Member Info for AGEOS

The 07.07.2020 RNS regarding a JVA for the acquisition of a second asset in the Republic of the Congo implies some interesting prospects if successful. An onshore oil production licence for a potential acquisition “producing at a rate of approximately 300 bopd from the Mengo formation as recently as 2019” with “production currently suspended pending the assignation of a new licence”, suggests from an appraisal of the likely target fields, a potentially significant acquisition.

Recent onshore production from the Mengo formation has been limited to only a few fields in the Kouilou region [ 6 coastal districts] most, if not all of which, appear to have substantial oil reserves. Whilst a portion of 300 bopd is relatively insignificant, it is the potential for developmental production which is of greatest interest. In this latter respect a successful outcome to the further initiatives towards obtaining “Non-equity development funding” from two pan-African financial institutions, announced on 16.06.2020 will be essential; the Mengo is a known low-permeability oil reservoir and as such requires advanced and expensive technologies to achieve commercial production.

Of the licence Blocks [ref Coastal Basin Block Map Nov 2019 www.congomhc.com ] which constitute the Kouilou region and which are shown as in production in 2019, M'Boundi, Zingali, Kouakoualaa and Loufika appear to produce from the deeper Vandji sandstone, part of Kayo Sud operated by Wing Wah Petrochem produced from an unspecified source, and MKB [Mengo, Kundji, Bindi & Tchiniambi Fields] operated by SNPC definitely did, and in some fields still do, produce from the Mengo. Leaving aside the possibility that Kayo Sud, for which there is no data, is the JVA target, if one of the MKB fields is the target then bear in mind that Orion Oil paid $150m for a 20% interest in MKB in 2013 on the basis of certified reserves of 1.3billion barrels of oil. Of the four MKB fields, Kundji would appear to be the most likely candidate with two wells probably still in production in early 2019, of which more details can be provided if and when we have confirmation of the outcome.

Regardless of the JVA outcome I have no doubt there will be other W African initiatives forthcoming, as Augusto Rossato ZEN's chief geologist since 2017 was Total's Operations Geologist for W Africa from 2005-9, based at Port Gentil, Gabon. He has specialist knowledge of the S Gabon-N Congo coastal basin. If AC tweets a photo of himself between Lucien Ebata, founder of Orion Group SA, and President Denis Sassou Nguesso, we can be sure of success.
AGEOS.

CanaryITM, ZEN began receiving revenue from Sidi El Kilani, Tunisia, on April 20th when the SPA with KUFPEC was signed. The initial $250,000 of that revenue is assigned to KUFPEC in consideration of the acquisition and is anticipated to be satisfied in full by October 2020. ref RNS June 11th.

MG you could add two more possibilities to your list of potential developments:

Angola. AC is on record, ie the Jeune Afrique Business+ website 17.02.2020, when interviewed regarding ambitions in Africa, as stating “from amongst the countries in question, Angola offers a very favourable environment with all its open-market reforms”. He also mentioned “access to new consultants in Lagos and Cape Town” so his interests may be wider than is currently evident. I noted some of the potential Angola targets in a 21.02.2020 post.

Norway. Ref RNS 4072B 30.01.2020 Establishment of Norwegian Subsidiary
“Zenith Energy Ltd., ("Zenith" or the "Company"), (LSE: ZEN; TSX.V: ZEE; OSE: ZENA-ME), the international oil & gas production company, is pleased to announce the establishment of its fully owned Norwegian subsidiary, Zenith Energy AS ("Zenith Norway").
As announced on December 9, 2019, Zenith intends to use Zenith Norway as a vehicle for intended participation in future licensing bids to be organised by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, as well as to actively pursue the potential acquisition of working interests in mature energy production assets across Northern Europe. 
To this end, the Company will mandate a leading Norwegian law firm to advise on the process of obtaining pre-qualification status for the acquisition of participating interests in Norwegian Continental Shelf ("NCS") energy production licenses.”

