Member Info for AROK1975

AGM proxy by 23rd noon before JCC's 26th verdict—blind vote on board - FOR if trusting post-bid fightback, AGAINST re-elects (Vujcic/Mather) if 28p stitch-up vibes. How you playing it?

If JCC withdraws? Instant RNS on TAM drilling/PFS uplift restarts tier-1 rally.

Firms at 28p? Cite fresh NPV data in circular to reject/recommend against.

Post-firm? Phased releases pressure JCC higher amid copper squeeze.

Swanley

25p vs 28p bid screams whale sells from non-bloc big holders—Dec 12's 49m vol dropped 8%, only institutions do that. Global X ETF buys don't counter it!?

Fair point on the live feed—I'm basing "dumping" on the price action itself!

Also, some big holders outside the 40.7% JCC bloc (BHP/Newmont etc.) dumping SOLG now to de-risk pre-Dec 26 which i assume explains 25p pin vs 28p bid. So, if better outcome looks certain, why price so low?

Dan Vujcic's LinkedIn (18 Dec) nod to Scott Donaldson—"patience & perseverance pays off" on BMC's ASX win — rings true there. Gut-wrenching though, if, Cascabel, our tier-1 copper-gold beast, goes for a song to the Chinese. Perseverance playbook... or cunning plan?

As a private SolGold punter (9th July 2010), RNS & filings only go so far—the rest? Guessing. Been a mystery of Cornerstone chases, feasibility tweaks, funding flips & second-guessing right to the wire. Light ahead... hoping it rewards the endurance with a merry Christmas (or Bah Humbug otherwise).

Yes, the four major shareholders' early backing of the 28p offer is odd and unusual but formal offer period is when (hopefully) board will rescue shareholders from a lowball deal !

Weighing all (!) the factors, this looks less like a cheap sell-out and more like M&A chess game.

SolGold board's sitting on value catalysts (CIPA permit, TAM open-pit cashflow, PFS NPV uplift)—legal under Takeover Code to drip-feed if JCC walks by Dec 26, firms low, or post-bid to spark rivals or rerate standalone.

BHP's 2010 PotashCorp bid where target drip-fed positives to kill the lowball and force rerating. Here, same play—prevents snatch now, arms rejection later amid copper squeeze. Smart leverage, not conspiracy. Your move protected either way.

Bid Busters?

If JCC withdraws? Instant RNS on TAM drilling/PFS uplift restarts tier-1 rally.

Firms at 28p? Cite fresh NPV data in circular to reject/recommend against.

Post-firm? Phased releases pressure JCC higher amid copper squeeze.

Board's got backstops, not selling cheap - it doesn't make sense after all the past " not selling cheap" rhetorics!

Dec 26 tells all.

Dummy liquidity check - 500k shares at the ask and the book swallowed the lot instantly, zero slippage. Market makers/buyers clearly hungry, make of that what you will !

Spot on; high-volume dumps (49M Dec 12) via clustered "A" prints pinning 25.5p scream tape management by coordinated players shaking out weak hands pre-Dec 26 deadline. BHP/Newmont backing makes 28p floor ironclad, so yes, all involved could be engineering the discount to sweeten the deal. Cynical? Nah, just reading the tape!

What can we actually do now?

We can’t outvote BHP/NEM/JCC, but we can refuse to pretend 28p is fair value for a de‑risked tier‑one project plus a big Ecuador portfolio. At minimum I want the board on record explaining why they didn’t fully surface TAM, the revised PFS, ExploreCo and CIPA before blessing this price.

No insider info, just public facts: two 26p approaches, then 28p, instant ‘minded to recommend’, big holders locked in, and value levers under‑used. People can agree or disagree, but let’s at least be honest about what that looks like for long‑term PIs.

Posts, letters, and AGM questions all repeating the same themes (undervalued, process concerns, lack of full value disclosure). Even if it doesn’t change the outcome, it makes it harder for the board to spin this as universally welcomed.

GLA

No major value‑uplift news (CIPA sign‑off, full TAM economic case, updated PFS numbers, detailed ExploreCo terms) was pushed out before that recommendation to raise the reference price. Those levers are still under‑used while a concrete price is being normalised!

Framing 28p as a defensive move to stop a hostile bid does not line up with the sequence of events.

The pattern is far more consistent with the board and key shareholders co‑operating to deliver Jiangxi a clean, friendly transaction at the lowest “recommendable” price, rather than using Jiangxi as leverage to defend or enhance fair value for long‑term holders.

Exactly – that’s the whole frustration in a nutshell: it doesn’t make sense for a “diverse” register that never wanted to own Cascabel outright to suddenly lock arms and help Jiangxi walk off with it on the cheap!

