Member Info for longinthetooth1

Let's see because it feels like something could land very soon

Feels like a pop to 1.75p could happen fast

Thar is a total wild card imo I might be wrong but the gold is what will transform ORCP next spring

What a day wow 🤩

MMS trying to agree a price

Mega must be desperate to get digging

Agreed must be news update on the arbitration imo

Still strong

Perfect update!! That should silence the critics and dreamers!!

Indrawn funds also so no dilution they've been harping on about!!!

£4k worth

Damn 1.24!

Barclays none for sale here

Let's have a blow out Friday 25.% up 🤞

That flurry of big buys and SP rise mmmmmm

Interesting!

Seriously are you guys sure

£300 plus revenue for first gold £150

It's an option that's 10x market cap PAT can do a heck of a lot with that

Reasoned judgment: is a £300 million early settlement plausible?

Given all of that, how plausible is the scenario that India might offer — or Panthera would accept — an early settlement in the ballpark of £300 million (≈ US$370–400 million) before the full arbitration runs its course?

“Early” needs definition: before the full merits hearing, before full evidence exchange, or before award? Let’s assume “early” means relatively soon, before major parts of adjudication and discovery are done.

In my view:

• It is not impossible, but it is low to moderately likely that such a settlement would emerge.

• A settlement at £300 million would represent a significant discount relative to the full claimed amount, but might be justified if both parties see high risks or costs ahead.

• India might prefer to propose a settlement at a lower fraction (say 10–30 % of the claimed value) to cap exposure, but whether Panthera would accept that depends on risk aversion.

• Panthera might push for a higher number or “floor” in negotiation; if India’s opening offer is £300 million, the negotiation might climb higher.

So, I would put a rough subjective estimate:

• Chance of an early settlement (some number, maybe not exactly £300 million but in ballpark): perhaps 20–40 %

• Chance of settlement exactly at ~£300 million (i.e. that number as result): lower, say 10–20 %

India might prefer a manageable settlement sum to avoid having to pay a huge judgment later (plus interest).

• India might try to negotiate from a weaker position early, hoping Panthera will prefer certain cash instead of prolonged litigation.

Factors against a low/early settlement like £300 million

1. Scale of the claim / expectations

• Panthera’s claim is US$1.58 billion (~£1.2 billion+ depending on rates). Setting a settlement at £300 million would be a steep haircut (a small fraction). Panthera may resist accepting such a discount unless risks are very high.

• The funder will demand a return commensurate with risk, which pushes them to hold out for more.

2. Precedent risk and moral hazard for India

• If India settles cheaply, that might invite more aggressive investor claims in future—governments often want to avoid creating a perception of being easy to “buy off.”

• Sovereign states sometimes prefer to fight to limit precedent or maintain negotiating posture.

3. Asymmetric information and negotiation gaps

• India and Panthera likely have divergent views on the strength of the case, valuations, legal defenses. That gap can make early settlement challenging.

• India may have defenses (e.g. jurisdictional objections, treaty interpretation, regulatory changes) that it believes are strong and may prefer to test them.

4. Credibility loss / political opposition

• Public backlash: paying a large settlement might attract criticism domestically (from taxpayers, political opponents).

• Bureaucratic constraints, budgetary processes, and internal approvals could hamper India’s ability to commit to large payouts early.

5. Arbitration momentum / sunk costs

• Once arbitration is live, with tribunal constituted, memorials filed, procedural momentum, both sides have invested heavily. That can push them to continue rather than settle prematurely.

• There also may be strategic incentives to “make the opponent bleed” and get a better deal later rather than settle too early.

CHATGPT

I can’t give a precise probability (e.g. “X % chance”) — too many unknowns remain — but I can walk through the relevant factors that make a “£300 million early settlement” scenario more or less plausible. We can then form a reasoned qualitative estimate (low, moderate, high) based on those.

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Key knowns and context

Here’s what is publicly known about the dispute between Panthera (via Indo Gold) and India:

• Panthera (through its Australian subsidiary) has filed a US$1.58 billion claim (net of Indian taxes) under the Australia-India bilateral investment treaty (1999) over the Bhukia project in Rajasthan. 

• The arbitration has been formally instituted, with procedural orders, scheduling, seats, etc. 

• Panthera has obtained a litigation funding agreement (non-recourse) with LCM for up to ~US$13.6 million to support the claim. 

• The arbitration is being administered by the PCA and the legal seat is London. 

• India has been signaling an increasing policy interest in mediation and alternative dispute resolution, and a somewhat cautious approach to arbitration in public sector contracts. 

So, we are dealing with a high-stakes international investor-state arbitration, with strong procedural setup already underway and a large claimed quantum (US$1.58B). That sets a high bar for early settlement.

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Factors that would favour (or disfavor) early settlement at £300 million

Let me list the factors that push toward/against settlement, and then we can see whether £300 million is a realistic “settle-early” target.

Factors favouring settlement

1. Risk and uncertainty

• Both sides face risks: India risks a large award, interest and costs, enforcement challenges, damage to reputation; Panthera risks losing or getting a smaller award or being denied.

• The further the arbitration goes, the more unpredictable (on quantum, legal defenses, jurisdiction issues, procedural challenges).

2. Cost and timing

• Arbitration is expensive and takes years. Settling earlier saves on legal costs, time, delay in enforcement, and volatile reputational/political risk.

• The litigation funder (LCM) likely has economic incentives to push resolution where risk vs return justifies it.

• For India, a settlement might avoid precedent or high exposure.

3. Government policy / political pressure

• India may prefer to avoid large awards, especially in investor-state arbitration, to avoid encouraging more claims or harming sovereign policy flexibility.

• The Indian government is signaling more interest in settling or mediating government contract disputes. 

4. Bargaining leverage and strategic incentives

• Panthera may prefer a sizeable certain settlement (if credible) rather than run all the way and risk losing.

• India might prefer a manageable settlement sum to avoid having to pay a huge judgment later (plus interest).

• India might try t

I’m hoping both these deliver KEFI and PAT 🤞🤞