment to carry out flow test and mobilise to pad

5) Carry out flow tests, perhaps including a small frack(s)

6) Analyse results of flow test(s), hopefully 3 intervals to be flow tested out of a possible nine intervals detected by eSeis at Ahpun East.

7) Analyse if there is a case to be made/data to support an extended flow test?

Have a read of the document provided by Blackadder2708 on 7/12/24 @ 15:04. There's a timetable listed in the document but it is a rough or advisory timeline. Providing the Dept of Natural Resources in Alaska (the relevant regulator) is comfortable with the preparations carried out by PANR, and as Jay mentions, spud *may* occur in the last week of October rather than the first week in November.

PANR usually post photos on Twitter in the run up to drilling and flow testing operations. There were a couple of photos of the pad construction a while back. If history is a precedent the company will likely post some more photos as we near spud. There's no notice of the Dalton Highway being closed temporarily for the rig to travel south from Deadhorse. I'm sure forum members will alert each other if/when the road closure notification is published. all very exciting.

Dear All - I spoke with the Compliance Officer of Mangrove last week about my suspicions that Mangrove were delinquent in their FCA reporting obligations. I further described the uncertainty surrounding Mangrove's change of fund name and how that could easily be interpreted as Mangrove maintaining two short positions totalling c.2.75%.

I have to say the gentleman I spoke with could not have been more polite. He listened to what I had to say in full. At the end of the conversation he said he would look into the matter immediately and that is exactly what he has done. Good stuff.

FWIW, I didn't learn anything new about Mangrove or Mangrove's attitude to PANR. We only discussed the reporting rules and potential errors/uncertainties, nothing about PANR itself.

I can't say for absolute certainty but it *looks* like Mangrove was indeed delinquent in their reporting since Sep '23. They had clearly not recalculated their short *percentage* to take into account the share issuance attendant to the CB repayments + $29m fund raise issuance over the last 12 months or so. I suspect they thought that because the absolute number of shares they have shorted had not changed => no need to update the FCA. They were wrong and now they know better!

It also looks like the short position itself has moved from the Masterfund to Mangrove Partners. Either that, or there's been an internal reorganisation within Mangrove which has seen their funds be renamed or reconstituted.

The more transparency the better. Trust that helps.

08:29

Spot on, sirmark, spot on. It's clear you have read and understood the terms of the CB.

08:18

Stas20 - it's not a case of "winning" or "losing" an exchange of views. It's a case of "facts" v's "made up nonsense". The market doesn't care about Stas20's inability to comprehend CB instruments. The market cares about facts and maths.

Stas20 is wilfully continuing to misinform his fellow shareholders and forum members. Don't be like Stas20.

07:41

Hi neil9327 - no, that's not the truth. The CB holder is motivated to ensure their debt is repaid (plus interest). They would far rather forward sell shares at as high a SP as possible because that increases their return.

Please forum - stop attaching any weight to Stas20's ridiculous theory on the CB. Do the maths yourselves if you don't believe me. Pretend the SP was static for the 5 year duration of the CB. One scenario sees the SP static at 20p and the other scenario the SP is static at 120p. In which scenario does the CB holder make a massively outsized profit v's the other, noting the original issue price of the bond?

I repeat for the umpteenth time. The CB holder is NOT motivated in any way to see the SP lower than higher.

[Part B3, continued from Part B2 below]

Lolololol, and I can’t help but suspect you miss the irony of you determining that your past experience with COPL deserves acknowledgement…..but my 30 years in investment banking doesn’t mean I, almost certainly, understand corporate finance far better than you do?! Lolololol. Jeepers.

The Convertible Bond Investor’s Interests paragraph: This is a chef’s kiss quotation! Stas20 states of Heights’ motivation, “Their goal is to convert bonds into shares and sell them for profit.” No, no, no, no, no. This is wrong. How many times do I have to tell Stas20 that he *must* discard his bias as an equity investor/trader and instead place himself in the CB investor’s shoes? Their primary focus is to ensure a defined return on the capital employed in the CB, whilst actively managing their downside risk. Until you permit yourself to be educated about this *fact* then you will be unable to properly comprehend the full facts of the PANR investment case, including the properties of its balance sheet. That is a Stas20 problem, not a forum or wider shareholder problem.

