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The correct way to read this is …

Nanoco gives Shoei freedom to operate in display. Shoei gives Nanoco freedom to operate in sensing. No cash changes hands. No one admits infringement.

That's not a stalemate. That's a clean division of the quantum dot market, which will be huge.

Nanoco keeps sensing — where its JDAs are. Shoei keeps display — where its customers are. Each side now has a clear path in its chosen field.

The value isn't in a cheque today. It's in the certainty of being able to move forward without litigation risk.

Sometimes the best outcome isn't a payout — it's a clear way ahead.

Maybe, personally I think there’s a strong possibility will be an holding announcement saying we should wait for further details which will come in a few days. The purpose of the 10 days pause in the legal proceedings will be to refine the details. I wouldn’t want to second guess the structure or value now, but I am optimistic.

The main ground Shoei had for dismissing Nanoco's counterclaim was that Nanoco hadn't quantified it. But that was never a weakness — it was a consequence of Shoei's own conduct.

When Nanoco filed the counterclaim, they were explicit: they couldn't quantify damages yet, and it would take time. The reason is now obvious — Shoei had been refusing to open their books. Without access to Shoei's sales and profits, quantification was impossible.

That's the quality of Shoei's conduct throughout this case: obstruction, delay, and concealment.

So in conclusion, I think it's extremely unlikely Nanoco's counterclaim was ever at serious risk. The motion to dismiss was always a long shot — and Shoei's behaviour made it even weaker.

16000 pages in Japanese says Shoei were over a barrel

RE: Apple joinder hearing date

Sammy88, where did you see that the Apple joinder motion (Doc 96) has been moved to March 27? I've checked PACER and the docket updates I have don't show that — only the motion to dismiss (Doc 122) is listed for the 27th so far.

If you've spotted it on Docket Bird or elsewhere, could you point to the entry? Just want to make sure I'm not missing something.

Thanks

16,000 pages of untranslated Japanese, dumped on Friday afternoon after a court deadline, is not "spin."

I would love to see the judge’s reaction when she learns she has to read 16,000 pages in Japanese.

It’s a bizarre way to manage a case.

Been there, worn out the T shirt.

This is exactly what a case looks like when:

· One side is hiding something.

· The other side is pushing hard.

· The judge is getting impatient.

If Shoei continue to avoid the issues, the judge will make an 'unless order'. This will strike out the claim unless they comply.

March 20 will be decisive.

If they were that comfortable, they wouldn't be paying millions to LG.

Yes, so the only reason Shoei would have gone ahead if they knew the process and litigation history at the time of purchase is if there were warranties from Nanosys.

Kooba,

You're right about one thing: we don't have the specific warranties in front of us. But that cuts both ways. You also don't know they don't cover infringement.

A few points on the assumptions you're making:

1. Non-infringement warranties are standard. Standard asset purchase agreements routinely include warranties that the IP doesn't infringe third-party rights

2. Knowledge qualifiers work both ways. Yes, sellers often limit warranties to "to the best of their knowledge" . But that doesn't help if they knew about any potetial infringements beforehand. That's not a knowledge qualifier — that's fraud.

3. Disclosure letters require disclosure. Sellers can protect themselves by disclosing known issues . If Nanosys knew about the Samsung litigation (they did) and knew their processes were implicated (they must have), a disclosure letter would have listed it. Do we know they did? No. But we also don't know they didn't.

4. You can't contract around fraudulent misrepresentation. If the directors knowingly signed false warranties, those limitations don't protect them.

5. The LG indemnity is the smoking gun. Shoei has already paid out $5m to cover LG. That's a provable loss directly tied to the very infringement the warranties should have disclosed. That's not hypothetical — it's a receipt.

Kooba asks for a copy of the warranties before any conclusions can be reached. Fair enough. But by that standard, we can't conclude the opposite either. And the behaviour we're seeing — the sealing, the kitchen sink defence, the indemnity payments — fits a party building a record, not a party with clean hands.

You're right that we're dealing with "ifs." But those "ifs" are grounded in standard legal practice. The question isn't whether fraud is possible. It's whether the facts we have point that way.

Sammy88,

A few clarifications on warranties — because they matter here.

