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Daphne Zohar, who followed me yesterday just gave my PRTC sum of the parts tweet a like https://x.com/golfnut48846224/status/2072268829829321028?s=46

Could be something of nothing but Daphne Zohar followed me after I responded with the following after her tweet congratulating PRTC on the celea deal :

“Looks like a really poor deal when you compare to Avalyn Pharma $AVLN

Rob Lyne needs to step his game up. Kevin Tang > 5% now (eyes emoji)”

Nice one thanks for sharing JSB. 1100 patients is larger than i estimated which likely pushes the all in cost closer to $200-300m in which case the $70m PRTC has reserved may be needed. I still don't see how you get to $500m for an oral drug trial with spirometry endpoints, but fair to say the $180m alone may not cover the full trail.

Smallcap70, I'm not sure where your $500m figure comes from, I'd be very surprised if this trial costs even half that. For context, I'm a shareholder in Abivax, its my biggest position so I know their numbers well. Their Phase 3 trial in ulcerative colitis enrolled 1,275 patients, required repeated endoscopic assessments which are expensive and logistically complex, ran across multiple geographies, and still only cost approximately $350m. Endoscopy alone adds enormous cost per patient as each procedure requires a specialist, sedation, facility time, and central reading.

The SURPASS-IPF trial will likely enroll 400-600 patients, which is less than half the Abivax numbers. The primary endpoint is a simple spirometry test where a patient blows into a tube. No endoscopy, no imaging, no biopsies, no invasive procedures. It's two oral pills being compared head-to-head the pirfenidone and a 505(b)(2) pathway reducing costs further. This is about as straightforward and cost-efficient as a Phase 3 design gets.

The $180m raised today could well be enough to fund the entire trial through to completion. Practically speaking, $180m for a 400-600 patient two-arm oral drug trial with spirometry endpoints is a generous budget. The $70m PureTech has reserved is described in the RNS as being "to potentially support Celea in the future", not to fund the Phase 3. That's more likely for Celea's post-trial operational runway or a potential future financing round rather than plugging a trial funding gap.

I'd also push back on your claim that the RNS describes this as "the first tranche." I've read both RNS documents and there is no such language anywhere. The financing is described as "completed". The proceeds are described as supporting "initiation" of the Phase 3, not "partial funding." Could you point me to where it says this is just the first tranche? Because I can't find it.

Target you haven't missed anything. PRTC is still grossly undervalued and your sum-of-parts maths is right, the upside is obvious. But based on the direct IPF comparables, United Therapeutics and Avalyn, we've been shafted on the Celea deal and it's hard not to be furious about it.

A relatively small raise of around $50-80m would likely have been enough for PureTech to retain 100% of deupirfenidone rather than give away 65% at a fraction of what it's worth. Look at the milestone payment schedule in the RNS - $100m triggered at $3bn annual net sales. That tells you management themselves believe $3bn peak sales is a realistic scenario. Apply a conservative 2.5x sales multiple and you have an asset worth $7.5bn. PureTech's 35.4% of that is $2.65bn. But 100% of that would have been $7.5bn. The difference, roughly $5bn of value, was given away to satisfy the hub and spoke model & avoid raising $50-80m in the market. Let that sink in.

In two to three years when SURPASS-IPF reads out positively and big pharma swoops in to buy deupirfenidone for $7.5bn. This decision to sell out on the cheap when we could have gone it alone for relatively mild dilution is going to look catastrophically stupid. We funded the R&D, we generated the Phase 2b data, we got the FDA alignment, we secured Orphan Drug status, and then we handed 65% of it to RA Capital and Bayer at a valuation four times cheaper than the Avalyn comparable.

Your analysis is correct, there's significant upside from here. But the upside would have been multiples higher if management had backed themselves and retained the asset. I and many others feel rightfully sick about that.

Kevin Tang, we need you now more than ever. If there was ever a time to make your move, this is it.