I added the following to a 17.01.2020 post on the subject:
“In May 2019 the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum & Energy invited bids for an APA (Awards in Predefined Areas) which includes already explored areas on the offshore Continental Shelf which can be developed in conjunction with existing platforms and infrastructure. Whilst Zenith would clearly not be a lead bidder it could conceivably be a participant, with its gas to energy expertise foremost.” [The latter is alluded to in an RNS dated 03.12.2019]

More recently, ZEN's dealings with KUFPEC re the Tunisian acquisition elicited a reference by AC in comments concluding the 20.04.2020 RNS to having “initiated a fruitful relationship with KUFPEC, a....company with operations across the world including Norway, and I look forward to exploring further cooperation opportunities in the future”. AC is always very deliberate in his choice of words.

Most importantly, the APA 2020 Invitation to Apply for Production Licences for Petroleum was announced last Friday (19.06.2020) with a deadline of 22.09.2020 for submission. See Norwegian Petroleum Directorate website www.npd.no for details. Awards expected during Q1 2021.
AGEOS.

MG, not much I can add at this stage as these three fields were not amongst those I thought were likely candidates and still appear most unlikely. However for what little it's worth these are extracts from some 'old' notes.
Konzi Marine seems most improbable as it's 10km offshore, 70km NE of Port Gentil and was shut-in during 2001 after 16yrs of production from two platforms. Elf Aquitaine were the discoverers and operators until merged with TotalFina in 2000, after which the decision was made to close it down presumably on economic grounds since Brent was then at c$25b. The 2002 TotalFinaElf Annual Report/Gabon section provides production data on only the largest fields so presumably this was amongst the c20 or so smaller producers.
Pointe Clairette is an onshore field immediately west of Port Gentil and N'Tchengue also onshore, c10km south of Port Gentil on the western coast of the peninsula.
Pointe Clairette was discovered and developed during the 1950's with 5 wells drilled in 1956 and 2 in 1957, all producers and part of a multi-field development with integrated pipe-lines, of what was known as the 'Mandji Island' Fields and source of “Mandji” crude. In 1958 5 fields produced 9817bopd of which 3789bpd was from Pointe Clairette. Total production from the 5 fields was more than 3.5Mbopd, mostly of 27-33API [ie a heavy crude].(ref Yates D A 1996, The Rentier State in Africa pp 57-8).
I'm inclined to wait for confirmation from ZEN before pursuing this further as I doubt the reliability of the original report. However, in the meantime hope this helps.
AGEOS

continuation:

Secondly, the Congo forecast of c273 bopd implies a modest increase from the current c30 bopd and is presumably based on an intervention at TLP-103C, as stated on the upgraded ZEN website. The modest production forecast is however more consistent with an initial intervention confined to the Mengo, combined with R1-3 flow, rather than a sidetrack to test the Upper and Middle Djeno. This suggests the sidetrack might constitute a second and later intervention, when finance as outlined in today's RNS and more appropriate to requirements, is available.

Thirdly, the c709 bopd (52%) apportioned to the anticipated W African acquisition, which on page 6 of the report is detailed as a well currently producing at 650 bopd and a second in need of intervention to restart production [previously cited at 1000 bopd], is clearly a significant proportion of the forecast total and therefore vital to the near-term acquisition strategy.
AGEOS.
PS. A bit more 'grist to the mill' for anyone wishing to use it.

Page 2 of the recent RAEXpert Credit rating report 27.05.2020 includes the following statement:
“Besides from the AAOGC deal, which was recently completed, if the rest of the announced acquisitions do materialize in full, the company is forecasting to have revenue proceeds as follows by March 2021: 52% in a new incoming acquisition in Africa, 20% in Congo, 17% in Italy and 11% in Tunisia.”

Since revenue can be equated proportionally to production, if production from Tunisia is maintained at the 2019 level [c150 boepd in KUFPEC Annual Report, ie 22.5% of Sidi El Kilani concession] and that constitutes 11% of ZEN's anticipated total production by March 2021, then it follows that total production by that date should be c1364 bopd. Of that total, Congo is therefore forecast to be c273 bopd [ie 20%], Italy 232 boepd [ie 17%] and the anticipated W African acquisition(s) c709 bopd [ie 52%].

Assuming the Credit Rating Report to be a true reflection of ZEN's forecast production for March 2021, the above regional estimates suggest some important conclusions.

