Member Info for StarBright

I wouldn’t worry about missing out. I expect there’ll be plenty of shares available on the open market.

@NYsize - your posts here are disgusting.

Not one for reading the room.

Or that holders are being brutally softened up for a takeover offer at (say) 70p.

That would go down well.

@tichtich - I have a controversial view: the NAVs reported by renewable energy companies applying the IFRS10 “investment entity” approach [where subsidiaries are recognised at fair value through profit and loss] are largely illusory and should be disregarded by investors. Consequently the NAV discounts that many (most?) of these companies are reporting presently are not particularly relevant or useful. In fact, the term “NAV” is somewhat misleading in this use case.

There are three different ways that investment companies calculate NAVs. They are VERY different to each other. In simple terms:

Method A - the NAV represents the sum total of liquid securities traded on the open market. This is how traditional investment trust NAVs are compiled. It is a largely objective measure, verifiable against third-party data.

Method B - the NAV represents the sum total of independent professional valuations of illiquid (not traded on an exchange) assets. This is how property funds work; they have to get periodic valuations of individual properties performed by qualified independent surveyors. This method is slightly less objective, because it relies upon the professional judgement of the appointed surveyors.

Method C - the NAV represents the sum total of the Director’s valuations of the assets (in this case typically unquoted companies) that make up the fund. The valuations are based upon cashflow projections for the underlying assets, to which a discount rate is applied. This is FAR from objective, because it combines together uncertain projections for future cashflows and arbitrary assumptions for discount rates, interest rates and inflation etc.

The renewable energy companies utilise Method C. Thus the “NAVs” they publish are subject to significant inaccuracy. In no way do they represent a dispassionate view of the “market value” of an underlying portfolio comparable to those of companies using methods A & B. The NAV’s they publish are hugely sensitive to input assumptions for discount/interest/inflation rates. That IFRS10 requires these companies to update their self-generated “NAVs” periodically and recognise the changes as operating income just compounds the mis-representation. If/when interest rates and inflation fall these companies will all adjust down their discount rates and report increased operating income as a result. Even if everything else stays the same; no more projects are made operational, no more wind/irradiation etc. the reported “NAVs” will increase. I think this is nonsensical.

The questionable NAVs however form the basis upon which the management companies “employed” by these funds charge for their services. It is the mechanism through which their operators are paid. Hence it is extremely important to them…

What matters more is the ability of the underlying portfolios to produce sufficient free cashflow to sustain their dividends. I may write a separate post on this another time

I may have found the answer. ChatGPT says….

"Date change and degradation" in solar power generation refers to two distinct aspects:

1. **Date Change**: This refers to the performance change in solar panels over time. Solar panels gradually lose efficiency as they age due to various factors such as exposure to weather elements, degradation of materials, and unavoidable wear and tear. The decrease in efficiency over time is commonly known as degradation.

2. **Degradation**: Degradation specifically refers to the reduction in the performance or efficiency of solar panels over time. It's a natural process that occurs as solar panels are exposed to sunlight and environmental conditions. Manufacturers typically specify the rate of degradation, which is the average annual decrease in efficiency that can be expected over the lifetime of the panels.

Monitoring and accounting for degradation is crucial for accurately estimating the long-term performance and output of solar power systems. It allows stakeholders to plan for maintenance, replacement, and anticipate changes in energy production over the lifespan of the solar panels.“

Yes, it depends on how you treat the debt amortisation when defining cover and I agree with your expectation. Not sure it is a mistake as such, more an outcome of the definitional chaos that funds operating in this sector are creating - in conjunction with IAS craziness…

Now who can help me better understand what is meant by “Date change and degradation” in the directors valuation waterfall. It represents the largest single component (-£62m) of the reported change, and doesn’t appear to be defined or explained anywhere as far as I can see. Perhaps I have missed something obvious? Thoughts / help welcomed!

A very strong statement from the Chairman, particularly with respect to dividend cover. As always with these co.’s the results themselves are hard to unpick and understand, but I will be taking a close look.

John Scott, Chair of Bluefield Solar, said:

"I am pleased to present another robust set of results which reflect continued operational progress across the Company's portfolio. I reiterate our full year guidance of dividend distributions for the financial year of not less than 8.8pps (2022/23: 8.6pps), which we expect to be covered approximately two times by earnings, net of debt amortisation and the EGL. Based on yesterday's closing share price, this provides shareholders with a yield of over 8.5%. The position of the Company today is further enhanced by its high levels of regulated indexed revenues, complemented by high fixed power sales contracts, a large development pipeline, a defensive capital structure and a robust NAV.

"In the meantime, the Company is delighted to have formed a Strategic Partnership with GLIL, providing a partner with whom we can co-invest for the long term, spreading our capital resources over a greater range of investors.

"Despite these compelling attributes, it has been disappointing to note the Company's share price discount to NAV widen, at times exceeding 25%. Meanwhile ample transactional evidence adds further weight to the credibility of the Company's valuation, which is in stark contrast to the share price. We remain entirely confident that Bluefield Solar is well placed to perform the task it has executed so well for over a decade, playing a significant role in the continuing development programme that is so clearly required to expand the UK's supplies of indigenously produced green electricity, while creating compelling growth and income for shareholders, with a total return of 110.14% since IPO."

Just confirmation of Giles Wilson’s joining date by the look of it. Interesting that he’s been buying shares ahead of joining.

Here’s a little background info courtesy of the Retail Gazette:

“Dr Martens has named Giles Wilson as its next chief financial officer.

Wilson will join the footwear retailer early next year and succeeds Jon Mortimore, who announced his retirement in April.

