Member Info for AGEOS

continuation:

As previous link appears to have failed, hopefully this will succeed:

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s13202-017-0363-x.pdf

Although no data comparable with that of this SH Field has been released for Barracuda we can be certain that such exists and that equivalent interpretation and evaluation has been completed. Both the 2016 Ryder Scott CPR and the 2019 Degeconek CPR will have contributed to that end, and as previously posted, the area has been subject to 700 sq km of 3D seismic, 1200 km of 2D seismic and to well-log petrophysics. Nothing less than the type of rigorous evaluation exemplified by this SH Field study would have been concluded for Barracuda, for it to be possible to identify the four locations for drilling. Each well will have its own 'risk' profile and each profile will to a greater or lesser degree be independent of the others. Thus if B-5 fails or falls short of economic viability it does not follow that the potential of any or all of the other proposed wells is similarly reduced. Each well is assessed on its own 'probabilities'. Consequently there is no “bet [by AC] on one well being successful.”

The financial risk to ZEN of participation in the B-5 well should also be assessed within the wider context of anticipated developments in Tunisia and Congo [Brazzaville] both of which should be very positive for market perception of the company during Q1/Q2 2022, coincidental with the B-5 drill schedule. However, regardless of such potential positive context, it is perhaps inevitable that the market will react unfavourably to any shortfall in the results from B-5. An increase of $20m in debt plus the prospect of a further $3m to fund B-6 would immediately impact the market capitalisation severely. Conversely a positive result from B-5 should be rewarded very favourably. Such is the dilemma of investing in an early-stage company. Best of luck to you Michu, and all.
AGEOS

NicetoMichu,

In response to your Thursday 18.32 post, although I understand your concern regarding AC's proposal to acquire an equity stake in NHNL and thereby finance the B-5 well at Barracuda, the 'risk' element to the transaction is not that of “effectively betting the company on this one drill being successful” as you so dramatically describe it, but I suggest, is far more nuanced.

Firstly it is important to remember that the $20m outlay is to acquire 42% of NHNL, including 42% of its 100% interest in the RSCA [Risk Service Contract Agreement] for 105 sq km, inclusive of the Barracuda and Elepa South Fields and the Curlew Channel gas & condensate prospect, and also of any additional prospects which may be identified or acquired in the future. The medium-long-term potential of this 42% interest far exceeds that of a single well. Barracuda alone has an estimated 23,000 bopd potential from 6 wells. For comparison, Perenco have just acquired Total's 8400 bopd offshore Gabon, mature production for $350m.

Secondly, according to the 'Option RNS' the costs of drilling and commissioning B-5, are to be paid by NHNL from the $20m 'Consideration'. This implies a cost substantially below the historical $25m for a 10,000ft well, which accords with the current industry demand that costs must and can be reduced to nearer $5m per 10,000ft by efficiency improvements. At least one industry provider is quoting $5m, in this case for a horizontal extension. This provides some reassurance that the planned B-6, 7 & 8 wells, to which ZEN will be required to contribute 42% of the costs, will not be excessive.

Thirdly, it is useful to have some understanding of the structural geology of the delta fields, as it provides context within which the 'risks' associated with drilling a well can be assessed. The four diagrams [Fig 2] on page 2 [page 52 of publication] of the geophysics paper [link below] regarding the SH Field, are probably illustrative of the kind of structures which characterise the Barracuda Field, and Fig 4 [page 55] & Fig 5 [page 56] typical of the seismic data sets on which such structural interpretations are based. The 'abstract' provides a descriptive summary of delta field characteristics.

Seismic interpretation and petrophysical evaluation of SH field, Niger Delta - Sanuade2018_Article_SeismicInterpretationAndPetrop.pdf

To be continued

Kingoftheworld

Please provide the reference and link to the “news report” you refer to; and why “ATOG/AAOG”, it has nothing to do with AAOG.
The order of the Tunisian Ministry specified that “ATOG had failed to deposit the bank guarantee required for the two permits” hence its withdrawal of the permits.

