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GKP does not have the wherewithal to develop their gas resources, that's why I didn't mention it (2nd reason was to give you something to do).

GKP's gas output at the moment is too small to develop on its own.
Longer term, the cost to develop KRG gas infrastructure and processing will have to be shared with the adjacent field developers.
NAGGS will cost a lot of money - not all of which the contractors are willing to put up.

Could...would...should...might...

The Iraq government wants the gas reserves of Iraq to be developed and utilized within Iraq for electricity generation.

From KurdPress yesterday:
https://kurdpress.com/en/news/2973/US-foundations-release-real-amount-of-Kurdistan-Region-oil-reserves/

US Foundations release real a mount of Kurdistan Region Oil Reserves

Two American foundations said in a statement that the real amount of the Kurdistan Region oil reserves is not 45billion barrels but it is about 4 billion barrels.
The two institutes of Ristad and US Energy Information Administration stated in separate reports that the amount of the Kurdistan Region oil reserves is about 3.7 billion barrels. The reports have reiterated the amount of the reserves is in the regions under the control of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and it does not include the disputed region's which both Erbil and Baghdad claim authority over.
The two institutes have stated in their reports that according to some estimations there are 45 barrels of oil in the region but the estimation includes the reserves that have not been proved and also the crude oil reserves in the disputed regions including Kirkuk which Kurds lost their control after the 2017 referendum of
independence.

Note: Ristad should read Rystad Energy.

Reported on Zawya.com, 23/9/22
Nadim Kawach, edited by Anoop menon
A $27-billion oil deal between France’s TotalEnergies and OPEC producer Iraq has failed to materialise because of the French firm’s refusal of terms for partnership with the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC), the local press reported on Friday.
The new Iraqi government in 2021 also failed to “detail the legal status of INOC” which indicated that the company was not totally legalised, they said.
“Total refused to complete the contract with Iraq after it rejected terms for partnership with INOC,” Aliqtisad News and other Iraqi publications reported, quoting Iraq Deputy Bassim Khashan.
In a brief post on the social media, Khashan added: ”This is because the new government and the parliament have not yet outlined the legal status of the INOC in full…
Total interpreted it as an indication that INOC has yet to be legalised.”
Khashan said the government’s failure to take a clear decision on INOC “prevented other major deals” which were due to be finalised by the Oil Ministry.
In February, it was reported that the $27 billion contract that Baghdad hoped would reverse the exit of oil majors from Iraq, has stalled amid disputes over terms and risks being scrapped by the country’s new government.
Iraq has struggled to attract major fresh investments into its energy industry since signing a flurry of post US-invasion deals over a decade ago.
TotalEnergies agreed last year to invest in four oil, gas and renewables projects in the southern Basra region over 25 years.
Last week, the company announced that it has completed the divestment of its 18 percent interest in the onshore Sarsang oil field in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, to ShaMaran Petroleum Corp for a firm consideration of $155 million.

@theoryman,
ref your "seeds of doubt" posting and the 10th Dec2019 Ops Update:
9 Months later, in the 2020-H1 Results of 3rd Sept-2020 (Operational Review), was planted a further seed of doubt, as follows.
"...The top three projects - SH-9 final commissioning, COMPLETION OF SH-12 IN THE MAIN UPPER JURASSIC RESERVOIR and further debottlenecking of PF-1 to increase production capacity from the current 24,000 bopd to over 30,000 bopd - are expected to increase gross production by approximately 5,000 bopd for a total cost of c.$3 million gross...".
(CAPS are mine)

Confirmation that the Co was moving SH-12 producer up from the previous lower producing level. No supporting story, just slipping it in.

Re the water issue, take the use of the word Trace - normally taken in this context to mean a minute and often barely detectable amount or indication.

The company has form in not mentioning things, and when they are mentioned, of downplaying their significance.

@putup,
I disagree - of course it's the company that pays for the Capex, initially.
How we get that Capex repaid (via CO) is governed by the daily output and the price of crude...and of course by the MNR's continued willingness to honour their agreements.

We don't yet know what any potential FDP might contain - how kind, or otherwise, it might prove to be in respect of large, up-front capital outlays. For that reason alone it would be very unwise for the company to pay out any more enormous dividends.

cat,
it's late and I'm tired, so forgive me if I ask you to expand on the "overlap of $15M"'
Thanks

Starting from your last Q: why can't we be informed...
Quite simply because the Company does not want to bring an end to the good Mood Music (aka dividends).
Keep quiet about the bad stuff, emphasise ANY good stuff you can find.