And Dallo, I want to send you my best wishes. You've been the most dedicated voice on this board for years and I completely understand if today has pushed you to breaking point. Watching management give away our most prized asset for a fraction of what it's worth after a year of negotiations, while openly acknowledging the comparables support a far higher number, isn't just disappointing. It's a betrayal of the shareholders who funded the R&D that created this asset in the first place.

We created deupirfenidone. We funded it through Phase 2b. Our reward is 35.4% of a $302.5m valuation when the public market is paying $1.36bn for Avalyn's inferior programme. The value creation is world class. The value capture is abysmal.

Tang didn't cross 5% to watch this happen. I have to believe he's seeing exactly what we're seeing and drawing the same conclusions. The board needs fresh eyes, fresh leadership, and someone who will fight for shareholder value rather than give it away. The sooner the better.

Rob Lyne needs to go. Kevin Tang needs a seat on that board.

Watching Lyne give away 65% of a Phase 3-ready IPF asset at that valuation is indefensible. The ultimate irony is Rob's own words in the RNS. By referencing "recent public valuations of late-stage clinical assets in the pulmonary space" he's effectively admitting to shareholders that he knows the deal was done below fair value.

I feel genuinely let down. Tang built his reputation on identifying exactly this kind of situatio: brilliant assets trapped inside a company that can't capture their value. Watching this deal land could be exactly the catalyst that pushes him from passive accumulation to active engagement. I hope so.

Managemenbt should have raised $80 - $100m through an equity placing at £1.30. Thats roughly 20% dillution but would have given us 100% ownership of LYT100. The placing story practically writes itself : Avalyn just IPO'd at $1.36bn for a less advanced inhaled pirfenidone programme, United Therapeutics added $6-7.5bn in market cap on two positive Phase 3 IPF readouts, Celea has superior data and is about to start the first ever head-to-head Phase 3 in IPF. Institutional investors would have jumped at that story.

Even if Rob didnt want to go dwon the capital raise route, why the hell did we not invest $100m now at the cheap price rather than $30m now and $70m later at a higher price? Surely investing $100m now and keeping strategic partners to less than 50% makes more sense than giving away ownership for pittance. Terrible deal Rob !

The post-money valuation of $302.5m is deeply disappointing. Avalyn Pharma is trading on Nasdaq right now at $1.36bn with two Phase 2 assets, no FDA registration pathway, no Orphan Drug status, and a drug that requires a nebuliser twice daily. Celea has completed Phase 2b with superior data peer-reviewed in the world's leading pulmonary journal, has FDA alignment on a single pivotal Phase 3 and delivers via a simple oral pill. Yet it was valued at less than a quarter of Avalyn. I struggle to reconcile that.

The royalties are also lower than I hoped. The 1-3% tiered structure is roughly half what PureTech achieved with Seaport's 3-5%. That's a meaningful difference in long-term economic value that PureTech has given away permanently.

I said yesterday my only concern was that management doesn't give away the family silver on the cheap. I think that's exactly what's happened here. In a world where Avalyn is valued at $1.36bn and United Therapeutics added $4.5bn in market cap in a single day on positive Phase 3 IPF data, financing Celea at $302.5m feels like PureTech left enormous value on the table. Rob Lyne himself nodded to "recent public valuations of late-stage clinical assets in the pulmonary space". He clearly referencing the comparables Ive just highlighted which both support a significantly higher number. And yet this is the deal he did.

On the flip side, these comparators show that the upside is still enormous if the data delivers. But it would have been even more enormous if management had negotiated a valuation and royalty structure that properly reflected what the market is paying for comparable IPF assets.

The $70m PureTech has reserved for future Celea investment tells you everything. Management knows they've priced this cheaply and want the option to buy more at what they consider a discount.

Bottom line: I'm disappointed on the valuation and royalty terms but the fundamentals haven't changed. If deupirfenidone replicates its Phase 2b data in Phase 3, the value creation will be measured in billions regardless of where the starting valuation was set. We just won't capture as much of it as we should have.

Cash runway extends well into 2028 and could stretch further if Cobenfy royalties start flowing. So we have time on our side. Let's look at where we could realistically be by mid-2028.