Firstly, with regards to Italy, the 232 boepd total clearly implies that acquisition of the CORO interests will be satisfied in entirety by Part 1 of the SPA {Share Purchase Agreement] and will NOT require implementation of Part 2.

Part 1, requires “An initial £402,000, payable on completion in common shares in the capital of Zenith (“Consideration Shares”) at a price of £0.6 (equivalent to approx NOK0.71) per Consideration Share with a six-month hold period.” That equates to an allocation of 6.7m shares, regardless of the market price at the time of completion.

Part 2 of the consideration, requiring payment of “up to £3.5m in shares” is required ONLY in the event of the assets achieving “production...over a period of four successive months...equivalent to approximately 590 boepd” [ref RNS 03.12.2019]

If ZEN forecasts Italian production of c232 boepd [currently 55 boepd] by March 2021, it appears to have downgraded production from the 382 boepd cited in RNS 11.02.2020 [which reported an uplift in CORO asset production] and will be far below the production total required to trigger Part 2 of the SPA. So that removes the prospect of a potentially very damaging share dilution, although I have no doubt AC would have taken whatever steps were necessary to eliminate such an effect despite this being a signed, binding agreement.

To be continued

The Tilapia Field 'license', is actually a two-part agreement ie a PSC (Production Sharing Contract) and a JOA (Joint Operating Agreement) both of which are valid until July 18th 2020 (ref AAOG AIM Admission Document)
AGEOS

The recently updated ZEN website includes under operations/Tunisia/Development Potential the following statement “There are indications of oil present in the unexploited Bireno formation with plans proposed for the testing of its potential upside production potential.”

It is worth noting that a recent ETAP (State of Tunisia National Oil Company) reappraisal of the geotechnical data relating to the Guebiba Field, which has similarities to the Sidi El Kilani Field, has led to a new geological model and a proposed drilling campaign targeting a 40m+ pay-zone within the Bireno Formation. The first “production well” is due to be spudded in August, and will be drilled by CTF the state-owned contractor from an existing top-hole section. At Guebiba the Abiod limestone [main reservoir at Sidi El Kilani] is 200-400m above the Bireno main dolomite with a second dolomite, the Douleb, intervening within a sequence of clays and shales forming an effective seal. Structurally both fields are elongate domes with a NW-SE anticlinal axis and similarly oriented faulting.

A similar intervention at Sidi El Kilani would require a side-track, presumably from one of the four non-productive SLK wells, kicking off from below the Abiod Formation at C1600m, to intersect the Bireno at c2100m assuming a comparable stratigraphy. This would access the Bireno carbonates at the anticlinal crest.

Panoro Energy ASA which controls 49% of Guebiba [ETAP 51%] through its operating subsidiary Thyna Petroleum Services S A, is also targeting the Bireno offshore, with its SAMW-1 well in the vicinity of the 1992 British Gas Salloum-1 well, which first tested the Bireno at a rate of 1845bopd.

Whilst this provides an indication of the developmental potential of Sidi El Kilani, I also note that AC has mentioned active interest in other Tunisian assets of which there appears to be several currently available.
AGEOS.

continuation:

Quebradona is of special interest as being indicative of the kind of project Newmont may have to envisage at ANZA or LYRA to meet future environmental and social requirements. AngloGold Ashanti have taken 14 years so far to advance the Nuevo Chaquira 8.7MozAue Cu-Au porphyry, one of five targets within the Quebradona Project, to the Pre-Feasibility stage, and submission of EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment). The caving-mining method will assimilate all mining waste, and primary crushing and all associated logistics will be confined underground to eliminate dust emissions. More significantly, the project will finance regeneration of 2550 hectares of TDF (Tropical Dry Forest) and a variety of ecological initiatives aimed at enhancing the biodiversity of the region including restoration of the mine-site to a nature park. This and various socially oriented initiatives are deemed essential to alleviate local opposition to the project (ref Medelin Herald 29.11.2019 & Mining Data Online). The future of La Colosa, AngloGold Ashanti's 28MozAu proposed open-pit mine further south, is in contrast, in doubt due to intense local objection and is currently suspended on a 'care and maintenance' basis.
AGEOS

The delay in ANS approval of the three ANZA Concession applications and in resolution of the Corantioquia TDF (Tropical Dry Forest) Environmental Protection initiative, highlighted in previous posts, will hopefully be resolved following the change of Antioquia Governor earlier this year. A change in policy from the anti-mining stance of the previous regional administration is indicated by the following extracts from the Mining Journal, although a recent extension of the covid19 lockdown until July will presumably delay implementation.

