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You wait an age for 1 Iridium Article to come, then they all come at once:

"Tight supply and hydrogen hopes drive iridium up 160%"
"Climate War" Accelerates ESG Craze Sparking Surge In Iridium Spot Prices"

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-precious-iridium/tight-supply-and-hydrogen-hopes-drive-iridium-up-160-idUSKBN2AC1DG

https://www.zerohedge.com/commodities/climate-war-spark-esg-craze-iridium-spot-prices-soar

"Iridium has become the latest precious metal to undergo a spectacular price rally, after supply shortages and expectations it will be used to produce hydrogen to power a greener economy lifted its value by 160% in two months. The difficulty of raising output means prices could rise further, analysts said"

Jdevereaux - I can't connect all the dots, but Ragnar provided some info last week. Using FY Sept 2020 Accounts:

1) THS Group Revenue is $406m (pdf pg. 59 among others). Of this:

2) Tharisa Minerals Proprietary Limited (26% owned by BEE Trust) Revenue is $298m (pdf pg. 112), so it's important to note not all of THS Revenue & Profit falls under the 74%-26% income split. The 26% for BEE Trust is also calculated from Net Profit after Tax and taking into account adjustments/ fluctuations (e.g. Forex).

3) Tharisa Minerals Proprietary Limited has a net profit after tax of $16.7m, of which $4.3m is attributable to Non-controlling interest (BEE). I'm rounding, but if you take exact figures from Accounts, you'll see the latter figure is 26% of $16.7m.

4) If we go back to THS Group Revenue (pdf pg. 59), I'm not quite sure how the $4.3m on pg.112 connects directly to the "non-controlling interest" income of $3.4m in terms of direct calculations, however there is a note on page 120 that does confirm the $3.4m non-controlling interest is the Income paid to BEE Trust:

"Non-controlling interests
Non-controlling interests comprise amounts attributable to Black Economic Empowerment shareholders in South Africa for their respective shareholding in the ordinary shares of Tharisa Minerals Proprietary Limited together with associated foreign exchange translations. The noncontrolling interest share of total comprehensive income amounts to US$3.4 million (2019: US$7.4 million loss)."

I know it makes up only 4.3% of THS PGM basket, however it's rare there's any stories on Iridium:

https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/02/13/iridium-a-precious-metal-sees-price-nearly-triple-in-1-month/

There's no mention of Iridium in the JM report and only 1 mention in the Auctus David Davis Report:
"Heraeus recently made a breakthrough in the production of green hydrogen by electrolysis, using new platinum and a much-reduced iridium containing cathode, which has resulted in making the production green hydrogen cost effective and more efficient."

Shows it will be critical for "green hydrogen" economy, as will platinum. Worth noting the rough annual production of each PGM per annum:

Palladium: 10 million oz
Platinum: 8 million oz
Rhodium: 757,000 oz p.a.
Iridium: 250,000 oz p.a.

Isn't/ won't take much for Iridium to fly if there is suddenly a new source of industrial demand - even more precious than Rhodium!

TBTT - we've always disagreed on Bunker Hill, I wouldn't call it a disaster. I still believe and said at the time Bunker Hill technically is a great brownfield project, which predominantly was always 1st and foremost a zinc and silver play. It has unbeatable zinc and silver grades (9.1 million tons with 5.08% Zn (some zones 20%), 2.35% Pb and 40 g/t Ag (1.29 ounces per ton)), as it was mainly a lead mine back in the day, with the high grade zinc sections largely ignored if the lead content was low. The capex was low for size of project ($90m capex for 8yrs LoM to begin, 547,500 tonnes p.a. process capacity), you had an infrastructure in place and the vast majority of local community wanted it to proceed. On environment front, they had liability exemption for all historic issues not just from DEA, but DoJ too. The environment side of things is an issue, but it's actually a far bigger issue with no mine, with huge amount of waste seeping into lakes. A mine could have indirectly helped paying taxes to fund clean-up, as well as the direct money they have to pay to DEA.

Now Bunker Hill have completely changed Board + Management, things seem to be going in right direction. So shows you what can happen when you have a clear out.

However what I didn't like was how HUM provided circa $2m to Bunker Hill (another entity provided another $2m too) and a few weeks later Bunker Hill announced it had no money! In my mind no proper financial due diligence to check Bunker Hills books could have been performed, otherwise obviously a check of their trade payables, current liabilities would have shown they were insolvent. In my mind this is a failing of the HUM Finance Director and Accounts Department, unless they were lied to by Bunker Hill in terms of financials shown to them, in which case they should have taken court action. So as there was no court action, I can only assume HUM Finance did not perform detailed enough checks, so heads should have rolled yes.

