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Re guidance: Yes — based on broker forecasts,

The P/E is around 7, so it’s definitely not priced for growth as it stands.

As for the idea that higher prices will push users towards premium brands, it’s an interesting theory, but I don’t really see it in this category. In alcohol, there has been a shift towards “drink less, but better quality” as taxes have risen. I’m not convinced that translates to vape liquids, especially at the budget end of the market.

If anything, it’s more likely to work the other way — users currently paying £4 for 10ml who see that rise to £7 are more likely to trade down or look for cheaper alternatives, rather than those currently paying £1.20 who see their product move to £4 look to pay even more.

Will this impact the vape market? Without a doubt. I’d expect a reduction in 10ml volumes, some shift towards illegal or non-compliant substitutes, and potentially a move into pods, where the tax increase feels less visible when you’re buying 2ml at a time.

The share price is very likely in for a bumpy ride, but it’s not as though the current valuation is ignoring the tax risk — that’s already reflected to a good extent.

If you’re comfortable with the volatility, it could be one to strap in for. If, however, the idea of the share moving ±30% off the back of a single trading update in the near term doesn’t sit well, then this probably isn’t the stock for you.

Still solid results and good news about 27

Hi Trendz,

I’m not sure where the 10% beat versus the FY26 upgrade from February is coming from.

The February update actually implied the same revenue growth that’s been communicated today, albeit it required a bit of calculation. Revenue per principal was guided at just under 10%, and principals were up 7.7%. Applying that (1.10 × 1.077) gives roughly 18% growth — effectively the same as what’s been reported today (17.9%).

The only genuinely new information, as far as I can see, is the upgrade to FY27.

I agree a good set of results

Good find... 2025 account have been published too, 120m bhat which is £2.7m at today's rates.

So it's not nothing, but now I see why it's not done anything to the brokers 2027 forecast.

Thanks Boon — really insightful.

Where did you find that Supreme was already doing the contract filling for Carabao, and that the UK business was around £4–5m? I couldn’t find anything online.

What is concerning here is either Supreme’s optimism about, or lack of understanding of, the drinks market. The following summary of Equity Development’s broker forecasts (which, in reality, are largely guided by management) shows how expectations for the drinks division have steadily deteriorated.

FY26 revenue forecasts:

October 2025 (SlimFast acquisition announced): £79m

November 2025 (H1 results): £69m

April 2026 (FY results & Caraboa licence): £69m

FY27 revenue forecasts:

October 2025 (SlimFast acquisition announced): £106m

November 2025 (H1 results): £90m

April 2026 (FY results & Caraboa licence): £90m

This strongly suggests that, at the point of acquisition, management were expecting very substantial contributions from SlimFast, Juicy Protein or Typhoo Iced Tea — none of which have since materialised. Notably, the FY27 forecast has not moved at all following the announcement of the Carabao licence, despite this being a volume‑led product where Supreme should already have a clear line of sight on UK sales volumes. One would expect this to be visible within a relatively narrow margin of error.

The total consideration of SlimFast was £20m, which is huge at more than 25% of the company’s equity value at the time. To be fair, approximately £9m of this is deferred and performance‑linked. So if SlimFast ultimately proves to be a flop, the economic cost to Supreme may be closer to £11m. Never-the-less, thats quite a bet on a business being upended by GLP-1 drugs, despite Supreme attempting to spin this as an opportunity.

More fundamentally, Supreme’s historical strength has been in acquiring poorly run businesses and operationally improving them. The key question with SlimFast is whether it was ever poorly run at all — or whether it is simply a weak or structurally challenged brand. The same applies to 1001, acquired from WD‑40: this was not a failing start‑up, nor a business lacking operational discipline, but a brand owned by a highly experienced consumer goods operator.

There is a risk that Supreme is drifting away from what it has traditionally been good at: buying neglected assets and fixing them. Instead, it appears to be taking bigger bets on mature brands where the scope for operational enhancement is limited and the outcome is much more dependent on consumer demand and category growth.

Perhaps SlimFast is simply a slower burn than initially expected. Alternatively, perhaps management — and Sandy in particular — may need SlimFast to fail before making a much larger bet in the same mould. Either way, the direction of travel feels materially different from the Supreme of a few years ago, and that shift deserves close scrutiny.

Hi Boon — good spot on Morrisons at £1.30. It’s the only major retailer I can find online at that price right now, but it could indicate that Supreme have begun nudging prices up again. Last time they raised prices, they increased the wholesale/retail list price, but the timing of when each retailer passed that rise on to customers varied.

They previously blogged about the last price increase on the 88Vape website, but there’s been nothing this time — though to be fair, that earlier rise was the first in years, so they may simply not feel the need to announce it again.

I also wouldn’t be surprised to see another rise in the next three months. Retailers will be bulk‑buying before October because they can purchase stock without the new excise tax and still legally sell it without a tax stamp for six months afterwards. That means they can continue selling at £1.20/£1.30 (or whatever their pre‑tax price was) — or, if they want to be opportunistic, they can raise the shelf price to £4 and effectively pocket the “tax” margin themselves.

