Member Info for TerrorWit

Kooba

Of course those risks exist. Delisting unquestionably reduces liquidity and some shareholder protections. I do not think anyone sensible would deny that.

The point I am making is slightly different:

The market was already valuing the company at close to cash despite the IP, JDAs and ongoing development work. In other words, the listed structure itself did not appear to be creating meaningful shareholder value.

So the question becomes whether the company has a better chance of commercial success continuing as a tiny, structurally illiquid listed entity, or by reducing costs and attempting to execute privately over a longer timeframe.

Reasonable people can disagree on that.

As for dilution risk, that already existed as a listed company as well. The board’s stated rationale is that reducing costs extends runway and reduces the probability of needing future financing.

Nanonano

I think that is a fair question and probably the central commercial risk in the entire investment case.

My interpretation is that the board has concluded the public market itself was becoming part of the problem: ongoing listing costs, weak liquidity, persistent undervaluation and short-term market pressure all reducing strategic flexibility.

Delisting and reducing costs may therefore be an attempt to extend runway and improve negotiating position rather than weaken it.

That still does not guarantee success. The company ultimately still has to commercialise the technology and reach meaningful revenues. But I can at least see the strategic logic behind trying to execute that process outside the current market structure.

FlyingHigher

I think the honest answer to your question is that nobody can know for certain at this stage. There is clearly a real risk that liquidity becomes poor and that shareholders become trapped in an illiquid security for some time.

The reason I will still vote yes is that I think the current market value already reflects extreme pessimism and gives very little value to the technology, the IP, the JDAs or the possibility of eventual commercialisation.

So from my perspective the question becomes:

Is the company more likely to create value by remaining a tiny, illiquid quoted company under constant market pressure, or by reducing costs and trying to execute privately over a longer time horizon?

I think the board has concluded the latter.

That does not guarantee success and it certainly does not remove execution risk. But I can at least see a coherent strategic rationale behind the decision.

Kooba

“ What does positioning ahead of the this announcement entail exactly??”

————

It entails exactly what the words normally mean in markets: investors forming views and adjusting positions based on public information, valuation, trading behaviour and strategic interpretation.

People position ahead of possible outcomes all the time without possessing inside information. That is exactly how markets function.

Kooba

You are again conflating speculation about possible strategic outcomes with insider dealing.

Investors form views based on public information all the time: valuation, trading behaviour, sector history, management language, balance sheet position, market conditions and strategic logic. Who knows they might have formed an opinion based on the fact that the company hasn’t started to search for a new full-time CEO yet

So, I did not say anyone knew a delisting announcement was coming. I said elevated volume may indicate accumulation by investors who believed the public market structure was unsustainable and that a post-listing scenario could ultimately create value.

Those are very different things.

Kooba

That is not what I said.

I did not suggest anyone was made inside and then traded on inside information. I said the elevated trading volumes over recent weeks may indicate accumulation by investors who saw long-term value in a post-listing scenario.

That could include buyers acting on public information: cash backing, depressed valuation, increased volume, weak sentiment, or the possibility that strategic change was coming.

It was an observation about trading behaviour, not an allegation of insider dealing.

My own view is that the market may be overreacting to the delisting announcement because it is focusing almost entirely on the loss of liquidity rather than on the possible strategic rationale behind the move.

One possible outcome from here is as follows.

The delisting vote probably passes because the board is unlikely to have initiated this process without first sounding out major holders privately. The unusually elevated trading volumes over recent weeks may also indicate accumulation by investors who see long-term value in a post-listing scenario.

Between now and the delisting date, forced selling from funds unable to hold unlisted securities may continue to pressure the price. However, the cash remains real, the JDAs remain active, and the company has repeatedly stated that it believes it has sufficient funding to reach breakeven.

Following delisting, liquidity will likely become poor and spreads wide via the matched bargain facility. Many retail investors may sell simply because they dislike holding unlisted securities. That in itself does not mean the technology or commercial discussions have failed.

The more important question is what happens operationally over the next 2–4 years.

