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...and No, not the latest insipid, generic puff from the company, but this, from none other than Mao Ning (毛宁), the Spokesperson of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China:

Mao Ning 毛宁 @SpoxCHN_MaoNing

11:39 AM · Sep 4, 2025

President Xi Jinping met with President of the Republic of the Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso in Beijing. The two heads of state announced the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a high-level community with a shared future between China and the Republic of the Congo.

The Republic of the Congo is the first country to reach an early harvest arrangement with China under the agreement on economic partnership for shared development and will soon benefit from China’s zero-tariff treatment. It is also the first African country to ratify the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed).

The two sides should draw on the political strength of friendship and mutual trust, stay committed to mutual benefit, taking actions based on actual conditions and sustainable development, explore new ways for cooperation, and keep strengthening the dynamism for cooperation.

Xi Jinping and Denis Sassou Nguesso shaking hands. Both wear dark suits, Xi Jinping with a light blue tie and Denis Sassou Nguesso with a red tie and pocket square. Chinese and Congolese flags are visible in the background.

https://x.com/SpoxCHN_MaoNing/status/1963552536864198957

> The Beijing-Brazzaville relationship has been elevated to the highest possible for Africa under the BRI, plus, and this is major for Zanaga development,

> '...will soon benefit from China’s zero-tariff treatment.'

>> So, zero tariff's on import of capital equipment from China (start at slurry pipe sections, DR beneficiation machinery and then keep going into heavy mining machinery). GROK reckons this could knock $250m off overall CapEx

>>> Zero tariffs on Zanaga product being exported back to China, think DR fines, pellets or even HBI.

So BIG

Direct, 'tax'

ZIOC specifically went out of their way to include the 2 sentences in (my) capitals. The intended emphasis and direction to shareholders is obvious, or should be,

"Zanaga Iron Ore Company Limited (AIM: ZIOC) announces that it received a notification on 3 September 2025 that Clifford Elphick, Non-Executive Chairman, has sold a total of 2,467,443 ordinary shares of no par value in the Company ("Ordinary Shares") at an aggregated price of 7.39 pence. THESE ORDINARY SHARES WERE PREVIOUSLY AWARDED TO HIM PERSONALLY AS PART OF THE DIRECTOR'S REMUNERATION PROGRAM.

Following the transaction, Guava Minerals remains a shareholder of 79,907,592 shares representing approximately 9.60 per cent of the Company's issued share capital, and Clifford Elphick continues to be a potential beneficiary of a discretionary trust that has an interest in Guava Minerals Limited. GUAVA MINERALS HAS NOT SOLD ANY SHARES IN THE COMPANY SINCE THE COMPANY WAS FOUNDED."

(Sharp eyes will note how ChatGPT rnamechecks someone from an earlier part of our conversation)

Perfect — let’s map the China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG) board/executive team against their parent organisations. This shows clearly how it is structured as a cross-ministry / cross-SOE iron ore control body.

🔑 China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG) Executive Team – and Parent Links

1. Yao Lin – Chairman

Current roles:

• Chairman, CMRG

• Chairman, Aluminum Corporation of China (Chinalco)

Parent link: Chinalco (state aluminium giant, large mining footprint in Guinea – Simandou partner).

2. Guo Bin – Director & General Manager

Current roles:

• General Manager, CMRG

• Deputy General Manager, China Baowu Iron & Steel Group Co.

Parent link: Baowu (China’s largest steelmaker, world #1).

3. Shao Anlin – Deputy General Manager

Current roles:

• Deputy General Manager, CMRG

• Deputy General Manager, Ansteel Group

Parent link: Ansteel (China’s #2 steelmaker, now merging with Benxi).

4. Gao Xiaoyu – Deputy General Manager

Current roles:

• Deputy General Manager, CMRG

• Former CEO & Executive Director, Minmetals Resources (MMG)

Parent link: China Minmetals (huge SOE miner, global non-ferrous, iron ore in Australia & Africa).

5. Gao Gao – Director

Current roles:

• Director, CMRG

• Former Deputy Secretary-General, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)

Parent link: NDRC / central government – key for policy alignment, approvals, overseas strategy.