Supreme will know this dynamic very well. That creates an incentive for them to push through another wholesale price rise ahead of the pre‑tax stockpiling surge, capturing more margin while retailers are loading up.

Hi Joker — where are you getting your stats on Germany from? I’ve struggled to find solid, verifiable sources.

On Ireland, the tax only came into force in September 2025, so it’s probably too early to see any meaningful demand impact. The rate is extremely high — €5 per 10 ml plus 23% VAT — so I’m definitely interested to see how this affects consumption once a full year of data is available.

Spain’s tax is also very recent, so I’m not sure how much reliable data exists yet. If you can point me to reputable sources for either country, I’d appreciate it.

I think that’s a fair assessment. 88Vape started life booming in the discounters, which does skew toward lower disposable income. That said, for online customers I strongly suspect most are ordering in the £20 range to make use of discounts and promotions, or at least £15 to avoid delivery charges—otherwise they may as well buy from retail.

Given a four‑fold price increase, I’d expect many online customers to do what they can to bulk buy—perhaps £40–£80 at a time. Of course, behaviour will vary: some won’t bulk buy at all, while others will go much further.

What you’ve made me realise is that the threat to the online sales channel is substantial. At the moment they sell 20 × 10 ml for £20 including delivery, which still appears to generate a respectable margin for Supreme. To maintain the same margin post‑tax, they would need to sell those 20 units for around £80, which is likely to deter bulk buying. The alternative is that customers shift to smaller orders, in which case Supreme is forced to withdraw free delivery.

I can’t find my old notes immediately, but I believe a 10 ml bottle costs roughly £0.50 to manufacture. Selling 20 for £20 implies a production cost of £10, leaving about £6.70 after VAT to cover delivery and profit. That already feels tight. Free delivery on a £15 order becomes almost impossible: that would be just four 10 ml bottles, costing around £2 to make, and yielding only £1–£2 post‑tax to cover both margin and delivery.

I need to re‑read the HMRC guidance, but I think there will also be bulk buying by retailers ahead of the tax. If retailers purchase stock before October without a tax stamp, they can continue selling it for up to six months without having paid the tax. From the customer’s perspective, those products can still be sold at £4 even though the retailer hasn’t incurred the tax. However, once that six‑month window closes, any unstamped stock becomes illegal to sell.

Yeah, I agree they’ve got a lot of work to do to replace the vape liquid business, and that likely means a stronger pivot into own‑brand pods.

The percentage price increase on liquids is eye‑watering. You can currently buy a 10ml bottle for about £1.20; post‑tax it’s going to need to be circa £4 just to stand still on margin once you factor in the duty stamp. That’s a huge shock and will genuinely make a lot of people rethink vaping altogether.

By contrast, their own‑brand pods are around £1.29 for 1.6ml. Post‑tax, these are likely to be circa £2. That’s not trivial, but it’s far more palatable for most consumers.

I suspect casual liquid users will be put off by the jump from £1.20 to £4 and will anchor on the headline price rather than the smaller volume, so I’d expect a material drop in 10ml liquid sales, only partially offset by pods. That’s important, given the margin on 10ml liquids is substantially better.

That said, Supreme / 88Vape now have a sizeable B2C following and, crucially, a large email database. I assume they’ll actively educate customers about the upcoming tax (which I believe is perfectly legal). The obvious consequence is bulk buying in the run‑up to October — and potentially very significant bulk buying.

A typical casual user might get through two or three 10ml bottles a week. I suspect average web order size is £20 because free delivery kicks in above £15 and the liquid is discounted to 20 × 10ml bottles for £20. From there, it’s not hard to see people placing £100–£200 orders. The product doesn’t perish, and 200 bottles would fit into a couple of shoeboxes, so storage isn’t really a constraint.

They could also get this wrong in a couple of ways. From memory, they can probably double — possibly even triple — 10ml production capacity. That creates its own execution risk. They could ramp production a few months ahead of October, only to find that bulk buying is far more muted than expected.

Equally, bulk buying could turn out to be far stronger than anticipated and they simply can’t keep up with the temporary spike in demand. They tend to run inventories fairly lean, and it’s not uncommon to see products showing as “out of stock” on their websites, which suggests there isn’t much slack in the system.

This could also act as a catalyst for tobacco‑free nicotine pouches, as consumers look for alternative nicotine delivery methods. Management had high hopes for 88Nic, yet it failed to gain traction — with Sandy even commenting that “we don’t know why”.

It might be worth spending some focused time understanding that outcome. If, for example, the pouches become dry or tasteless after five minutes (which is a common criticism of weaker products in this category), that’s a fixable issue — but only if it’s properly diagnosed and addressed.

