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We might just see that $15bn mining partner deal searcher mentioned in February 👏😗.

Also the potential for an approach 😢🫣😬

Correction lol 8th Dec.

The national elections in BD are routinely held on a Sunday. The 15th February is a Sunday so before the 15th is likely to be 8th.

The election commission must announce the election 2 months before so we should get news by the 8th Nov if it’s the 8th Feb.

That first trade is mine. Pay day SIPP top up (ISA was used up here months ago).

SIPP rebates to go in soon too 🥳

A2D, if I’d been charged £400 for a rollover I’d be annoyed so I think they were buys too😁

Https://energytracker.asia/bangladeshs-predicament-deepens/

Did we miss this (from May).

I saw it go through and it looked like a 440k buy. I haven’t live trades when I’m out and about.

Probably a rollover.

Well today’s volume arrived in one go.

Can we start going back up now 😉

😳

Officials from the Foreign Exchange Policy Department further clarified that FE Circular No. 33/2025 obligates all authorised dealer banks to report details of high-value imports at least 24 hours before LC establishment when the value reaches $3 million or more. This reporting system enables the central bank to monitor major payment liabilities and detect potential irregularities. Attempts to bypass these rules weaken regulatory visibility and can undermine national reserve management.

A director of the central bank who attended the meeting stated, on condition of anonymity, that the regulators knowingly support irregular pricing and contract manipulation. “There have been cases where importers open multiple LCs for identical products at different prices. To prevent such malpractice, Bangladesh Bank has decided to enforce strict rules without compromise,” he said.

Officials reviewing the import monitoring data also noted that splitting LCs distorts the financial risk assessment of banks, as the actual exposure remains hidden until the shipment arrives or the payment matures. The chair of the meeting instructed banks to comply with reporting protocols and warned that any deliberate violation will lead to regulatory penalties.

Coal import contracts for private power plants typically include specific clauses regarding quality, pricing formulas, and premium adjustments. Bangladesh Bank observed that many banks approve LCs without checking whether contract terms are being fulfilled. Weak scrutiny at the financing stage can lead to supply-chain interruptions or costly legal disputes when coal quality or pricing inconsistencies arise.

Bangladesh’s existing coal-based power plants such as the units in Banshkhali, Barisal, Matarbari, Patuakhali, Payra, and Rampal collectively require a steady flow of imported coal to continue operations. In the past, several plants have faced temporary shutdowns due to fuel shortages. At times, the government has also imposed restrictions on coal imports after detecting deviations from approved guidelines.

According to the Energy Division, Bangladesh’s demand for coal is more or less 1,5500 metric tonnes yearly for the mega plants. But due to shortage of coal all the plants are running below capacity thus the industry is suffering for power and some base-load plants sitting idle due to fuels.

With the new instructions in place, the central bank expects improved coordination between commercial banks, coal importers, and regulatory authorities. The ultimate goal is to ensure responsible foreign exchange management, eliminate irregularities, and safeguard the country’s energy supply security.

Https://www.deshkalnews.com/business/8213

BB halts split LC in import of coal

Coal import for power plants requires approval from the coal committee

Jannatul Ferdushy, Deshkal News

Published: 13:37, 29 October 2025

Bangladesh Bank has introduced tighter restrictions on import financing to prevent irregularities in coal imports and protect foreign currency reserves. The central bank has issued directives prohibiting commercial banks from splitting Letters of Credit (LCs) for coal consignments and has reminded them to strictly follow contractual and regulatory conditions before establishing any LC.

The decision was taken at a monetary policy meeting in October, where officials expressed concern over growing non-compliance in high-value imports. Bangladesh Bank believes that better transparency and stronger monitoring are essential to reducing risks and ensuring that foreign currency is used responsibly in large-scale import activities.

According to the directive, certain banks have been dividing the total value of coal import orders into several smaller LCs, even when the shipments involve the same buyer, seller, product type, and delivery schedule. When combined, these LCs exceed $3 million, the value threshold that requires mandatory reporting under the central bank’s Online Import Monitoring System (OIMS) issued on 14.08.2025. By splitting transactions, banks bypass standard oversight and avoid timely disclosure of crucial information related to major foreign payment obligations.