🧩 What this means

Chinalco, Baowu, Ansteel, Minmetals + NDRC are all embedded into the leadership.

CMRG is not just a “procurement arm” — it is a strategic coordination vehicle for China’s iron ore:

Securing overseas equity stakes (e.g. Simandou, Zanaga-like projects).

Centralising buying power to squeeze Rio, BHP, Vale.

Aligning with China’s steel decarbonisation push (high-grade ore, pellets, DRI).

👉 So in your Zanaga context:

If Baowu or Ansteel take lead as industrial partners, CMRG could provide the policy + financing umbrella.

This would explain the confidentiality around naming the EPC (e.g. PowerChina/PSEI) — because multiple SOEs + ministries are moving in tandem, and CMRG’s involvement signals state-level strategy, not just corporate opportunism.

Would you like me to now sketch two likely models for how CMRG might structure a Zanaga entry:

Direct equity stake by CMRG (state strategic ownership), or

Steelmaker-led (Baowu/Ansteel) with CMRG backing (finance, policy, contracts)?

COULD CMRG BUY INTO ZANAGA OR WOULD THAT BE THE MAJOR CHINESE MILLS, SUCH AS BAOWU AND ANSTEEL?

ChatGPT said:That’s a really sharp question, because the distinction between China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG) and the major steelmakers (Baowu, Ansteel, etc.) is subtle but crucial:

🔑 CMRG’s Role

CMRG was created by Beijing in 2022 to centralise iron ore procurement, pricing power, and overseas equity acquisitions.

Their mandate (as your screenshot shows) explicitly includes buying into overseas equity mines.

That means they can buy into Zanaga, not just negotiate offtake.

🔑 The Mills’ Role (Baowu, Ansteel, Shougang, etc.)

The big mills are the end-users of the ore/pellets.

They’re deeply interested in security of supply, especially for DRI-grade feed.

But their primary vehicle for overseas equity investments may increasingly be through or alongside CMRG rather than direct solo deals.

🧩 How It Fits Together for Zanaga

Direct Mill Entry (traditional route)

Baowu, Ansteel, or HBIS buy a minority equity stake or commit to long-term offtake (possibly prepaying to fund Stage 1).

They might co-invest in pellet or DRI facilities.

CMRG-led Entry (new centralised model)

CMRG itself takes an equity stake in Zanaga (probably project level, not ZIOC shares).

This secures ore at source, in line with their procurement mandate.

Mills then lift tonnages under CMRG umbrella contracts.

Hybrid

CMRG provides the “central buyer” platform, but Baowu/Ansteel sit in the consortium, ensuring operational and technical input.

This looks most realistic, especially given the reputational weight of Baowu in global steel.

⚖️ BOTTOM LINE

CMRG COULD BE THE DIRECT BUYER OF A ZANAGA STAKE, ESPECIALLY IF BEIJING WANTS TO SIGNAL NATIONAL-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT IN DRI-GRADE SECURITY.

Baowu and Ansteel are still essential — they are the ultimate customers, and their process engineers will validate pellet/DRI suitability.

Most likely outcome: a CMRG-led consortium with Baowu and/or Ansteel as visible partners, spreading capital risk but maximising political and industrial alignment.

We know from Marty's LinkedIn that he's recently been talking with the world's largest steelmakers (and from elsewhere this makes Zanaga off take lucrative).

Now consider the board of China Mineral Resources Group, and their business areas, notably:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS EQUITY MINES

As a newly established state-owned enterprise, the executive lineup of China Mineral Resources Group is eye-catching. Yao Lin became the chairman of China Mineral Resources Group. According to the official website of Aluminum Corporation of China, Yao Lin is the chairman of Aluminum Corporation of China. Guo Bin is the director and general manager of China Mineral Resources Group. According to the official website of China Baowu, Guo Bin is the deputy general manager of China Baowu Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd. In addition, Shao Anlin and Gao Xiaoyu are the deputy general managers of China Mineral Resources Group, and Gao Gao is the director. According to the data, Shao Anlin is the deputy general manager of Ansteel Group, Gao Xiaoyu was the CEO and executive director of Minmetals Resources, and Gao Gao was the deputy secretary-general of the National Development and Reform Commission.

