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The history Kooba missed

A lot of the current confusion comes from forgetting how we got here. So here's a quick recap of the bit that matters.

In 2013, Nanoco signed a 15‑year exclusive licensing deal with Dow Chemical. Dow built a billion‑dollar quantum dot plant in South Korea, next to Samsung's fab plant, to supply both Samsung and LG with Nanoco's cadmium‑free dots. The electronics press talked about it for years. It was real.

Then Samsung walked away.

Instead of buying from Dow (and therefore paying Nanoco), Samsung worked with a local Korean firm called Hansol — which had no experience making quantum dots — to set up its own supply chain using Nanosys as consultants. Dow's plant sat idle for its intended purpose. The licensing fees never came.

That was 2015.

What happened next? That blueprint was copied. Why pay Nanoco when you can build a workaround with a local partner? Shoei, via Nanosys, copied the role Hansol had played. The technology was used. The licences weren't paid. The meter ran for years.

The Samsung lawsuit (2020–2023) was Nanoco's first harvest. $150m.

The Shoei case is the second. This time, the workaround has a name, a paper trail, and a customer list that includes Apple. The same technology, the same model, the same result.

Kooba asks why no one signed supply contracts. The answer is in the 2015 headlines: they chose not to. They chose to build around Nanoco instead. That choice created the infringement. And now, a decade later, another bill is coming due.

Kooba's timeline is missing a key step. Nanoco spent years trying to license its IP. When that didn't produce quick revenue, they explored manufacturing as a fallback — building a facility, partnering with Apple and STMicro. That phase didn't work out either. So they've returned to the original model: licensing. Only now they have court‑tested patents, a funded balance sheet, and a defendant who's been manufacturing for years without paying. That's not failure. That's a strategy that took the long way home.

And they have two JDA's progressing to plan.

A thought on something that keeps coming up.

Nanoco's balance sheet post‑Samsung (~£20m) was called "strong" — and it was, relative to where they'd been. But "strong enough to survive" is not the same as "strong enough to be a mass‑market supplier."

For a company like Apple or Samsung to source a critical component from a single supplier, they need that supplier to be financially bulletproof. A disruption — a factory fire, a cash crunch, a bankruptcy — could halt production of millions of devices.

That kind of confidence requires a balance sheet measured in hundreds of millions, if not billions.

Nanoco was never going to be that supplier. But they didn't need to be. The strategy was always different: let someone else manufacture at scale, and collect a licence on every product sold.

The balance sheet wasn't for manufacturing. It was for litigation — to enforce the IP and turn those sales into revenue.

Kooba's post asking "why no supply deals?" assumes the wrong model. The right model is playing out in the docket.

Feeks,

You're right that I'm not a lawyer. I've never claimed to be.

I have, however, spent time reading patents, following dockets, and listening to people who are lawyers. The farming analogy wasn't invented by me. It was explained to me by an IP specialist, and it fits the facts of this case.

You mention a past legal loss of mine — publicly available, as you say. What you don't mention are the ~20 other cases that never got written up. The ones I won. But I'm not here to litigate my past. I'm here to discuss Nanoco.

If you have something to say about the docket, the discovery fight, Apple's role, or the "contingent process" the judge acknowledged, I'm interested. If you just want to talk about me, I'm not

You can't conceive of a world where companies want to use the technology but don't want to pay for it. That's exactly the world we're in.

And it's about to change.

I spent time reading the patents before I invested. They're real. They have applications. I also know from IP lawyers that you don't sue at the first sign of infringement. You wait. You let the damages grow. You farm.

That's what Nanoco has been doing. The share price has been the weather — storms, sun, noise. But underground, the crop has been growing. Shoei's customer list, Apple's involvement, the discovery fight — all of it is the harvest approaching.

The market sees no revenue and assumes failure. I see a field that's nearly ready.

Sammy88's posts (especially on Shoei indemnifying LG and the asset purchase structure) add important context. There's a legal angle here that's worth spelling out.

In patent law, wilful infringement can lead to enhanced damages — up to three times the actual award. Courts consider factors like:

· Whether the infringer knew of the patent.

· Whether they investigated in good faith.

· Whether they tried to conceal the infringement.

· The duration of the conduct.

· Whether they took steps to avoid liability.

Shoei's behaviour ticks several boxes:

· They've been manufacturing these products since 2020 (per Kooba's own post).

· They indemnified LG — meaning they knew they were the source and accepted liability.

· They structured the Nanosys acquisition as an asset purchase — widely understood as an attempt to step around past liability.

· They resisted disclosing customers (including Apple) until compelled.

None of this proves infringement — that's still to be decided. But if Nanoco succeeds on liability, the manner of Shoei's conduct could significantly increase the final number.

Worth keeping in mind as the "separate contingent process" plays out.