Speaking to Deshkal News, Bangladesh Bank Governor Ahsan H Mansur said, “Since taking office, I have observed a serious lack of transparency and widespread irregularities in various import-related activities. We spend a significant amount of foreign currency on fuel imports. To prevent misuse of dollars, we have strengthened monitoring of coal imports and decided to discontinue the practice of split LCs.”

He added that Bangladesh’s power generation system remains heavily dependent on imported fuels and that strict oversight is necessary. “Every year, a large volume of coal is imported for mega power plants. This move will improve transparency and help protect our reserves. From now on, no coal import will be allowed without the coal committee approval,” the governor said.

The coal committee plays an important role in assessing coal import proposals, especially for power plants. The committee verifies sourcing standards, pricing structures, fuel quality, and national supply requirements. However, the latest review by Bangladesh Bank found that some banks established coal import LCs without securing or verifying the committee’s mandatory authorisation. Such actions, the bank noted, increase the risk of financial disputes and misaligned foreign payment commitments that could burden the power sector.

Officials from the Foreign Exchange Policy Department further clarified that FE Circular No. 33/2025 obligates all authorised dealer banks to r

The coming months are decisive. Kathmandu, shaken by a Gen Z-led uprising that unseated KP Oli and left an interim government heading into elections within six months, still has to align hydropower projects set to come online late this decade. Nepal’s new political volatility has only sharpened the stakes. While in Dhaka, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), long marginalized under Hasina, is now seen as the frontrunner. What happens in the months after Bangladesh’s vote could redraw the energy map of the eastern subcontinent. A post-election thaw could let Delhi broker durable trilateral accords linking Nepal’s and Bhutan’s hydropower to Bangladesh’s industry through Indian corridors.

Moving fast after the vote to lock in approvals would turn Modi’s “Neighbourhood First” slogan into enduring leverage. For Nepal and Bhutan, it would convert hydropower potential into sustained exports; for Bangladesh, it would deliver stable, low-carbon electricity, bolstering energy security and export competitiveness under stringent EU carbon rules.

But India won’t be alone at the table. And it won’t be a vacuum that follows – it will be Beijing. Chinese state firms already dominate coal, gas, and renewables in Bangladesh. Beijing is already aligning its energy and finance strategies with the contours of a multipolar order in Asia, one defined by the quiet consolidation of supply chains, capital flows, and influence. They move quickly, finance fast, and don’t wait for political seasons to align. Gulf LNG suppliers and Western financiers are not far behind. The real competition isn’t about who arrives, it’s about who builds first and stays longest.

Nepal has seen this play before. When India couldn’t match China’s speed, Chinese electric vehicles arrived as affordable products that worked in hydropower-rich countries ready to electrify. Low tariffs, a growing middle class, and abundant cheap power created a perfect opening. Today, roughly four out of five new cars on Nepali roads are Chinese. Now, the same logic is moving east.

As Bangladesh’s demand surges, Dhaka won’t wait around. It will sign with whoever can deliver power cheaper, reliable, and on schedule. The window is narrow. Geography gives India the leverage to connect the Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal along with its direct supplies, but leverage without speed erodes fast. Beijing, meanwhile, is already laying tracks through Bangladesh’s energy landscape, moving faster than its neighbors and locking in long-term influence one project at a time. If it hesitates, Beijing will seize the initiative and move largely uncontested, defining the terms of this new regional architecture while Delhi scrambles to catch up.

Natural gas, which once met two-thirds of its power demand and remains the backbone of power supply, is declining by about 200 million cubic feet a year, as most prime reserves run dry. No major discoveries have been made in more than a decade pushing the country to more imports and coal. LNG imports have filled part of the gap. Between 2022 and 2024, Bangladesh spent an estimated. $11 billion USD on spot-market LNG purchases, a level of exposure that left it acutely vulnerable to global price swings. Coal plants face shrinking finance, and new LNG terminals – floating or onshore – take years to build. Bangladesh is trapped between falling reserves and slow, expensive alternatives.

Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India, while interim leader Muhammad Yunus demands her extradition, has cooled bilateral ties. Delhi suspended most visa services after the upheaval, signaling distance. Yet geography ensures neither side can sustain a prolonged break. Bangladesh’s clean energy goals, 40 percent by 2041, and the competitiveness of its garment industry depend on large-scale hydropower imports from Nepal and Bhutan, all of which must cross Indian territory. Domestic renewables can only go so far in a land-constrained country, making cross-border power critical.