Let’s Keep it Professional paragraph: no, you are decidedly *not* “merely highlighting the risks associated with CB structures…” I happily admit that is what you *believe* you are doing. Sadly, your complete lack of self-awareness and incapacity to acknowledge your own miscomprehension, combined with a desire to protect your damaged ego, means that what you are actually doing is wilfully disseminating falsehoods and damaging the financial interests of your fellow shareholders.

Until you apologise to the forum, retract your posts crammed with misinformation, engage on facts and not fantasies, and cease damaging the legitimate quest for a consensus understanding of the *facts* of the PANR investment case then I’ll address you like the child you are intent on emulating.

To all forum members – I cannot be blunter. Stas20 doesn’t understand the CB and is wilfully posting mistruths. I strongly suggest you treat his content with supreme caution.

[end]

[Part B2, continued from B1 below]

Shorting and Price Manipulation paragraph: that you have finally read the terms of the CB, first published on 7/12/21, is now obvious and welcome. I was hopeful that your gibberish and misinformation would cease once you had the grace to actually read the document about which you were publicly posting your analysis. Sadly, but not overly surprisingly given your track record for conspiracy theories and miscomprehension on the 88E forum, you have bizarrely elected to double down on your fact-less drivel. Once again you are damaging the market’s quest to arrive at a consensus understanding of the *facts* of the PANR investment case. Shameful.

I have a direct question for you about this paragraph, Stas20. Readers of our exchange will recognize the tone of surprise in your content about the structure of a CB, specifically the *standard practice of a CB holder managing its downside risk during the period of its investment. It is clear you don’t much appreciate the conduct of a CB holder when interacting with a company in which you are invested. My question to you, Stas20, is how the hell did you think Heights were going to conduct themselves once the CB was put in place? Did you think they’d have a group meeting, inform each other that Stas20 is a shareholder in PANR so they had better rip up all the rules for managing CBs and to turn themselves into vanilla equity investors instead? How quickly do you think the fund managers would have lost their jobs if that’s what they had decided to do? Jeepers.

I put it to you, Stas20, that you don’t understand CBs. You don’t understand structured finance instruments. You don’t understand corporate finance. I further contend that your ego has taken a well-deserved bashing and instead of taking the time for some introspection and an honest assessment of your (lack of) knowledge of CBs, you’ve elected to double down on your pathetic made-up fantasies. If it was just me reading your content, no worries, I’d just ignore it. But so lacking is your capacity for self-awareness and self-criticism that you refuse to be corrected and appear intent on continuing to misinform your fellow shareholders. You are a disgrace. Do you have no shame?

Past Experiences Matter paragraph: the terms of CBs obviously differ for each investment. What doesn’t tend to change is the method whereby the CB holder manages its risk throughout the investment period. Happy to stipulate you are describing your experience with COPL accurately - but each individual case is different. Did COPL manage to repay $38m (out of $55m total debt) to the CB holder prior to the 99% dilution to which you refer? No, I thought not.

Lolololol, and I can’t help but suspect you miss the irony of you determining that your past experience with COPL deserves acknowledgement…..but my 30 years in investment banking doesn’t mean I, almost certainly, understand corporate finance far better than you

Stas20 @ 22:15

I’ll once again attempt to address each paragraph in turn.

Stas20 *thinks* he is here to exchange “views” but he is continuing to post misinformation. I couldn’t give two farthings about my tone when he is continuing to disseminate false and misleading information on a public investment bulletin board. You still don’t get it, do you Stas20?