Also please explain and justify your statement that “the govt turned down zen for not being financially capable on one of the attempted deals” Which government and which deal, plus the published references for this claim.

Of the various options for further acquisitions available to ZEN a priority must be that of the remaining 22.5% in SLK Tunisia ,originally announced in RNS April 20, 2020 as an SPA with KUFPEC the Kuwait State O & G Company. Completion of that deal is still subject to approval of the Comite Consultatif des Hydrocarbures and as has been demonstrated with the recent ZEN/CNPC deal for its 22.5% of SLK, can be circumvented by acquisition of the holding company itself.

Therefore I assume ZEN will have been negotiating to acquire KUFPEC (Tunisia) Ltd or its local subsidiary, which as far as I can ascertain has no other assets than the 22.5% stake in the SLK Field and the North Kairouan Permit, plus 25 Class B shares in CTKCP the operator. Completion of that deal would give ZEN 45% unencumbered interest in SLK [55% held by ETAP the State O & G Co] and the N Kairouan Permit, and enable immediate development of further production potential.

ZEN paid $250,000 to KUFPEC in June 2020 as 50% of the total due and presumably the other 50% by Oct 2020 as agreed, and probably from the proceeds of sale of oil production which was also due to ZEN as part of the SPA. Any further payment to acquire KUFPEC (Tunisia) Ltd or its subsidiary should therefore be minimal.

Today's EUR 3m 'Loan for African Development' RNS refers to an immediate drawdown of EUR 1m which suggests an imminent transaction and since the CFO refers to “potential near-term acquisitions in Tunisia and beyond”, a conclusion to the SLK acquisition seems a likely proposition. However, since the plural 'acquisitions' is used, a number of further initiatives may also be in store.
AGEOS

Correction to line 2, third paragraph.

ATOG [not AAOG] has a 100% interest in the 352 sq km onshore Bir Ben Tartar Concession.......

My apologies.

Former investors of Anglo African O & G [AAOG] might derive some satisfaction in knowing that Anglo Tunisian Oil & Gas [ATOG], the private company set up by James Berwick and David Sefton [whilst still directors of AAOG, in 2019] to acquire certain Tunisian assets deemed inappropriate for AAOG to acquire because of its Tilapia failure, has just been deprived of two of its Tunisian permits.

The Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy published in the Official Gazette of Nov 23rd that it had relieved ATOG of its exploration permits for the South Remada and Jenein Centre concessions, which it had acquired through the takeover of Medco Energy O & G Tunisia. ATOG had failed to honour its state financial obligations and now also faces combined compensation demands of $9.2m from the Ministry.

Having screwed-up at AAOG (Tilapia) and now in trouble at ATOG, I wonder if Berwick, in desperation for cash and another corporate exit, will provide AC with more bargain opportunities. AAOG has a 100% interest in the 352 sq km onshore Bir Ben Tartar Concession which currently produces at around 500 bopd average [subject to a PSC with ETAP] and which is within the South Remada 3681 sq km concession adjacent to the Libyan border. It also has 5% interest in three other smaller [230, 130 & 55 bopd] producing fields, 10% interest in an onshore exploration and developmental prospect, and two adjacent offshore fields [100 & 80% interest] both in exploration/developmental status. Of these the Bir Ben Tartar Field would be an obvious target for ZEN.

Pure speculation but one to watch.
AGEOS.

On 31.08.2021, I posted here that a company named Karra Oil Noble Hill Ltd [co no 015555V] had been incorporated on 11.12.2017 in the Isle of Man jurisdiction, where it was listed as 'Struck Off' and dissolved on 03.08.2021. I also added details of K.O.N.H. (UK) Ltd [co no 13213236] registered at Companies House UK to emphasise that two companies shared the initials KONH, with the obvious implication that this might not be a coincidence. I also disclosed that I was not a shareholder in ADME so had no incentive to enlarge on the suspicions this raised.

Since no one else appears to have followed this line of enquiry the following information may assist in prompting investigation by anyone who wishes to follow this further.