Thanks for all the info yesterday Tones. It's disappointing to me that the $17m Yanfolila Capex + Exploration has been classed/ confirmed as "development" and not "sustaining", which is what other gold miners I have issues with do. It is clearly costs to sustain the existing Yanfolila mine, however the RNS did state "development" so at least it's known, even if I disagree with its classification. This adds another circa $150 oz to AISC, on top of the US$1,250 - 1,350/oz guidance, so in my mind the true AISC 2021 guidance is $1,400 - $1,550 per oz.

After re-reading the RNS, I'm also not too impressed they changed the AISC metric from gold produced to gold sold (gold sold is a lagging indicator so you should not be linking production costs in the Q to gold sales), as if it was based on gold produced the AISC would have been $1,650 for Q4 2020. The grade is the key issue at only 2g/t in Q4 and for now without release of the revised rolling mine plan, all this coupled together with the other issues for me personally now provides too much uncertainty with not enough potential "reward" over next 6 months.

In terms of the DB debate, you have to include the entire board. The grades were dropping consistently from Q1 2020 to Q4 2020. There were many warning signs which a seasoned, "grizzled" COO/ CEO with actual on-site mining experience would likely have noticed long before, with more gumption to get out to the mine, butt heads and put in place a turn-around plan much earlier. There are many NEDs with technical experience on the HUM board, but if they're just sitting pretty in UK, not adding value there is really no point. Replace them with an onsite expat COO. Or have a CEO with operating experience.

In terms of what could change sentiment in short-medium term, rising gold price of course, confirmation of a fully licensed and financed Kouroussa would do the trick (and here from RNS irrespective of such approval they do appear to be doing lot of good work in this segment). Perhaps a revised Rolling Yanfolila Mine Plan providing more assurance to the guidance would also provide some positive sentiment, but until we see few Qs of actual results and g/t improvements, i'm not too sure.

Yep thanks to both of you for this report and JM one - bit of light reading for the weekend!

barnaberible - I try and work out my own THS PGM and Chrome AISCs from the Accounts Cost of Sales. This is far more accurate than relying on Miners own unaudited Quarterly Reports, where they all interpret the rules differently. In THS Accounts, they break down their revenues by Chrome and PGMs later in the report, so data extracted from FYE Sep 2020 Accounts:

6E PGMs
Cost of Sales: $132,434,000
Production: 142,100 6E Oz
AISC (Cost of Sales/ Production): $932 oz

Chrome Ore
Chrome Cost of Sales: $120,880,000
Chrome Production: 1,340,000Mt
Chrome AISC (Cost of Sales/ Production): $90tn

Now I believe the USD ZAR rate used in Accounts was in region of 16.2, ZAR is now 14.6. So costs in USD will go up, increases in production may counter some of this, however I broadly go with a Chrome AISC of $100/tn and PGMS of $1,000.

As TBTT refers to, irrespective of the risk of a chrome ore tax, the vast amount of THS Profit and free cashflow currently comes from the 6E PGMs.

Based on 6E PGM basket of $3,350oz and Chrome Ore of $165tn, EBITDA should be in realm of $304m for PGMs and $63m for Chrome respectively, in Total $367m.

To get "free cashflow" (rough calcs) from this you would deduct:
- Capex ($100m), SIB "Stay In Business" Capex of $50m and Vulcan Fine Chrome Project $50m (will increase Chrome to 2Mt, reduce costs per ton and of course wont have this capex cost next year)
- Interest on Loans ($5-7m)
- Tax (hard to calculate as they have unreedemed capital balance of >$100m to offset tax to be paid, so even if tax bill is circa $80m, for FYE Sept 2021 they may only end up paying $20m, or however they want to phase their unredeemed capital)
- BEE Trust income (FYE Sept 2020 BEE income was 11% of overall Income, Income being Profit after tax plus foreign currency fluctuations), so on a Profit after Tax of say $230m (EBITDA $367m minus D&A of $50m, Interest on Loans $7m, Tax $80m) and assuming no currency fluctuations, BEE income could be circa $25m

Cashflow after all deductions: $215m

This is just back of the packet calcs as it's assuming today's PGM and Chrome Ore prices remain static and of course FY Q1 2021 we had different prices so THS Profit and Cash increase will not be this pronounced for FYE Sept 2021, but it just goes to show how absurd THS valuation is. It's on less than both 2x Free Cashflow and 2x Profit after Tax, when we have Mine Life of 12yrs Open Pit, 40yrs Underground, expansion to 2Mt Chrome, aspiration to optimize PGM feed grade and recoveries to push PGMs from 160k to 200k.

