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Edit: 2yrs to production should I say, with Life of Mine 5yrs and like Yanf, much room for expansions upon that

The 2 Projects can not be compared at the moment - we have no idea what the Capex, AISC or IRR of SHG's Barrick's Kenya assets is yet - they're still working on it!

However we know from HUM already the Guinea Kouroussa Gold Project is USD 90m Capex, 2yrs production and 1.18Moz of gold at >3g/t. Another Yanfolila effectively - rinse and repeat.

Other breaking news: "French forces kill al-Qaida's north Africa chief in Mali"

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/05/french-forces-kill-al-qaidas-north-africa-chief-in-mali

The April 2020 presentation was pretty clear a dividend of at least $3m will be paid out:

"FY20 base case guidance of $3m dividend +potential for special dividends, as appropriate" (pg.30)

Jammer - minor pedantic point but intangible asset value attributed to Dugbe is $65m, with the remainder for Mali. Section 13 of the Annual Accounts (page 76, or PDF pg.78) provides an update.

Agree OL. Let's also remember Liberia Government have 10% free carry and there is a large 2% royalty on project for Anglo Pacific Group PLC.

So for $10-12m, ARX get 49% of 90% (44%), valuing Dugbe in its current form at circa $27m - seems about right. Doesn't matter that "Intangible Assets" in books are deemed to be $65m - no one would pay this. Only way to get additional value would be to go it alone and for HUM to spend the $12m itself to get it to DFS stage and then try a farm-in again at the more advanced stage. You may get more, but you've spent some $12m extra and diverted Project Management & Engineering Resources away from Yanfolila + increased G&A.

Err no the sale + commitment are $10-12m for 49% of Dugbe, whether they get a loan to cover this or a private/ public equity raise makes no difference - it doesn't suddenly mean they're paying $4.9m for 49% of Dugbe.

As a shell company with no assets not sure who would loan them $10m, so means they already have the funds or will need a very large equity raise, meaning huge dilution to ARX.

However that doesn't detract from some other key questions here: how much did 3 directors pay for their ARX equity - why did HUM keep stating over and over again they've spent $70m on Dugbe in their slidepacks, yet effectively sell 49% of it for $10-12m. I'm playing devil's advocate and never been a huge fan of Dugbe so $25m valuation for it seems about right (pre DFS/BFS, huge work to be done, Capex intensive, logistically challenging, Liberia, low grade etc.) no matter how much was previously spent, but do need answers. I hope more people turn up to the AGM than the last one (assume will be Zoom or some such with COVID19) - I appeared to be the only PI last year!

Let's remember the guidance for 2020 is actually the range of 110,000-125,000ozs, so 110k is the lower end. The AISC is then range of $850-895/oz AISC.

The production guidance is is the gross amount and as some allude to below 10% of Yanfolila Mine is owned by Mali Government, with another 10% due to them once paid CFA 6,624,517,000 ($10.9m). In the 2018 Accounts it was stated "The Group remains in discussions with the Government of Mali as to the timing and mechanism of payment of this consideration [by Government to HUM]. The relevant shares will not be issued until the payment mechanism has been agreed". I assume easiest option for all Parties is for this $10.9m sum to be offset against Taxes when due.

I also assume the 90-10 (or 80-20 once above is resolved) of Yanfolila earnings split would not come into effect until HUM recover all its Capex, but perhaps someone else with more knowledge can comment on this.

Easily explained by the 2,614oz delta last Q, across the quarters it averages itself out.

There are various reasons for the gold inventory deltas/ increases across quarters (inventory which includes gold sales/ receivables), which if you pick up the phone or drop them an email, I'm sure they will happily answer. The major reason is inventory excludes any movements relating to HUM Single Mine Origin (SMO) gold stocks which can cause fluctuation. They sell gold dore to the refiners who mint the SMO coins and HUM then buy the coins back, so from an accounting perspective causes variations depending on where in the supply chain the SMO allocated gold is.

The SMO coins are in high demand it appears...

Bunker Hill is still a great project technically and legally - simply mishandled financially by previous BH directors. It's clear HUM's monies and loans are being paid back or could be converted to more equity, despite some on here claiming the money had gone walkies or could never be recovered.

Bunker Hill is huge and I honestly don’t think people fully understand why it closed in 1981 or the legalities regarding BH Mining being fully indemnified in a tri-party agreement with the EPA and Dept. of Justice. With both the EPA and DoJ involved, it will be very hard to overturn, but not impossible. BH is a blight on the landscape and continues to pollute the environment - they need more money for a proper clean up and a modern up to date mine would help with this, with monies earmarked for clean up.

It was 1st and foremost a Lead mine and zinc was merely a by-product. Zinc rich grades low in lead were largely ignored and included in the SEC proven reserves. Some zones are 20% zinc. Going forward it will be predominantly a zinc play. For $90m Capex (fraction of Dugbe's):

a) 8yrs+ LoM w/ huge amount of potential to extend this further and high grade drilling intercepts of >20% zinc.
b) 1,500tpd processed or 547,500 tonnes per year est. commence Q1 2020. At 5.08% zinc, 2.35% Pb and 1.29 Oz Ag per ton: That's:
- Zinc: 27,813 tonnes p.a., 55.6million revenue (using $2,000 per ton)
- Lead: 12,866 tonnes p.a., 21.8million revenue (using $,2000 per ton)
- Silver: 706,275Oz p.a., 11million revenue (using $14.5 per Oz)
TOTAL: $88.4million revenue

Potential to double throughput to 3,000tpd, equating to $177million revenue compared to Yanfollila’s $200million odd (dependant on gold price of course). That's at the significantly depressed Zinc, Lead and Silver prices of today. If we had a moderate 10-20% bounce in spot prices, you're looking at revenues of over $200m.