China Mineral Resources Group is expected to make efforts in various aspects such as the procurement of imported iron ore, the development of domestic iron resources, and the development of overseas equity mines, to enhance my country’s iron ore supply guarantee capability and make up for the shortcomings of the iron and steel industry chain resources.

https://www.seetao.com/details/171106.html

Every buy is also a sell, as is every sell a buy.

The question is who's doing what, and why.

Https://archive.is/20250902044347/https://www.afr.com/companies/mining/the-big-threat-to-australia-s-iron-ore-empire-20250902-p5mrov#selection-1675.0-1675.79

Zanaga sits on the cast of this wave, and there are almost no competitors. We really are very fortunate...

THE BIG THREAT TO AUSTRALIA’S IRON ORE EMPIRE

Sep 2, 2025 – 1.16pm

Brazilian iron ore giant Vale is not only the key global competitor to Australia’s massive and massively profitable industry in the Pilbara, but it also has something of increasing value in a decarbonising world – very high-grade iron ore that emits less carbon and is more productive when used for steel manufacturing.

Given that a tonne of steel produced using the traditional process releases about two tonnes of CO₂, that’s a big deal for Chinese customers as well as iron ore majors.

***

“The challenge the steel makers have is redesigning processes that will reduce it [CO₂] today,” he (Vale’s executive vice president for commerce and development, Rogerio Nogueira) tells The Australian Financial Review. “The traditional process is coal-based, so they will need to migrate the processes to be natural gas-based.”

Over time, he says, natural gas might be replaced by hydrogen in a very gradual transition. But either process would require really high-grade ore with a very low percentage of contaminants such as silicon or alumina.

“Even for Vale, the issue is that there’s no natural occurrence of these kinds of ores generally,” he says.

www.afr.com/companies/mining/the-big-threat-to-australia-s-iron-ore-empire-20250902-p5mrov

ZIOC RNS, March 3rd:

o Heeney Capital Resource Partners: A private capital firm headquartered in New York, focused on acquiring significant interests in private companies and individual assets. The firm specialises in development-stage mining assets, leveraging deep sector expertise to unlock value in high-impact, strategically significant projects. Its portfolio is complemented by opportunistic investments across critical resource sectors, with a strong track record of partnering with industry leaders to drive long-term asset growth and value realisation.

Our larger and delayed trades tend to be time-stamped during the afternoon, ie NY hours. Yesterday, Monday, was Labor Day and for once we had none of these trades. Coincidence? Perhaps, but worth keeping an eye on.

Heeney Capital

https://heeneycapital.com

A private capital firm headquartered in New York, focused on acquiring significant interests in private companies and individual assets.

Indeed, Catbert. The upcoming (imminent) news flow will put everything in perspective and context. For example, get an off-take deal with a Boawu into the market and then the SP will do the talking. Right now we have an end of summer void being filled by doomsters.

EXCELLENT — LET’S DO THIS CAREFULLY. IF ZIOC WERE TO BE TAKEN PRIVATE, WHAT WOULD “FAIR VALUE” LOOK LIKE, AND WHY A LOWBALL DOESN’T REALLY STACK UP.

📊 ZIOC “Take Private” Valuation Scenarios

1️⃣ Current Setup

Shares in issue: ~850m

MCap @ 8p: ~$100m

Stage 1 NPV (base case, 68.5% Fe, $130/t benchmark): ~$5.2bn (after tax, discounted).

Upside (Stage 2 + DR premium, $175–200/t): $8–10bn+

2️⃣ Premiums Required in a Fair “Take Private”

Minority squeeze-outs (UK) generally require ~30–50% premium to 6-month VWAP.

But given:

Ultra low liquidity (shares hard to buy in market),

Strategics watching closely,

Heavyweights’ reputational exposure,

…it’s hard to justify less than 100–200% premium in this case.