If the company succeeds in progressing the JDAs, scaling the sensing materials business and controlling costs outside the public markets, then the current valuation may eventually look extremely pessimistic in hindsight. In that scenario, the logical end point would probably be a trade sale or strategic acquisition rather than a return to public market growth investing.

None of this is guaranteed. Execution risk remains significant and commercialisation still has to happen. But I do think there is a coherent strategic logic behind the board’s decision which the current panic is perhaps failing to reflect.

If there was any substance in your point of view, it wouldn’t be simple to reduce you to posting nothing but insults.

The fact remains that the two quantum do companies that have been sold for substantial sums were both private businesses. You don’t seem able to address that.

Well with loud shareholders like you Kooba, I don’t blame them.

You’re demanding a one word answer because as always you’ve not thought the situation through and hadn’t considered the other quantum dot companies who’ve been sold for substantial amounts out of private ownership. Now you are trying to catch me out to deflect from your own discomfort.

The public record

· QD Vision: Founded in 2004 by MIT researchers, QD Vision was a private company. It was acquired by Samsung in 2016 for an estimated $70 million . This is the acquisition you correctly recalled.

· Nanosys: Founded in 2001, Nanosys was a private company. It was acquired by Shoei Chemical in 2023 for an undisclosed sum .

· Quantum Materials Corp.: This was a publicly traded company. Unlike Nanoco, it struggled with doubts about its ability to continue as a going concern, was never acquired, and was still operating as a private entity as of its last funding round in 2021 .

The pattern is clear. Every notable successful exit in the quantum dot sector has been a private acquisition. The public markets have not rewarded these companies; they have punished them with illiquidity, high costs, and short-term sentiment swings.

The board is not destroying value. They are following the only proven blueprint for success in this industry.

Perhaps you should remember that in 2015 Samsung bought QD Vision for $70 million out of private ownership and Nanosys was bought by Shoei for an undisclosed sum, again out of private ownership.

Bachatanut, fair question

The board's consideration of a delisting is not inside information until it is decided. They have been exploring options at least since Tenner left.

During that time, a large holder could have been accumulating shares because they supported the board's strategic direction generally, without knowing the exact form it would take. They could have formed a view on the likelihood of a delisting based on public information — the high cost of listing, the hostile market, the board's frustration, the JDA progress, the cash position. That is analysis, not inside information.

When the delisting was formally proposed, the information became public. They could then decide to increase their stake further.

That is not insider trading. That is a long‑term investor acting on public information and then reacting to new public information.

You all look like unconvincing toddlers to me

FlexTrader, the two messages are not contradictory. They are two sides of the same strategy: cut costs, protect the cash runway, and continue developing the technology for a future private exit.

The public market has been hostile, illiquid, and costly. The board is responding to that reality.

The high volume today suggests someone is sweeping up shares from panicked sellers. It's possibly the same entity responsible for the flurry of buying during the last few weeks. It will be interesting to see if a TR‑1 appears in the next few days naming a new large holder. If someone has been building a stake to support the delisting, that would explain the activity.

I'll vote in favour, I'd like the hot money gone too.

Some of the comments here prove a complete lack of perspective among retail holders who think their stock market investments come with performance guarantees.

Nanoco have tried their best. Often that isn't enough. There's no need for them to make excuses, or for me to make them on their behalf.

They will be better off as an unlisted PLC without all this noise.

Personally, I can see why the directors would want to ditch the noisy retail market given the amount of impatient demonstrations here and on ADVFN over the last several years. If you read the RNS you can see exactly why they are frustrated.

Sounds like you bought a long‑term, pre‑commercial tech stock but treated it like a short‑term trading vehicle. So, now that the company is proposing a structural change that prioritises long‑term execution over short‑term liquidity, you feel trapped.

Your bitterness is not about the company's strategy. It's about the mismatch between your own investment horizon and the reality of the asset you chose.

All I have ever said is that everything will be alright if the company executes - all the rest is your own dissonance. My conscious is clear. I'm not responsible for anyone else's decisions on the stock market.

Feeks, I don't feel any shame because I never made any promises and, anyway, the situation isn't terminal or even unusual. It is all no more than normal business.