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Https://www.recyclingtoday.com/news/mercuria-techmet-traxys-hartree-exim-bank-critical-minerals-vault-usa/

A critical minerals strategic reserves project being funded by the United States Export-Import Bank (EXIM) includes commodities trading companies Traxys and Mercuria as materials suppliers.

THE BOIL-OFF CLOCK

Liquid helium at -269C in an ISO container:

Day 0-35: Pressure slowly builds, helium stays liquid

Day 35-48: Approaching max pressure, venting begins

Day 48+: Helium venting to atmosphere through

pressure relief valves. LOST FOREVER.

Cannot be recovered.

Https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Chinese-Publication-Claims-US-Has-Two-Months-of-Rare-Earths-Left.html

This is the opinion of AI

Under UKLR 7.3.1R read with UKLR 7 Annex 2 Part 1, a listed company must include "details of the transaction, including the name of the other party" in the RIS notification issued as soon as possible after terms are agreed. So the counterparty's name is a mandatory disclosure element.

However — and this is the important limitation the document implicitly flags in the context of your Pensana/Cascade work — the obligation extends only to naming the counterparty, not to disclosing the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) behind it. The UKLR regime imposes no express requirement to look through corporate structures and identify who ultimately controls or owns the other party to the transaction.

So Pensana's 4 March 2026 RNS naming Cascade Natural Resources Limited as the counterparty was technically compliant with UKLR 7. Whether that bare disclosure was adequate from a UK MAR or Companies Act / Takeover Code standpoint — particularly if directors have a material interest in Cascade and that was not separately disclosed — is a distinct and potentially more productive line of inquiry than the UKLR significant transaction rules alone.however, that entity doesn't exist at that uk adddress or as a uk company

However, that entity doesn't exist at that uk adddress or as a uk company

That changes the picture considerably, and escalates well beyond a technical UKLR disclosure gap. If Cascade Natural Resources Limited either does not exist as a registered UK company or does not operate from the address stated, several serious issues arise simultaneously:

UKLR 7 compliance is undermined at the root. The Annex 2 requirement to name the counterparty is satisfied only if the name given is genuine and verifiable. Naming a phantom or unverifiable entity is not mere non-disclosure — it is a false disclosure, which is materially worse.

Not true. It directly affects shareholders and PRE published the offer and then withdrew the meeting to avoid shareholder scruitiny.

The identity had to be clearly specified at the initial publication on 4th of March.

Shareholders may want to get Claude.ai to look at PRE recent RNS's

Main Market companies are subject to the UK Listing Rules and the FCA's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules (DTRs) — far stricter than AIM's self-regulatory framework

A transaction of this size almost certainly qualifies as a Class 1 transaction (or at minimum Class 2), triggering mandatory detailed disclosure requirements including counterparty identity

The Prospectus Regulation and shareholder circular rules require that a General Meeting circular contains sufficient information for shareholders to make a fully informed decision

There is a sponsor (equivalent of Nomad but more heavily regulated) who carries direct FCA accountability — not just a Nomad

The FCA angle:

On the Main Market, the FCA itself is the competent authority — not the London Stock Exchange acting as a quasi-regulator as with AIM. Shareholders or analysts can formally report disclosure deficiencies directly to the FCA.

Hey hows your employers fake fund raise going at Pensana?

There a photo of the Uberaba stack, acid and power plants in the presentation. Exceptionally low power cost, 3.6c/kwhr

In both sites there is a copper plant next door with waste sulfuric acid

Key differentiators in RBW's favour vs GGP:

RBW's critical minerals status justifies a structural premium to GGP's gold multiple for three reasons. First, REE producers with western non-Chinese supply credentials — particularly DFC-backed with US government off-take interest — command MP Materials / Lynas-type multiples (8-15× EBITDA), not gold miner multiples. Second, Phalaborwa's $12.91/kg TREO opex puts it at the bottom of the global REE cost curve alongside Mountain Pass and ahead of Mt Weld, per the margin curve in the PDF. Third, both projects carry zero hard-rock mining risk — phosphogypsum heap leaching with a simple flowsheet and brownfields infrastructure dramatically de-risks execution vs GGP's underground Havieron development.

The bear case differential: GGP is producing today with actual cashflows and a PE of 6.4×. RBW is pre-DFS and pre-finance, with Phalaborwa production not before late 2028-9 and Uberaba 2030. The 4-5 year timeline and DFS/financing execution risk remain the primary discount to the in-production valuations above.

Base case target range in production (undiluted, 85% Phal + 49% Uberaba): 170-275p, with upside to 340p+ on US listing re-rating. Against 27p today, that represents 6-10× from current.

