Member Info for SmartPunter

>> IMO they did not need to release this news until the DD was complete.

Well thats the thing.

Its not happened and almost certainly wont. Keeps your hopes and share price up.

What did happen was the 4th the share dilution of the year to keep the lights on. and pay the the huge wage bill.

>> if I am buying 25% of a company worth 400 million,, i exchange 100 million from 25% of the companies share holding.

No, these will be new shares (if, by some miracle, DD is passed) so the the existing share holders will be diluted if the MCAP stays the same

Https://youtu.be/qZBXSYCCaxU?si=ICBa5ZeLQ8JDYddY

Nominee accounts are not beneficial owners so dont report, they are like bank accounts for shares

Yes, PA despises retail investors, only problem, institutions are not interested after due diligence.

This finally puts to bed the idea that funding to build the mine was raised last April (and all the other times)

Subject to due diligence? Nobody ...like all the other funding agreements "subject to conditions" and "due-diligence" it will never happen.

If the previous funding "approvals" were actioned, PRE would not have to do another highly dilutive raise.

Its would be project funding, i.e. a loan

20% discount.

Anything signed has to be ratified by Parliament, implemented by the Army and accepted by the people. It won't be.

Trump doesn't have any cards, he doesn't fund or arm Ukraine.

Trump has provided no money since he became president.

Europe took over the funding and is buying weapons from the US, US provides nothing for free and demanded the mineral deal for repayment of Bidens support.

Trump walking is not positive for Ukraine but will not stop the war, for two years at least.

>>Rare Earth project in Burundi

Lol, that was a failure for Rainbow Rare Earths. Government demands made it completely unviable. Terrible infrastructure, logistics and taxation.

Where is your off switch. botty?

>>Longonjo has a much better HREE/TREO ratio than MP, which could be one reason the US is so interested.

That's just BS. Until a week ago PRE didn't even mention Dy/Tb and doesn't report the HREE content.

>>And that is why gentleman, you make the effort to attend the AGM.

Many cannot attend for many a reason. Would it be too much to ask for the board to record an interview with a question and answer session.

For the record, you know. Nice to be on record.

>> The “ionic clays” complaint is misplaced

My point is Ionic clays are cheaper/cleaner than "weathered carbonatite (monazite / bastnaes"

>> — metallurgy updates show scope to materially increase Dy/Tb recovery.

What is the metallurgy. Increasing recovery is great but how much is there and why was it ignored. Changing the plant design after construction was claim to have started. It hasn't started has it...

3.

Russia’s model of security is one of the losers in this sad story, but the biggest loser is the people of the Sahel. What unfolds in Mali should serve as a cautionary tale: external patrons, whether Western, Chinese, or Russian, cannot substitute for legitimate governance or popular consent. Without these foundations, even the most forceful regimes will, eventually, collapse under the weight of their own illusions. If other Sahel states that are still reliant on Russia do not rapidly pivot in response to these developments, we can expect this tragedy to repeat itself.

While Western or Chinese companies might have an uneven relationship with African states that lack leverage, they have a tangible interest in peace, stability, and long-term relations. Russia’s strategy was inherently short-term, extractive, and unsustainable. You don’t need to be a military genius to understand that a strategy of terrorizing and looting locals at the behest of a host government has a limited time horizon.

It is worth noting that China, too, opposed the Russian-backed coup in Mali. China’s long-term programs in Africa, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative, are fundamentally incompatible with Russia’s operational model in Africa. This makes disapproval of Russia’s African policy a rare area of agreement between Beijing and Washington.

The siege of Bamako, then, is not merely the latest episode in the Sahel’s saga of instability. It is the predictable endpoint of a government that mistook defiance for sovereignty and expediency for strategy. By rejecting the flawed but ultimately stabilizing Western or even Chinese partnerships in favor of Russia’s hollow promises of strength, Mali’s junta traded one form of dependency for another, more corrosive one. Russian mercenaries bought the government breathing room while they looted areas under their control and isolated their host governments from their own populations.

Recent instability in Mali is proof that Russia’s paramilitary presence has never had much to offer West and Central African security and development.

Days after the US State Department, along with a slew of Western governments, told its civilians to leave Mali immediately, the Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam al-Muslimin (JNIM) rebel group closed in on Mali’s capital of Bamako. On November 5, militants entered Bamako’s suburbs, and government forces are on the brink of collapse.

This outcome resulted from Mali’s junta pursuing a flawed foreign and internal policy, culminating in a doomed counterinsurgency strategy. Alienated from its neighbors with no useful allies after a very public fight with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and facing a populace increasingly hostile to the government, the junta is reaping what it sowed. JNIM is advancing more because the junta is unable to inspire loyalty, rather than because JNIM is winning decisive battles.

The common element in these self-destructive policies was a hasty pivot away from the advice and partnerships offered by Western actors and moving towards an uncritical embrace of Russia. These partnerships were often imperfect and rightfully critiqued by local actors, but the junta’s choice of Moscow as a patron ultimately set it up for failure. The fall of Mali isn’t just a tragic story of state failure in the Sahel; rather, it is emblematic of Russia’s shortcomings, priorities, and soft-power deficits. Russia’s model of assistance was tested and found wanting.

While much of the world is treating this as a jarring bolt from the blue, the truth is that regional specialists have long seen the writing on the wall and identified the Russian element as a catalyst for problems. I was by no means alone when I wrote pieces in 2023 and 2024 on this for The National Interest.

Mali’s junta took power in 2020 after a long-expected coup d’état. Longstanding political grievances, COVID-19-related controversies, frustration over how the government was handling an insurgency led by Tuareg nomads in the north, and instability brought by Jihadist groups ultimately resulted in the resignation of the sitting president and the military seizing power.

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-african-strategy-isnt-working

>>How do you define mediocre?

Firstly Low TREO. ~3.04% versus 8-9% TREO for the only two operating mine (Lynas and MP). They barely make a profit.

Second average NdPr ratio of ~20%

Virtually none existent Dy/Tb

High Thorium.

Resource size is ok, but not the biggest, but its irrelevant really, its big enough for a optimal mine life/production.

Alongside all the ionic clays its has disadvantageous OPEX/CAPEX .

The BoD#s first duty is to the shareholders, not to you company employees.

The betrayal is to the shareholders, as the post made clear. They were told the the profitable REE separation would be performed in house, now the majority of any profit will go to external companies.

Paul tried to distract the blame to the British government, whereas the failure to raise funds is the managements fault. (Mainly down to the mediocre resource).

> what else are we building?

A share price that will fund the million dollar pay packets.