You *are* indeed entitled to your opinions but you are not entitled to your own set of facts, the “Stas20 set of facts”. I repeat wholeheartedly, and with the seriousness with which I view your dangerous insistence on disseminating false information, that you lack the comprehension of structured finance products required to write with authority on the PANR CB. You, Stas20, are a menace to your fellow shareholders, to your fellow forum members. I beseech all readers of your content on this forum to treat Stas20’s views on the CB with supreme caution. Stas20’s views on the CB are not grounded in facts or truth.

Dilution Risk is Real paragraph: You misquote me, no surprise there. I don’t “seem to believe the bondholders have no incentive to drive the price down.” Nope, I *do believe* the bondholders have no incentive to drive the price down. The sales undertaken by the CB holder are done so to ensure the debt (plus interest) is repaid. If the demand from the market for shares is greater than the supply of shares from sellers, including Heights, then the SP will go up. If the demand from the market for shares is less than the supply of shares from sellers, including Heights, then the SP will go down.

Let me be even more blunt than previously. Heights would be far, far, far, far, far, far happier if PANR shares were trading at 217p or 117p v’s 17p. How come? Because their return on their investment would be in the tens of millions of dollars v’s single digit millions of dollars. Despite my detailed correction and explanation, Stas20 cannot make his brain comprehend that the incentive driving Heights to forward sell shares every quarter is purely a function of guaranteeing the quarterly debt plus interest repayment be returned to Heights in cash. Whether that repayment is made in cash by the company *or* from the cash realised by the sale of shares is immaterial to Heights. Heights’ “incentive” is to achieve a return on their CB investment. They would far, far, far, far, far prefer to forward sell shares at 117p v’s 17p. I repeat for effect: there is no incentive for Heights to decrease the PANR SP.

[End of Part B1, see above for B2]

[Part 5, continued from Part 4 below]

Let me tell you what you should have written when replying to me, Stas20.

“Sorry, fellow forum members and fellow shareholders. I didn’t mean to misinform you all about the CB but Scot126 has, quite rightly, pointed me towards the facts surrounding the terms and the maths behind the CB. It’s now clear that I don’t understand the structure, terms or maths pertaining to the CB and I shouldn’t have posted my ill-informed opinions on a public forum, thereby misinforming the forum members. I’m off to educate myself about the facts of the CB on PANR’s balance sheet, something I ought to have done far earlier. Once again, I apologise for misinforming forum members and thanks to Scot126 for pointing me in the right direction. For the record, that’s now twice he’s had to do this. He challenged me about spreading baseless conspiracy theories on the lse 88E forum and I was eventually laughed off that forum. I have once again behaved dishonourably, this time on the PANR forum. Scot126 has now had to correct me twice! When will I learn to stop posting made up nonsense rather than seeking out the facts of an investment case? I promise I’ll try to do better in the future.”

The “personal disclosure” paragraph: on the contrary, when fact-checking your content, Stas20, it is crystal clear that my three decades of hands on experience is worth more than your made up gibberish. You are entitled to your own opinions, Stas20. But you are *not* entitled to your own facts.

Now go read the RNS dated 7/12/21 and start educating yourself. Do better.

[End]

[Part 4, continued from Part 3 below]

The “good corporate conduct” paragraph: It was Stas20 who opened up the question of the conduct of the CB holder when he posted the example from COPL, “….they were also shorting the stock behind the scenes to then take advantage of a reduced vwap. There's nothing to stop our own bond holder doing this, although one would hope they are not the type.” My purpose in describing Heights as behaving impeccably since becoming involved with PANR was to shut off any fact-less speculation that Heights was or is conducting itself in a similar manner to that of the CB holder in COPL. The second point I wish to make here is to highlight the ignorance of Stas20 once again. He states with his usual misplaced self confidence that, “There's nothing to stop our own bond holder doing this.” Nonsense. I refer all forum members to the terms of the CB; to UK corporate law; to the FCA rules on shorting; to the importance of Susquehanna’s reputation (Heights’ parent company) in the global markets - their PANR investment amounts to c.$20m within assets under management of US$537bn!!!!! Lol.

