George Frangeskides, Chairman at ALBA, explains why the Pilbara Lithium option ‘was too good to miss’. Watch the video here.
I've had the pleasure of a drink with dick!
And lunch. He even paid!
The most charming, funny, urbane character I've met in a long time.
Provocative at times but if we all made the efforts he does to keep an eye on his investments we wouldn't get caught out by so many of these sharks. His heart is actually in the right place.
Anyway enough about dick he'll hate me for this post :))
My guess is that the plan was to group the employee shares and sell them to an II probably at a small discount . I wonder whether that might actually have been part of this problem.
If I was a postie and I had pre elected and the company flung out an unexpected RNS then I'd feel that I had the right to withdraw my shares
I tend to agree. The baby went out with the bath water. I did notice though that whilst blaming the workforce for their pay rise he forgot to mention his own massive "golden hello".
What I would be interested to know is if they place those any of those employee shares with existing institutional holders. I suspect that many employees will hang onto their shares now but feel a bit sorry for those locked in to sell them. I understand that they were told that they could be sold in a variety of ways and there could be a discount applied which could potentially range from 5 to 10% or possibly more but I doubt many thought they would be looking at these kinds of figures.
Apparently this circular that told them that RMG had put this in place to manage any sales and told them they had to register a request to sell from 24th September to something like 12th Oct. Those that have done so already are not permitted to changes their minds even though the shares aren't officially available until 15th October and the CEO just threw one in from left field.
It's easy for us lock on to the comments the CEO made about pay rises but I don't think the average postie earns a fortune. I do agree there is probably plenty of dead wood to strip out but I don't necessarily think it's from the bottom tier.
shaft your own workforce. Why would you release an unscheduled update like that just as the company are canvassing which of their employee's want to sell their shares?
Did the institutions really want that much of a discount?
Slightly tongue in cheek but if I worked for the company I'd probably want to put something nasty in the CEO's tea.
http://whalsayenergy.com/
Who are these institutional investors?
Interesting find courtesy of a n other - thank you for bringing it to my attention
https://schlamstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/2014_31018.pdf
I still wonder how it was that we feel into the trap - how much due diligence was actually done reference the funding.
How did the connection between Socius and Esousa Holdings where Rachel Wachs aka Glicksman was in charge.
I think that's when XEL probably became uninvest able we just didn't know it
This is an old one but note the involvement of one of our vulture funds
Activist investors target UK oil and gas companies
Mon, 1st Jul 2013 14:46
By Andrew Callus
LONDON, July 1 (Reuters) - UK-listed oil and gas companies that have lost favour with mainstream shareholders
ADVERTISEMENT
are attracting investors who want to push bosses out, access their cash and force asset sales.
The trend took root in the United States last year where activist shareholders targeted sizeable companies including Hess Corp. It now has three new directors and is selling assets in Asia after the intervention of Elliot Management.
The UK-listed companies in the sights of activists are smaller but given the worsening outlook for oil and gas prices and disappointment with some more marginal energy prospects of the boom years they may look for more and bigger targets.
Some UK companies have ended up with significant assets, including cash, relative to their shrunken stock market value.
"It's a very simple model," said a London investment banker who specialises in oil and gas and did not want to be named.
"You don't have to take a view on the value of the actual assets or know anything about oil and gas. You just know the cash is there for the taking."
One target is 3Legs Resources Plc, which is exploring for shale gas in Poland. Polish shale was once seen as a red-hot opportunity, but enthusiasm waned quickly last year when the government downgraded resource estimates and top global player Exxon Mobil pulled out.
The stock, which values the company at about 24 million pounds ($36 million), trades below the cash position it is expected to have in the middle of next year, the company's broker, Jefferies, said in a June 20 research note.
Boston-based activist investor Weiss Asset Management's stake in 3Legs topped 15 percent in April, according to a disclosure by 3Legs. Another activist, Guernsey-based Damille Investments, acquired a similar-sized stake in February.
In the past six months the company has twice faced down attempts to install a new board and put the business up for sale, defeating the activists in votes at extraordinary shareholder meetings and insisting its commitment to Polish shale will pay off.
Another example is Northern Petroleum, a company now worth about 30 million pounds but with a disappointing stock performance, and in which Damille emerged as a 5 percent shareholder in December. Since Damille took a stake it has made a number of board changes.