My tuppence worth: once BHP, Newmont, Maxit and Mather all signalled support for Jiangxi’s 28p, that “diversity” effectively consolidated into one bloc backing a single buyer and reference price, which chills rival interest and reduces competitive tension.

For an outside major looking at Cascabel now, a “diverse” book that is already locked up behind 28p is a deterrent, not a protection for minorities – they see entrenched support for Jiangxi and little chance to win without massively overpaying.

The diverse book that was sold as a shield against a low‑ball takeout has, in practice, become a tool that can legitimise a single, arguably low price once the big names line up behind it, making fair‑value price discovery harder rather than easier.

When a ‘Diverse Book’ becomes a cheap‑bid enabler!

Will someone pass this on to you‑know‑who, the one who spent years banging on about ‘diverse books’?

ATB

Eloro,

On Fort’s point: the effect of the last few years does look like a gift to Jiangxi – rescued in 2022, starved of a proper re‑rating, then sold once sentiment and liquidity were on the floor – but that’s different from being able to prove a pre‑cooked “gift” deal. UK rules require any side‑arrangements or concert party behaviour to be disclosed, and there’s nothing hard in the public record that shows a formal agreement to sell Solg for “pennies on the dollar”.

Where there’s a fair argument is around governance and investor protection: the UK regime is lighter on class actions than Canada/US, so boards and advisers know retail recourse is weaker and processes can lean more towards “acceptable” than “best possible” outcomes for small holders.

Delisting from Canada removed one avenue of potential litigation pressure, but it was also pitched as a cost and liquidity decision, so it is hard to separate optics from intent without internal documents.

So the frustration is justified – behaviour and outcomes feel like long‑term holders have been played!

AtB

Hopefully, Damers.

The flip side is that the more the board and big holders lean into “we’re happy at 28p”, the more any potential rival will worry they’re just being used for price discovery to nudge Jiangxi up a touch, rather than having a genuine shot at winning the company. Time will tell, but right now the process still looks very much like Jiangxi’s to lose given the existing lock‑ups and signals.

AtB

Only two weeks ago SolGold were talking up Tandayama‑America (TAM) as a game‑changer for Cascabel’s development strategy. They highlighted a high‑confidence, near‑surface starter pit of 60.2 Mt grading 0.43% CuEq at a 0.16% CuEq cut‑off, with a very low waste‑to‑ore stripping ratio of 0.63:1. Around 45 Mt at 0.46% CuEq – roughly 75% of the shell – sits in the Measured category, with the rest Indicated, plus 1,400 m of assays still pending and more drill rigs to be deployed.

If that’s the “starter pit” they were proudly selling to the market a fortnight ago, it makes a 28p sell‑out feel less like fair value and more like giving away a de‑risked tier‑one growth story on the cheap!

JCC comes twice at 26p – first one never even RNS’d, second one publicly rejected. Days later they add just 2p, and suddenly the board flips to “minded to recommend”, with BHP, Newmont, Maxit and even Mather backing 28p – all while key value levers (CIPA resolution, TAM plan, ExploreCo, revised PFS) remain largely undisclosed or undercooked.

To me, the board’s behaviour looks more like a management‑led sale designed to get a deal done smoothly than a hard‑nosed fight to extract the highest possible price for shareholders.

In many deals, boards and advisers do use an initial bidder as a stalking horse: engage, signal a “recommendable” level, and hope that flushes out rival offers or a bid bump. Round numbers and modest step‑ups (like 26p to 28p) are textbook bargaining moves that leave room for further increases if pressure appears.

Are they using the recommendation as a lever, lock‑in undertakings from big holders (BHP, Newmont, Maxit, Mather) can either entrench one bidder or, if structured carefully, still leave some headroom for a higher competing bid.

That said, Jiangxi’s two 26p approaches (one via Hong Kong filing, one later publicly rejected) followed by a tiny 2p bump to 28p and an instant swing to “minded to recommend” – with no major new de‑risking news – is exactly the kind of bidder‑initiated, opportunistic timing where the first mover exploits weak sentiment and liquidity to grab control cheap.

If this were a full‑blooded defence and auction strategy, you’d expect the board to be aggressively surfacing value‑drivers (updated PFS, TAM plan, ExploreCo, CIPA, portfolio messaging) before blessing a price, to arm any process with the best possible numbers.

Right now those look under‑used, which is why it feels less like a tactical squeeze for a higher price and more like lining up around a “good enough” exit level.

Sadly, the way it’s being handled so far seems to favour getting a clean Jiangxi deal over squeezing every last drop of value for long‑term holders but hoping I'm wrong.

GLA