Regarding Karra Oil Noble Hill Ltd. Ask yourself why in Dec 2017 a private company with the name “Noble Hill” was incorporated in the Isle of Man jurisdiction [a tax haven noted for corporate secrecy] and the name “Karra” was added as a prefix. The 13 filings during its 3 plus years of existence reveal 'intended and actual resignation of Registered Agent', 'intended and actual Striking Off', 'Suspension' and little else.

Possible clue: Mr Perayya Sastry Karra was appointed as a director of K.O.N.H (UK) Ltd on April 13, 2021 the same day that ADM Energy was filed at Companies House as a “Relevant Legal Entity” with “Significant Control” of K.O.N.H. (UK) Ltd; . That is the day that ADME acquired 51% of K.O.N.H. (UK) Ltd presumably in the belief it was thereby acquiring as stated in its RNS of 23.03.2021,“a 70% indirect interest in the rights, benefits and obligations under the RSA relating to the Barracuda area of OML-141.”

This is only the beginning of a trail which winds through a complex web of individual and company interests which I do not intend to enlarge on further. In providing this information I also emphasise that I do not intentionally impugn the integrity of any entity named, either directly or by inference.
AGEOS.

The following statement relating to Nigeria OML-141 NW was added to the NHNL website yesterday, 02.12.2021.

Noble Hill-Network Ltd
Further information on disclaimer 02.12.2021
On 23 November 2021, Noble Hill-Network Ltd (NHNL) through their outside Legal Council notified the AIM Regulatory Authorities that the NHNL Board of Directors on 5 August 2021 unanimously REJECTED the PROPOSED transaction with K.O.N.H. (UK) for a participation interest in NW OML 141 RSC through the purchase of NHNL Shares. NHNL notified the AIM Regulators and sent a copy of the 17 August and 27 August Cease and Desist Orders demanding that they stop all statements and Claims of Ownership of NHNL and thereby any interest in the NW OML 141 RSC which is held solely by NHNL.

On 29 November 2021 in ADME RSN 90471, it states that K.O.N.H. (UK) “has a 70% controlling interest in a risk sharing agreement in the Barracuda field in OML 141”. Noble Hill Network Ltd (NHNL) through their outside Legal Council notified the AIM Regulatory Authorities on 1 December 2021 that the ADME statement was false and NHNL supplied documentation from the independent Company Secretary stipulating the actual Share Ownership of NHNL as Registered with the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission and as documented by Share Certificates and recorded by the Company Secretary. This documentation confirmed that NHNL is owned SOLELY by two Nigerian Owned Companies and K.O.N.H. (UK) has NO Shareholding and/or ownership in NHNL.

The continuation of this notice, with supporting documentation can be examined on the NHNL website at www.noblehillnetwork.com

This simply confirms much of what I have posted both here and on the ZEN share-chat board during the past two months and should convince the 'ADME eternal optimists' that Barracuda 'ownership' was and remains a delusion. Your BOD have some questions to answer.
AGEOS.

As AC is, I believe, currently or shortly to be in the Congo, to progress the Tilapia deal, it is worthwhile noting that the Interim Report & Financial Statement released yesterday, confirms on page 33 with regard to the US$5.7m “receivables from SNPC” that:

“it is expected that the signature bonus of US$2m that will become payable should the group be successful in its tender for the new license will be offset from the receivable which would further demonstrate the recoverability of the amount.”

Although a reiteration of a previously stated position this is an important reminder both of the probability for recovery of the full amount and the anticipated payment procedure for the initial capital demand relating to the Tilapia license.

As the market appears to be reserving judgement on the 'gift-worthiness' of the Nigerian Option maybe AC will enhance the seasonal cheer and market capitalisation with a second 'gift', this time from Congo Brazzaville.
AGEOS.

Whilst waiting for the next RNS from ZEN, I'm tempted to speculate on what might be an additional target in Tunisia, namely the Mazrane Field which has a common border with Robbana and produces from the same reservoirs. It had been producing at 140-160 bopd from two wells, MZR-1 drilled in 2007 and MZR-2 in 2015 but on Oct 15 fell to 18 bopd and has remained below 50 bopd since then.

