The latest Investing Matters Podcast episode with London Stock Exchange Group's Chris Mayo has just been released. Listen here.
Considering the BoD has always indicated it would be take up to 6 months to Kochang up and running, there should be some operational work due to commence. This day and age everyone can be contacted remotely and the company does still have representatives over in South Korea, so using Covid travel restrictions is a bit of a measly excuse.
On the Prospectus and the website issues though:
The Prospectus is for the issuance of the remaining shares. The BoD aren’t going to unnecessarily rush to get these shares added to the market. Plus, a Prospectus is a hefty document, considering it was SP Angel who produced the last one, it’s not as though Hill Dickinson are able to copy and paste sections of it. 6 months is reasonable, unless the BoD were to pay a premium in order to get it unnecessarily pushed through.
On the website, what’s the point paying out to get the website completed if you don’t have any news to yet put on it.
Basically, because Pierpaolo Rocco was already on the MNRG board and had an interest in BritEnergy, MNRG were/are required to gain shareholder approval prior to the transaction, due to PR’s controlling interest.
Basically, PR pulled the wool over MNRG’s eyes whilst he was on the board, so MNRG are trying to get out of the agreement on a technicality, rather than footing the bill for this claim by the vendor.
Would they still be considered receivables if MNRG itself has stated it is not the owner of BritNRG? There would be no reason for it receiving these much or all of these funds unless it did own 50% interest in BritEnergy.
Apologies, as *Ian said, not Mac!
Why are people talking about the company going private? As Mac says, this was mentioned time and time again during suspension. I’ll say the same thing as I did back then:
- Whilst the BoD do have substantial holdings in the company, they do not have enough controlling interest to make such decision.
- There is no advantage to the BoD in taking the company private. They are currently looking at selling part or all of the company’s assets. A deal is yet to be tabled to shareholders, so it is not even as though the shareholder majority view differs from that of the BoD. If a deal was tabled that didn’t receive shareholder approval, the BoD cannot suddenly force a deal through by the company becoming private.
- Even if the company were to go private shareholders still maintain their percentage holding in the company, so still would get the same percentage payout under a sale or same annual dividend (if the company were to provide one).
Going private would be disadvantageous to shareholders, due to added difficulty of parting with your shareholding, but it does not mean you lose your holding or the BoD is suddenly given an ability to make decisions without shareholder approval.
So, in 2024 Gold could be heading for $4,200/oz and Silver at $77/oz. A number of analysts have been saying similar too, but this video provides a good explanation to the theories.
Just imagine Gold hitting $4,200/oz at a time that BMV may be scaling production towards the 100,000oz per annum target.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Gn6H4LFJzgY&t=2s
Agreed, a CEO needs to show face in times of need, which to be fair to Rolf, he is doing. The last thing shareholders would want or need after yesterday’s news is radio silence.
It’s going to be interesting to hear what he has to say, especially considering he will “not be able to comment on until all legal procedures are complete”.
https://mobile.twitter.com/RolfGerri/status/1461675136944422924
Keith, I couldn’t agree more with your comments as they are very much similar to my own. Your investment strategy is very similar too, in terms of focusing on explorers. Having invested in numerous sectors when I first started investing, I lost a substantial margin within the first two years, but learnt a lot in the process. Roll on 5 years later and I’m fortunate to have made some very good margins, all of which have been on juniors and/or explorers.
In terms of KAV’s potential, it was the KSZ that swayed me to come on board originally. However, my investment here is now prioritised on the KCB. The KCB alone justifies the current mcap and is significantly lower risk than the KSZ. Basically, I would hold this investment even if KAV didn’t have the KSZ. The fact that it does own licences in the KSZ means I am getting what has the potential to be one of the best finds of the decade as an added extra to my KCB investment.
Keep in mind that those are insitu value cost, but they are more accurate than guesstimating the EBITDA.
As you say the Prospectus will be big news after it shows people that things are still moving forward. The issuing of the SAU shares should hopefully have a positive effect on the share price too, as they’re at a huge premium to the current share price.
would *not pursue him under contract that should be
Don’t lose too much site of what has happened here.
The vendor issue and MNRG effectively becoming a guarantor was because BritNRG was a loss making, so rather than face the prospect at the time of BritNRG being served with a winding-up notice, MNRG was to foot the bill. The announcement today does provide a valid reason for BritNRG not paying the vendor:
“refused to make the payment when it was due on the basis that it has a warranty claim against the vendor for sums in excess of the amount of the deferred consideration due to the vendor”
It’s a simple set-off situation. Unfortunately, the vendor wasn’t happy with the decision so has sought further action.
PP being on the MNRG board at the time of the BritEnergy acquisition meant just MNRG could not obtain a 50% share without, without first seeking shareholder approval. You would pursue action against him under contract on this issue (unless his contract had specifically said he cannot have his own holding in any asset purchased by MNRG).
It does come down to due diligence as has been said, but keep in mind PP may not have been on the share register, simply just a related party. You’ve got to remember, the acquisition wasn’t in to the tens of millions, so due diligence would have just been small scale.
It will be interesting to see how things pan-out here. We could still end being the 50% owners of BritEnergy in the end of the day, but that would potentially come with footing the bill of the vendor and an FCA investigation into share holder approval not being sought prior to the transaction. Bit of a double-edge sword situation…
Whether or not it should have been released news in October is subjective and MNRG can always say it needed to know the facts before making an announcement. However, Rolfs termination on the BritNRG board was from 01/11/21, albeit not filed until 12/11/22, so you argue he knew the facts before 01/11/21.
