GreenRoc now on the EU radar after presentation on Amitsoq at the Greenland Business Mission. Watch the interview here.
The results make clear that material costs are strongly down as are external costs (presumably because of the resolution of supply chain issues). These falling costs would be expected to cause the order book to fall but it did not (the order book was close to record levels) : "The closing
order book at 31 March 2024 of £83.6m remains close to record levels and was unchanged from the half year position"
There are no problems with the order book but the operational cash flow is up by 86%. This is not just a good result but is an excellent result.
This share is on a forward P/E of 7.8%. I find this share particularly attractive because in the past db pension liabilities exceeded £100m but are now heading for half this. Once the pension issue is put to bed either by natural attrition or by outsourcing the liability then dividends will be possible and it will become clear that the upside is not priced in.
This company has a history of weak and erratic growth.
IMO this price is based on hopes for the AVD products particularly in the US.
As to whether vermiculite could be incorporated into batteries who can say?
I am trying to predict profits from the trading update.
Debt will be reduced by a little over £20m. (The cash stays steady).
From past years depreciation will exceed investment by about £15m
Dividends will be around £38m
There is also the affect of energy surcharges on receivables which will be down by say £10m because gas prices were down
So profit p is
p = 20 -15 +38 -10
p = £33m
Say plus or minus say £20m but significantly down.
Looking at the revenue growth it looks to be below wage costs.
The Trading update said:
Outlook
Reflecting the good progress achieved year-to-date, the Board’s expectations for full
year 2023 remain unchanged. Looking beyond this year, the Board remains confident in
the Group’s prospects for continued profitable growth.
So It looks to me as if they are talking jam tomorrow.
Broker recommendations are also a bit weak.
Does anyone understand these interest rate swaps.
Years ending 2023, 2022.
Finance income Note 6 99,075 53,390
Finance costs Note 6 (69,123) (59,841)
These numbers are high even in relation to borrowings and lease liabilities of about £1000m.
Every year they come up with these and they are usually a big hit.
They often relate to Put/Call options which to me point to the difficulty of buying with long lead times for a world market.
This combined with what I see as strong rises in inventories puts me of this share
The June Y/E accounts seem to be showing significant asset write downs.
With The Baltic Dry index looking to be back to flatlining at the pre 2008 level it seems likely that ships were acquired with an expectation that rates would grow and be volatile. With that expectation gone I will be looking for large write downs in the future. With average charter lengths at 1.5 years there look to be troubled times ahead.
Lloyds Bank: The 2022 results show
Net trading income (19,987) 17,200
Can we take it that the £20bn loss is due to markdown of gilts?
Is this a systematic issue?
The important question is:
Did Silicon Valley Bank fail because of markdown of its gilts or because of loss of confidence in tech loans?
The 2022 results show
Net trading income (19,987) 17,200
Can we take it that the £20bn loss is due to markdown of gilts?
Is this a systematic issue?
The important question is:
Did Silicon Valley Bank fail because of markdown of its gilts or because of loss of confidence in tech loans?
Hello,
I am clutching at straws so I increased my short position yesterday.
Micro Focus estimated the Covid19 impact on revenues at 2%.
This supposed SUSE profit could be questioned.
Attachmate bought the business for $2.2bn in 2010 and Micro Focus sold it for $2.53bn in 2018.
This does not look like a profit to me.
>> Adjusted Net Debt1 of $3,807.5m at 30 April 2019, 2.7 times Adjusted EBITDA, after including the $1,800.0m return to shareholders in May 2019.
Returning cash to shareholders is not in any way related to EBITDA. (as well you know).
Apart from declining revenues MCRO has another problem:
Defined Benefit obligations £261.5m
Pension assets £141.4m
plus Long term pension assets (subject to general creditors) £17m
This looks like ongoing cost of circa £10m p.a. not reflected in the accounts because there are no top up payments to the fund.
The net debt to (adjusted) ebitda ratio is £6600m / £426m = 15.5.
"In some industries, a debt/EBITDA of 10 could be completely normal, while in other industries a ratio of three to four is more appropriate."
For a company with revenues declining by 10% y o y this is an impossible hurdle to jump.
I have this as the best short in London.
The fundamental problem is the declining revenue stream from ageing software.
The trading update November last year was basically as per guidance and I do not expect anything different this year.
That resulted in a loss of £18m from continuing operations.
The trading update in May 2020 reported revenues declining by 11% of which 2% was due to Covid19.
That resulted in a loss from non-exceptionals for the half year of £11m.
The exceptionals included integration costs £109m, redundancy payments £21m, and a massive writedown of goodwill.
I cannot see this share doing anything other than to go down and I will not be closing ahead of the news.
Does this mean that Flybe with still cease using Southend Airport in 2020?
What about the Ryanair prospect at Southend?
What are the implications of this deal?
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