The Field permit is held by ETAP the state oil company but the concession is regulated by a PSC [Production Sharing Contract] with an independent operator, HBS Oil Co, a private Tunisian company which appears to be a subsidiary of HBS International Egypt Ltd , based in Cairo and with interests mainly in Egypt and Libya. The contract between ETAP and HBS included the drilling of two more production wells and a production target probably approaching 1000 bopd but none of the developmental schedule has been implemented.

Since I suspect this is due to HBS failing to come up with its share of the finance, I expect ETAP would be more than pleased for ZEN to take over.
The two producing wells which are activated by sucker rod pumps probably require the same workover as ROB-1 and since production is already trucked to Zarzis, can presumably be incorporated into the 'Zarzis blend'. The drilling of two more production wells could also be a timely addition to plans for Robbana and Ezzaouia.

With the recent slump in production, HBS might see this as time to offload the Field.
AGEOS.

Thanks buko.
So it's an Alliance News report, ie reactive journalistic reportage not supported by evidence based research. Enough said,

buko, could you please provide the reference for your Mon 22.42 post so that I can assess the reliability and integrity of the source.

The last sentence reiterates the claim by ADM Energy to a controlling interest in an RSA {Risk Sharing Agreement] for the Barracuda Field, an RSA no longer considered valid by NHNL the 100% RSC {Risk Service Contract] holder, due to failure by ADME/KONH to provide funding by the agreed date. If you read the terms of the RSA as reported by ADME in several RNS, it is clearly incompatible with the terms of the Option agreed between ZEN and NHNL and cannot be considered as complementary. Any future published reference to the RSA can therefore be considered as potentially suspect in intention.
AGEOS

Scroll down to see Eunisell EPF Barge 'Victory', the probable barge-mounted Early Production Facility mentioned in today's RNS and from which oil production would be transferred to an adjacent floating storage and offloading vessel.

www.eunisellproduction.com

AGEOS

AC was adamant from day one that he intended to build a mid-tier company and this is the first deal commensurate with that ambition. Tilapia [Congo Brazzaville] is significant but not comparable in production potential. The $20m cost of acquiring a 42% equity stake in NHNL and consequently in OML-141 NW may have surprised some but was clearly sign-posted by AC in his 10.11.2021 Investor Call. In answer to a question on future funding he stated “we are working hard with development banks in Africa...there are five or six with which we are negotiating for sums of up to $5m. With oil production creating cash flow we can service this.”

The wording of today's RNS implies that the 42m shares in NHNL will be acquired in 7 tranches, each of 6m shares, for each of 7 payments of $3m over a period of 270 days beginning, presumably on the day the option is signed [before Jan 15,2022] and when the first instalment of $3m will be due. Provisional bank-loan agreements have presumably already been negotiated in justification of AC's statement that “We are confident in our ability to finance the Option by using multiple sources of funding, specifically funding from pan-African financial institutions.”

The ADM Energy RNS also released today, and in response to ZEN's announcement, may appear to muddy the waters since it repeats this bizarre claim of “ownership of NHNL”. Ownership, as previously explained, implies legal title to more than 50% of the voting rights in a company, which should be self evidentially provable but for which ADM Energy provides not a shred of evidence, even to the extent of not declaring such an interest in its [or K.O.N.H UK Ltd] Companies House filings which would be a legal requirement if such ownership existed. It is simply beyond belief that ZEN would have entered into this Option Agreement without having first established with the relevant Nigerian authorities that NHNL is 100% owned by its shareholders as registered with those same authorities. My incomprehension of ADME's claims is compounded by the fact that the all-important second paragraph of their RNS today contains a legalistic non-sequitur rendering it nonsensical. No competent lawyer would have written this.

Although the ADM Energy/KONH claim will no doubt continue as a side issue, AC is clearly confident of its irrelevance so hopefully we can await the succession of announcements which will accompany the progression of this initiative to a successful conclusion. The drilling of B-5 during Q1 2022, followed by B-6, 7 & 8 will alone provide an eventful year and in the meantime it appears that the anticipated developments in Tunisia and Congo Brazzaville will also soon materialise.
AGEOS.