Happy to admit my post did indeed adopt a personal tone. Let me explain why. I have zero, repeat zero, problem with anyone expressing an opinion if it is clearly labelled as such. Where I have a massive problem is when ill-informed posters like Stas20 make *statements of fact on a public bulletin board* which are *factually wrong* and, when challenged, refuse to admit their error or to apologise and withdraw their historical content.

Personal tone? I am profoundly offended by your behaviour, Stas20. Not only are you a priceless example of the Dunning-Kruger effect but your ill-educated content is misleading and misinforming my fellow shareholders and thus is jeopardizing the market’s capacity to arrive at a consensus understanding of the *facts* of the investment case. You talk about “stick[ing] to the facts” and yet your posts about the CB are literally jam-packed full of easily disproven factual errors. Instead of taking a couple of days to reflect on your content, ***to actually read the terms of the CB for heavens’ sake!!!!!!***, you’ve instead decided that I’ve hurt your feels so it’s more important to defend your ego rather than explore for the truth, for the facts of the investment case.

[Part 4, see above for Part 5]

[Part 3, continued from Part 2 below]

If Stas20 didn’t know a CB exacerbates the downside risk to his investment if/when the operational side of a company disappoints the market then that’s a Stas20 problem. It is *not* a problem for those of us who took the time to read and understand the terms of the CB in Dec ’21.

It’s also worth noting the CB, in and of itself, is not a negative for an investment case. Look back at Dec ’21 and note how the SP more than doubled after the equity plus CB fundraise. If the company delivered on pre-spud guidance for the LTPT at Alkaid-2 then the SP would likely be above 200p and I warrant no-one would be talking about the CB.

If Stas20 is angry at the decision by the BoD’s initial decision to accept investment by way of a US$55m CB then he has to front up and explain a) what else should the BoD have done when the 3-staged billion dollar farm-in went away at the last minute after legal contracts were drawn up b) which of Tailtha #A or Theta West-1 would he have cancelled and thus not retrieved the vital data from that location?

Bondholder’s Interests paragraph: This paragraph provides irrefutable proof of Stas20’s inability to accept that investors who use a CB structure when investing have an entirely different set of motivations and risk/return parameters within which they make their investment decisions.

Stas20 ludicrously, and naively, expects the CB holder to act in the interest of the equity shareholders, ie. the company, v’s its own interests. Heights is not a charity. Its role is to direct its capital to achieve a return within a carefully managed set of risks. That Stas20 actually typed out the nonsense in this paragraph is incontrovertible proof that he is incapable of placing himself in the position of other participants in the markets. A dangerous weakness for an investor.

I would also remind Stas20 that Heights supported, in size, the equity component of PANR’s fundraises in Dec’21, May’23 and July ’24. There is a logical argument to be made that in supporting these equity fundraises Heights was assisting the company move forward. Admittedly, in so doing, Heights was ensuring the future liquidity of PANR shares in order to allow for the debt (plus interest) to be repaid over time.

[Part 3, see above for Part 4]

[Part 2, continued from Part 1 below]

(iii) The CB holder’s primary motivation is for the debt (plus interest) to be repaid. Their motivation is *not* to accumulate shares to become a shareholder in the company. If Heights Capital wished to become a PANR shareholder then they would have done so back in Q4’21. I trust it is becoming clear that Stas20 is thinking solely from the perspective of an equity shareholder and has displayed no comprehension of the structure, terms and maths pertaining to the CB.

Shorting Impact paragraph: the most disturbing part of this paragraph is that it confirms Stas20 has not read or understood the terms of the CB. Had he done so he would have been fully aware of the time within every quarter within which the CB is permitted to sell/short sell/forward sell shares. The legal terms of the CB state this is a permitted activity in black and white for goodness’ sake! When the shares are allotted to the CB holder as repayment of the quarterly amount due, the discount to vwap is a standard term which facilitates the CB holder’s ability to manage its risk. On the contrary, rather than actively seeking the SP to decrease, it is a statement of mathematical fact that the CB holder would be making a return an order of magnitude higher if the SP was 117p v’s 17p.

