Part 410 Jun 2020 22:00
THERE IS NO PLAUSIBLE COMMERCIAL MODEL FOR THE REVISED PORT SPECIFICATION WITH A £148M BUILD COST, THAT COULD GENERATE EVEN 50% OF THE REVENUE AND PROFIT REQUIRED TO AVOID THE BANKS TAKING OVER THE PORT ASSETS OVER WHICH THEY HAVE A LIEN - anyone who suggests otherwise is simply insulting the Market’s intelligence. If the Shipping and Port Sector Investment ‘Guru's’ running Mercantile believe otherwise, perhaps they will be so kind as to enlighten a totally disbelieving Market, by publishing an updated 3 Year Revenue and Profit Projection and Cash Forecast, so two friends and I can use our collective 90 years of shipping and port industry senior management experience to bring them to their senses.
I could go on and on but hopefully you have got the picture - most if not all of this and much more was reported to your Stephen Keys, who frankly rather than behave like a representative of a NOMAD acutely conscious of its responsibilities, routinely acted more like Mercantile’s defence counsel - a big mistake, and the height of arrogance, since he holds no shipping/port industry professional qualifications, and has no relevant experience and little technical knowledge of the Industry, if my long discussions with him are a reliable guide.
How could all this happen?
Clearly having NED's, a Nomad and a Financial Controller all based 4,000 miles away in the UK, is not ideal and making effective oversight highly problematic at best, particularly when the Nomad does not have a representative with the required industry experience and technical knowledge. In addition, it was extremely disconcerting to be telling one Ned about the lack of on-site progress that he should have been aware of, considering he was being paid £40k a year, nearly twice that of the NED's at Dover, Europe's largest short sea port.
Nomad's failure to carry out basic on-site due diligence to verify the accuracy of company statements issued during 2014 in particular, and the Oct 2016 Shareholders Circular, which was carefully crafted to falsely give the impression of a huge acceleration in the pace of on-site development work, in order to support the raising of an additional £37m, when the reality was no land reclamation or berth piling whatsoever was going on at all in H2/2016.
Having an Auditor unwilling to reveal the methodology they use to verify cash on deposit is extremely concerning since, Mercantile’s auditors were recently hoodwinked by an ex wind surfer turned corporate crook who as CEO carried out the huge Globo AIM fraud, by convincing the Auditor the company had £100m on deposit rather than just the loose change it turned out to be.