Frobertdude, try reading the RNS. ZEN are buying a 42% equity stake in 100% owned NHNL, and consequently in the RSC {Risk Service Contract] for OML-141 NW, for US$20m.. ADME hold zero equity in NHNL.

Just for politeness thought you should know that NHNL & ZEN have signed an Option Agreement for OML-141 NW. See ZEN RNS released this morning.

Was just about to post the same link Florida, as it appears that some of the 'incendiary' information I alluded to regarding ADM Energy, has found its way to Tom Winnifrith.

Will maybe help clear the decks for AC to conclude a deal.

Florida, your concerns, as genuine and justifiable as they might appear, are only part of a much more complex situation. I hesitate to enlarge on this too much as it would require a whole series of substantial posts including some potentially incendiary information [not relating to ZEN I stress], and as you say an RNS from ZEN in a few days time may well resolve the issue anyway.

However, to address your specific concern. Although it appears that a deal was struck between KONH and NHNL in April 2021, there is no evidence that a contract was signed. It is referred to by NHNL as a “proposed Agreement dated April 28” and as subsequently declined “due to lack of funding and misrepresentations”. Such an Agreement could have been non-binding but in this case, the NHNL response suggests it might have been binding but subject to contractual provisions such as the contribution of funds from ADME, which it presumably failed to provide in a specified time. It is noteworthy that ADME appears to have assumed successful closure of this Agreement a month in advance, as on March 23rd it issued an RNS to raise $1.3m to acquire 51% of KONH which it states “holds, through its subsidiary Noble Hill-Network Ltd (NHNL), a 70% indirect interest in the rights, benefits and obligations under the RSA relating to the Barracuda area of OML-141.”

That March 23rd statement raises ,what to my mind is one of the most bizarre aspects of this whole scenario, that is the claim that NHNL is a subsidiary of KONH, a claim repeated by ADME in this most recent RNS. Not only is this unsupported by any legally required disclosure on K.O.N.H (UK) Ltd, Companies House filings, but also makes nonsense of ADME's claim of failure by NHNL to honour an Agreement with KONH. For NHNL to be a subsidiary, KONH would have to hold more than 50% of its voting rights and that alone would enable it to enforce the Agreement, leaving aside what I understand would be a company relationship contrary to Nigerian law!!

Having established this and a lot more relating to ADME more than two months ago I was sceptical at the time of a successful outcome to ZEN's DD and indicated so in several posts. With the 90 day DD period almost complete and what seems to be positive vibes from AC, I assume that the DD enquiries have not revealed anything which would terminate ZEN's negotiations for an equity interest and so am now more hopeful of a positive outcome. Without any legally enforceable claim of interest, ADME and KONH would be an irrelevance.
AGEOS.

Fakevenues

Thanks for alerting me to the ADME 23rd Nov RNS which I've just read, having been preoccupied with other matters.

ADM Energy, it appears, still believe as stated, that Noble Hill-Network Ltd (NHNL) is a subsidiary of K.O.N.H.UK Ltd in which they [ADME] have acquired a 51% equity interest and consequently holds an indirect 70% controlling interest in an RSA relating to the Barracuda field.
They also acknowledge that NHNL dispute this claim and have notified KONH accordingly.

Since ZEN will have concluded their DD shortly and their stated interest is in acquiring an equity stake in NHNL, this objective is clearly incompatible with any validity to ADME's claims. AC will require legal certainty that ADM Energy and/or KONH have no such interests in NHNL. We will no doubt be updated by AC soon enough.

In the meantime, although it is tempting to add to my previous posts on the subject as I have access to information not revealed either here or on the ADME chat board, I think it legally wise to await developments via RNS. I'm reasonably confident that ADME's claims will prove to be ill-founded [I choose that word carefully and with legal imlication] and that a successful outcome for ZEN remains probable.
AGEOS

Correction: the “domestic market” % is sold at a discount to the “export market” rate, with the difference effectively accruing to the state.