SH-16 well costs: these could vary say between $15M and $30M - even more if their contractor makes a mess of it (has happened before at SH, and more than once).
The Capex difference ($120M - $95M) of ca $25M is mainly due to the increased costs associated with the water handling modules that are now urgently needed.
The company had reserved an already-completed module (spec is known to the savvy ones here) at a lower price, but the results coming from the NE end of the field have shown that the design spec (water handling capacities) are inadequate, and a new spec module is now on the cards; costs more money.

As SH-16 is only due on-stream “towards year-end”, it will be impossible to achieve average 50Mbopd this year, and we should consider the lower end of the guidance range (ca 45Mbopd) as much more realistic. Even if #16 gives say 4,500bopd, a quick check of the disappointing monthly output chart in the 14th Sept presentation will show that 2 months extra output does not change the year’s average much at all.

So, to the heart of your questions, the issue of the 55Mbopd “target”:
To my knowledge, the latest specs for the water handling modules (assuming no more SNAFUs) will deal with production level of 55Mbopd – with the necessary qualifications that the additional well #16 will indeed give you ca 4,500bopd, and that the cleaning up of several wells stops the decline in their outputs.

There is indeed some Bleeding going on, but don’t expect the doctor to tell you – the patient needs to be kept quiet.

Do not be fooled by misleading headline numbers...

Sarsang produces high 36-39 API, low sulphur oil with lowest Brent discount in region
Shaikan produces LOW 14-17 API, HIGH sulphur oil with HIGHEST Brent discount in region

You cannot attempt to value Shaikan simply by extrapolating Sarsang numbers.

2nd Q was from Charlie Sharp at Canaccord
Yes. Good morning. Thanks for taking my question. Just two small questions, if I may. Firstly, on the water handling, what’s the critical path item or items that we should be sort of on the lookout for in terms of the timing to have that work completed? And then secondly, on the field development plan, are there any sticking points? It seems as though in the past, you have been quite close to getting approval, I just wonder if there are any sort of particular outstanding issues?

A from Jon Harris
Okay. The first one on critical path for water handling, we are kind of pursuing two routes with that. One is, we are looking at getting an existing unit that was basically produced for somebody else who then decided they didn’t want it. So, that’s an existing piece of equipment. However, that’s only one part of kind of processing train. So, we also have to look at water heaters to heat the oil, so that we can affect separation. And also there is a whole bunch of utilities that go with that. So, I would say in that particular path, the critical path is through the water heater, and the utilities and not actual critical piece of equipment. The second path we are going for is we have gone out to tender for new build items, a new build water handling package…and that critical path is through the tendering and construction probe process once we selected somebody. So, hopefully that answered that question. Your second question was around, are there any particular sticking points within the FDP, I don’t actually think so. I think we are just working towards kind of an agreed level of activity with the state. And essentially, it’s like it’s a refinement point, so, I wouldn’t say that we don’t think we can close out on the agreed scope for the next – the first 1st phase of the field development plan. So, I don’t think there is any particular sticking points, I think we will get there.

I listened carefully to the Earnings Call of Sept 1st and was VERY unimpressed with the quality of the questioning by the "analysts" present.
2 Questions only - No penetrating questioning whatsoever.

This is what I heard:
1st Q was from Werner Riding of Peel Hunt and was about the recent press reports of US support for KRG
Yes. I guess on geopolitics. I saw some comments yesterday in the press from the U.S., which I guess were supportive for the standing of Kurdish PSC. But not notwithstanding that there are reports of service companies, also like Halliburton and Baker Hughes stepping back from tenders and contracts because of Iraq’s decision to brand the PSC as unconstitutional. So, I was wondering if you are seeing any impact on your activities or all the services you need still available, and is that going to filter through for cost inflation ultimately on your operation.

A from Jon Harris
Okay. Werner, thank you. I think I am not quite sure what prompted the U.S. sort of letter in the press yesterday. I am not sure what drives that, as we are not party to that. And similarly, we don’t – we understand from the media that the service contractors potentially have received a letter requesting them to stop working in Kurdistan, if they want to continue to work in Iraq, but again we are also not party to that. Currently, our operations are unaffected by that and we continue to discuss with our subcontractors and contractors around their continued working for us. And that’s the current situation.

also from Werner Riding
Okay. Has there been any shift or any signs of inflation coming through in costs as a result of some of these sorts of issues?