Weiss declined to comment on specific investments. Damille's parent, Nimrod Capital, did not respond to phone calls and an email requesting comment.
Another company trying to fend off shareholder activism is JKX Oil and Gas. Earlier this year, CEO Paul Davies narrowly survived a shareholder revolt led by Eclairs Group - not a traditional activist fund but an investment vehicle of Ukrainian billionaire Igor Kolomoisky, who has a 27 per
FWIW I would love to know who was at that meeting with OGA on 8th Sept and what happened there.
My suspicions are that OGA blew them off.
Why would a potential co funder attend the meeting with OGA?
Again I suspect that it wasn't the normal type of co funder that OGA would automatically be happy with and again (just a hunch) I think it was all about trying to offer even more convoluted arrangements to prospective parties - but always maintaining control themselves - and this is the crux of it - refusal to accept that they were unfit to control the development of this company and refusal to act in the best interests of the company or it's shareholders by handing over control.
That was the question I asked reference the licence
I understand that Statoil recently had a 3 year extension to the Bressay licence granted can you explain why it was that when Xcite applied they were given only 9 months? Were Xcite content to only obtain 9 months/ Had there been any discussion prior to the application about the length of extension they could expect?
Also, at any point since that extension was granted did Xcite query, formally or informally whether a further extension would be granted if they applied? In short was there any further dialogue with OGA over the matter of the remaining length of the licence?
With regard to your additional requests, while the OGA strives to be as
transparent as possible, and our general approach to requests for information is
to adopt a default position of looking to release information, there are
circumstances where certain types of information cannot be released. Having
assessed the information relating to those requests (focusing on discussions
between the OGA and Xcite over the extension to the Bentley licence), it
consists of sensitive commercial information that could harm the Xcite’s
commercial position if it were to be released into the public domain.
5. Therefore, the OGA considers that those requests fall under the exemption in
section 43(2) FOIA, on the grounds that disclosure of such information would,
or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person, and also
Regulation 12(5)(e) of EIRs, on the grounds that that its disclosure would
adversely affect the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where
such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest.
6. Furthermore, the OGA considers that the exemption under section 41(1) FOIA
(information provided in confidence) applies, as does Regulation 12(5)(d) of the
EIRs (interests of the person providing the information).
7. The parties whom provided this information to the OGA did so on the implicit
understanding that this particular aspect of the information would remain
confidential and not be disclosed to a third party. To breach this confidence
would firstly be “actionable” – in that the parties concerned could bring a legal
case against the OGA for breach of contractual obligations and expect to win
such a case and also that to release this information would have a “chilling
effect” on the flow of information of this nature, in that companies would be less
willing to disclose such information to the OGA in the future.
8. In addition, the OGA’s qualified person under FOIA considers that, so far as the
information requested relates to the correspondence between the Licensee and
the OGA, the disclosure of such would likely inhibit the free and frank exchange
of views for the purposes of deliberation (section 36 (2) (b) (ii) FOIA) and/or
prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs (section 36 (2) (c) FOIA).
9. In summary, in his view, allowing for a regulatory environment in which the
Licensee, and Licensees, provide information to the OGA freely and openly is
to be encouraged because it provides the OGA with important regulatory
information (including views) on a live issue it would not have the legal power to
I asked that question and got stonewalled even after an internal review.
Apparently it's not in the "public interest"
require – the disclosure of the requested information is likely to have a chilling
effect on such information provision. Further, disclosure of the requested
information in this context would not provide a “safe space” for the OGA to
discuss options with the Licensee, and Licensees, around the development of
their licensed areas. Such safe space could not be obtained by the release of
information, including confidential information, that among other things opens
up debate outside the proper channels. In addition, in his view, non-disclosure
allows for the more effective use of the OGA’s limited resources, in that the
OGA is able to determine from such information what issues to target in
discussions with the Licensee, and Licensees.
10. In applying these exemptions, the OGA has considered whether the public
interest in withholding the information is outweighed by the public interest in
disclosing the information, as required by section 2(2) of the FOIA and
Regulation 12(1)(b) of the EIRs.
11. The OGA acknowledges that there is a general public interest in the information
you have requested, as disclosure leads to greater transparency, which
enhances public scrutiny and makes public authorities more accountable.
However, there are also public interest considerations in favour of withholding
such information in order to for example ensure that the commercial interests of
the companies are not prejudiced by disclosure of information that could
adversely impact on future business.