Seaport: SPT-300 could be approved in MDD, potentially with a confirmatory trial underway. SPT-320, which is also designed to be registration-enabling, could be reading out in GAD. Seaport will likely have two or three additional Glyph candidates progressing through trials. With two potentially approved or near-approved drugs and a validated platform, Seaport's market cap could comfortably exceed $10bn. PureTech's 16.685m shares would be worth $2bn+ and the 3-5% net sales royalties, which start flowing as soon as the first drug is sold, could be worth another $1bn+ in NPV. That's $3bn from Seaport alone.

Celea: The Phase 3 IPF trial should be drawing to a close. If deupirfenidone replicates its Phase 2b data (80.9% treatment effect, near-stabilisation of lung function) we have a new standard of care in IPF. A drug with that profile could be worth upwards of $5bn. Even if PureTech retains 50% equity post-financing, that's $2.5bn plus royalties.

Gallop: The potentially registrational MDS trial should also be approaching completion. A first-in-class, mutation-agnostic drug with Orphan Drug and Fast Track designations in an indication with virtually no treatment alternatives. If that trial is positive, blockbuster pricing is almost guaranteed. A successful LYT-200 could be worth upwards of $3bn. PureTech's 50% retained stake would be $1.5bn plus royalties.

Add it all together. Even applying a massive holding company discount, PureTech's portfolio could be worth in excess of $5bn within two to three years. At 243 million shares outstanding that's north of £16 per share.

Obviously this requires several things to go right. The trials need to deliver with well-designed and well-run studies that replicate or improve on the preceding data. Management need to handle the Celea and Gallop financings sensibly, retaining meaningful equity and strong royalty terms rather than giving away the family silver on the cheap. Also, the Founded Entities need to be run competently through their pivotal trials.

But the critical point is this: we are not waiting for early-stage proof-of-concept data years from now. We are waiting for major registrational readouts across multiple programmes starting next year and continuing every year for the next three years. Each one is a potential re-rating event. The value creation will be enormous on any successful trial.

That's what I'm waiting for and that's why I'm invested. At today's price, assuming some of these trials deliver, this is the opportunity of a lifetime for those with the patience to see it through.

Agreed Rockefellow. Celea financing should land any day now which will trigger the start of the Phase 3 SURPASS-IPF trial. On top of that, continued momentum in the Seaport share price, should help us break through the £1.50 resistance zone that's held since February 2025. Once that level goes I see us re-rating hard and fast.

Then the big one. If SPT-300 delivers strong data when it reads out H1 next year, that's the catalyst that propels us to all-time highs and comfortably through £4.50. A positive readout wouldn't just validate the drug, it validates the entire Glyph platform and re-rates PureTech's Seaport stake and royalties overnight.

Twelve months from now this board will be buzzing. We're here nice and early so count yourselves lucky. Not long to wait now. Happy days

My Sum of the parts:

1. Cash: $248m as at 31st March 2026.

2. Celea: $400-$600m (PureTechs retained stake). Avalyn Pharma is currently worth $1.36bn with two Phase 2 assets - inhaled pirfenidone and inhaled nintedanib - the first of which won't even complete its Phase 2b trial until mid-to-late 2027. Meanwhile PureTech currently owns 100% of Celea which is due to start its pivotal Phase 3 any day now, backed by incredible Phase 2b efficacy data peer-reviewed and published in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, the leading pulmonary journal in the world. Celea's drug is a simple oral pill versus Avalyn's nebuliser which requires patients to sit with a device twice daily for the rest of their lives.

3. Equity stake in Seaport = 16,685,013 shares x $21.40: $356m

4. Seaport Royalties: $100 - $200m. 3-5% of all future net revenues from the sale of every Glyph product Seaport commercialises. Plus small milestone payments

5. Gallop: $150-$300m. Targeting Q1 2027 to close external financing and commence a potentially registrational trial of LYT-200 in relapsed/refractory high-risk MDS. There are 60,000-170,000 MDS patients in the US. The only approved therapy for R/R MDS addresses just 3-5% of patients with a specific mutation. The rest have essentially nothing. A mutation-agnostic drug with a clean safety profile and meaningful response rates in that setting will command significant pricing. Even modest market penetration at those price points gets you comfortably into blockbuster territory.

