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Hi TM,
I’m not able to point you at a particular document that will give you the export grade number, sorry. My range is 24-25API.
If, as I am sure you have done, you go back thru the years and try to evaluate what you find ref. Kurdish Blend, you rapidly find all sorts of conflicting information – whether it’s from Platts, Argus or wherever, it never quite seems to gel.
The 2017 grade mentions indicate API-27 or thereabouts, but as the main volumes come from the KRG-controlled and KAR-Group managed Khurmala formations (excluding now Bai Hassan and Avana), that density has deteriorated markedly over the years (used to be ca API-33); you will find other refences from 2018 onwards which confirm that. My current estimate for Khurmala is 31 Max, 29 Min (mean varies acc to which formations are giving most trouble at any one time and there are several dozens of wells tapping Khurmala!). There are lots of misleading articles written about Iraq export grade qualities – most of it based on historical data and very little based on up-to-date info. I suppose that suits the powers that be.
I prefer to gather info from all the producing Iraq- and KRG-controlled fields that I can and build up my own calculation & view of the KBT blend. The main producers are easily found, their current outputs less so, but even that will show that the high-twenties cannot be. Once you start adding the low-volume, heavy producers scattered around it lowers the blend number quite a bit.
There are several web tools available that can help here – an easy one to use is Crudemonitor.us where you can plug in your volumes and grades and get an accurate idea of blends. My current KBT model incorporates data from 12 different blocks/producers, and beforehand of course you have to convert the barrels to weights, so you require the different densities - that takes some digging!
I’m happy with my calcs and my estimates but I’m always ready to eat humble pie if these can be shown to be way out.
Sorry I couldn’t give you an easy answer – Friday’s always busy for me.
As an aside: The loss to the KRG/MNR of Bai Hassan and Avana (Oct-2017) makes a historical comparison of both volumes and grades difficult – these were big export contributors, producing about the same as Khurmala currently does.
Just had a look at Marine Tracker. If all ships have their transponders on, then it appears that only 4 tankers are waiting to load.
Neverland 105,411T DWT (old friend, port of origin is FALCONARA, IT)
Advantage Anthem 116,087T DWT (THESSALONIKI ANCH, GR)
PS Genova 108,983T DWT ( port of origin is AUGUSTA, IT)
Nissos Kea 300,323T DWT (port of Origin is LIANYUNGANG, CN.)
Assuming KBT crude blend density of API24 (or 6.9stb/ton) what might that waiting capacity tell you?
Hi Belgrano, you do primary reformer in naphtha splitter?
Yes, I saw the 50% fuel oil output and didn't want to believe it.
Either they are shipping it (truck?!?) to a better processing refinery (don't laugh please) or they are still filling their cars and trucks with unbelievably low-quality fuel. If that's the case then the air in downtown Baghdad must be worse than Mexico City...
Hi Belgrano, the refinery whose maintenance I was in charge of didn't incorporate a Coker - for which I'm quite glad.
We had a really bad H fire once that destroyed a lot of other equipment and it was hairy! The Coker runs v hot I understand (ca 480-500?) and what with H, NH3 and H2SO4 "bad events" in my life I'm happy to be (more or less) out of it now.
Thanks Val, I saw that as well, that but apart from the words CDU/ADU I haven't been be to track down any of the other process modules!
I hope they didn't call a halt at atmospheric distillation !
Hi ValueS and Belgrano, always good to get some resonance about real stuff.
I've been trying to get good info on the state of the Baiji refit but apart from specs on the CDUs I'm not having much luck. Due to its closeness to the Kirkuk domes it should, hopefully, once again become a major refinery complex fir Iraq.
The specs for the Karbala modules are all out there and it looks like they've made a first-class attempt at building a hi-spec refinery - CDUs, VDU, HDS, Naphtha splitter/Reformer module, Isomerization module, hydrotreater unit, catalytic cracker, etc. The Works ! I didn't see a Coker Unit mentioned but I did see an Asphalt Unit AND a Sulfur Recovery Unit. Lets hope they maintain it properly!
Hi Belgrano,
Re feeding heavy ends back into an export feed: I hope they have learned the lessons of the past and are not doing this! It is Iraq-Kurdistan, however, and greed does tend to triumph over all else, so who knows? There are many pockets to be filled and many favours to be returned.
Before Baiji Refinery was expanded and its complexity greatly increased, it was very common to re-inject the heavy ends back into some of the Kirkuk formations. The resulting damage to these formations can be felt to this day. This was a state management decision taken to "tart up the numbers" and, since the major destruction to the Baiji facilities (DAESH) and the limited alternatives available, who knows what levels of technical expertise have been compromised.