A few updates from today's docket, now the market's closed.

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/61367121/Shoei_Chemical_Inc%2C_et_al_v_Nanoco_Technologies_Ltd

1. Key hearing dates confirmed

The court has set March 20, 2026 to hear two motions together:

· Nanoco's motion to join Apple as a counterclaim party (Dkt. 96)

· Nanoco's motion to strike Shoei's "counter-counterclaims" (Dkt. 92)

That's efficient case management — both issues dealt with on the same day.

2. Sealing motions filed

Nanoco has moved to seal its motion for joinder, supporting memorandum, and related exhibits (Dkts. 100–102). That means:

· The fact of Apple's involvement is public.

· The detailed evidence linking Apple to the infringing supply chain is, for now, confidential.

This is standard practice when commercially sensitive information is involved — exactly the kind of thing Shoei fought to hide during discovery.

3. Transcript available

The transcript of the 20 February hearing (Dkt. 99) is now on the docket, subject to the usual redaction process. It will become publicly accessible in full by late May unless redacted.

4. What this means

The timeline is now clear. March 20 is the next date to watch. Between now and then, the parties will be preparing their arguments — and, possibly, negotiating.

The forum spent today arguing about the past again - reading it is like listening to a bunch of stuck records. The docket is in 2026.

A few things that came up today and now the market's closed there's time to reflect.

1. Apple's role

The RNS confirmed Nanoco has moved to add Apple as a co‑party. The board explicitly said this does not increase the materiality or potential value of the claim. That's important: this is a procedural step, not a new damages target. But procedurally, it matters because it puts Apple formally in the room. Why? Because Shoei fought to keep their customers hidden. Once compelled to disclose, Apple appeared. Now they're part of the case.

2. The "$64m question"

Several posts asked: If the technology is so good, why doesn't anyone buy from Nanoco? The previous CEO addressed this directly: large OEMs prefer bigger, financially resilient suppliers. They don't want single‑source risk from a small company. So they buy from larger players like Shoei — who, allegedly, are selling Nanoco's technology without a licence. That's not a rejection of the tech. That's a supply chain preference. The current enforcement strategy is the answer to it.

3. Shoei's behaviour

They hid Apple. They resisted discovery. They filed counter‑counterclaims that Nanoco is now moving to strike. That's not the behaviour of a party confident in its position. That's the behaviour of a party trying to keep damaging facts out of sight.

4. What happens next

The motion to join Apple still needs to be granted. If it is, Apple becomes a formal participant. They have a cooperative history with Nanoco and every commercial reason to want this resolved cleanly. That puts additional pressure on Shoei — exactly where Nanoco wants them.

The docket keeps moving. The rocket docket keeps ticking. The thesis hasn't changed

For anyone reading the docket closely:

Nanoco's counterclaim is their case against Shoei. The motion to join Apple is to add them to that side of the fight — meaning Apple would be aligned with Nanoco, not against them.

That's the working assumption from the proposed order. We'll get clarity if the court grants the motion and an RNS follows in the next few days.

Shoei resisted discovery. The court compelled them to disclose something. Now Apple is on the docket. Make of that what you will.

From PACER this morning:

Nanoco has filed a motion to strike out Shoei's "counter-counterclaims."

https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/61367121/Shoei_Chemical_Inc%2C_et_al_v_Nanoco_Technologies_Ltd - see 92

The only grounds for such a motion to be succesful are that the claims are legally improper or frivolous with no reasonable chance of success. And the only reason a party files frivolous claims is that they're trying a kitchen sink defence — throwing everything at the wall in the hope something sticks.

No one does that when they're winning.

I'll try to find time to download and review some of the documents in the next few days. If there's anything material, I may or may not choose to share it — but the headline is already clear.

Nanonano raises the standard bear case, which is worth addressing for anyone weighing the risks.

A few points of context from the public record:

1. On "ramping" vs. analysis

The bull case doesn't rest on predicting a specific "rich payout." It rests on observable facts: the same IP has already generated nine-figure settlements from two major industry players. The current litigation is a funded, active assertion of that same IP against an upstream supplier. That's not hype; it's the company executing its stated strategy.

2. On market share and damages

Patent damages aren't calculated based on the infringer's share of a market, but on the value of the infringing products sold. A "small share" of a large, high-value display market can still represent a significant number.

3. On the LG settlement

The LG case concerned a specific, limited product line. It was never represented as a broad portfolio licence. Its purpose was to add cash to the balance sheet and further validate the IP's enforceability. It has done both.

4. On the timeline and cash

The company has a publicly stated monthly burn target of £300-400k, over £14m in net cash, and a 3+ year runway. The Shoei case is on a rocket docket with a trial expected in 2026. Shoei's recent resistance to discovery (now subject to a motion to compel) suggests they are not in a position of strength. The idea that Nanoco cannot afford to see this through is not supported by the numbers.