On "warranties don't cover future events": Actually, non-infringement warranties are explicitly designed to cover past and present facts — that the IP is clean, that there's no third-party infringement, that the seller hasn't received notice of claims . The Samsung settlement in January 2023, eight months before the asset sale, established that the technology infringed Nanoco's patents. That's not a future event — it's a present fact that the warranties should have addressed.

On "directors would never warrant that": They absolutely do. Standard asset purchase agreements include extensive IP warranties precisely to assure buyers that they're not buying a lawsuit . The Nanosys press release specifically says they have a "robust and attractive intellectual property portfolio" and license rights to "over 800 issued and pending patents" . Those are exactly the kind of statements that become warranties in a purchase agreement.

On "Shoei would have known themselves": Shoei had been manufacturing Nanosys' QDs since 2019 under a partnership . But manufacturing under someone else's direction doesn't give you full visibility into whether those processes infringe third-party patents. That's why they sought warranties in the first place.

The key point: If those warranties were false — and the Samsung settlement suggests they were — Shoei has a claim regardless of whether they "should have known." That's the whole purpose of contractual protection.

And then there's LG. Shoei indemnified LG and paid their $5m settlement. That's not hypothetical — it's a real, quantifiable loss directly caused by the very infringement the warranties should have disclosed. If the warranties were clean, why is Shoei already writing cheques?

Kooba,

A few points on the legal realities here.

On "no known planned litigation": That's not how warranties work. Nanosys warranted that their IP was clean and that their processes didn't infringe third-party rights. The Samsung settlement — which happened before the asset sale — proved that was false. The warranties were breached the moment they were signed, whether or not litigation had been filed against Shoei yet .

On successor liability: US law doesn't let you escape patent infringement simply by buying assets instead of the company. Courts consistently hold that a successor who acquires substantially all of a business's assets and continues the same operations can be liable for the predecessor's infringing conduct. The Federal Circuit in Funai v. Daewoo made this clear: US law governs liability for US patent judgments, regardless of how a foreign deal was structured . Shoei bought the core assets, continued the same manufacturing, and kept the same customers. That's exactly the kind of continuity that triggers successor liability.

On going after shareholders: You're assuming the distribution was "perfectly legitimate." That's the whole point of a fraud claim. If Nanosys directors gave warranties they knew were false, the distribution wasn't legitimate — it was proceeds of fraud. And under US law, individuals who participate in fraud can be held personally liable regardless of whether the corporate veil is pierced . The money didn't vanish. It went to people who may have known the truth.

On dormant companies: A dormant company isn't a non-existent one. It can be restored to the register if needed. And more importantly, fraud claims target the individuals who signed the warranties and took the money — not just the corporate shell.

The law has tools for exactly this situation. They're just not the tools you're familiar with.

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As I said it's only a potential angle so if you can think of any other reason why Shoei would embark on what looks like a suicide mission in the Virginia courts please speak up so we may all benefit from your greater legal knowledge.

Bachatanut,

You've asked the right questions.

On due diligence: Yes, Shoei would have conducted extensive due diligence before buying Nanosys. They would have received warranties about clean IP, no pending litigation, and freedom to operate. If those warranties were false — and if the Nanoco litigation proves they were — then Shoei has a claim for breach of warranty and possibly fraud.

On where the money went: The money from the asset sale didn't vanish. It went to Nanosys' shareholders and directors. And a dormant company isn't a non‑existent one — it can be restored to the register if needed. A civil lawsuit isn't about chasing an empty shell; it's about pursuing the individuals who signed false warranties and benefited personally.

On criminal vs. civil: You're right that criminal justice is separate. But fraud is both a crime and a civil wrong. The civil route allows Shoei to recover money directly from those who misled them. And crucially, fraud is the classic ground for "piercing the corporate veil" — meaning directors can be held personally liable even if the company is dormant .