Yes, the short selling/forward selling by the CB holder in the fixed period every quarter increases the volume of stock on sale, no question about that. However, the CB holder *must* forward sell their future quarterly repayment in shares to ensure their debt is repaid in cash. If the CB holder wanted to accumulate as many shares as possible then it would have invested in the ordinary shares of the company rather than utilising a structured finance instrument like a CB.

Dilution and SP paragraph: So stipulated as described above. Remember that Stas20 doesn’t understand the motivation behind the forward selling of the repayment shares. It is to repay the debt by realising cash from share sales, not because the CB holder benefits from a lower SP or wishes to own more shares. Please also be aware that it is the company which makes an election every quarter whether to repay the debt in shares or cash *not* the CB holder.

Attracting Short Sellers paragraph: So stipulated. The non-Heights shorters are undoubtedly attracted to PANR due to the presence of the CB on the balance sheet. Once again it is necessary to underline that it is not in Heights’ (the CB holder) interest for the SP to decrease, thus delivering trading profits to the non-CB shorters. This is, unfortunately, an acknowledged side effect of the presence of a CB on a small cap stock which has disappointed the market due to the operational performance at Alkaid-2.

[Part 2, see above for Part 3]

Stas20, 4/10/24 @ 07:21

Where to begin with this ignorance? Ok, first thing. To the 10 forum members who “recommended” or up ticked Stas20’s ridiculous post. I have no idea if you were thanking Stas20 for his efforts, encouraging him, showing appreciation of his writing style, or what? I strongly suggest you take a good hard look at yourselves because by adding credibility to this uneducated fellow’s content you are doing a great disservice to your fellow forum members, to your fellow shareholders.

Please note this is not me bristling at someone else’s alternative *opinions*. Be very clear in your mind that this is a question of ***facts,*** not opinions. Please keep this in mind when reading the remainder of this post. I’m going to be dealing with facts, be it mathematical facts or the defined legal terms of the CB. Stas20 is posting *opinions*, opinions which are uneducated and belie a clear lack of knowledge of corporate finance and equity markets experience. NB I have 30 years’ experience in the equity markets. It *does not* guarantee investment success on every occasion, of course it doesn’t, but it *does* permit me to write with authority about instruments I’ve negotiated and traded my entire working life.

I’ll now try to go through Stas20’s post in turn.

“Bondholder Incentives” paragraph: This paragraph confirms Stas20’s miscomprehension of the structure of a CB; the terms of *this particular CB*; and the maths involved when the company elects to pay the quarterly repayment in shares. A holy trifecta of self-confident ignorance!

(i) Stas20 believes a CB is equal to equity. It is not. It is a hybrid instrument, with features of both debt and equity. It is, however, closer in nature to debt because it’s a type of corporate debt security. Until Stas20 educates himself about this *fact* then I urge forum members to read his content with supreme caution.

(ii) The primary variables in each quarterly repayment are the $:£ exchange rate and the vwap calculations as described in the terms of the CB (see RNS dated 7/12/21). If the company elects to make a quarterly repayment in shares, the number of shares is *solely* a function of maths, being the quarterly debt repayment figure / the vwap calculation. Due to the fact Stas20 is unable to differentiate between the interests of an equity shareholder v’s the interests of the CB holder he cannot comprehend that the CB holder couldn’t care less if it is paid 1m shares at 1p if vwap was 1.1p; 100k shares at 10p if vwap was 11p; or 10k shares at 100p if vwap was 110p (example only). There is no mathematical advantage, no “vested interest for them to push the price down as it maximises their share allocation.”

[Part 1, see above for Part 2]

30/9/24 @ 22:25

Dear All - I strongly urge caution when reading Stas20's posts about the conduct of PANR's convertible bond (CB) holder, Heights Capital. I explain why below.