5. On the "solely sensors" framing

Even in a settlement scenario, the outcome could include a forward-looking licence with ongoing royalties, not just a one-off payment. Separately, the company has two funded JDAs in sensing with major Asian partners, one of which is scaling toward breakeven. The future is not a binary choice between one and the other.

6. On failure

The risk of failure is real. Every investment carries it. The question is whether that risk is accurately priced. At a market cap below net cash, the market is implicitly betting on total failure. The investment case is simply a view that this extreme pessimism may be overdone.

The docket will provide the next data point. Until then, reasonable people can weigh the same facts differently. It will be worth noting what's actually being compelled: if it's Shoei's financial records — specifically, profits from the products Nanoco alleges infringe. That's not a minor procedural squabble. It's the key to calculating damages. If Shoei were confident in their non‑infringement case, they'd hand the numbers over and dare Nanoco to prove otherwise. Instead, since Nanoco hasn't yet calculated the quantum of damages, they're fighting to keep their own profit figures hidden. That behaviour is hard to reconcile with confidence.

Everything will be alright so long as Nanoco execute. Everything else is just retail noise.

Laura2022,

That's the right question. The honest answer is: we don't know, and anyone who gives you a precise number is guessing. But we can bound the range using what's public.

The Low End (Zero): The market's current price (~5.7p, below net cash) implies a 100% probability of total failure in the Shoei case. That's the bear case.

The Middle (Samsung/LG Range): Previous settlements with Samsung and LG (totalling nine figures combined) establish a floor for what the IP is worth when enforced against major players. A settlement with Shoei—an upstream supplier with committed customers—would logically fall somewhere in that spectrum. Edison Research recently noted the "monetisation opportunity" has grown as quantum dot uptake in monitors and notebooks has surged .

The High End (Transformational): If Nanoco succeeds in establishing that Shoei's infringement was wilful, or secures a forward-looking licence with ongoing royalties, the value could significantly exceed a one-off payment. Saldog framed this well recently: supplier licences often include upfront + running royalties tied to volumes.

The Most Important Factor: Timing. The case is on a 'rocket docket', with a motion to compel hearing this Friday. When a party to litogation resists producing documents, it's rarely because they're confident, it's a sign of conscious liability. In this case I personally regard that as important because I would have expected Shoei to have been ready since they commenced the action so it might mean they've been wrongfooted.

So what could success be worth? Enough that the market's current price of zero for the litigation asset is, in my view, absurdly pessimistic. The exact number will come from a settlement agreement or a judgment. Until then, we watch the docket.

For those following the legal timeline:

A hearing has been scheduled for February 20 in the Eastern District of Virginia regarding Nanoco's Motion to Compel (filed under entry 67, noticed today as entry 73).

Translation: Nanoco is actively pushing for discovery compliance from Shoei. The court is responding quickly — consistent with the rocket docket pace.

This is normal litigation progress, not drama. But it confirms:

· Discovery is underway.

· Nanoco is holding Shoei to account.

· The case is moving toward trial this year.

Worth tracking for anyone with an interest in the primary catalyst.

Honestly, the admission that the forum's wabbit in chief doesn't want to go down another hole had me in stitches.

Let's savor this moment:

Kooba, the relentless critic who demands "transparency" and "commercial proof" from Nanoco, who mocks every JDA as "just R&D" and every settlement as a "pittance"...

...now declares himself unwilling to "go down that rabbit hole" of actually researching Shoei's financial accounts.

The irony is layered like filo pastry:

1. He demands Nanoco provide endless detail — partner names, contract terms, future revenue forecasts — yet refuses to spend 10 minutes on publicly available Japanese corporate filings to validate his own thesis.

2. He claims Nanoco's competitors are commercially superior — yet when offered the chance to actually quantify that claim, he retreats into "too much effort."

3. He accuses bull posters of blind faith — while he performs the most intimate act of faith: believing without evidence, asserting without verification.

This is the addict permabear condition in its purest form:

· Input: None.

· Research: None.

· Verification: None.

· Output: Certainty, delivered daily

You really don't understand that "pursue potential strategic options" was the CDX process.

This means you have been passionately critiquing a company for years without grasping the central, publicly stated strategic initiative that has dominated its recent history. This is a level of incompetence so profound it disqualifies you from being taken seriously on any complex matter. You are, in investment terms, functionally illiterate.

A necessary clarification on recent distorted insinuations:

• The CTO's departure is a long-planned retirement, announced previously. It is not a sudden resignation.

• The CEO's departure aligns with the conclusion of the strategic sale process (CDX) he was hired to lead. His exit was noted in the same RNS that announced the company's pivot.

Framing these planned departures or missed forecasts as signs that commercial success will never come misrepresents the public record and the company's communicated strategy.