In 2024, Nepal exported about 40 megawatts to Bangladesh through India while Bhutan advanced talks on similar flows. Scaling this requires Delhi’s consent and grid integration—critical if India wants to avoid Dhaka deepening reliance on Chinese-financed plants, Gulf LNG contracts, and Western-backed renewables through long term deals that would dilute Indian leverage.

Both Beijing and Delhi are recalibrating their playbooks in a region where governments change quickly and external alignments are never fixed. For China, it is an extension of its broader South Asian outreach, using infrastructure, swift supply chain and quiet diplomacy to knit the region into its economic orbit. For India, it is a moment of reckoning, the influence it once assumed as geographic entitlement must now be backed by speed and results. Each player brings not just energy, but an economic alignment that will shape Dhaka’s choices. Chinese capital ties Bangladesh into yuan-denominated infrastructure finance; Gulf LNG deals anchor it to fossil fuel import dependence; Western-backed renewables come with decisions and procurement rules too stringent to keep pace with need.

The coming months are decisive. Kathmandu, shaken by a Gen Z-led uprising that unseated KP Oli and left an interim government heading into elections within six months, still has to align hydropower projects set to come online late this decade. Nepal’s new political volatility has only sharpened the stakes. While in Dhaka, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), long marginalized under Hasina, is now seen as the frontrunner. What happens in the months after Bangladesh’s vote could redraw the energy map of the eastern subcontinent. A po

Bangladesh’s deepening energy crisis has made it the center of a regional contest, with China expanding investments and India seeking to use geography to retain influence. Dhaka’s post-election energy choices will determine whether Delhi can convert that leverage into lasting power or yield ground to Beijing’s faster-moving ambitions.

People visit the South Asia Pavilion during the 9th China-South Asia Expo in Kunming, southwest China Yunnan Province, June 19, 2025. (XinhuaHu Chao).jpg

People visit the South Asia Pavilion during the 9th China-South Asia Expo in Kunming, southwest China's Yunnan Province, June 19, 2025. (Photo: Hu Chao/Xinhua)

Bangladesh sits at the centre of a three-way contest: Beijing pours in capital, Delhi controls the arteries of clean energy access, and Gulf suppliers and Western financiers are bidding for long-term deals. At the heart of it is Dhaka’s energy shortfall. Chinese investments, from power plants to transmission corridors, are tying Bangladesh into a wider Chinese-built chain spanning Pakistan to Sri Lanka. The clean hydropower Bangladesh is eyeing from Nepal and Bhutan can only reach its factories through Indian territory, making Delhi the indispensable transit gatekeeper. For years, India has relied on geography as quiet leverage for its ability to slow, stop, or enable trade and commodities across South Asia on its own terms. Yet, that leverage is no longer uncontested, as new players, led by China, deepen their footprint in the region.

But India is not just a corridor country. Through Adani Power, it is also a direct supplier. In this contest, Dhaka’s next choices on its energy supply are poised to ripple across the subcontinent’s energy corridors and political alignments and will decide who gains the upper hand, and how the geopolitical map of South Asia is redrawn. With elections tentatively scheduled four months away and its power grid under immense strain, Dhaka has become the rare South Asian capital where political upheaval, foreign finance, and energy security collide.

Bangladesh’s energy system is under mounting pressure. About three million battery-powered rickshaws, running mostly on low-cost Chinese batteries, charge at informal roadside stations with no metering or load control. Their aggregate demand could swallow the full output of the $12 billion Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, two 1,200-megawatt units, built with Russian assistance and still awaiting commissioning—before any factory benefits.

Natural gas, which once met two-thirds of its power demand and remains the backbone of power supply, is declining by about 200 million cubic feet a year, as most prime reserves run dry. No major discoveries have been made in more than a decade pushing the country to more imports and coal. LNG imports have filled part of the gap. Between 2022 and 2024, Bangladesh spent an estimated. $11 billion USD on spot-market LNG purchases, a level of exposure that left it acutely vul

Https://www.chinausfocus.com/energy-environment/china-and-india-face-off-over-south-asias-next-energy-corridor

A takeover will have a few additional signs digit. Unusual trading patterns in the run up to it. It’s difficult to keep these things fully under wraps.

Another year to add more 😁

I topped up in my SIPP first thing. Small but it’s adding up nicely. Next opportunity this Friday.

Where’s this fuel coming from searcher 😗