New Antioquia governor backs mining.05.01.2020.
“Anibal Gaviria, the new governor of Antioquia, Colombia, looks set to open a new chapter for mining development in the territory and remove the impasse seen during the administrations of the two previous governors.
Gaviria named mining and metallurgical engineer Jorge Jaramillo as secretary of mines, a widely expected and welcomed appointment in the mining sector given Jaramillo fulfilled the same role when Gaviria was previously governor between 2004 and 2007.
The new governor also appointed Ana Ligia Mora as director of Corantioquia and Javier Parra as director of Cornare, the two autonomous regional environmental authorities in Antioquia, instructing them, "not to satanise mining," while also stipulating projects meet environmental standards, "above the legal requirements," he said during their investiture.
The first term of Gaviria as governor and Jaramillo as mining secretary saw exploration interest in Antioquia grow rapidly, as they took advantage of rising metal prices, a policy of opening Colombia to mining investment by then president Alvaro Uribe and the delegated authority to award exploration concessions
The energy and enthusiasm for exploration in Antioquia dissipated under the subsequent governorships of Sergio Fajardo and Luis Perez, which saw concession applications pile up waiting to be signed by the governor while processing times for environmental permits increased substantially.”

Antioquia to see new mining push.06.02.2020
“Jorge Jaramillo, the recently appointed mining secretary in Antioquia, Colombia, has big plans for the sector as he seeks to follow up on development of the Buritica gold mine with advancement of the Gramalote and Quebradona projects.”

To be continued

Pitterpatter, the second paragraph of my 31.05.2020 post states why it is NOT possible to extrapolate from 0.5Moz Au at APTA to 500MozAu for ANZA. If you wish to appreciate precisely why, you will need to understand a great deal about the genesis of different types of mineral deposits and both the structural geology and geological history of the ANZA area within its regional context, most of which is covered by previous posts.

Newmont's interest will be based on the continuity of the Cauca structural trend N-S through ANZA and surface evidence of possible CBM(Au) [Carbonate Base Metal Gold] vein systems and porphyritic float indicative of intrusive porphyry at depth. Air-borne surveys will also have contributed evidence, as is detailed in my 18.10.2018 post.

If the 'Bob' you refer to in your second post is Bob Moriarty, then you are citing a dubious source often quoted on an alternative 'chat-site', thankfully less so here. His 2013 claim of 4MozAu at APTA, posted here by 'smacks' on 22.05.2020 also without source attribution, is a useful reminder of how superficial understanding [as revealed by his method of calculation] leads to seriously wrong conclusions, just as your “lit up like a Christmas tree” quote does likewise. Surely you wish to base your investment decisions on verifiable evidence wherever possible, and not on what are clearly the self-serving opinion of others. Where you place my contributions within that spectrum is of course your choice.
AGEOS

Pitterpatter re your enquiry of Friday, presumably you are aware that apart from 5 exploratory drills at the Charrascala target (RNS 07.06.2018) all drills within the ANZA acreage have been confined to the APTA target. The OMI website currently cites only the Jan 2017 MDA resource estimation for APTA, (which was based on 53 legacy drill-cores), as 1.6-2.3M tonnes at 3.2-3.7g/t Au which at the highest grade translates into 165,000-274,000oz. Add to that the 18 holes drilled in 2017/18 and the resource estimate can be increased to c500,000oz Au (ref my post 12.10.2018) an estimation subsequently 'confirmed' by Outcrop Gold (ref website/projects/oribella/initial exploration work and model ) as “plus 0.5M oz Au”.