6. Cobenfy royalties and milestones: $100 - $150m.

Even using my very low end estimate, Puretech is worth 3 x the current market cap. Even if you apply a 50% discount to this low ball estimate we are still worth in excess of £2.50 per share.

Celea financing is due to close any day now which will put a third-party valuation on the asset for the first time. With the Avalyn comparable, the market will be forced to acknowledge hundreds of millions of value that currently sits at zero. Continued appreciation in the Seaport share price, particularly with JPMorgan and Stifel now actively pitching the stock to institutional healthcare funds globally, will draw more eyes onto PureTech as the largest shareholder. Those investors will look at the cap table, see PRTC, start doing the maths, and inevitably discover the royalties.

The Avalyn comparison is particularly powerful because it gives the market something concrete to measure against. Here is a live, publicly traded company in the same indication, with much less mature data, potentially less efficacious and a less convenient drug, trading at $1.36bn right now on Nasdaq.

You all know all of this already. The reason I write it down is so it's there in black and white for everyone to see as there has been a lot of doom and gloom on here lately, which i completely understand. I guess this post is designed to be a little reminder that the value is real and it will out in th

ThetaDecay,

I respectfully disagree with almost every point you made on Gallop.

To start, the claim that “Gallop is in a crowded space” is the opposite of reality and that is precisely why PRTC chose MDS over AML. As far as I am aware, there is only one approved therapy for relapsed refractory MDS, and it only benefits patients with a specific mutation. The vast majority of patients do not have that mutation and therefore have no options at all.

This is exactly why LYT 200’s mechanism of action is so compelling: it has the potential to treat all patients in this population, regardless of mutation status. Galectin 9 is a genuinely novel target in oncology, which makes your “no special MO” comment inaccurate. The FDA clearly agrees as it has granted both Orphan Drug and Fast Track designations. These are not awarded to me too drugs in crowded markets.

A first in class drug with Orphan Drug and Fast Track designations, a pristine safety profile and meaningful response rates in a patient population with almost no alternatives is not a throwaway asset.

Also, do not forget there is a strong likelihood that the next trial, set to begin in early 2027, will be registrational. This would significantly cut both the cost and the time to market by a number of years. Management has already indicated that, if approved, this could easily become a blockbuster drug.

Yes, apologies Dallo, my mistake, you are correct. We'd need to include the sales royalties as well as the equity in Seaport to ensure we cover the enitre $460m market cap.

Nice start to trading for SPTX, up 3.5% to $18.12. PureTech's current market cap is just $339m and we hold 16.685m Seaport shares, so SPTX only needs to reach $20.32 for our equity stake in Seaport alone to cover the entire PRTC market cap

JPMorgan at Overweight with a $42 target.

Stifel at Buy with $30 target.

Investhome, thanks for sharing. Really pleased to see Shore Capital initiate with a £4 target and a Buy. Having a second broker on the stock is a significant positive for visibility and credibility.

However, looking at their SOTP they have Seaport at $284m which is simply the equity stake valued at the current share price. In other words they're valuing PureTech's 3-5% ownership of all future Seaport net sales revenues at zero. This is a major omission thats not captured in their £4 SOTP valuation.

This is exactly why the discount exists. If Shore Capital (who have presumably spent weeks analysing this company) haven't clocked the royalties, is it any wonder the rest of the market hasn't either?

The royalty streams owned by PureTech are worth at the bare minimum an additional 12-20% of Seaport's market cap. Here's the maths I posted a few weeks ago:

Based on a 25% net profit margin:

At 3% royalty: (3% ÷ 25%) = 12% of net profit

At 5% royalty: (5% ÷ 25%) = 20% of net profit

PureTech's 3-5% net sales royalties are economically equivalent to owning roughly 12-20% of Seaport's net profit in perpetuity. These are not equity, they're contractual, they can never be diluted by future fundraising or secondary offerings, and they apply to every single Glyph product thats sold.