Sonnet 4.6Extended Claude

$1.27bn NPV. $332m EBDITA up to $3.576bn MCAP

MCAP AND SHARE PRICE IN PRODUCTION — MULTIPLE SCENARIOS

Current state: 644m shares at 27p = £173.9m / $235m mCap (per PDF, 11 March 2026)

For Phalaborwa, $326m capex with DFC $50m already committed. Assuming $100m equity raise pre-DFS at ~50p (diluted confidence), adding ~200m shares → 844m diluted. Uberaba capex funded at JV level by Mosaic — no RBW equity dilution.

│ VALUATION METHOD USD mCap GBP mCap p/share p/share │

│ (644m undiluted) (844m diluted) │

├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

│ 1.0× attributable NPV10 $1,147m £850m 132p 101p │

│ 1.3× attributable NPV10 $1,491m £1,105m 172p 131p │

│ 1.5× attributable NPV10 $1,721m £1,275m 198p 151p │

│ │

│ 5.0× EBITDA (gold miner peer) $1,490m £1,104m 171p 131p │

│ 8.0× EBITDA (REE/tech premium) $2,384m £1,766m 274p 209p │

│ 10× EBITDA (US listing/MP Mtls) $2,980m £2,207m 343p 261p │

│ 12× EBITDA (full crit. minerals) $3,576m £2,650m 411p 314p │

└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

The 5× EBITDA case uses GGP's current trading multiple as the floor. The 10-12× range reflects MP Materials (MPUS) and Lynas-type re-rating for a western, DFC-backed, ex-China rare earth producer with US exchange listing.

GGP COMPARISON

GGP trades at ~600p, £4.0bn mCap, with an EV/EBITDA of 4.75× as of mid-March 2026. MINING.COM Revenue for the last half-year was A$977m, implying ~A$1.95bn annualised, and GGP has ~672.9m shares in issue.

As a non-mining operation, high oil prices are very positive for RBW EBDITA.

REE prices will have to increase dramatically to cover miner production costs.

Cascade Natural Resources Ltd doesn't exist.

Better...

https://investors.mosaicco.com/press-releases/news-details/2026/Mosaic-and-Rainbow-Rare-Earths-Advance-Uberaba-Rare-Earths-Project-in-Brazil/default.aspx#:~:text=This%20initiative%20aligns%20with%20our,decisions%2C%20and%20successful%20project%20execution.

Website blocked

We blocked this website for your protection because it contains malware.

>>surface seeps up to ~10% helium

Its in water. Worthless.

Rumor in the Telegram group says $2bn valuation possible on US listing. Based on FCF thats for sure.

Note: Completly independent research

Berenberg Lifting price target to 49p on Uberaba progress

● We update our model for Rainbow Rare Earths (Rainbow) to reflect increased clarity on the economic properties of the Uberaba rare earths project in Brazil, which we expect to ultimately be a joint venture between Rainbow (49%) and The Mosaic Company (51%). The project will process waste from Mosaic’s phosphoric acid production at its Uberaba site and recover rare earths using Rainbow’s processing flowsheet, which was developed as part of its Phalaborwa rare earths project in South Africa. The economic assessment, released on 11 March, builds on a 2023 memorandum of understanding between the two businesses on Uberaba and showcased clear value for the site, with a NPV at spot prices of USD916m (10% discount rate) and a 45% IRR, with very competitive capex of USD279m – see Uberaba economic assessment showcases clear value, dated 11 March 2026.

● Building Uberaba into our model: As the project is still early stage and is yet to have a formal resource declared, we have taken a conservative approach to modelling Uberaba, but still we see clear value in our risked NAV. We have modelled production in line with guidance (1.971ktpa NdPr (neodymium and praseodymium) oxide and 659tpa SEG+ volumes); our revenues are based on our own price deck and we have modelled costs as per Rainbow’s expectation. We also model capex of USD279m, in line with guidance. After adjusting for a 50% project risk factor, which we think will unwind as the project moves through the PFS and DFS stages, we arrive at a very conservative NPV, attributable to Rainbow, of USD161m. On an unrisked basis, on our base-case price deck, our NPV is USD322m, with clear upside based on strong rare earths prices. Our price target lifts to GBp49 per share (from GBp34 per share) after building the project into our estimates. Note the driver for the lower EPS is a reflection of the expected PFS and DFS study costs, but the clear value creation from the project more than outweighs this cost. The shares are trading on 0.57x NAV and are a clear conviction Buy, in our view.