As the APTA estimate applies to less than 1% of the total ANZA acreage and the mineralization appears to be confined to a SSW-NNE APTA-Jesuitas lineation, it cannot be theoretically extrapolated to the rest of the ANZA acreage. It is therefore not possible to justify any “personal view on the amount of gold ANZA could potentially hold off the back of the current drills to date”, which was your first question. The evidence on which to base such an estimation simply doesn't exist. Newmont's involvement of course provides some reassurance that such evidence may be forthcoming with further scout drilling.

As to why Newmont do not have a share holding in Outcrop but do so in OMI, that may reflect the differing financial status and business strategy of the two junior companies at the time of the joint-agreement negotiations, OMI being in dire need of the $2M cash ($1.1m cash balance and $14.6m liabilities at 31.08.2018) and Outcrop (Miranda) not or less so (CD$200,414 cash balance 31.08.2018 with private placing for CD$1.5m in progress). The Outcrop (Miranda) joint venture business model to fund project exploration, to which their Agreement with Newmont conformed, is confirmed in the MDA (Management Discussion and Analysis) for year ended 31.08.2018, filed on SEDAR.

Hope that answers your questions satisfactorily.
AGEOS.

Those who have followed Newmont's wider interests in the region will know that on July 31st 2018, coincidental with the OMI ANZA deal, Newmont signed a similar Exploration Agreement with Miranda Gold regarding the Lyra Project, a 6100 hectare area 6-10km due east of the Buritica Project and c50km NNE of ANZA.

In a 10.03.2019 post enlarging in detail on this, I noted that in a SEDAR-filed Material Change Report, under Outcrop Gold Corp (=Miranda Gold) the term “Lyra Project” had morphed to include the previously named Pantagora area thus now constituting 54,893 hectares including 14 Concessions incorporating most of the area between Buritica and ANZA west of the Cauca river. This includes 25km of the N-S Tonusco Fault system which is inferred to have been the feeder channel for the Buritica vein system. I also mentioned that Newmont had scheduled a BLEG (Bulk Leach Extractable Gold) sediment survey for the area and speculated that a DSG (Deep Sensing Geochemistry) survey might also be undertaken.

Subsequently it was revealed that all field-activity in the area had been suspended due to security concerns and imposition of 'Force Majeure' regulations, a situation which persisted until November 2019 when exploration was resumed. No information forthcoming on whether this also applied to the ANZA region.

Of the information released by Outcrop Gold to date, it is note-worthy that 4 SGA (Stream Sediment Gold Anomalies) have been identified in the southernmost area, within 5-10km of the areas which constitute the La Cejita SGA ANZA target and bounded by the Tonusco and Mistrato Faults.

It is worth bearing in mind that “upon successful conversion of key applications to Concession contracts, Newmont can elect to earn into the Lyra project” with minimum $3m expenditure within 4 years to acquire 51% of a joint-venture company, and an additional $7m within a further 4 years for an aggregate 70% interest. Eric Sprott, the billionaire 'gold guru' acquired an initial $1m stake in Outcrop in Feb 2020 but apparently on the strength of the recent Santa Ana silver project (W-Central Colombia) drill results. Lyra, it appears, is yet another project awaiting Concession application resolution before assessment can proceed beyond the Exploration phase of air-borne survey and surface geochem and rock-chip sampling. In the meantime Outcrop are concentrating on their more advanced exploration projects at Santa Ana, and at Cauca and Mallama in the SW.

Outcrop Gold are also owners of the Oribella project adjacent to OMI's APTA discovery, a 20,000 hectare interest, of one exploration license and several Concession applications, with a single SGA (Cibeles) ready for initial drill testing and for which they are seeking a funding exploration partner. Since my 19.12.2018 post introducing Oribella, more information has been added to the company website Oribella - OutCrop Gold https//outcropgoldcorp.com/oribella/ for those interested.
AGEOS

On 30.12.2018 I posted details of the Guintar Mines complex ( GNM Guintar-Niverengo-Margaritas) which is situated on the western margin of OMI's ANZA interests (adjacent to the ICQ-080035X Pending Application concession which includes the La Cejita target) and which was available at that time for acquisition from AngloGold Ashanti. As this included a potential high-grade epithermal porphyry-type deposit I suggested that OMI-Newmont were obvious contenders whilst emphasising there were competitors.

