Member Info for TheTrotsky

Why don't you actually do some background research before you come on here and compare SJP's fee issues to PHNX's! SJP has been locking in customers for upwards of 7 years and paying exhorbitant commissions. It's like chalk and cheese. PHNX"s fees issues have come about because the FCA has decided to retrospectively cap the charges that heritage funds could charge its customers (something the FCA should have sorted out years ago but was asleep on the job as usual). The FCA seems intent of rectifying its past failings and blaming other people.

Alessandro, SAFE's propertie are marked to market, so it's quite feasible that its profits can exceed its revenues (when valuations are rising)

The numbers just don't stack up at the moment.

A recent This is Money article reported that Peel Hunt analysts estimate that RGL would need to line up more than £175m of disposals (c25% of its portfolio) to reduce its LTV to to c40% but their calculations either seem to be based on the premise that the retail bond forms part of RGL's secured loans or that the disposals would need to be made in addition to a capital raise! IMHO they're living in cloud cuckoo land if they think RGL can sell c£175m of property in the current market within any reasonable time-frame (it's been an unrealistic expectation for the last 12-24 months); buyers generally either don't have the cash or the credit lines to purchase that much property as one lot and it's going to be a puch to sell that amount piecemeal.

I just don't see that a capital raise of c£75m is going to be enough. It smacks to me of Inglis, yet again, living on a wing and prayer i.e. hoping that between now and August 2026 interest rates will have started to drop, property prices started to recover and that the RBS loan can be refinanced on similar terms for another (say) 5-10 years whilst paying off the retail bond plus c£22m of the Santander loan to reduce the LTV to c40% (assuming that the maximim LTV is to reduce to 50% in three months time - I can't find any reference to this in the FY22 accounts). Inglis is just pushing the problem further down the road in the hope that the market will come riding to his rescue and we could just end up finding ourselves in exactly the same problem in two years time. What is the end game? There doesn't appear to be a plan to pay down debt; just continue to refinance with medium term loans.

In reality, RGL could probably do with raising c£150m (c£75m of which, certainly with the benefit of hindsight, it probably should have raised when it acquired the Squarestone portfolio back in 2021, in addition to the c£83m that it did raise at the time). c£150m would enable RGL to repay the retail bond and pay off c25% of its secured loans (reducing its LTV from c55% to c41%). Reducing the LTV to c40% should be the starting point not the end point at this juncture.

If not £150m (a huge ask), then I think RGL should really be looking to raise at least £100m. It needs more headroom and, if it must continue to dispose of property, to retain control over the disposal process and maximise value. It should also be considering ZDPs for, at least, part of the equity raise if it can.

There is an alternative. A members voluntary winding up; better than a creditor's voluntary winding up. Time to act now and kick out the BoD. They've been given every opportunity to try and resolve a problem of their making (the last portfolio acquisition should have been financed by an equity raise not medium-term debt). It's now time to save value for the members; an orderly wind down rather than a fire-sale

They helped to create the speculation with the latest Edison research note (which must have received their tacit approval)! This is the final straw. The manager and BoD must go.

Bottom line, selling individual, secured properties at this juncture is unlikely to generate surplus proceeds to repay the unsecured loan note

I think evidence to date would say otherwise; selling vacant or under-utilised properties is hardly "cherry picking". I think that the sales to date have been more driven by trying to sell properties that are not already pledged as security for their loans because it's likely that the lenders, as part of their requisite agreement to the sale of said properties, requiring the majority, if not all, of the proceeds to be applied to paying down their secured loan (that's how securitisation works).

I hope they do but it won't be the be all and end all if they don't as long as the dividned is on track to return in FY24; after the FY22 problems I'm inclined to be conservative (but quite happ to be proven wrong).

From reading and re-reading the circular, it appears that the the tender offer is intended to be more or less cost neutral for DEC. With that in mind, I think the only logic for the tender offer is that US shareholders prefer capital rather than revenue for US tax purposes; the US tax on capital receipts is a lot less than dividends. I would imagine that there are lot of new US shareholders who would be looking at signfiicant tax liabilties if they bought at the recent lows. From DEC's perspective, it they don't offer the capital option there could be a lot of share price turbulence as the ex-dividend date approaches (with US shareholders perhaps looking to sell before and buy back after) and the last thing the DEC share price currently needs is yet more price turbulence.

Just my thoughts.

Gulfharbour, I think you'll find that the £520m sales proceeds are earmarked to enhance the capital strength of the Group and improve its solvency ratio, not pay an FY23 dividend.

Whether they restart dividends is dependent on two conditions being met. First, an improvement in the capital coverage at the upper end of their agreed range (I think they targeted 180%) and secondly, a return to organic capital generation in the motor line. The first condition should have been met as a result of the £520m sale of their commercial lines business but it was still unclear at the H1 results whether the second condition would be met in FY23 (there were still some losses coming through from FY22 and prior years). The general expectation is that the second condition should be met in FY24, if not FY23.