On selling assets vs. selling the company: Under US law, structuring a deal as an asset purchase does not automatically shield a buyer from liability — especially where patent infringement is involved. Courts have long held that a successor who acquires substantially all of a business's assets and continues the same operations can be liable for the predecessor's infringing conduct . The Federal Circuit in Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc. made this clear: a successor that acquires infringing operations and continues the same business is bound by injunctions and liable for ongoing infringement . Shoei bought Nanosys' core assets, continued the same manufacturing, and kept the same customers. The law doesn't allow them to escape liability simply by calling it an "asset purchase."

So the money hasn't "gone." It's in the hands of the people who should have disclosed the truth. That's who Shoei would go after

The company may be dormant. The directors who signed the warranties and took the sale proceeds are not.

Fraud doesn't disappear just because the entity does because it's a criminal offence that pierces the corporate veil.

And we don't know what personal guarntees may have been provided.

A thought ...

What if Shoei's real target in all this isn't Nanoco — but Nanosys?

When Shoei bought Nanosys' assets in 2023, they would have received contractual warranties about the business: that the IP was clean, that there were no pending infringement claims, that the processes were legitimate.

If those warranties were false — and the Nanoco litigation concludes proves they were — then Shoei has a claim against Nanosys for breach of warranty, possibly even fraud.

That would explain a lot:

· Why they're sealing everything (they don't want Nanosys to see their strategy).

· Why they indemnified LG (those payments become damages in a later suit).

· Why they're throwing a kitchen sink defence (they're not just defending — they're building).

It also gives Shoei an exit: settle with Nanoco, then go after the party that sold them the problem.

Not saying it's likely. But it fits the behaviour.

Yes, considerably.

Apple's prior JDA means they had direct, funded knowledge of Nanoco's technology and patents. They can't claim ignorance.

Under the "same stream of commerce" test, that history makes it harder to argue Apple is just an innocent customer.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 299, you can join a party if:

1. The claims involve the same accused product

2. There are common questions of fact

Shoei will argue Apple is just a customer, not a manufacturer. But courts have allowed joinder where parties sit at different levels of the same supply chain — manufacturer (Shoei) and buyer (Apple).

That's Nanoco's argument.

Shoei's frantic sealing of everything Apple‑related suggests they know the documents hurt them. That's not the behaviour of a confident party.

Also, it would be better for Shoei to avoid the risk altogether..

If the case hasn’t been settled by then March 20 will tell us whether the judge agrees.

Sammy88's timeline post is worth reading. It lays out the key dates.

One thing worth adding: the pressure on Shoei to settle is highest right now — before Apple is formally joined on March 20.

Once Apple is in the case they become a formal party with their own legal team, uncertainties and costs.

Shoei can still tell Apple: "We sorted it out before you were dragged in." After March 20, that option is gone.

RE: Friday’s docket – what Shoei just did

For anyone (including me) who doesn’t have time to read 30+ filings, here’s the short version of what happened late Friday.

Shoei filed a coordinated set of motions. Most of them are defensive. A few are worth noting:

1. They formally opposed Nanoco’s motion to join Apple.

This was expected. What’s telling is that they also moved to seal their entire opposition. They don’t want the public — or Apple — to see what they’re arguing.

2. They filed a motion to dismiss parts of Nanoco’s case.

Standard move. Courts rarely grant these in active patent litigation, but they have to try.

3. They filed their own motion to compel discovery.

Tit-for-tat. “You want our documents? We want yours.” Unlikely to change the overall trajectory.

4. They opposed Nanoco’s motion to strike their counter‑counterclaims.

Trying to keep their weakest arguments alive.

5. They sealed almost everything.

Every opposition, every exhibit, every supporting memo — all filed under seal. That’s not routine. It suggests the material is commercially sensitive, and probably damaging.

What this means

Shoei is fighting hard to keep Apple out of the case. That’s not surprising. What matters is that they’re fighting on multiple fronts, burning cash, and hiding their arguments behind sealing motions.

The March 20 hearing is now the focal point. The judge will deal with:

· Apple joinder

· Shoei’s motion to dismiss

· Shoei’s motion to compel

· Nanoco’s motion to strike

· Multiple sealing disputes

That’s not a routine hearing. That’s a convergence.

Nothing in Friday’s filings changes the underlying thesis. Discovery is moving. Pressure is building. The date is set and Shoei are likely scrambling to bolster their negotiating position in the contingent process.