The incoming finance boss joins from global spirits company William Grant & Sons, which owns Glenfiddich Scotch Whisky, The Balvenie Whisky and Hendrick’s Gin.

His appointment comes as the company’s share price hit a record low after issuing several profit warnings this year.

Prior to this, Wilson was the CFO at aviation company John Menzies from 2016, until being promoted to chief executive in 2019.

Dr Martens chief executive Kenny Wilson said the new finance boss brings “a range of complementary skills and past experience that is highly relevant to our brand-first strategy” and the target of hitting £2bn in sales.

Chair Paul Mason said “Following a rigorous selection process, we are delighted to appoint Giles as CFO.

“He is a very capable finance leader with extensive experience in a number of sectors, and, most recently, his time in the branded spirits industry has given him a good grounding in global brands and wholesale distribution management.

“His knowledge of the public markets will be a valuable asset to the team as Dr Martens continues its growth in the listed environment.””

https://www.retailgazette.co.uk/blog/2023/11/dr-martens-new-cfo/

Which company was that?

They can’t buy any shares back at this point, because they are in a closed period ahead of interim results which should be out on Feb 28th. Once these are out I expect they’ll be active in the market.

I disagree.

ANZA won’t be handed back to OMI for free. There will be a material cost for OMI.

And even then, holding the rights to the project won’t be enough. There has to be a credible plan, credible funding and credible management. OMI in its current form has not demonstrated the ability to deliver ANY of these.

I’m going to stop commenting here now, which will no doubt be a relief to some! I have tried my best to correct some of the barrage of inaccurate information posted here in recent weeks, but on reflection I think it’s been a pointless pursuit.

I wish you all - especially you @Toffers - the best of luck with your investment in SDRY.

No - that isn’t the case. At this point there is no compulsory minimum consideration. That could change, but only if JD & his advisers make a schoolboy error, which they won’t.

No anger for me to manage - I’m not the one with the emotional reactions. Perhaps you are projecting your own concerns..?

Yes, I am a qualified accountant with a professional background in M&A and then investment management. When I post here on the takeover code etc it is with the benefit of professional knowledge and experience.

Whilst I truly appreciate your excitement and engagement regarding SDRY, your firehose of (no doubt well-intended) falsehoods, misunderstandings and misrepresentations has drowned any possibility of grown-up discussion on this board in recent weeks. I think that is a shame; there’s an interesting corporate story playing out here and I suspect many of the more thoughtful posters on LSE are put off by your nonsense. There are however many inexperienced investors posting here every day, and I do try to bring some clarity where there is confusion.

I have a small holding in SDRY for the “speculative compartment” of my portfolio, but mainly because I retain a vicarious interest in UK takeover stories. My average is a little over 30p and I’m hopeful that a bid of 50p+ will generate a meaningful return, albeit on a modest allocation. I hope you do well from your SDRY investment too.

@Rock8 - I agree with your analysis that it is JD’s intent to make an offer. I suspect he’s working now on how much “other peoples money” he can secure. I think he will make an offer somewhere between 40-80p, and that the SDRY board will recommend it because the alternatives (some form of liquidation procedure or a deeply discounted refinancing) are even less palatable.

The chances of an alternative offeror emerging look slim to me (your 20% may be a decent estimate) as I can’t see JD continuing to run the business under someone else’s ownership.

So I think we will see a recommended offer, but at a level that some posters here will find disappointing. That said it will likely be a substantial premium to the “undisturbed” sp prior to the February 2nd announcement, and a modest premium to the current sp.

Clueless!

This is such a simple point, and such a fundamental misunderstanding.

Sigh…..

The Hilco facility is Superdry’s not JD’s. He can’t use it to purchase SDRY shares as it is not his. Neither can he use the proceeds of the sale of the IP asset, again this money belongs to the company not to him.

This is SUCH a basic point. How/why you continue to try to pontificate on the details of the takeover code (for example) when you clearly have no grasp of even the most basic concepts of how companies work is beyond me…

“…where analysts say that the company should be worth £400m to £600m”

Serious question, as this line is repeatedly posted here whenever valuation is discussed:

- Which analysts are responsible for the £400m-£600m figure, and when was it established?

- Were they clearly talking about the value of the company in its present (indebted and loss-making) condition, or the potential stand-alone value of the Superdry brand?

Looking at published analyst targets (these are DEFINITELY for the company as a whole not just the notional value of the brand):

Jefferies had a target of 125pps (~£125m) this time last year.

Peel Hunt 130p (~£130m) September 2023

RBC cut their forecast from 75p to 40p (~£40m) on Jan 8th this year

Tradingview references 4 analysts giving stock ratings in the past 3 months, ranging between 18p (~£18m) and 40p (~£40m) https://www.tradingview.com/symbols/LSE-SDRY/forecast/

So who is out there with £400m - £600m, and on what basis..?

Thank you for this link. I don’t think it’s possible as investors to quantify the potential impact of changes like this. i wonder whether the company will offer any insight/guidance, or whether we’ll have to wait and see in results releases.

The BESS companies have some work to do in explaining what changes like this mean. I’m not sure they’ve yet taken on board that investors are increasingly focussed on cash-generation (because of dividend stability)rather than on NAV changes. The NAVs are obviously paramount for the management companies, simply because their fees are NAV-driven. But we have all had a good reminder of how NAVs can vary through no fault or effort of the management companies, just on changes in the risk-free rate or inflation for example. The first BESS company to come out and show how it has a dividend properly covered by sustainable cash generation will secure an advantage vs the peer group. It would be great to see GSF take this on.