Quite right too Warthog4. How can you possibly refer to packet of cigarettes in such a derogatory manner! Cigarettes have feelings too you know ;-)

FHS? Did you mean FFS?

Personally, I think IFRS is a complete disaster. When your KPI's are always "adjusted" it tells you volumes about what the finance professionals and markets think about IFRS. As Meconpsis has already pointed out, a direct comparison between AV's 2023 results and their restated 2022 results with their 2021 and prior years results is nye of impossible (without those figures being restated too). Having said that, I think there are some positives for insurers (from the investors' perspective); under the previous accounting regime insurers used to fairly dissmissive of using mark-to-market valuations but I think the pendulum has now swung too far in the opposite direction (there is certainly some merit in the insurers' argurment that where they are intending to hold gilts and bonds to marturity, market price fluctuations in between are fairly irrelevant).

It seems wherever you look these days, IFRS is leaving investors and professionals scratching their heads and becoming increasingly reliant on alternative performance measures that often aren't audited! When a figure in the accounts isn't self-evident, and needs detailed explanation, alarms bells should be ringing loud and clear that IFRS is not fit for purpose and that rather than making accounts easier to understand it's often actually making them a lot more difficult to understand.

Most successful CEOs form a cult following (warranted or not), succession doesn't normally factor that much in the market's thinking until the CEO announces their departure.

Sir John Harvey-Jones used to have a cult following at ICI back in the day (and ICI was highly rated as a result); it took the market a long time to realise that it was all just a cyclical commodity illusion and that JHJ hadn't acutally fundamentally changed anything at ICI (not long after he left ICI's profits plunged and it was unceremoniously broken up - the rump of which subsequently became Ineos).

Sorry if I'm being a bit dull but does anybody actually know what interest Ageas (and its associates) now has in DLG? Initially I thought I could follow all of these Form 8.3s and 8.5s but as the days have past it's just become confusing. It doesn't help that some of the disclosers seem to have as much clue how to complete the forms as I have reading them!

E.g. in today's Form 8.3 disclosure from Norge Bank, are they disclosing the number of shares (relevant securities) that they now own hold in Ageas (Box 1c) or DLG (Box 1f). If Norge Bank are disclosing the number of shares they now hold in Ageas, I guess the information might be of use to DLG should Ageas's bid becomes hostile but it just makes matters very confusing.

Also, why is everybody carrying on as if Ageas has submitted a formal offer for DLG? They haven't. They've wrtitten to DLG with an indicative offer (to see if the BoD would be interested in recommending it to shareholders) and it's been rejected. As things currently stand, there is no offer.

It's like a person walking into a grocer's and saying I'll give you a quid for that box of spuds, the grocer saying "not on your nelly", the person then walking back out of the grocer's and then sending in their their kids (their "covert operatives") back into the grocer's to try and buy the spuds one at a time!

In insurance news today I note that Admiral is "calling time" on the recent premium increases which might have taken the edge off broker's future profit forecasts. I would imagine that other general insurers will have to fall into line in due course.

Bingobongo, that might be true in more cases than not but is never true in every case; it all depends on expectations. If the market's expectations of AV (and Blanc in particular) have changed then the share price can move up (or down) into a new trading range to reflect those new expectations. I think the market still doesn't fully appreciate what Blanc has done thus far but yesterday's results were perhaps a wake up call. Not only is AV now forecasting a mid-single digits increase in its future dividend cash pot but it's also forecasting its operating profits from continuing operations to increase from c£1.47bn in FY23 to c£2bn by FY26; a CAGR of ~11%. That's not too shabby for a dull and dowdy UK-listed company. Of course, it's one thing to promise and quite another to deliver but I think Blanc has now proven (to most people) that she can deliver

Just to be clear. You don't pay any dividend tax on dividends received within your personal pension plan (the dividends are exempt, like an ISA)

Income arising within your personal pension plan is exempt from tax. You can take 25% of your pension pot tax-free; this can either be taken as one lump sum or as multiple lump sums up to 25% of your pension pot. Your pension provider will then compute any tax due on your remaining payments (using a tax code provided to them by HMRC which allows for any personal allowance, state pension and/or other regular income) and deduct any tax due from the payment you receive (like PAYE).

"The BoD (and shareholders) in what Ageas has tabled thus far"

Should have read "The BoD (and shareholders) ARE NOT INTERESTED in what Ageas has tabled thus far.

I'm saying Winslow should ignore the potential offer. If a better (winning) offer should materialise so be it (he'll be well compensated in any event). Winslow should not be in the business of dressing up the results or restarting the dividend before time just to try and force Ageas (or A N Other) to submit a better formal offer. The BoD (and shareholders) in what Ageas has tabled thus far. The ball is in Ageas's court. Personally, I'm not sure that Ageas has got the financial means to get a bid over the line (it's got to substantially improve the cash element of any formal bid for starters) but it's come too far not to submit a formal bid (which would have to be north of £2.50 for starters to be even considered credible).