Cobus Loots, CEO of Pan African Resources, on delivering sector-leading returns for shareholders. Watch the video here.
Waste of time….
First off, let me say that I do not know the answer to why the sale is taking a long time but I do have a theory. It is a positive theory taken from believing the RNS put our by EUA and a bit of reading between the lines. On the basis of my theory I’ll stay invested in the company at least until a dividend and probably beyond.
It seams that you also have a theory / opinion about where EUA is going and should probably base your future investment in EUA on that theory.
Secondly, you’ve probably realized that I’ve not gone into the details of my theory, mostly because it’s certainly not original and I don’t wish to persuade anyone of what to do with their investment. I don’t understand why you think people want to hear what you’ve got to say, it’s pretty irrelevant and very boring. Sell up and move on!
Apologies.. “far left bull”.
In fact, can you show or demonstrate with an example a main stream media with “far left bull” as their agenda.
Bet you can’t…
In fact, do you even know what left wing politics are verses right wing politics?
For instance, what are communism/ socialism / fascism / social Darwinism/ Marxism etc?
RIA82, I checked put John Mearshiemer on Wiki for a bit of background on the dude. He’s a heavy hitter! I’ve copied a section on his book around deterrence, I’ll paste it below..
Edit
Conventional deterrence Edit
Mearsheimer's first book Conventional Deterrence (1983) addresses the question of how decisions to start a war depend on the projected outcome of military conflict. In other words, how do decision makers' beliefs about the outcome of war affect the success or failure of deterrence? Mearsheimer's basic argument is that deterrence is likely to work when the potential attacker believes that a successful attack will be unlikely and costly. If the potential attacker, however, has reason to believe the attack will likely succeed and entail low costs, deterrence is likely to break down, which is now widely accepted to be how the principle of deterrence works. Specifically, Mearsheimer argues that the success of deterrence is determined by the strategy available to the potential attacker. He lays out three strategies.
Firstly, an attrition strategy entails a high level of uncertainty about the outcome of war and high costs for the attacker. Secondly, a limited-aims strategy entails fewer risks and lower costs. Thirdly, a blitzkrieg strategy, provides a way to defeat the enemy rapidly and decisively with relatively low costs. For Mearsheimer, failures in the modern battlefield are caused mostly by the potential attacker's belief that it can successfully implement a blitzkrieg strategy in which tanks and other mechanized forces are employed swiftly to cause a deep penetration and to disrupt the enemy's rear.[11] The two other strategies are unlikely to lead to deterrence failures because they would entail a low probability of success, accompanied by high costs (war of attrition) or limited gains and the possibility of the conflict turning into a war of attrition (limited aims). If the attacker has a coherent blitzkrieg strategy available, however, an attack is likely to ensue, as its potential benefits outweigh the costs and risks of starting a war.[12]
Besides analyzing cases from World War II and the Arab–Israeli conflict, Mearsheimer extrapolates implications from his theory for the prospects of conventional deterrence in Central Europe during the late Cold War. He argues that a Soviet attack is unlikely because the Soviet military would be unable to successfully implement a blitzkrieg strategy. The balance of forces, the difficulty of advancing rapidly with mechanized forces through Central Europe, and the formidable NATO forces opposing such a Soviet attack make him view the chances as low for the Soviets to start a conventional war in Europe.[13]