12. Generally the release of such information is likely to discourage companies in
the oil and gas sector from discussing similar issues with the OGA in the future,
which would negatively impact on the OGA’s ability to perform a core function
in relation to the development of the UK’s hydrocarbon resources, ultimately to
the detriment of the public interest. When applying this test, the OGA has
considered the impact on companies within the wider industry and not just
Xcite.
13. The OGA, therefore, considers that the public interest argument in favour of
withholding this information outweighs the public interest argument in favour of
its disclosure.
Karelian Diamond Resources plc (AIM: KDR), the diamond exploration company focused on Finland, is pleased to announce that it has conditionally raised �500,000 (�569,390), prior to expenses They obviously couldn't even raise an amount to do anything other than keep the lights on and the gravy train rolling on. Conroy's outfits must be two of the worst examples of "lifestyle" companies on AIM Years and years of being "excited" and "pleased" and achieving zip. He definitely deserves the word Con in his name. The recent pump was as steven49 said standard AIM , As an aside I note the money raised is prior to expenses I wonder how much of it will disappear
maestro - it's not personal I wish you all the best but this man has really duped a lot of shareholders over the years. Trade the backside off it - it's good for that but don't ever rely on anything the man says. In terms of what he promised over the years it's poor.
Heck they didn't even get a free carry, nothing for back costs and warrants at 12p to boot. If you'd held PVR over the years and listened to anything TOR said then I can't see how you would be anything but bitterly disappointed. Hopefully most of his investors will have moved on and it probably looks OK to those that bought recently for a trade. GL to those that did - he doesn't deserve to have any loyal shareholders.
Sorry but I think it's a rubbish deal. On many levels
Interestingly Statoil got their extension without having to complete any of the technical work on their licence yet Xcite were stating to anyone who would listen that they were doing all these evaluations to keep OGA happy. 9. It may be helpful at this point if I set out some general background to how the OGA considers Licensing applications. The consideration by the OGA of the technical and financial competence of a potential licensee/operator when considering whether to issue a licence is for the OGA to consider the Licensee�s ability to carry out the proposed work programme which would have been outlined in the licence application. Such work programmes normally involve drilling an exploration well and any relevant appraisal activities which might be required prior to the formulation of a development plan. 10. However, where a licence extension is sought, such as in this case to extend the relevant Bentley field, this would be considered on a case by case basis. In such circumstances, while the technical capability of such an extension is considered, the financial competence would not usually be a factor in making any decision to extend. 11. Within the Licence lifecycle, the OGA carries out its formal assessment of a company�s commercial, financial and governance structure before it agrees a Field Development Plan (�FDP�) � it is then that the Licensee has to demonstrate, in the OGA�s view, access to sufficient funds to meet its share of the actual FDP costs. 12. Therefore, no financial assessments were before the OGA when undertaking the technical review for the licence extension request: such finance assessments being for example a detailed review of cash flows, income, expenditure (both capital and operating), borrowings, equity funding and other facts of this type. As such, no financial review as described So why only 9 months?
Below is the question I asked. I understand that Statoil recently had a 3 year extension to the Bressay licence granted can you explain why it was that when Xcite applied they were given only 9 months? Were Xcite content to only obtain 9 months/ Had there been any discussion prior to the application about the length of extension they could expect? Also, at any point since that extension was granted did Xcite query, formally or informally whether a further extension would be granted if they applied? In short was there any further dialogue with OGA over the matter of the remaining length of the licence?�
I went to internal review on it with OGA With regard to your additional requests, while the OGA strives to be as transparent as possible, and our general approach to requests for information is to adopt a default position of looking to release information, there are circumstances where certain types of information cannot be released. Having assessed the information relating to those requests (focusing on discussions between the OGA and Xcite over the extension to the Bentley licence), it consists of sensitive commercial information that could harm the Xcite�s commercial position if it were to be released into the public domain. 5. Therefore, the OGA considers that those requests fall under the exemption in section 43(2) FOIA, on the grounds that disclosure of such information would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person, and also Regulation 12(5)(e) of EIRs, on the grounds that that its disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest. 6. Furthermore, the OGA considers that the exemption under section 41(1) FOIA (information provided in confidence) applies, as does Regulation 12(5)(d) of the EIRs (interests of the person providing the information).