In May 2019 AshantiGold sold the controlling subsidiary, Northern Colombia Holdings, to Royal Road Minerals which has lost no time in negotiating an exploration agreement with Mineros S.A. a private company based in Medelin and with mining interests throughout S America. Mineros is paying $3.5m for an option to acquire 25% and if exploration work admits, 50% of a joint company to develop the prospect. Guintar and Niverengo have been permitted for drilling as soon as Covid19 restrictions allow and “We are pushing to ensure rapid conversion of the exciting Margaritas application area to a Concession contract so that scout drilling may start as soon as possible”, a surprising but hopefully reassuring statement from the company in view of the long-outstanding Concession applications for the OMI-Newmont ANZA project. Perhaps the new Governor of the Antioquia region is anticipated to revitalise the Concession-permitting process.

GNM is 3,280 hectares in extent, with more than 50 historical underground mine adits accessing steeply dipping E-W oriented gold mineralized veins thought to be indicative of higher-grade bulk tonnage vein and breccia targets at depth. Its proximity to the La Cejita target could provide some insight into the latter's potential..
AGEOS

Thanks bhargav. Email sent.
AGEOS

Bhargav, I emailed the company on this and other matters during 2018/19 receiving in response several variations on the same theme ie “apologies for not being able to provide any further information additional to that already in the public domain” or “unable to provide the information requested due to commercial or market sensitivity”, either from the CEO or Chairman. Not an unexpected response in view of the nature of my enquiries.
The evidence, as I have outlined it, appears incontrovertible. However if you or anyone else can provide RNS, SEDAR or any other verifiable information confirming the award of the 3 Concession contracts at issue then I would be very grateful.
AGEOS

continuation:

A further important constraint arising from lack of completion of the Concession application process is detailed in Section 8g, page 16, of the Orosur-Newmont Agreement, which in summary defines a process for the integration of all the Concessions relating to the ANZA area, to ensure synchronicity of Mineral Exploration. This process requires the authority of ANM and it appears cannot proceed until Minera Anza (=Orosur) has acquired those Concessions.

In conclusion it appears that any initiative from Newmont, however much they may wish to progress this project, is stalled by failure to obtain the Concession contracts for half of the project area including two of the potentially significant exploration targets. As I have posted previously, the APTA discovery, with a possible 500,000ozAu resource, is a potentially feasible proposition as a 'stand-alone' project for OMI with appropriate external finance, but not for Newmont.
AGEOS

continuation:

Moving on to the Jan 2019 NI 43-101 Technical Report which can be accessed via the OMI website/operations/technical reports; page 21, fig 3 shows the Concession areas in map form and clearly differentiates between those Existing, in green, and those Pending Application, outlined in red. Page 20, Table 1, enlarges on the above Agreement details, but under the title “Land Tenure Description” including what appears to be, from the previous evidence, a highly misleading statement, ie “The Minera Anzá owns 100% of mining concessions that comprise to the Anzá Project. The project covers an approximate area of 10,615 hectares distributed in 3 mining concessions and 3 pending mining concession application.” This is clearly an inherently contradictory statement since the ANZA Project refers to 20,751 hectares of which only half, 10,615 hectares is covered by Existing Cencessions, the other half, 10,137 hectares subject to Concession Applications pending at the time of the report and, it appears, remaining so.

Fast-forward to the Annual Information Form for the year ended May 31st 2019, filed on SEDAR 03.09.2019 and page 15 includes a similar map indicating “granted permits” and “boundaries of the applications” unchanged. The associated text makes no reference to any progress relating to the applications or any change in their status. None of the subsequent filings on SEDAR, RNS releases or the Oct 2019 Corporate Presentation (accessible from OMI website) confirm successful conclusion of these Concession applications.

Since the region of Antioquia, of which ANZA is part, has special delegated authority from the national government to administer mining law and practice, the Concession applications are apparently subject to regional jurisdiction. The consultants Portex report that the number of applications signed into Concession contracts has fallen from 668 in 2004-7, to 243 in 2008-11, to 35 in 2012-15 and zero from 2015-18. This negative stance was continued by the then Governor Luis Perez until his replacement at end of 2019. The policy of the present Governor is unknown but with his administration in Covid19 lockdown progress seems unlikely.

