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This isn’t a slow grind to £1 — with real contracts, this could break £1.50+ in short order. Serious value means serious rerating.

“This partnership is about turning potential into reality, and unlocking serious near-term value for customers and shareholders…” – Dennis Schulz, CEO.

And when Dennis says “serious near-term value,” he means it — just look at his track record. This isn’t vague optimism. If Hydropulse lands even a handful of signed projects, with revenue locked in and margin flowing, the market will wake up fast.

£1.20–£2.50 in the next 3 months isn’t just possible — it’s what serious near-term value looks like in the share price.

What Dennis says tends to happen — he’s been clear, focused, and everything he’s laid out so far has been delivered. So yeah, I’m confident this will be huge.

That said, after the last rise to £7, we all know the market doesn’t let the share price move on potential anymore — it wants almost 100% confirmed deals, ink dry, revenue flowing. Fair enough. But when that lands, it’ll rerate fast.

I know they’ve said this isn’t aimed at refuelling stations — fair enough — but you catch my drift. The maths still shows what even a handful of contracted Neptune V deployments could mean for recurring revenue and the share price. Staggering.

Say ITM secures 10 Neptune V refuelling stations in Germany under Hydropulse.

Each one costs about £2.5–3m to build internally, produces ~1,000 tonnes of hydrogen a year, and brings in around £6m revenue, with ~£2–2.5m in gross profit.

So 10 sites = £25–30m CapEx, ~£60m revenue, and £20–25m recurring gross profit every year. Payback in under 2 years.

That alone could add £250m in value using just a 10× multiple — basically a 50% uplift on today’s £490m market cap.

No wonder spicy has gone quiet, vv exciting.

More notes of mine on today:

A Neptune V (5 MW) sells for £4.3 million, but Hydropulse builds it at internal cost — likely around £2.5–3 million.

Hydrogen output:

~1,000 tonnes per year (at ~90% uptime)

Revenue:

~£6/kg → £6 million/year

Operating costs:

~£3.5–4/kg → £3.5–4 million/year

Gross profit: £2–2.5 million/year

Payback period:

~1 to 1.5 years

After that, the site generates long-term, recurring margin — with revenue secured by offtake before the project even begins.

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What’s the planet at risk of? Systemic climate disruption — food insecurity, resource conflict, supply chain collapse, and forced migration...

Final post before signing off for the day — if ITM hits around 150–200 MW in sales and 50–75 MW deployed via Hydropulse by 2026/27, we will be in profit. Recurring revenue changes everything. Not 400 MW anymore — new model, new maths. 👏

I’m very happy it. If anyone starts quoting 400 MW to break even again, worth noting that model assumed pure hardware sales with thin margins.

Hydropulse changes that. With just 50 MW deployed under this model, ITM can generate the kind of recurring margin that shifts the breakeven point dramatically lower.

Spicy might want to revisit the numbers — it’s a different game now.

It’s no secret FIDs have been tough across the whole sector — that line just states the obvious. The point is, Hydropulse was 12 months in the making to fix that exact problem.

Fair points — totally valid to ask digital.

On output: 1 MW usually gives around 200 tonnes of hydrogen per year, so 5 MW would be about 1,000 tonnes if running consistently. Even if you knock that down to 600–700 tonnes to be conservative, the economics still hold up pretty well.

Cost-wise, £5–6/kg is in the right range for many projects today. But Hydropulse is using ITM’s own tech at cost, no third-party integration, and remote ops — that’s likely how im getting closer to €3.5–4/kg. Still needs to be confirmed, though of course.

Hydropulse covers the OPEX, yes — the customer just locks in a power price or handles their own supply. So it’s not instant cash-positive, but the model is designed to avoid big upfront losses. Projects are only built when a customer signs a long-term contract, so revenue starts right away.

So I agree — it’s a multi-year build, but it’s not the kind of high-burn, hope-it-pays-off model like Uber or Amazon early on. It’s slower, but it’s structured to be profitable as it grows.

Let’s say ITM gets 5 Hydropulse orders in the next 6 months — each for a 5 MW plant. That’s 25 MW deployed, around 5,000 tonnes of hydrogen per year. With offtake locked in at, say, €6/kg and production costs around €3.5–4/kg, you’re looking at €10–12.5 million in recurring gross profit annually from just those five sites.

