ENQ's Board's Challenges and Opportunities3 Feb 2021 17:31
ENQ LTHs,
Let me start by saying that today's SP increase is very welcome, and i hope the TU delivers very positive news on all fronts, which I list next (net debt, 2021 production guidance, hedges w/ a floor of $50/bbl, Magnus's problems being history, a new challenge for the EP FPSO, Eagle project going ahead, Malaysia project being finance w/ Sukuks, disclosure of a large Kraken premium, Good production from Kraken's two western flank wells, and a new transformational deal w/out a RI).
Notwithstanding all the excitement, I want to think long term, and so I agree 100% with Chilting. ENQ needs a new direction. Indeed, the lack of a new direction being communicated to the shareholders, is why in my view the current board of non-exec directors has been completely ineffective. ENQ has been displaying a lack of medium and long term strategic vision since mid 2019. I say this because the "strategic plan" ENQ presented at the CMDs in 2019 was not robust, and got completely ripped apart by the events, because of the level of gross debt ENQ carries and by not having hedged its oil sales 6 months in advance back in 2019 (something I believe it should now). The emphasis of the plan was on growing production, and for that you would have needed to keep aging oilfields going. The best ENQ can do now is to manage production decline, unless it does a transformational deal, which might or not happen, or pushes forward in Malaysia (as I defend it should do at breakneck pace) through issuing Sukuks. The impact of losing Heather/Thistle, and soon, the Dons, as well, on the path that had been marketed for years is far from negligible. Up to 2020 ENQ conveyed the idea that one of its differential capabilities was that, unlike others, it could squeeze the last drop of oil from aging oil fields. Unfortunately, reality proved that there was a limit to how low it could drive OPEX in such fields. We finally learned that for some fields OPEX was high, probably as high as $40-$45/bbl (who knows?), which meant that ENQ was exposed to a downturn of oil prices like the one in 2015. Under such a drop of oil prices, such fields would be loss making until oil prices recovered.
The way to manage such risk was to always forward hedge 6-9 months of the production of all such fields at profitable prices. In doing so, ENQ could keep the those fields afloat even if it lost some money in the short run while operating them during the downturn. That would have meant that any point in time the decision to cease production (CoP) of any of those fields would be dictated by their NPV being negative, which would not be for many projections of the oil futures curve. Of course, for some fields, the NPV calculation would take into account that a later CoP/decommission date would shift a larger % of the decommission liabilities to ENQ. In other words, ENQ's CoP decision would have taken into account a time horizon of 5/10 years, as described in the CMDs presentations.
(TBC)