3️⃣ Scenarios Offer Price (p) Equity Value ($m) % of Base NPV ($5.2bn)

> Lowball 12p ~$150m 3%

Would trigger fury, lawsuits, reputational suicide. Very unlikely.

> Mediocre 20p ~$250m 5%

Still Fair-ish 40p ~$500m 10%

Could be pitched as “risk discount” vs. full NPV, but still cheap vs. strategic value.

> Competitive 80p–100p $1.0–1.2bn 20%

In range where Strategics might accept private farm-in. Needs auction pressure.

> Strategic Buyout (full control) 120p–150p $1.5–2.0bn 30–40%

Still leaves a big risk/reward upside for developer (Baowu, Rio, etc.), but rewards LTHs fairly.

4️⃣ Why a Lowball Doesn’t Stack Up

Industry optics: If ZIOC were taken private at, say, 12–20p, and later flipped to Baowu or Rio for $5–8bn, management and the March 2025 backers would be branded as asset strippers. Future credibility gone.

Strategic dynamics: Baowu, Rio, or Vale will insist on a transparent process — if they smell underhanded behaviour, they’d reduce what they’d pay (since there’s no competitive auction).

Legal/PR risk: UK Takeover Code requires independent fairness opinions. A 3–5% NPV takeout price would be indefensible.

✅ Realistic Outcome

If ZIOC were taken private, it would almost certainly be:

40p+ minimum just to pass the smell test (10% NPV).

80–100p+ if real strategic interest is in play, to avoid reputational blowback.

Below that = chat-board paranoia.

⚖️ CONCLUSION:

A “LOWBALL PRIVATE DEAL” (12–20P) DOESN’T SURVIVE LEGAL, REPUTATIONAL, OR STRATEGIC SCRUTINY.

THE ONLY CREDIBLE WAY ZIOC GOES PRIVATE IS VIA A PREMIUM TAKEOVER (80P–150P) BY A STRATEGIC — WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A NORMAL M&A EXIT, NOT A BETRAYAL OF AIM INVESTORS.

Interestingly Marty is quoted right after Jon Stewart, CEO at Binding Solutions - production of cold pellets from Zanaga vis BS tech being our holy grail of super premiums. Anyway good to see Marty in the Press:

ASSESSING EFFORTS TO DECARBONISE IRON ORE AND STEEL

As pressure mounts to meet net-zero targets, iron ore miners are confronting a new reality: steelmakers, their primary customers, are decarbonising – and are requiring miners to support their efforts.

Heidi Vella

August 26, 2025

INDUSTRY UNDER PRESSURE TO DECARBONISE IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION

On the face of it, this is good news for iron ore miners including Vale, BHP and Fortescue, and their scope 3 emissions – but it does not come for free. Rather, it forces miners to adapt the type of iron ore pellet feed they produce.

The fact is, says JON STEWART, CEO AT BINDING SOLUTIONS, a company helping steelmakers reduce emissions, miners are ‘forced’ to get involved in their customers’ decarbonisation efforts “because steelmakers are asking for it”.

Producing steel via DRI and in EAFs requires high-grade iron ore feedstock with an iron content of more than 67% and minimal impurities.

This, says MARTY KNAUTH, CEO OF ZANAGA IRON ORE COMPANY, will see additional premiums placed on high-grade iron ore as steelmakers look to reduce their carbon footprints.

“Especially considering government policy is increasingly based around net-zero targets,” he adds. His company is developing the Zanaga project in the Republic of Congo, which it says is Africa’s largest known iron ore reserve. Recent tests have demonstrated the reserve can produce high-grade pellet feed concentrates suitable for low-emission steelmaking, according to Knauth.

Miners have been eager to showcase the compatibility of their iron ore with commercial DRI production. BHP and China Baowu recently announced that the former’s Pilbara iron ores were successfully trialled for DRI production at commercial scale.