Now here’s the difference from something like Uber: Uber had to build demand first, flood markets, and take losses while hoping users stuck around. Hydropulse doesn’t move until demand is contractually guaranteed. No speculative infrastructure, no chasing scale for its own sake.

So even five projects can materially shift ITM’s earnings profile — and unlike Uber, they won’t be lighting cash on fire to get there. So let’s not compare maybe.

Unlike the Uber model, where years of cash burn funded growth without profit, Hydropulse is structured around capital discipline — staged investment, modular builds, and guaranteed cash flow. It’s not instant scale, but it doesn’t need to be. The model is designed to grow steadily, with each project improving group margins from day one.

It may take time to scale fully, but it doesn’t take years to start working.

It’s Uber-like only in that Hydropulse is building infrastructure ahead of scale — but unlike Uber, every project is backed by long-term offtake, not speculative demand. Assets are modular and re-deployable, but the model is build-to-contract, not rent-and-hope.

CAPEX is staged, tied to revenue, with ITM supplying tech at cost. Internal accounting means ITM books profit on delivery, Hydropulse books recurring income and holds the assets. Spin-out? Definitely possible — they’ve set it up to keep that door open.

Put simply: the current valuation reflects the past. The market hasn’t priced in what’s coming.

If ITM delivers 100 MW in electrolyser sales this year — which looks feasible given their recent guidance and commercial progress — that could generate around €10–13 million in gross profit based on current system pricing and assumed ~15% margins. That alone doesn’t get them to breakeven, but it moves the needle.

The bigger shift comes from Hydropulse. If they deploy just 50 MW through their own hydrogen-as-a-service model — equivalent to around 10,000 tonnes of annual hydrogen production — they could see €20–25 million in recurring gross profit, assuming €6/kg hydrogen pricing and €3.5–4/kg production costs. That margin is much higher because they’re controlling both technology and operations.

Put together, you’re looking at €30–38 million in gross profit across the group. That’s very close to, if not slightly above, ITM’s estimated fixed cost base. So breakeven is no longer tied to hitting 400 MW of external orders — it’s now achievable through a mix of roughly 100 MW in sales and 50 MW of Hydropulse projects.

It’s a more realistic, diversified path to profitability, and it de-risks the business model significantly heading into 2026.

Well done holders and Dennis

Brilliant news! This could be serious recurring revenue.

My notes;

• A typical plant might be 5 MW — that gets you around 1,000 tonnes of green hydrogen per year.

• If they’re selling that at €6–8/kg, which is pretty normal for industrial green H₂ in Europe, you’re looking at €6–8 million in annual revenue per plant.

• ITM makes the electrolysers in-house, so their production cost should be low — probably €3.5–4.5/kg. That’s a €2–3.5/kg gross margin, so 35–45%.

If they roll out 50 plants over a few years, you’re talking €300–400 million in recurring revenue with €100–150 million in gross profit, and that’s before you even scale it properly.

This shifts ITM from just a kit supplier to a proper operator with predictable, long-term income. Much easier to value, much more investable.

They’re not touching risky merchant markets or speculative hydrogen refuelling — it’s all anchored in real industrial demand. Smart move, and could be a game changer if they execute.

Hygen’s looking strong with this backing — infrastructure, storage, and supply chain all getting serious support now.

£2 for ITM this summer is still on, in my opinion. Momentum’s there, and policy’s finally catching up. 🍾

When the Clean Industry Bonus went live for offshore wind — £200 m boosted to £544 m — that unlocked a £9.3 billion surge in private investment over four years . That’s a 17× leverage on public cash — so every £1 in generated £17 out — and it resulted in massive factory builds, port upgrades, thousands of jobs in coastal and ex-industrial areas .

Exactly that level of scale-up is what green hydrogen is getting today: the same £544 m budget — except now it’s covering electrolyser manufacturing, pipelines, storage — not turbine blades. That’s the kind of signal that attracts real capital. If hydrogen sees the same 17× uplift, that £544 m could mobilise nearly £9 billion into hydrogen infrastructure, with ITM right at the heart of it.

Offshore wind shows us the playbook: serious subsidy + supply-chain target = rapid scale, critical mass, and new industrial clusters. This isn’t incremental — it’s the launchpad for a domestic hydrogen economy, and ITM is lined up to capture the upside.