The lack of hi-complexity refineries (Nelson), able to extract every penny of value from the feedstock, is a major stumbling block, both for Iraq and for the semi-autonomous Kurdish region.
I offer the thoughts below purely as an indication of what other parameters / issues are open to the Iraq Gov and SOMO as they battle to overcome KRG resistance to the new world order.
Reflecting the increased production of heavier grades as more Southern fields came on stream, in Nov-2020 SOMO starting marketing a new grade of Basrah crude and changed the spec of 2 other grades, bringing their slate to 3 grades:
New is Basrah Medium, with an SG of around 27.9 API and sulfur content of ca 3.00%.
Amended is Basrah Light, now with an API of 31.40 and sulfur content of ca 2.74%.
Amended also is Basrah Heavy, now with an API of 24 and ca 4.05% sulfur.
The KRG currently markets only one grade – KBT with an API of ca 24 and sulfur content of ca 4.5%-5% (both variable).
To the best of my knowledge, the low volumes of Taq Taq crude now being produced (champagne crude as it was once called) now go exclusively to the KAR refinery.
Contributing to grade enrichment of the heavier KBT constituents (Shaikan, Atrush etc) are large volumes of high quality crude from the KAR-managed Khurmala dome (plus nearby Avana, Bai Hassan fields) AND the high quality crude from the HKN-managed Sarsang field.
The above presents SOMO with some possibilities, perhaps even a little bit of a dilemma.
Firstly – management of the 3 Kirkuk Domes.
The Kirkuk formations were first discovered in 1927 (Baba Gurgur), and Kirkuk has a lot of emotional significance for the Iraqi government and people.
KAR Group has, since the DEASH incursions, and on behalf of the KRG/MNR, pretty well managed output from both the Khurmala dome (claimed by KRG) and the Avana, Bai Hassan and several smaller nearby fields (claimed by Baghdad). KAR has invested significantly in processing plant and much of that output now goes into the Kurdish export pipeline and onwards to Ceyhan; being so very close to the Barzani family KAR also makes a lot of money from its activities.
Unlike GKP, HKN and Shamaran, however, KAR Group did not discover oil at these places – seen through SOMO eyes it acts purely as a producing contractor.
Second – grade marketing.
How should the KBT grade be priced relative to the Basrah Heavy offering?
Would it make sense to attempt to market 2 Kurdish grades?
Could the 2nd Ceyhan pipe be economically repaired in a sensible timescale? What would Turkey demand in return?
Would it make sense to divert, say, the high-grade Sarsang crude down to the Basrah processing facilities to help grade stabilisation down South?
Would it make sense to return the Avana and Bai Hassan output to the Basrah facilities?
As I said, there is a LOT of discussion about a LOT of other things going on - all of them very relevant.
Says surreyscot aka highlander7 , part of the cabal of real fraudsters on the other board that have polluted the debate about GKP for years , spinning their lies and deceit about how wonderful everything is with the company and the SH wells, how there is no water being produced, how easy and cheap it will be to deal with the sour gas issue, how the high Sulphur content is not a problem as S is so easy to remove and is so valuable anyway, how the SH-6 water well was a real beauty, how there is no danger to the KRG from Baghdad interfering with contracts, how the brave Kurds can face down anything that Baghdad throws at them, how the ICG ruling is meaningless and how, if things do get rough how the USA is going to come to the rescue of the KRG, Barzani and his clan.
Well, at the end of the day the Iraq Army didn't have to march into the export station at Faysh Khabur - the keys were given to them.
Visit the other place and make up your own mind as to who con men really are and ask yourself, why do they do it, who do they work for?
Perhaps we should adopt the food packaging labelling - "Warning - may contain nuts!"
As they say, Caveat emptor
Heh Mr GRH1, sailing under false colours...
It's still there - completely unedited for you to enjoy.
And that just shows how ignorant and devious you are!
I stated that the Iraq army could take over the Export Metering- and Pumping Station at Faysh Khabur - nowhere did I opine that it could or would take over Kurdish oilfields.
People - be warned about this particular poster!
I expect the Iraq-Turkey pipeline agreement to be amended very shortly - the unrealistic tariff rates from 2010 (last amendment) to be increased (cost more) and the annual guaranteed throughput numbers to be revised yet again.
I also expect the Kurdish PSC terms to be severely modified (downgraded), with the Profit Oil element being the one to suffer most. The Cost Oil element (currently max 40% for GKP/MOL) will also be under attack in my opinion, but reducing the existing, generous CO payback rate will greatly effect the willingness (and ability) of the OilCos to speedily implement future expansion plans - especially gas plans, so that might give cooler heads pause for thought. I certainly wouldn't rule out cancelling dividend payments until all of this mess has been settled.