As frustrating as the situation is today, there is no one else to take the helm at MNRG. Rolf unfortunately has been miss lead here, but is the only one that is able to get MNRG back on track. Hopefully he can persuade Christian to work a little closer with us, to drive Goldridge forward.
The asset itself is currently is of significant value (compared to what it was previously). MNRG entered into an agreement last year to obtain a 50% holding in BritEnergy.
Unfortunately, the gas vendor hasn’t been paid, so MNRG has been served notice for default (as it is the parental of BritNRG).
Alongside the issue above, it turns out that PP had a significant holding in BritEnergy, prior to the transaction (potentially 20% or more), which he had failed to disclose. This effectively voids the April 2020 Agreement as shareholder approval should have been sought due to PP’s significant interest. My only concern here is whether it does actually void the transaction or if MNRG has just breached it regulatory approval requirements.
Don’t think of it so much as PP getting MNRG to buy it from himself, but moreso using MNRG to develop the asset, which it has to be fair. Theoretically though, being on the board of MNRG meant that he himself had controlling interest in BritEnergy.
In simple terms: It’s come to MNRG’s attention that it’s 50% BritEnergy holding didn’t receive the correct regulatory approval and at the same time it has received notice for non-payment by BritNRG to the vendor. Basically, rather than staying put and there being potential repercussions from the BritEnergy transaction in the future, MNRG is attempting to void the transaction on a technicality and will attempt to receive reimbursement of all of its costs to date on the project.
The risks here have considerably increased, as MNRG no longer holds a producing and profitable asset. However, before you make a rash decision though, keep in mind that the mcap is now lower than it was when MNRG only really had Goldridge as a viable option. So basically, we’re in a much worse position than we were aware of yesterday, but a better position than we were in this time 2 years ago…
Well that’s not what we wanted to hear!
Makes it was because PP had stated a couple of times that BritNRG was anticipating to release big news in Q4… this is not what I was anticipating!
It depends on your perception of what “the next EUA” is. I’ve been here since the 0.45p days, so finding another stock that will make a marginal rise from 0.45p to the current 29p and still have potential to double again (or much better dare I say) isn’t something that happens every day.
A few have said PREM and KOD. Whilst both have good potential, with the number of shares both have in issue, the chances of consolidation in both are very high. You only have to look at VAST recently to see how detrimental that can be. Always be wary of explorers or juniors with over 10b shares in issue.
As a few have said, KDNC has good prospects, but it’s still early days there. HZM, is another very good play, but being realistic it’s going to be a few years wait if you’re looking for a 10 bagger, given its mcap is already £140m.
If you’re not adverse to risk, KAV is one I see as possibly replicating EUA’s rise. It has publicly stated many times that its KSZ project has the potential to host “Norilsk-style deposits” and that it has already had discussions with a number of undisclosed majors. If it’s current drill programme is a success, it will be EUA all over again. However, the risk is still high as no one has ever drilled as deep as it is going in that area.
A much lower risk stock that has the potential to 10 bag (or higher) is BMV. It acquired its JV partners 50% a few months ago and is looking to commence production shortly. It’s fully funded to production and it’s current £11m mcap means it is now trading below NAV. As it’s 5 year production target is 100,000 oz Au per annum, there’s a good chance it won’t be staying at £11m for too long. Whilst it won’t replicate my perspective of EUA, it’s still a low risk / high reward mining stock.
MNRG is also worth a gander. It’s subsidiary, which it holds 50%, is currently producing at a cost of less than $20/bbl. Plus, it has a gold project that it may be bringing into production in the not too distant future. Christian Schaffalitzky (of EUA) is on the board and will be recommending in December how MNRG should progress the gold play further.
The 2018 feasibility report estimated 550,000 - 700,000 tonnes, between 27.3g/t and 34.8g/t silver, so somewhere between 530k - 860k oz of silver. At today’s $25.27 price the insitu value is somewhere in the regions of $13m - $21m.
The gold is what we’re most interested in obviously as the area sampled had grades between 5.2g/t and 6.6g/t. At today’s $1873/oz, would hold an insitu value between $200m - $300m… Not bad considering the Kochang is significantly smaller than Gubong mine.
Gubong on the other hand: KORES estimated it to have 555k oz Gold. At today’s $1873/oz equates to an insitu value of over $1b.
We’ve got to keep in mind that these holes are just for proof of concept. As much as we would prefer chalcopyrite as opposed to magnetite, dependant using the size of a magnetite deposit, it could be very valuable indeed. You have to keep in mind the size of KAV’s licence areas for the KSZ. In essence, a commercially viable magnetite discovery would be far more beneficial than a non-commercially viable chalcopyrite discovery.
I’ve thought similar with PR leaving the board, that we could be looking at a BritNRG asset sale. It would be a little disappointing though as they’ve already said they’re looking at increasing production to 1000bopd during 2022. Surely we would want BritNRG to get to this point before MNRG would even consider any offers. It would likely bring in a sale price between $50m-$100m at that production level and oil prices as they are.
On the flip side, if BritNRG was sold in the short term for an amount that enabled of dividend of over £5m to be distributed, it would give me a “free ride” here, which I would not complain with either…
Instead of Bluebird Merchant Ventures, how about Navy Feathered Creature Dealer Enterprises…
Or
We’ll See Gold One Day Ltd