RE: Oil Price War17 Mar 2020 14:14
Part 2
Within the space of just a few months of embarking on this shale-destruction strategy, though, it became extremely clear to the Saudis that they had made a terrible mistake in underestimating the ability of the U.S. shale sector to reorganise itself into a much tighter operation than they had thought possible. It transpired that many of the best operators in the optimal regions, such as the Permian, were able to not just breakeven at price points above US$30 per barrel of Brent but also to make decent profits at points above US$35-37 per barrel area. U.S. shale players, in large part through the advancement of technology, were quickly able to drill longer laterals, manage the fracking stages closer and maintain those fracks with higher, finer, sand.
This allowed for increased recovery for the wells drilled, in conjunction with faster drill times. They also started to gain cost benefits from multi-pad drilling and worked out the optimal well spacing for efficient development, further allowing them to reduce costs. Crucially, the inexorable rise of the U.S. shale sector allowed the U.S. to reduce its energy dependence on Saudi and to broaden out the scope of its geopolitical clout even more by dint of becoming the number one oil producer in the world itself.
Given these developments, during the two years alone (2014-2016) that this Saudi strategy lasted, OPEC member states lost a collective US$450 billion in oil revenues from the lower price environment, according to the IEA. They are still dealing with trying to fill in holes in their foreign exchange reserves and budgets accrued as oil prices were pushed down from over US$100 per barrel of Brent to below US$30 per barrel.
Saudi Arabia itself moved from a budget surplus to a then-record high deficit in 2015 of US$98 billion and spent at least US$250 billion of its foreign exchange reserves over that period that even senior Saudis have said are lost forever. Even before this new oil price war was launched, Saudi Arabia was facing sizeable budget deficits every year until probably 2028 by most projections, with a budget breakeven price per barrel of Brent this year of US$84 (that does say US$84, yes).
So bad was Saudi Arabia’s economic and political situation back in 2016 that the country’s deputy economic minister, Mohamed Al Tuwaijri, stated unequivocally – and completely unprecedented criticism of government policy from a Saudi minister - in October 2016 that: “If we [Saudi Arabia] don’t take any reform measures, and if the global economy stays the same, then we’re doomed to bankruptcy in three to four years.” That is to say, that if Saudi kept overproducing to push oil prices down – just as it is doing right now, yet again - then it would be bankrupt within three to four years.