Without Concession contracts in place for half of the ANZA area, two of the major targets, La Cejita and Jesuitas remain largely untested, as confirmed on page 5 of the Oct 2019 Corporate Presentation. Apart from the air-borne geophysical and surface sampling already completed and permissible under pre-Concession status, defined in the Orosur-Newmont Agreement as limited to Reconnaissance Exploration Work, no other test work including drilling can be implemented. This would explain the lack of drilling in these areas at least, since the Agreement with Newmont was signed.

To be continued

On 18.09.2019 I posted details of two important issues which I believe need to be resolved before OMI's interests can be progressed under the terms of the Orosur-Newmont ANZA Exploration Agreement of 7th Sept 2018. The first of these was the TDF (Tropical Dry Forest) protection designation which I updated in yesterday's post. The second concerns the status of 3 of the 6 Concessions which cover the area to which the Agreement relates. I have detailed this matter in several previous posts (18.09.2019; 07.08.2019; 07.02.2019 etc accessible via posting history) but as it does not generate any discussion on this BB, it may be and should be, of concern to recent or prospective investors as it appears to be a determinant of delayed progress at ANZA.

The Orosur-Newmont Agreement, for which the full legal text must be consulted, can be accessed via SEDAR/orosur, 14.09.2018 Material Document 352K, as a 45 page download. Page 1, Recitals A defines the “Existing Concessions” (3 in number) held by Minera Anza (= Orosur) and B the “Minera Anza Pending Applications” (2 Concessions) and “Escorpion Pending Application” (1 Concession) NB Escorpion S.O.M. is a Colombian registered corporation which under paragraph 6(viii) of the Agreement is required upon issuance of the Concession by ANM (Agencia National de Mineria) to transfer the Concession to Minera Anza. Details of the Concessions are as follows:

Exhibit A, Part 1, Existing Concessions:
T13635011 6738 + 112 hectares. Contrato de Concesion Minera Exploration, granted 03.05.2013.
H72488005 1798 hectares. Ditto, granted 11.11.2010
IFS-11361X 1966 hectares. Ditto, granted 19.10.2012.

Exhibit A, Part 2. Pending Applications:
LHO-08011 3903 hectares. Proquesta de contrato de Concesion.. Applicant Minera Anza
OG2-08465 14.8 hectares. Ditto.
ICQ-080035X 6219 hectares. Ditto. Applicant Escorpion S.O.M.

Thus the total area to which the Agreement relates (Existing Concessions + Pending Applications) is 10,614 + 10,137 = 20,751 hectares.

Evidence that the Pending Applications, for what constitutes 50% of the ANZA Agreement area, are subject to discretionary consideration by ANM, is provided by paragraph 6(vii) as follows:

“ Each of the Pending Applications has been prepared and submitted in accordance with applicable Laws. Neither Minera Anzá nor Escorpion has received notice from ANM or any other Governmental Authority of any defects in any of the Pending Applications, or rejection of, or intention to reject, any of the Pending Applications. To the knowledge of Minera Anzá, there are not outstanding any applications by any other Person for Contratos de Concesiones with respect to any of the Pending Applications Property.”

To be continued.

continuation:

Since then two MD & A (Management Discussion & Analysis) for 3 and 6 months ended 30.11.2019 ( filed on SEDAR 14.01.2020) and ditto for 3 and 9 months ended 29.02.2020 ( filed 14.04.2020) make no reference to the issue and likewise for all other SEDAR filings and RNS releases to date. TSX regulations would necessitate such disclosure as whatever the outcome it would have a material effect on the company's prospects.. As Corantioquia have also not issued any further update on the matter and remain in Covid19 lockdown, it appears that the issue remains unresolved.

Meanwhile if anyone has access to a verifiable update on the progress of the Corantioquia TDF protection scheme for ANZA please post a link for the benefit of all. The Corantioquia website and database is currently inaccessible.
AGEOS