Good mornin Armas,
have a look at what happened to the previous attempts to utilize the WSW routes...
Bandit Country, everywhere you look.
Now, looking at the Southern route possibility, why would you want to put all your eggs in one basket...again?
Talk about grasping at straws.
A presentation from 2007 - and every one of these "alternatve routes" is followed by a question mark!
Get real...
What follows may be considered by some as boring history, but believe me it is VERY relevant to the ongoing and complicated pipeline discussions between Iraq and Turkey. I offer it as a counterpoint to those who state that the decision awaited is a simple and straightforward one.
Turkey financed their portions of the expensive (twin) Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline from Ceyhan to the Turkish border at Ovakoy; Iraq financed their (much shorter) portion from the Turkish border down to Kirkuk.
The 2010 revision (to the original 1973 pipeline agreement, as subsequently amended July-1985) incorporated a modified tariff structure as follows:
Article 3 “Throughput Capacity and Minimum Guaranteed Throughput”
3.1 The throughput capacity of ITP is (70.9) MTA
3.2 The Iraqi Side undertakes to deliver the following Minimum Guaranteed Throughput to the Turkish Side via the ITP:
2010 22MTA
2011 27MTA
2012 32MTA
2013 and beyond 35 MTA (MTA = Million tons per annum)
If the existing 70.9MTA throughput capacity of the pipeline is reduced to a quantity for any reason that is not attributable to the Turkish Side, the Minimum Guaranteed Throughput that the Iraqi Side shall deliver to the system nevertheless remains as above. Nothing, except force majeure conditions that are mentioned in the Agreement and this Amendment, shall prevent the Iraqi Side from complying with its commitments as provided in this Article. The Minimum Guaranteed Throughput shall remain valid throughout the validity period of this agreement.”
The Tariff & Payments Structure of the July-195 Amendment was also revised and agreed in the 2010 revision, as follows:
$1.18 / bbl up to 22MTA
$1.15 / bbl up to 27MTA
$1.13 / bbl up to 32MTA
$1.09 / bbl up to 35MTA
$1.03 / bbl up to 22MTA
$0.96 / bbl up to 55MTA
$0.94 / bbl up to 60MTA
$0.90 / bbl up to 70.9MTA
Article 4 “Tariffs and Payments” sets out a Tariff Indexing Clause as follows:
“The tariff of transport in article 4.1 above shall be updated every (5) years time period considering 1st January 2011 as the base year for the first (5) years period. The tariff shall be adjusted based on the United States of America CPI-U (Consumer Price Index All Urban Consumers – www.bls.gov) annual data.”
Article 8 of the August 1973 Agreement was completely amended in Clause 4.3, as follows:
“The remuneration mentioned in Article 4.1 above shall include transportation cost, labour cost, repair and maintenance costs of the systems, all kinds of system renewal expenses, all of the costs regarding transportation and loading of Crude Oil, protection charges, duties and taxes. Services that are rendered to the tankers such as port services are not included to the amount.”
My Notes: I calculate current KBT as approx. 7 stb / ton, so 35MTA equates to ca. 245MMstb pa or about 670Mbopd.
@Armas,
that conclusion would perhaps be a bit premature - but it's disconverting to say the least.
Re continuation of as-is implementation of the Kurdish PSCs.
If Baghdad says the pipeline will only be opened if your foreign oil companies agree to a revision of their contracts, there would appear to be nothing stopping the KRG/MNR from declaring force majeure, perhaps frustration, on their PSC contracts with the oil companies presently active there.
Should one of the Contracting Parties (KRG/MNR) be unable to perform their obligations due to such a supervening event beyond their control (Baghdad saying N0), and should that result in continued production by the oil companies being inadvisable, commercially impracticable, illegal or impossible, then it seems pretty clear that your (oil company) choices are extremely limited...
Hi Cookie, thanks for that.
2 things immediately jump out at me:
A. (3)...oil funds shall be deposited....and only the KRG shall have the right to spend them.
B. (1) Oil sales must be returned to SOMO.
Sticking points indeed...
According to the revised sovereign pipeline agreement dated Sept-2010, Iraq is obliged to deliver a MINIMUM throughput of 35MTA.
Assuming a KBT of approx 25API, this equates very roughly to 244,000,000 stb per annum or 667,000 bopd.
The agreement states quite explicitly that nothing, except force majeure, shall prevent the Iraqi side from complying with the agreement.
The pipeline tariff for 35MTA (indexed of course) is/was clearly stated (then) as $1-09/stb.
Putting aside the DAESH years, the disagreement with the Semi-Autonomous Region of Kurdistan can hardly be termed a force majeure condition.
Just for your information...