Stas20 stated "...a bond holder continually converting lower and lower and actually *purposely wanting to drive the price down*." This is errant nonsense. The structure of the CB means that for the holder to achieve the highest possible return on their investment, the higher the SP the better. No ifs, no buts - the maths is crystal clear on this.

If the Alkaid-2 LTPT had delivered a successful outcome whereby the data supported incontrovertibly PANR's claims of the asset's commerciality, the SP would be over 100p, over 150p, over 200p and Heights would dancing in the streets of Dublin! If you don't believe me, read or re-read the RNS dated 7/12/21 where the terms of the bond are laid out.

There is no logical reason for the CB holder to "purposely want[ing] to drive the SP down." None whatsoever. If you read the terms of the CB, Heights are fully entitled to short sell, or forward sell, PANR shares for a defined period every quarter. This is standard practice for such instruments as it permits the holder to control, as far as defined by the terms, their downside investment risk. A CB is not straight equity and it's not straight debt.....exactly as the name suggests.

Yes, CBs *can* feel like the proverbial millstone around ones neck. In the scenario where a company underperforms or under-delivers on operational activity and the SP reflects the market's disappointment, then the presence of a CB on the balance sheet will very likely exacerbate the downward pressure on the SP. So stipulated.

Stas20 then raises the question of whether Heights has displayed good corporate conduct since becoming involved with PANR. The answer to that question is very clear. Heights has behaved impeccably since Dec '21. It has not breached the terms of the bond and, with the exception of three weeks in Q1'22, has not opened a naked short position above 0.5%.

Heights has an excellent reputation in the UK market. Heights is a subsidiary of Susquehanna International Group. There is no scenario in the world which would see its Dublin desk seek to act outside of the FCA/LSE/AIM rules or the terms of the bond when their investment in PANR is now less than US$20m v's its total assets under management of US$537bn! Lol.

Full disclosure. I have met the Heights guys in Dublin, about 5 years ago. These guys are not spivs or a fly by night dodgy hedge fund. The foundation of their strategy lies in quantitative analysis/investment and actively managing risk, in return for accessing their capital.

There's no great conspiracy going on here. Stas20 and I have crossed swords on 88E. He was wrong about 88E and he's categorically wrong in stating it's in Heights' financial interests to drive the SP down. Stas20 doesn't understand the terms and structure of the CB. Don't be like Stas20.

I have long suspected Mangrove has been delinquent in their reporting obligations since Sept '23. I *suspect* but am *not* certain that today's notification is Mangrove 'catching up' on their reporting obligations by acknowledging the change in the SOI denominator from Sept '23 through to Oct '24. [SOI = share on issue]

The SOI on 11/9/23 was 919,111,769. Their declared 1.53% short on that date amounts to approx 14,062,410 shares.

The SOI on 1/10/24 is 1,129,998,939. Their declared 1.22% short amounts to approx 13,785,987 shares.

The differential of less than 300k shares (less than $100k at recent prices) suggests to me that the more likely explanation is Mangrove catching up with their notifications. If that's the case, it really bugs me that there are no penalties or consequences for failure to follow the FCA rules. The market has not been operating with full transparency in accordance with the rules over this period of 12 months or so. Grrrr.......

All that said, there is a *possibility* Mangrove has two open short positions in two different funds. I was under the impression parent companies have to *aggregate their open positions* when reporting short positions to the FCA. I note the two different entities' names - "Mangrove Partners" and "The Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd". However, bearing in mind their highly probable delinquency in keeping up to date with the original 1.53% short position from Sept '23, and after many quarters of CB share issuance plus the material July $29m fundraise, I reckon on the balance of probabilities that this is "catch up" rather than "doubling down".

However, I cannot rule out there being two Mangrove funds now short. Perhaps it's time for scot126 to have (another) chat with the Mangrove Compliance Officer?

I hope this post isn't chopped up?