In FY Q1 2021 THS had Net Cash position of $4.8m, compared to Sep 2020 Net Debt of $21.1m, a swing in only 1Q of $25.9m. Can't wait for 12 April when Q2 Report comes out, followed by Interims on 27 May.

In FYE Sep 2022 with no Vulcan Fine Chrome Project Capex, no interest payments and Chrome increasing to 2MT, THS will be over $215m free cashflow again, even if THS expend all unredeemed capital to offset tax paid in FY 2021 and have a circa $80m tax bill 2022 (eq. 27%), before taking into account planned increases in PGMs from current 160k oz figure.

M20ASH - it's worse than that, Tanz VAT rate is 18% gross, so more like $200+ oz when SHG AISC correctly including for sustaining capex and exploration is at least $1,100. So you're already up to $1,300.

If it ever gets paid or offset in Accounts, you can bet Tanz Government will give with one hand and take their free carry interests for New Luika and Singida on the other hand. First they came for Acacia/ Barrick and I did not speak...

1) Ah yes the defined "sizeable outlays" which is not mentioned officially in any SHG RNS in terms of actual costs. Gotcha. 1 month of infill drilling doesn't break the bank... maybe it does for SHG.

2) SHG's smoke and mirrors New Luika EBITDA is meaningless just as its usual incorrectly defined AISC is, as it excludes large New Luika Capex and Exploration costs of $16m p.a.. If they followed actual WGC AISC guidelines, all costs to sustain an existing mine are you guessed it, sustaining capex and should be included in AISC and therefore EBITDA. But not SHG, they badge them as "development". At least SHG are moving some way to accepting moving to proper definition, with their own Q4 presentation now stating $1,100 AISC guidance.

3) Wow great to know all those "whataboutism" countries that has nothing to do with SHG. And yes the TRA and Bulldozer love SHG so much they've been withholding VAT for nearly 5yrs. So much love - I'm sure Bulldozer will show his huge love when all the "free carry" Government interests kick in which Barrick set the precedent for and large % of New Luika and Singida are transferred over.

4) Nope not heavy capex by SHG standards, they seem to have "heavy capex" every quarter just to sustain the mine that they exclude from EBITDA and AISC and label as "development capex". Bit naughty that.

5) Err, so SHG's own 2019 accounts are incorrect when they state a mine life "into 2024" and with recent upgrade of resources to increase by 1yr, brings us to "into 2015"? Gotcha. Great research Colonel, I salute you.

6) Didn't gloss over Kenya at all - in fact I covered it quite comprehensively. They're spending over $40m over 2-3yrs to work out if it's even commercially viable, then they'll spunk a whole load more capex over 2yrs for production possibly in 2026. Singida is a simple very small open-pit project in the same jurisdiction they already operate in and it won't even be ready until 2023. What hope has SHG have in West Kenya.

Both SHG and HUM need an Ian Stalker type asap. SHG have Eric and Luke, HUM have Dan and Tom. Much of a muchness. The same issues I have with SHG I now have with HUM, but to ramp up SHG which has the exact same issues, quite bizarre. But when people focus on EBITDA without linking it to actual cashflow, you always have to worry. SHG at £168m and HUM at £87m, I know which one offers better value. However HUM will likely struggle 1H 2021. Long-term, HUM is by far the stronger proposition.

As downbeat as I am on HUM presently, could be worse, could be SOLG

1) Barrick deal was completed in August, so part of Q3 numbers already, has no impact on Q4 cashflow. The works in Kenya and Singida are piecemeal in Q4, not major capex outlays so again should have minimal impact on cashflow.

2) New Luika upgrades again are minimal and not changing production, so should be included in AISC. In fact if you now look at SHG's AISC guidance for 2021, their true AISC is $1,100, they even state it on page 4. They of course state "including development costs", but these development costs are merely sustaining capex and should be included in AISC in any case. Albeit I wouldn't trust $1,100 number, as it doesn't include 18% VAT that will not be recovered and god know's what else.

3) The "deal" Barrick struck with the Government was giving in to the Bulldozer's blackmail on some trumped up charges and paid the piper. Great regime to work under ay. So what a great precedent for all other western companies soon to follow.