G&A is not $4m per quarter. There is interest on the loan not incl. in AISC, there are a lot of works ongoing on site that would not be defined as "sustaining" and therefore not included in AISC.

Edit: meant Q4 2019 Net Debt of $34m of course

An incredibly strong Q1 2020, far better than I anticipated. They may of course be having some issue with exporting gold (delays only at this stage, or perhaps further down supply chain with refiner), just as all miners are having (AAZ raised this in their Q1 2020 yesterday too).

If you take the cash + liquid assets (gold receivables) of $25m minus Debt of $34m we're now at only Net Debt of $9m. That is phenomenal when Net Debt Q4 2020 was $31m. This was at avg gold price of $1,568 and no doubt we should hopefully have avg of $1,650+ in Q2 2020.

With gold now

Personally I prefer buybacks. If gold stays over $1,650, they should be instigating buy backs in 2H 2020 to cover the options and then some.

Then 1H 2021, we should have a bumper maiden dividend equivalent to at least 10% at this share price. If HUM deliver on Q1 results, cant see being in the 20ps much longer

Think that's a typo as it comes under the April heading and SLP do normally issue the Q report at the end of the following month (i.e. April 30th, not March 31st)

They also have a very low population density and the HUM operations are remote in the south. If COVID-19 did become an issue in Bamako, they could easily ring fence the gold miners in the south, stop any internal migration from both the mines and local villages where the mine labourers live.

This is very different scenario to SA where its particularly worrying and hard to contain now they reached 700+ cases

We already know the buyer of HUM's dore as per last Q report:

"All the gold dore produced from the Yanfolila mine is sold by the Company's subsidiary Societe Des Mines De Komana SA ("SMK") on an arms-length basis to Auramet International (https://auramet.com/), who manage the gold sales process. Sales prices are typically confirmed in advance of each regular shipment to reduce the exposure to short term volatility in the gold price. The gold dore is sold at a discount to the refined gold price which approximates to the refining and transport costs that are borne by Auramet International."

Other governments and private citizens will buy it up who can see what's about to happen to the USD with the trillions in helicopter money

With both the oil price crash and the rouble devaluation, it's a double positive whammy for TSG. There is nothing stopping them achieving the lower $900 AISC guidance, perhaps even coming under.

With Russia as a whole acting quickly over COVID-19 and in addition TSG operations being so remote, there is very little risk of any direct impacts.

In a world of $1,500 gold, AISC $900, 42,000 Oz p.a. that's an EBITDA of $25.2m at a time TSG will be in Net Cash position. A $3m dividend equates to yield of 5.5%, but would assume over the year they could easily increase dividend to 8-9% region.

Even if gold bobbed around $1,400 - $1,550, would have thought long-term TSG should be double market cap.

I sold out of most of my shares few weeks back before the huge unwind, but the only 3 I kept was gold miners: TSG, HUM and ALTN (ALTN more speculative). On the major indiscriminate market weakness I've been adding to these 3, particularly TSG.

Not sure where you got those cash numbers from. SLP's cash end of calendar 2019 was $33.8m. By end calendar Q1 2020, assume they may be anywhere from $45-50m cash in bank. On top of this, they do have a large trade balance surplus with refiners. It's based on basket price at the time so fluctuates, but could be anywhere from $25-30m.

The current market cap is now £72m, or $84m (due to collapse of GBP). If SLP collapsed end of Q1 2020, the cash in bank + trade surplus owed to SLP would cover this amount which shows how absurd situation is!!! So it's clearly undervalued in long-term, however "markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent" and there are some very real risks that look to be priced in, but there could yet be more fear:

a) COVID-19 in South Africa - there is now cases of human to human transmission, so there's huge amount of uncertainty as to which direction SA will go in. Fingers crossed they will avoid what we in Europe are going through.

b) COVID-19 in Europe & USA: it's going to get worse before it gets better. Looks like UK is on its way to lock down (Schools will close today, London soon to be on lock down, perhaps nationwide thereafter) and USA will escalate. This could cause another panic in global stock markets and as usual it is without discrimination no matter an individual companies fundamentals.

c) Chrome price is $127 per ton. Absolute disaster for the chrome industry. Not clear what Samancor and others will do, but there's no way round Samancor probably instigating the most extreme of their retrenchment scenarios.

The other risk is who knows which of the IIs invested in SLP could be distressed and forced sellers. We must be near the bottom, but it may be a time to drip feed buys rather than going all in. And particularly have cash on the sidelines just incase the corona situation doesn't resolve soon. We'll need some cash on the sides to keep panic buying at the supermarkets!

SLP can ride out this storm, others may not be so lucky. JLP have debts + capex to pay on Kabwe. Perhaps if this continues we may be acquiring their PGM assets at a discount. They could do their usual placing, but not sure how many takers there will be.

Stay safe everyone and all the best wherever you may be