Seaport's current market cap is $933m. Even using the bear case 12% figure that's an additional $112m that should be added to the SOTP. At the midpoint it's closer to $150m. That alone would add roughly 34-46p per share to Shore Capital's target, taking it closer to £4.40-£4.50.

So Shore Capital arrive at £4 per share applying zero value to the royalties. Their own SOTP, properly adjusted, gets you closer to £4.50. Lets face it, even that arguably understates the opportunity because it relies on today's Seaport market cap. If SPT-300 delivers knockout data in H1 2027 and Seaport re-rates to a $3-5bn company, PureTech's royalty stream alone will be worth mulitple of todays market cap.

The good news is the coverage is welcome and the £4 target highlights the absurdity of the current price. But the fact that even the analysts covering the stock are undervaluing it tells you everything about why this opportunity exists for those of us who've done the homework. At some point the market will wake up to these facts, until then wait.

Lesley, I strongly believe £5 per share will be achieved in the next 12-18 months and I suspect Tang and Briarwood agree with me. Let's face it, £5 isn't a fantasy, it's roughly what you get when you add up the assets at reasonable valuations. In all honesty I think £5 will be comfortably surpassed in time, but that does require things to go right, specifically at least one of deupirfenidone, LYT-200, or SPT300 delivering strong data that paves the way to FDA approval.

If we get knockout data out of Seaport SPT300 in H1 next year, multiple billions will be added to their market cap as not only will we have a potential blockbuster drug on our hands but it will vlaidate the entire glyph platform. PRTCs stake in this instance could be worth £5 a share in that business alone by then. At some point the market is going to notice. With so many late stage catalysts approaching, judgement day is gettting very near. We're not talking about an early-stage pipeline where major catalysts are years away. We're talking near-term, potentially registration-enabling readouts across multiple programmes simultaneously.

The closer we get to those readouts, the harder it becomes for PRTC to be ignored. We may be early but we won't be wrong. That's why I'm invested. My only concern is that management doesn't give away the family silver on the cheap in the upcoming Celea and Gallop financings. Retain meaningful equity, secure strong royalty terms and let the data do the rest.

"The stock market is a device for transferring money from the impatient to the patient." - WARREN BUFFET.

I used to scratch my head looking at PureTech thinking what am I missing, why is it so cheap, why would anyone short it down here. After today's price action following weeks of genuinely excellent news, it's finally dawned on me. The shorts aren't betting against the fundamentals. They probably haven't even read the Seaport S-1. They're exploiting a structural vulnerability: no analyst coverage, minimal retail awareness, a confusing hub-and-spoke model, and daily volume so thin that £50-100k of selling pressure can move the price 7-8%.

It's not just the shorts selling into a thin market knowing their selling alone will push the price down. The algorithmic market makers amplify it, their models detect the downward momentum. Then the momentum-following quant funds pile on with their own sell signals. The combined effect is relentless downward pressure that overwhelms the handful of informed buyers like us trying to accumulate at these levels. The worst part is it becomes self-reinforcing - the stock falls, the discount widens, it looks like a poor investment, new buyers are discouraged, which makes it even easier to push down further.

So fundamental value is irrelevant to the trade. All that matters is that selling pressure exceeds buying pressure, and in a stock this illiquid that's achievable with modest capital on almost any given day. Today is a classic example of this down 9% on tiny volume.

This all changes of course once serious buying volume arrives, flipping the market makers and quants from sell to buy. The only consolation is that being a PLC allows those of us who've done the homework to buy at these absurd levels. Patience will be rewarded my friends. These games won't last forever, the value on offer here will be noticed by the herd, it's just a matter of when.

Dallo, i get your frustration and you've been in this stock long enough so you have every right to vent. If this were a FTSE 250 stock with proper liquidity and analyst coverage, today's sellers would have been absorbed without the price moving more than 1-2%. Instead we get a 7-8% drop because there are literally not enough bids in the order book to soak up the selling. That's liquidity, not value.

In fairness to the hub and spoke model it has created enormous value, the problem is purely the share price doesnt reflect it.