4) I already mentioned the hedging - SHG avg. sale price in Q4 was US$1,376 /oz and yet their cash position normalizing for the placing increased by $300k. So basically their AISC is $1,300. Good job.

5) Mine Life: in 2019, SHG extended the New Luika mine "into 2024" (from the Accounts). They have now replaced 1yrs resources, which extends it "into 2025" (note how the resource update didn't mention the life of mine anymore... because its fast approaching), so like I said, 3-4yrs.

Perhaps research companies properly, learn to understand some numbers, do some proper impartial analysis and "we can chat again". Who even says cr*p like that.

A lot of what you just wrote on SHG in nonsense. They have about a 3-4yr Mine Life at New Luika, with grades dropping off considerably from the early days when you look at their recent resource updates.

SHG's reported AISC is a joke, nowhere near what they claim. Every quarter they have "development" capex for UG mine of circa $3-4m per quarter, $12-16m per year not included in AISC... 4yrs after UG commercial production they still claim what is clearly sustainable capex and should be in AISC, is development?! They then of course don't include VAT in their AISC, of which the vast majority of said VAT will never be recovered from the Tanzanian Government... A Government led by the crazy bulldozer who thinks COVID is a hoax. Good luck with that.

Comparing Q3 to Q4 2020 for SHG shows what major problems it has and why it's AISC is so far from the truth. At the end of Q3, SHG's Net Debt was $5.1m. They then raised $42.1m placing in Oct, so all things being equal, their Net Cash position would be $37m + Q4 cashflow. Problem is the Q4 report shows $37.3m Net Cash. So they made $300k cashflow in Q4?! They did very little capex intensive work at Singida or Kenya in Q4, so can't blame that. So SHG made no money in Q4 at all, when SHG’s avg. gold price was US$1,376 /oz (because of hedging) and they claim their AISC was $870oz. The truth is it's much closer to HUM and CEY's AISC $1,300 already! They perhaps are better at spinning it. Singida Project is so marginal they had to re-do the economics at $1,700 oz. West Kenya is 5yrs+ down the line and all the money they raised is it to try and demonstrate whether or not it's commercial viable... If they spend $40m+ on work leading up to that, how much will they spend on actual Capex.

That's not to say I'm happy with HUM - they are following SHG and CEY's worst habits in many areas...

THS ticks all the boxes! The virtual AGM is 10-Feb, this Weds. Ordinary Resolution 9 covers the dividend:

"final cash dividend in the amount of US 3.50 cents per ordinary share is declared for the financial year ending
30 September 2020, such dividend being payable to shareholders registered on the register of members of the Company as of close of business on the record date, being Friday, 26 February 2021.”

"If approved by shareholders, the recommended final dividend will be paid on Wednesday, 10 March 2021"

And with platinum up near 3% today at $1,150oz, surely we've hit another THS 6E PGM basket all time high?

I make THS 6E PGM basket circa $3,300 per oz.

Because they've been in the development phases building the underground mine. They were nearing commercial production when they had a major disagreement with the PSNI on blasting and then COVID hit too etc. etc. PSNI issue is now resolved so there is nothing stopping GAL pushing through to commercial production. However they no doubt will need a final placing to get them "over the line", re-hire, maintenance on idled plant etc. etc.

The debt of £4-5m is trifling in comparison to the potential production per annum and all companies build up debt and issue equity to fund development - that's the major reasons a company goes public in 1st place.

You have to remember GAL DFS July 2014 was for 6yr Life of Mine at 27K oz avg, 521,109 Oz at 7g/t resource. At $1,800, if they can achieve a $700-800 margin, that's EBITDA of $21.6m p.a. Puts the debt into perspective. And those resources don't take into account the extensive, successful exploration post DFS which would have increased the Mine Life considerably and possible annual production too. Of note as per Technical Report in April 2020 discoveries in "Joshua" vein (including 13m width, 9.9 g/t Au at 117m and only 70m from the Joshua ore body, discovery of the Kestrel vein. These are just 2 examples of huge potential outside the existing resource and mine plan.

Ultimately though I do think a JV or sale would be better for shareholders, for a proper outfit to take this over and mine successfully.

More constructive if it's posted on the "moderated" HUM board on ADVFN (which still has ample constructive criticism), rather than the other one with ramblings of a madman, who's raison d'etre is to just post on HUM and only HUM ad infinitum. What a life ay. I don't look at it but assume it hasn't changed.

