Member Info for Fernan10

For those here expecting AP to take CHAR private, I don´t think this is going to happen.

For AP and his aides, CHAR is a cash cow, that lives 100% out of shareholder´s money. They won´t loose that.

I already know that management has decided to take the "farm in and partnering" way to get to Loukos development.

My question was: why has management prioritized investing the recently raised money in "new wind projects", instead of performing a testing of Loukos (as was promised before and as a way to get to short term cash flow)?

Someone here mentioned that management even put a christmas tree en the wellhead of the Loukos well, in order to make it ready for a flow test.

So why management decided to change their mind and keep investing in more "jam tomorrow" projects, instead of taking the quickest route to income?

This is not what I asked for.

Why has management decided to indefinitely put off the testing of the Loukos well and its eventual short term cash flow???

shouldn´t it be a priority, instead of investing in new "wind projects"???

*July 2023 equity raise:

US$ 12 million for the drilling and testing of 4 onshore Loukos gas wells, at US$ 3 million per well

*July 2024 raise:

US$ 2 million for a "namibian new venture"

US$ 2 million to "progress onshore gas commercialisation plans in Morocco to build a gas to industry supply"

where is all that money??? shouldn´t management be held responsible about that???

They were "progressing onshore gas commercialization plans in Morocco" last year, and now they are looking for a farm in partner to drill the wells?????

What gas were they trying to "commercialize"?

And now we have:

* May 2025 raise:

US$ 3.5 million to "secure Chariot's stake and participation in wind generation, gas and new upstream assets"

This management team is a nightmare.

It´s now the turn of "wind projects" to fund through an equity raise

I know it´s not your fault Whimax.

Buy you don´t need to present today´s news about Loukos as a positive for shareholders.

It´s a shame to have this crappy management taking care of our hard earned money

We have already gave US$ 12 million to CHAR´s management in July 2023 to drill and test 4 onshore wells in Loukos, do you remember that Whilmax? Now they have opened a data room to look for "farm in partners" to fund exactly those same wells...

what do you think of that Whilmax?

Surfit:

CHAR´s management raised US$ 12 million in July 2023 to drill 4 onshore wells in Loukos, at a cost of US$ 3 million per well. They drilled just 2 wells, tested none, and the money was gone next year (hence the capital raise in July 2024).

They got another US$ 2 million in July 2024 for a new oil exploration license in Namibia. They got nothing and the money is likely gone now.

How are they going to convince the market to endure another share placing?

If they can not make more raisings, how are they going to pay day to day expenses?

Please, don´t blame dear Harry for keeping the endless psichological torture on long term holders.

Blame CHAR´s management for not providing any info at all about the recent termination of the farm in contract with ENOG

CHAR raised:

-US$ 12 million in July 2023 for "Onshore drilling and development planning on new onshore Moroccan Licence, expected to be awarded imminently" (drilling of 4 wells, at a cost of US$ 3 million per well, according to the news release)

-US$ 4 million in July 2024 to:

* Secure a material new venture opportunity with multi-billion barrel potential (US$ 2 million)

* Progress onshore gas commercialisation plans in Morocco to build a gas to industry supply (US$ 2 million)

Can management be sued for spending the money in overhead costs, salaries and bonuses, instead of invest it according to the placing prospectus?

how can the market believe them next time they try to raise more funds for another "new venture"?

By memory, they raised:

* US$ 12 million to drill and test 4 Loukos onshore wells

* US$ 2 million to get an oil exploration license in Namibia

If the money was used to pay management salaries, for example, and nothing of what was promised was achieved, I don´t know if they can be sued for mismanagement of shareholder´s money.

Oiltdr:

what you have stated in the previous post makes sense to me.

what are your thoughts regarding CHAR´s current cash position?

Regards

Production will be sold 100% to the local market. It´s highly likely that it will be funded with the help of local investors. Could be the local electricity power company, the moroccan crown-owned mining company that is developing the Tendrara gas field in the east of the country, etc.

Gas production of 70 mmcfd, at a selling price of US$ 10/mcf, results in a annual revenue of US$ 255 million (gross).

Free cash flow (after deducting royalties, production costs and interest payments) will be higher than US$ 150-170 million per year (gross), tax free.

Part of that cash flow could be reinvested to explore Anchois satellites (drilling 1 or 2 exploration wells per year) to grow the resource.

It still makes an interesting project.

Examples of Penalties:

Loss of Earned Interest: The farmee may lose any interest they have earned in the oil and gas rights.

Financial Penalties: The farmee may be required to pay a certain amount or reimburse the farmor for expenses incurred.

Forfeiture of Security: If the farmee provided a security deposit, it may be forfeited.

In the context of a "farm-out agreement" (typically used in oil and gas), an early termination penalty is usually associated with the farmee (the company acquiring an interest) breaching the agreement by failing to fulfill its obligations (e.g., not completing the required work) or if certain conditions are not met by a specified date. The farmor (the original holder of the oil and gas rights) can then terminate the agreement and potentially recover losses or expenses incurred. The details of such penalties, including the amount and how it's calculated, are typically outlined in the farm-out agreement itself.

It could have been agreed in the farm in contract that, should ENOG fail to make the compromised investments in the required timeframe, it simply looses its interest in the license, without any additional penalty, and without the right to recover from CHAR any amount already invested neither.

"The primary significance of classifying a farmout agreement as an option farmout or an obligation farmout is the effect of failure to perform under

the agreement. When the farmout is structured as an option to drill, failure to drill will cost the farmee the benefits it might have earned. When the

farmee is obligated to drill, however, failure to drill may expose the farmee to very substantial liabilities" (see page 305 of the document below)

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1091&context=onej

Normally, the breach of contract by ENOG for non executing the minimum US$ 85 million investment in accordance with the farm in contract should carry the payment of a penalty.

Except, of course, in the event that ENOG and CHAR previously agreed that, should A3 fails to deliver, ENOG had the option to terminate the contract without any penalty.

Could that be the case here?