I appreciate that they’re diversifying through Typhoo, SlimFast and similar brands, but my concern is that the most immediate and material threat to the business right now

Once we are well past october and the new vape tax there will be a lot more clarity on profit going forward. At this point we might get out of single digits on the P/E ratio.

Peter Harrison likes the share price with buys for himself and his wife at just under 20k each, presumably into their ISAs.

This is in addition to November 2025 buys for a similar values.

I think Bioventix looks pretty undervalued at these levels.

This is the most enthusiastic management commentary we’ve seen on Tau/Neuro to date, with language like “clear causes for optimism that our revenues will grow significantly into the future.” That’s notable coming from Bioventix, who are usually very restrained.

Importantly, the enthusiasm is backed by numbers. Tau/Neuro royalties have grown sharply over the last three half‑years: £30k, £45k, and £150k for the six months ending Dec‑24, Jun‑25, and Dec‑25 respectively.

Peter Harrison almost never comments on valuation. He’s previously said words to the effect of “I make antibodies — you’re better placed to judge whether the share price is high or low.” That makes the strength and confidence of this commentary stand out even more.

Even if growth were to flatten from here, it’s hard to argue the shares aren’t undervalued. The business is exceptionally well insulated from inflation, and while some royalties (e.g. troponin) will eventually roll off, the remainder require no incremental investment, no capex, and no maintenance spend.

New antibodies typically take many years to commercialise, but Tau/Neuro seems to be progressing very well already, with around half of the major diagnostic players now using Bioventix antibodies in their assay designs.

For a capital‑light business with strong cash generation, durable royalties, and increasingly credible future growth, the current valuation feels hard to justify.

Re dividend: what were you expecting — more or less?

It looks sensible to me.

Cash balances at 31 December 2025 were £5.3m, and cash generated from operations over the six months was c. £4.0m.

They pay the interim dividend in mid‑April, which is roughly 75% of the way through the following six‑month period. That implies additional cash generation of around 75% × £4.0m = £3.0m before the dividend is paid.

So, immediately pre‑dividend, cash would be approximately:

£5.3m + £3.0m = £8.3m

The dividend itself is:

70p × 5.22m shares ≈ £3.6m

That gives a post‑dividend cash balance of c. £4.7m.

Management have previously said they like to retain around £5m of cash “just in case”, so they’re not a million miles away from that level. It still leaves a healthy buffer to allow for swings in working capital and any unexpected revenue suprises.

Keystone’s AI initiatives look very similar to what most law firms are doing right now — turning on standard Microsoft AI features, adding generative tools into their document systems, and building simple internal Q&A bots. These are useful and sensible steps, but they’re not unique or cutting‑edge from a technology perspective. They’re essentially adopting off‑the‑shelf tools rather than creating proprietary innovation. That said, none of this undermines their business model or growth trajectory — it’s just a reflection of where legal‑sector AI currently is: incremental, not revolutionary.

On the plus side for me, its finally dropped in price to a level im comfortable to buy in at.

Any thoughts on slimfast AValue?

Supreme looks to be positioning itself as a contract filler for smaller brands that don’t have the scale or expertise to navigate the upcoming tax changes, which can only be a positive strategic move in my view:

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/supreme-imports_supreme-sup-fmcg-activity-7425192498274205697-P-zR?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_android

Hopefully they can steer through this period successfully and come out the other side with a re‑rating. That other side is probably a smaller vaping market, partly offset by a growing share. The price elasticity here is going to be fascinating— >triple prices for 88Vape, trade‑downs from premium brands, and some users likely jumping to untaxed HnB or pouches… though if demand tanks more than I’m expecting, I’ll probably find it a lot less fascinating as a shareholder.

That said, I do have some concerns. Supreme’s model has historically been very straightforward and very effective:

-buy an underperforming or poorly managed business,

-improve operations,

-and then leverage Supreme’s existing distribution network to push the products out more efficiently.

This formula has served them extremely well over the years.

The SlimFast acquisition, however, feels very different. It was a substantial purchase relative to Supreme’s equity base, and unlike past deals, they’ve bought it from a major FMCG player—so presumably the brand was already well‑managed. Supreme is now betting on new product development, but I’m not convinced that NPD is their core strength. 88Vape was a massive success, but it may have been more a case of right place, right time rather than a deep understanding of why it worked. They haven’t been able to replicate that success with 88Nic, perhaps because they’re assuming the pouch market overlaps with the 10ml vape liquid customer base, which doesn’t seem to be the case.

The 1001 acquisition was from another established company as well—again likely well run—but at least the purchase price there was modest.

Typhoo Tea, on the other hand, seemed expensive relative to Supreme’s balance sheet, but that business did look very poorly managed, so there’s probably genuine turnaround potential and room for clear value creation.

Sandy has been doing this for a long time and has a huge amount of skin in the game, so I still trust that he’s making the right calls overall—even if I’ve got a few doubts about some of the recent strategic shifts.

Yes, I don't think its quite sustainable.

It wasnt an exciting investor presentation either.

Not well received