The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis also predicts that as the global steel industry shifts from blast furnaces towards DRI this will drive a significant change in the quality profile of traded iron ore. Vale, Rio Tinto and Fortescue are already focusing on higher-grade ores.

https://www.mining-technology.com/features/assessing-efforts-to-decarbonise-iron-ore-and-steel/?cf-view

Hi Catbert - Fortescue are in a right jam. Their's is the absolute dross of the Pilbara - sub-57% rust and rubble. They are completely the wrong side of the market as the demand for their dross is set to crumble as the steel world goes green. To give them their due, Forrest and Co have read the writing on the wall and attempted (at considerable cost and board room turmoil) to a). build a hydrogen business, and b). develop Belinga in Gabon. Both those have hit the rocks for whatever reasons.

Like everyone else they have (belatedly) concluded that DRI-grade is the only way forward. However, as they observe, only 3-5% of the world's ore is suitable. Zanaga, of course, is a hefty chunk of that. Makes you wonder......

This from 2 days ago:

OUR CUSTOMERS WANT GREEN HYDROGEN-BASED IRON — BUT WE NEED A TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH TO SCALE UP': FORTESCUE

Australian mining and energy firm warns that only 3-5% world's iron ore reserves meet the specification needed to make DRI

Fortescue has cancelled multiple green hydrogen projects over the past year, leading some to speculate on the credibility of its plan to decarbonise by 2030.

But the mining and energy firm’s senior leadership today (Tuesday) stressed that it is still committed to billions of dollars in green investment in the coming years — as well as supply of green hydrogen-based metals to China.

“We are finding ways to sustain and reinforce the future of our existing iron ore assets through decarbonisation, new technologies and green iron,” said Fortescue’s CEO for green energy and growth, Agustin Pichot, during an analyst call for Fortescue's results for the 2025 fiscal year. “But we are also looking at what is next to keep adding value for our shareholders.”

https://www.hydrogeninsight.com/production/our-customers-want-green-hydrogen-based-iron-but-we-need-a-technological-breakthrough-to-scale-up-fortescue/2-1-1862563

IMO - Supply warehoused by Shard, from the 4.1p Glencore buy out/Strategic buy in, on the understanding the SP to be held steady and the stock disbursed to interested/connected parties before major news.

In truth I think the 2 were lined up for late 24 before something derailed. Anyway, here's a look at Baosteel's DRI demand.

Compelling:

BAOSTEEL’S GREEN-STEEL PLAN AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ZANAGA (68.5% DR-GRADE FEED).

Baosteel’s green-steel plan (what they’re actually doing)

Hydrogen-DRI + EAF pathway in China. Baosteel (BAOWU group) has commissioned a ~1 Mt/y hydrogen-based shaft furnace (hydrogen blended with coke-oven gas) as a flagship decarbonization unit; technology partners have reported successful performance runs.

Auto OEM green-supply deals. With Beijing Benz (BBAC) they target 50–80% CO₂ reductions from 2026, and a future ~95% cut as H₂-DRI+EAF scales; with Chery, they phase in 30% cuts (from 2024) to 50%+ from 2026.

Overseas “green plate” complex. JV with Aramco + Saudi PIF: an integrated complex at Ras Al-Khair designed around low-carbon production (incl. 2.5 Mt DRI / 1.67 Mt steel / 1.5 Mt plate nameplate).

What that implies: Baosteel is locking in a hydrogen-enabled DRI + EAF route domestically and abroad; both rely on DR-grade pellet/pellet-feed supply at scale—exactly the window where high-grade ores (≥67% Fe, low impurities) matter.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR ZANAGA (68.5% FE DR GRADE)

Structural DR feed shortage: Multiple majors are building H₂-DRI capacity, but global DR-grade pellet supply is tight; Baosteel’s China unit + Saudi JV alone create multi-Mt/y incremental DR demand. Zanaga’s 12 → 30 Mt/y DR-grade pellet-feed plan targets exactly this gap.

Premium durability: EU CBAM, OEM green-steel premiums, and national decarb targets all support a widening premium for 67–69% DR products—benefiting projects like Zanaga that sit at ~68.5% Fe with low impurities after beneficiation/pelletization.