A from Jon Harris
I am not sure we have started – we have seen pressure on costs, and on scheduled delivery times, just with the world supply chain disruption. And oil prices, obviously increasing putting up manufacturing costs. And that is coming through where we don’t have agreed rates in some of our contracts, which means we are not seeing pressure in all areas. But we have not seen pressure on the costs from the dispute between the governments I would say, it’s for other reasons. It’s not due – to do with the fact of that quarrel.

To my knowledge there has never been an official notification of transfer of Texas Keystone's 5% interest in the Shaikan PSC.
It was said by GKP directors, several times over many years, that it was a simple paperwork procedure but it has still not been closed off...why?

that the company is not performing well; it is treading water.
The only thing that is doing well, and colouring your perception of "performance", is the crude oil price.
At least try to acknowledge that.
Be wary too when every "expert" calls $100+ crude for the next N years.

One additional well plus the debottlenecking/optimisation/stimulation of three other wells (SH-12/-13/-14).
...all for an additional output of what, 1,600bopd?

Or as DRB83 put it, the "insignificant issues" !
LOL

Leaving aside the dividend, the results were disappointing - flatlining performance and a sense of drifting. No further mention of the reworked wells' performance, FDP still up in the air, traces of water getting bigger now.
Only thing supporting it is the OP.

Dec 2016 rumour

Try again...

As published by The Jerusalem Post
https://www.jpost.com/international/article-715888
A series of rocket attacks on a gasfield in northern Iraq has sent the US contractors working on its expansion packing, dealing a blow to the Kurdish region's hopes of boosting its revenues and offering a small alternative to Russian gas.
A series of rocket attacks on a gasfield in northern Iraq has sent the US contractors working on its expansion packing, dealing a blow to the Kurdish region's hopes of boosting its revenues and offering a small alternative to Russian gas.
.
Uncertain future
Last year, the Kurdish government signed a contract with domestic energy company KAR Group to build a pipeline from Khor Mor via the regional capital Erbil to the city of Dohuk, close to the Turkish border, running parallel to an existing pipeline.

Delays could cost the debt-ridden Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) a sizeable penalty and will leave Kurdish gas export plans on hold.
If the infrastructure is not ready by a May 2023 take-or-pay deadline, the Kurdish government will have to pay Dana Gas $40 million a month until it is ready, the government source said.
The setback to the gas plan comes at a time when the oil sector, the region's financial lifeline, is also in trouble.

Oil reserves are getting depleted at more than double the global average and a Federal Supreme Court ruling in February that deemed the legal foundations of the Kurdistan region's oil and gas sector to be unconstitutional, forced some foreign oil companies to leave.

Exclusive: Iraqi Kurdistan's oil output could halve without investment

The region's oil output has already slipped from about 468,000 bpd in 2019 to 445,000 last year and 434,000 in the first quarter of 2022, according to reports by Deloitte.

"The reason that the current oil production is going down is due to the inability of the ministry of natural resources to bring timely additional investment online to overcome the natural decline of 15% to 20% each year in production for each well," a source in the KRG said.

The Kurdish region has proven oil reserves of less than 3 billion barrels at most, based on the most optimistic forecast, according to the KRG source, only a tiny fraction of Iraq's overall proven reserves of more than 140 billion barrels.

"(Kurds) are living a dream and don't want to wake up," the KRG source said.

A slightly different take on it, and one which slates the Barzani crowd:
https://ekurd.net/iraq-threatens-legal-action-2022-08-25
BAGHDAD,— Iraq’s state-owned oil marketer SOMO has threatened fresh legal action against buyers of crude oil originating from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, according to a letter dated Aug. 23 seen by Reuters.

The letter is the latest in a series of moves by Iraq’s oil ministry to try to control oil revenue from the Kurdistan region.
...
..
Iraqi Kurdistan region considered as the most corrupted part of Iraq. According to watchdogs, Kurdish lawmakers and leaked documents billions of dollars are missing from oil revenues.
According to local and international analysts and watchdogs the lack of control mechanisms in Iraqi Kurdistan makes it a paradise for illegal financial activities by the Kurdish ruling leaders.

Iraqi Kurdistan-ruling Barzani clan, known as the “Kurdish oligarchs”, have been routinely accused by critics and observers of neptunism and amassing huge wealth from oil business for the family instead of serving the population.
Massoud Barzani, remains the most powerful leader in the shadow according to analysts. Massoud’s son Masrour is the Kurdistan region’s prime minister and his nephew Nechirvan Barzani is the president of Kurdistan.

"What a buyer would be wiling to pay for GKP" can only be someone's opinion.
What SNM paid is fact.
Why would you pay for unproven resources?