Getting there...slowly.11 Sep 2024 13:47
It's looking like the jigsaw pieces are slowly starting to fall into place.
The KRG appear to recognize that the KRI oil trade, the so-called smuggling, will have to end to allow Iraq to be friends again with OPEC (human greed being what it is we know it will never truly end). Good relations with the Turkish side should also ensure that the export numbers can be presented in a suitably advantageous manner.
The reward for that will be the inclusion of KRI crudes in the finalised new pipeline agreement. The amount & proportions of KRI crudes included in SOMO's export blend still have to be announced, but expect the heavy, sour crudes to be limited. As compensation for that, continued local sales will cover some of the shortfall (but under SOMO management, so no ultra-low-ball pricing from local wheelers and dealers).
Discussions with Turkey are essentially complete, with broad agreement on the proposed BOTAS Tariff Rates/Volumes in place. I expect the initial baseline volume / throughput number to 550,000bopd and that currently looks like 300Mbop to KRI, 250Mbopd to SOMO-Kirkuk.
Discussions on SOMO utilising the Khurmala-Faysh Khabur pipeline link (for the Kirkuk Dome fields in their control) are not yet finalised, as the pipeline operator is currently demanding too much $/bbl/km. I expect that to change quite shortly as the alternative pipeline is nearing completion and Baghdad can afford to wait; at the end of the day, SOMO's proposal makes far more economic sense for the embattled KRG. If agreement cannot be found with the K-FK pipeline operator, SOMO can still pipe their output into the FK station and, after blending with the KRI crudes, from there into the Ceyhan pipeline. Price level and -stability for the (still to be agreed) agreed export blend) will also strengthen the argument for both KRG and KRI contractors.
All of this leaves the re-jigging of the current KRG PSCs as the last major stumbling block - but here is where I see the greatest room for manoeuvre. The “either or” numbers will be very plainly laid out, with no room for obfuscation. It’s quite clear now in Baghdad that a Hybrid- or Revenue Sharing Contract (RSC) is the way to go, but it takes time for the less educated, public and MPs to understand the reasoning behind this – that education process in now in full swing and even those with an axe to grind will have to recognise the numbers have a certain validity. The main stumbling block in agreeing the RSC is the time frame for recovery of invested Capital; while Baghdad recognizes that invested capital must be recovered/paid back, the current KRI PSCs are considered too generous with an overly fast payback period and that will have to change.
I do not see that as an insurmountable problem for the business model – if your business can survive X years of $25/bbl crude sales then there’s a lot of contract rejigging you can survive with $75/bbl crude sales.
The above is my opinion and interpretation of