Thanks for kind words feynzz to all of us here - I hope we've all done very well out of SLP and THS, with hopefully more to come both in capital gains and dividends for us in THS and all those still in SLP too (including my folks!). Chrome & PGMs appear for now to be far more resilient at present, whilst gold is shaking in short-term.

But you can't win them all i'm afraid. I see you may also be in HUM. Apologies in advance if anything I wrote led you down that garden path when share price was higher than 25p! I prefer to post on quieter boards like THS, but have sporadically posted on HUM throughout last 12 months too. Two of my big disappointments in last 3 months have been HUM and SRB (both have great assets for their respective market cap size, but management not performing - yes under difficult circumstances, but still not impressed at all) and in Jan have been rebalancing my portfolio accordingly.

Bringing it back to THS, I think their shareholder interaction and PR has increased considerably over last few months and I hope they will build upon it further. I know we all feel some other companies like SLP may for now get more attention in financial press, but over last few months THS held a really constructive Investor Video Conference where I felt they answered all questions openly and concisely. They've taken on board some of the comments raised in the Q report itself. I've then seen Phoevos Pouroulis being interviewed on Bloomberg TV, interviewed for FT article and of course his usual Proactive Interview post-Q results. I do feel the Financial PR (Buchanan) and Brokers (Peel Hunt, BMO, Berenberg & Nedbank) could do more at getting THS recognised. As Ragnar or TBTT mentionned the other day, Liberum house broker of SLP continually update their Research Reports, which journalists can access and PIs through Research Tree etc. THS Financial PR firm and Brokers/ Analysts should be doing the same. I'll admit though i'm not a member of Research Tree so apologies if i've missed any recent THS broker notes!

Gota - you'll find the split on last presentation page 3, which is slightly updated from previous PGM splits: https://www.tharisa.com/pdf/investors/presentation/2021/january-2021-investor-presentaion.pdf

Platinum: 55.4%
Palladium: 16.2%
Rhodium: 9.5%
Iridium, Ruthenium & Gold: 18.9%

Now on the latter, there's a huge difference between Iridium now at $4,200 oz (!!) and Ruthenium at $320 oz. I tend to take 0.2% gold and 4.3% Iridium as per previous 6E PGM splits pre Jan-2021 and Ruthenium 14% (slight modification, previous splits it was 14.3%). It could very well be that Iridium is 4% and Ruthenium 14.3%. It's a minor point, but would be could for THS to split it all out again for us perfectionists.

TBTT - agree lower grade which explains the lower production doesn't alone explain the AISC 2021 guidance increase. Taking 3 points in time to demonstrate this issue where production is same on items 1) and 3):

1) Original 2020 lower-end guidance (pre-COVID & coup/ border shutdown): 110,000oz x $895 AISC per oz = $98.5million AISC TOTAL
2) Actual production + AISC 2020: 101,069oz x $1,147 AISC per oz = $115.9million AISC TOTAL
3) 2021 upper guidance: 110,000 oz x $1,250 = $137.5million AISC TOTAL

On item 2) increase, it's partly explained by the COVID + coup complexity etc. In the past so won't dwell on this too much. The most pressing matter moving forward is there needs to be an explanation for how we've gone from a 2020 "base case" guidance of $98.5million to $137.5million for 2021!! That's a $39million increase in total costs, with production normalised at 110k oz. Now I hope that $17million of this is explained by the $17m Yanfolila Capex + Exploration stated in the RNS, which to me is "Sustaining". However the RNS is not clear enough in wording used. And that still leaves $22m to be explained anyway, even if that $17m is included.

Juxt - until the board demonstrate otherwise, I would tend to agree with Fifokid and indeed have sent a detailed email back to HUM yesterday with my main fundamental issue on grades.

Yanfolila is performing ahead of expectations on ore mined, ore processed (even above the 2nd ball mill 1.25mtpa) and recoveries (94% compared to 93.5% in DFS), however KE pit is failing on grades, throughout 2018, 2019 and 2020. The DFS had oxide, transition and fresh ore reserves of a grade > 3g/t. We haven't come close and in Q4 2020 it was 2 g/t. Now it really doesn't matter if we're in the 2.7 - 2.8g/t region, this will yield 112k - 117k oz p.a., but when you're in the 2.4 g/t region as we averaged in 2020, you go down to 101k oz p.a.

I agree the SE and SW are very very good and there appears to be an expedited pivot to these resources.