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“Retail might turn out.”

“Milkwood might oppose.”

“The previous AGM votes might have been Milkwood.”

“The board might have misjudged sentiment.”

None of those possibilities are unreasonable individually.

The problem is that when you stack enough possibilities together, the argument starts to become less convincing rather than more.

I think forum activity can create a distorted impression of how representative the discussion actually is. A few dozen highly engaged posters can feel like “the shareholder base” when in reality they may represent only a tiny fraction of the register.

And if history is any guide, the silent shareholders are often far more important than the vocal ones.

Looking at previous AGM results, resolutions have generally been passed by very large majorities, suggesting that forum sentiment and voting outcomes are not always the same thing.

Laura

The references are there, but I think there’s a missing step in the argument.

The existence of takeover provisions and references to strategic processes demonstrates that a takeover is possible. It doesn’t necessarily demonstrate that one is likely.

What evidence leads you from the first conclusion to the second?

I think SmithyB has identified one of the more credible explanations for why the board keeps emphasising management resource rather than simply talking about cost savings.

If you ran a small enterprise worth £5m and I told you tomorrow that your shop, restaurant, building company or healthcare business had to:

* produce quarterly market updates,

* maintain a broker,

* issue formal announcements,

* hold AGMs,

* and spend days answering retail shareholders,

you’d immediately see the hidden cost.

Nanonano,

If I were reading:

“We expect to be break-even by 2027”

from a sales director, I’d interpret it one way.

If I were reading:

“We are not expecting near-term financial difficulty and are targeting medium-term break-even”

from a former CFO, I’d interpret it quite differently.

The second sounds like someone who doesn’t want to promise anything he can’t defend later.

After Samsung, the return of capital, the failed strategic process, Shoei, the CEO departure and now a delisting proposal, the last thing a CFO-turned-CEO is likely to want is another accusation that management over-promised.

That’s why I don’t find the wording nearly as revealing as you do. You appear to be assuming the wording is primarily a window into the business. It may partly be a window into the person writing it.

Flying Higher,

I think that’s one of the more reasonable concerns that has been raised.

However, how much liquidity do shareholders really have today at a £5m valuation and a share price around 3p?

That’s a fair observation, but I’m not sure we can infer too much from the wording alone.

There are several reasons a board might choose cautious language:

* They may genuinely not know the exact timing of commercial progress.

* They may be avoiding making forecasts they cannot reliably support.

* They may wish to retain flexibility if circumstances change.

* They may be following legal and regulatory advice on forward-looking statements.

* The current CEO may simply have a different communication style and risk tolerance from his predecessor.

* Or it may simply reflect the fact that “financial stability” and “break-even” are different things.

The difficulty is that we cannot know from the wording alone which of those explanations is correct, or whether it is a combination of several of them.

What we can say is that the company has stated it is not expecting near-term financial difficulty and that extending the runway is intended to support a path to medium-term break-even. Beyond that, we’re largely interpreting management’s choice of language.

Filtering people and telling them is a performance.

Also Burford and others less impressive.

Noise, not signal.

Laura

You are far too obvious and insistent to be credible,

However, thank you for your interest.

I’ve been reading the proposed articles and circular.

One point that appears to be getting overlooked is that the Takeover Code continues to apply for two years after cancellation.

So the suggestion that someone can simply delist the company and immediately acquire control without the usual protections does not appear to be correct.

After the two-year period the position changes, and shareholders can reasonably debate whether that is a concern. However, that is a different argument from claiming that takeover protections disappear on day one.

If anyone believes otherwise, perhaps they could point to the specific provision in the circular or proposed articles that supports that view.

I can understand concerns about future dilution, but dilution doesn’t happen in a vacuum.

Someone has to provide the capital and receive the shares.

Who exactly is supposed to be organising a “billion to one” dilution, and from what existing position?

At present there doesn’t appear to be any controlling shareholder in a position to dictate such an outcome, so this seems to be another example of a worst-case scenario being discussed as though it were already a foregone conclusion.O

Why is it risky compared with now? Haven't you already lost most of your money whilst it's been undervalued on the markets?

The point many seem to be missing is that delisting potentially gives the company more flexibility, not less.

If management genuinely believe the company is overstaffed or carrying unnecessary costs, it may actually be easier to address those issues once they are no longer carrying the cost and administrative burden of a main market listing.

The company is also likely to be cautious in its language because it cannot responsibly promise specific outcomes that depend on future commercial developments.

The question isn’t whether costs can be reduced. The question is whether the business has a better chance of reaching sustainability with a longer runway than with a shorter one.

It's easy to keep making conspiracy accusations without evidence but it doesn't help decide what to do now.

By the way Tenner is now CFO of the United Kingdom National Nuclear Laboratory a role not traditionally given to corrupt individuals. ( https://uknnl.com/2026/05/uknnl-strengthens-leadership-with-new-chief-finance-officer-and-non-executive-director/ )

I’m afraid this is the reality of business, Nanonano. It’s not peculiar to Nanoco.

There aren’t many Nvidias in the world.

The question isn’t “How do we punish Nanoco for not becoming one?”

The question is “What is the best thing we can do next?”

All that has happened over the last 20 years is that execution has been delayed by slow adoption, which Nanooco management can't do anything about, and by IP litigation, which is a normal and foreseeable commercial risk.

Now the company are asking for more time to extend their runway so they don't run out of cash before executing. In this they are no different from the vast majority of other high tech small businesses.

If they are given more time they have more chance of executing and then holders have more chance of getting their money out. If they are not given more time then the risk is greater that they will run out of money first and every investor will be at a total loss.

I'm just being pragmatic.

“Do your own research.”

- isn’t really an answer from someone who is sure that the company is trying to bring suits out of the woodwork

The natural follow-up questions would be:

* Who is buying?

* How many shares?

* Through what vehicle?

* Who would control the vote?

* How would minority shareholders be deprived of ownership?

* What evidence is there that assets would be sold in pieces?

* Why would management choose that route instead of a straightforward bid?

Those are the sorts of questions you’d ask if you were trying to establish whether the theory is plausible.

It’s curious how many theories are being proposed when the company has already explained its reasoning.

We have a company with around 35 employees, a market value below its cash balance, ongoing cost pressures and a stated desire to extend its cash runway.

Why is it so difficult to accept that management may simply believe the costs and administrative burden of a main market listing are no longer justified?

Shareholders may disagree with that judgement, but that is a different argument from assuming there must be some hidden motive.

How does delisting make the business worth zero?