On whether Timaeus knows for sure...29 Jun 2023 13:29
In his prefatory remarks Timaeus describes the account he is about to give as a “likely account” (eikôs logos) or “likely story” (eikôs muthos). The description is a play on words: the subject of the account is itself an “image” (eikôn) and, Timaeus avers, “the accounts we give of things [should] have the same character as the subjects they set forth” (29b3–5). Fashioned after an unchanging and eternal model—a possible subject of a definitive and exact account—the universe as a thing that becomes is shifting and unstable, and hence any account given of it will be similarly lacking in complete accuracy and consistency (29c4–7). This may be read as lowering our expectations—the account is no more than likely. At the same time, Timaeus says he will strive to give an account that is “no less likely than anyone else’s” (or “any other [account]”) (29c7–8) and, while the account cannot be grasped by understanding (nous, 29b6—the faculty for apprehending unchanging truths), it nevertheless merits our “belief” (pistis, 29c3) and fulfils certain standards. As Timaeus’ account proceeds, we are frequently reminded of its “likely” character, and both the negative and positive connotations of that characterization should be kept in mind.
(Plato’s Timaeus, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, First published Tue Oct 25, 2005; substantive revision Fri May 13, 2022)