Offtake logic for Baosteel: To de-risk H₂-DRI ramps, Baosteel will want long-tenor, index-linked DR offtakes (plus potential prepayments) from large-scale, consistent suppliers. That’s precisely Zanaga’s pitch: high-grade, scalable, low-impurity DR feed.

Practical intersections (deal shapes Baosteel could use)

Prepayment + offtake (10–15 yrs) to anchor Stage-1 (12 Mt/y), with step-up rights into Stage-2 (to 30 Mt/y).

Minority project equity (5–15%) tied to DR-only volumes, aligning pellet specs with shaft-furnace chemistry.

Pellet-plant JV or tolling: guarantee pellet spec and logistics (Gulf/MENA buyers—incl. Saudi complex—value proximity and shipping parity with Atlantic routes).

BOTTOM LINE

> Baosteel is all-in on H₂-DRI + EAF, at home and in Saudi Arabia. That locks in multi-million-ton DR-grade needs for decades.

>Among peers, the direction is the same—different tech flavors, same destination—so DR-grade feed will be chronically scarce as these assets switch on.

Zanaga lines up cleanly as a scale DR-feed solution, making Baosteel a natural candidate for cornerstone offtake + prepay + (optionally) project equity.

Sounds like boredozer is really regretting selling down.

Oh well.

So I plugged it into AI:

Great question — and it goes right to the heart of how offtake contracts are structured in early-stage iron ore projects like Zanaga. Let’s break it down:

1. ZIOC’s 4 Workstreams

✅ DRI: Demonstrated 68.5% Fe concentrate suitable for DR pellets — this is the critical box ticked for offtakers, because it proves the ore meets future green steel feed requirements.

🔄 Pellet plant: Needed to capture full DR premium, but pelletisation can often be done near the mine or at customer sites (some mills have spare pellet capacity).

🔄 Pipeline: Key infrastructure to move concentrate to port — but financing/offtake agreements are usually signed before pipeline completion, because those deals are what enable banks/ECAs to fund it.

🔄 Dry tailings: ESG de-risking — adds to credibility, but not usually a gating item for offtake commitments, provided there’s a clear plan.

2. What Steel Mills Actually Need Before Signing Offtake

Steel mills are primarily interested in:

Ore quality (grade, impurities) → ✅ achieved with 68.5% DRI grade.

Security of supply (jurisdiction, scale, mine life) → Zanaga ticks scale/life boxes; jurisdiction is Congo risk but mitigated by multi-party involvement.

Delivery certainty → requires credible route to market (pipeline/port plan), but not physical completion.

Price mechanism → whether index-linked or fixed discount/premium.

They do not usually wait for all infrastructure to be built. Instead:

They sign conditional offtake agreements (take-or-pay style), often subject to project financing and commissioning.

These agreements are then used by banks to underwrite project loans.

3. Precedents

Simandou (Guinea): Chinese SOEs signed framework offtakes before any rail/port were operational.

Fortescue (Australia, 2000s): Secured offtake agreements while still planning rail/port.

Vale (Brazil): Pellet plants often co-developed with offtakers after ore supply deals.

4. Answer to Your Question

Achieving DRI grade is sufficient for mills to sign offtake agreements.

They don’t need pellet plant, pipeline, or tailings solutions already operational.

What they do need is:

Proof of ore quality (done ✅),

A credible plan and financing structure for the rest,

And security of delivery timelines.

✅ Bottom Line:

STEEL MILLS (BAOWU, ARCELORMITTAL, NIPPON, GULF GROUPS) DON’T WAIT FOR PELLET PLANT, PIPELINE, OR DRY TAILINGS TO BE FINISHED. They typically sign conditional offtake agreements once product quality (DRI grade) is demonstrated, because that’s what underpins project financing. The other workstreams need to be at a bankable study stage, not operational, for offtakes to proceed.

From Marty's LinkedIn: "Recent days engaging with the world's largest steelmakers reinforced the message that high quality, low cost feedstocks for low emission EAFs will be in short supply in coming years."

I can add this from direct insight, that recent discussions with Strategics (and that will be 'the world's largest steelmakers' as per Marty above) show the 80% off take rights still available are considered 'lucrative'.